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The prevalence of sexual assault and its consequent harm to both individual victims 
and society as a whole has now been widely researched, documented and recognised 
in Western jurisdictions for generations. In particular, policing of this gendered5
 
 
crime has been the subject of many research endeavours and police organisations 
have increasingly opened their doors to academics and other researchers in pursuit of 
evidence-based knowledge that will assist them to enhance their training, 
investigations and Brief preparations in this respect. Victoria Police has been among 
the foresighted police organisations in this regard over the past several years.  
This report is the result of one major research endeavour concerning reports of sexual 
assault made by adults and the related police response, investigation and management 
involving Edith Cowan University in partnership with Victoria Police. This study was 
designed in terms of three strands, each of which incorporated a number of 
interrelated research programs. Strand one focused on victims/survivors and it 
proceeded through the use of an online survey and interviews of adult 
victims/survivors as well as focus groups and interviews of police officers in the State 
of Victoria and rape crisis counsellors from Centres Against Sexual Assault located 
across Victoria. Strand two focused on police decision-making processes and police 
networking in relation to complaints of sexual assault by adults. It proceeded through 
close reading of Victoria Police operational case files, individual interviews and focus 
groups involving police, and a focus group of Office of Public Prosecutions 
personnel. Strand three focused on the management of the police response and the 
recruitment, training and development of police for the specialist role of sexual 
assault policing. It proceeded through the use of strand two methods, as well as 
observation of Victoria Police training courses, police trainee feedback sheets and 
online survey, and interview of trainers in relation to the specialist sexual assault 
policing role. 
 
The results of this research are many and varied, and the full body of the text is 
necessary reading for adequate comprehension, however the key general findings are 
summarised as follows. 
 
Reporting and non-reporting by victims/survivors 
 
Chapter Three reports the research evidence and findings gleaned from 
victim/survivors’ survey responses and focus group/individual interviews.  
 
Barriers remain a significant issue. The current research data and findings indicate 
that barriers to reporting remain a significant issue for victims with many unable to 
over-come multiple barriers that prevent reporting.  
 
                                         5 Sex offenders are overwhelmingly male and victims are overwhelmingly female. We recognise that males are also victims of sexual violence with the offenders being predominantly male. As such the crime is appropriately considered a gendered crime. 
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System barriers. System-oriented barriers included a lack of confidence in police and 
the legal with social barriers being linked largely to family, friends and the 
community.  
 
Family barriers. Family plays a significant role in victim decision-making with 
regard to disclosure and reporting. Family members may not necessarily block the 
report as many victims were so fearful of their family response they never tested the 
potential response. Sadly, many victims who did disclose to family members and 
expressed a desire to report the abuse often reported a lack of support to outright 
threats and punitive responses for making a report to police. 
 
Motivators of victim reporting. A significant finding of the research was identifying 
factors that motivated victim reporting. The reasons motivating a report were a desire 
to protect others known or unknown to the victim; a sense of civic duty to wider 
society; to make the justice system more accountable in terms of accurate recording of 
the prevalence of sexual offences in the community. In essence, the majority of 
respondents were motivated to report as a selfless act for the purpose of protecting 
others potential or future victims or to safeguard other persons or things that were 
meaningful to them. 
 
Barriers are significant but not the sole determinants of reporting. Barriers 
therefore must not necessarily be understood as the sole preventers as victims in the 
PJO study reported barriers and some could not overcome them while others either 
overcame them or ignored them to report. So barriers are not the sole factors victims 
use to determine reporting but they are a large part and must be addressed. 
 
Victim experiences of reporting. Where victims received a positive response from 
police it correlated strongly with their willingness to continue with the report and to 
feel confident with police handling their case. Some victims were surprised by the 
positive response of police due to their fear and uncertainty about making a report. It 
cannot be overemphasised that the response from police plays a critical role for the 
victim in terms not only of their willingness to continue with a report and stay the 
distance, but in assisting their recovery. By contrast, those who reported a negative 
experience with police also expressed the varying degrees of distress and damage this 
caused to them in terms of the recovery and capacity to trust police in the future. In 
recent years police have improved in specific areas such as providing victims with 
referral advice and other material relating to other services they can assess for support 
and advice. Police have improved slightly in maintaining regular contact with victims 
post reporting with statistical results showing that regularity of helpful contact 
promoted victim confidence to continue with a report. Notwithstanding this there was 
strong consensus from victims and counsellors that police need to improve the 
regularity of contact. 
 
Police perceptions of victim reporting and non-reporting 
 
Chapter Four reports the research data and findings in regard to police perceptions of 
victim reporting and non-reporting. 
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Police genuine concern for victims. Police generally were genuine in their concern 
for the welfare and justice that ought to be delivered to victims of sexual crime. Police 
believed that the legal system in particular let victims down and linked this to a lack 
of victim confidence in reporting. 
 
Police perceptions of barriers to victim reporting. Police demonstrated insight into a 
number of barriers that may prevent victims from reporting or make the process 
fearful for them. However, they did not perceive that victim/survivors often saw 
negative police responses as a barrier to reporting. That is, police generally appeared 
to consider that victims had no difficulty with police responses, yet victims 
themselves often reported otherwise. 
 
Police perceptions of motivators of victim reporting. Police demonstrated limited 
knowledge or understanding of what might motivate victims to report a sexual 
offence. They considered motivators related to victims’ mental state, intra-familial 
sexual abuse or a need to finally report historical abuse. Research programs to date 
have also tended to neglect these considerations.   
 
Rural locale factors. Police officers from rural locales were cognizant of the 
additional barriers that victims often encounter such as lack on anonymity; 
conservative attitudes and fear of retribution in smaller communities. 
 
Police beliefs about false reporting. There was a somewhat surprising degree to 
which police members believed that false reporting was a major issue still to be 
appropriately addressed. This was despite police being generally able to anchor the 
beliefs against current rates of false reporting.   
 
Police responses to victims. Differences in responses were detected when dealing 
with certain types of offences. Police officers raised the issue of resourcing 
constraints or a belief that certain types of cases were less likely to succeed at trial, or 
victim credibility issues and in these instances some police used the ‘options talk’ to 
dissuade victims from continuing with a report. Police viewed historical offences as 
particularly problematic and often targeted these cases for non-recording by 
dissuading victims from reporting in the first instance. In essence, police attitudes at 
various times drove their decision making. 
 
Resourcing issues. Police reported various pressures in their work due to poor 
resourcing. This included physical resources such as staff levels, equipment such as 
cars, computer access and audio-visual recording equipment. Police in rural areas 
suggested they lacked these resources more than their metropolitan colleagues. Many 
believed that this resourcing was having, and would continue to have an impact on 
police as what they have identified as a now hybridised SOCIT model was rolled out 
across the state. 
 
Options talk. A number of police invoked resourcing issues as a reason for not 
recording certain offences or using the options talk to dissuade certain victims from 
reporting, on the basis that they did  not have the resources to follow through on 
certain types of cases they regarded as ranking lesser priority than other cases. In 
essence, resourcing issues were used to drive decision-making on non-recording of 
cases through dissuading victims from reporting.  




Understanding and support for SOCIT police. A number of officers expressed a 
view that Command, management and other police members generally did not fully 
appreciate, value, or support their work. Together with the identified resourcing 
issues, this view has resulted in morale issues among many specialist sexual assault 
police. 
 
CASA counsellors’ perceptions of victim reporting and police responses 
 
Chapter Five reports the views of CASA counsellors concerning victim reporting and 
police responses to victim complaints. 
 
CASA/police relations. CASA counsellors generally enjoyed good working 
relationships with police officers from sexual offences units though this relationship 
was often built on an individual to individual level as opposed to a whole unit. There 
were inconsistencies also according to which particular police unit and manager was 
involved with a CASA agency. 
 
Barriers to and motivators of victim reporting. Counsellors were insightful about the 
barriers to reporting and also the reasons that motivate reporting. Counsellors in rural 
locales were also cognizant of the additional barriers that may be present in smaller 
communities.  
 
Training of police. Counsellors considered that police would benefit from more 
training that focussed on addressing values and attitudes around sexual violence as 





Chapter Six reports the research evidence and findings in relation to police decision-
making processes.  
 
Uncertainty avoidance: Police decision-making commonly reflected a ‘hard 
evidence’, uncertainty avoidance approach and it was substantially more considered 
and concerned with formal justification in non-authorisation than in authorisation 
processes. 
 
Opaque decision-making: Nonetheless, police decision-making in relation to both 
authorisation and non-authorisation was found to be significantly opaque in the 
continuing use of vague ‘reasons’ such as ‘sufficient/insufficient evidence’ and 
‘success unlikely’. Moreover, written reports detailing argument were lacking in a 
large proportion of non-authorisation cases; and non-authorisation most often 
involved supervising and authorising officers agreeing with investigators in a 
perfunctory ‘tick-the-box’ fashion on the Brief-head.  
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Stages of decision-making: Two stages of decision-making were evident in both 
authorisation and non-authorisation. In the former, stage one was during investigation 
and Brief preparation, and stage two saw additional decision-making in interaction 
with prosecution officers. In non-authorisation, stage one involved victims’ formal 
withdrawal of complaints after police ‘options talk’, and stage two saw formal police 
decision-making not to proceed regardless of victims’ wishes. 
 
Key decision drivers: Authorisation was driven predominantly by witnesses with 
offender admissions also frequent, whilst in non-authorisation victim-related factors 
were dominant with accused denial/credibility also frequent.  
 
Two sets of decision criteria: Aside from witnesses and offender admissions, 
authorisation was associated with medical evidence, visible victim harm, multiple 
victims, surveillance footage and other ‘objective’ items rather than the victim’s word 
only; whereas non-authorisation was associated with factors such as victim’s word 
only evidence, victims as poor witnesses (e.g., emotional or memory issues), victim 
blameworthiness (e.g., alcohol use, sexual conduct), uncooperative victims, accused 
denial/credibility, and unclear issue of consent.  
 
Little change in non-authorisation reasons: The case file evidence revealed little 
change in the reasons for non-authorisation over the past two decades – given earlier 
research - although it showed more detail in police reasoning. 
 
Typifications: Current research is consistent with evidence in the literature that police 
decision-making entails the use of typifications which take account of whether the 
victim and offender are strangers, acquaintances or intimates, as well as victims’ 
alcohol/drug use, psychiatric illness, cognitive impairment, perceived immorality, 
risk-taking behaviour, and absence of physical injuries, among other indicators of 
whether the victim is credible, reliable and genuine, and did not consent to the alleged 
sexual conduct. Typifications are employed as mental short-cuts that serve to collate 
complex real-life pieces of evidence together with other data that are not always 
germane to the decision-making process. Thus, the concept of ideal versus non-ideal 
victims that has been reported in much of the literature was evident in police decision-
making about whether or not a sexual assault complaint should be processed to the 
point of Brief authorisation. 
 
Non-supportive victim narrative: A non-supportive victim narrative in non-
authorisation decision-making was found in analysis of the case file data. This 
narrative reflected the message evidenced in the literature that victims are often not 
given a sympathetic hearing when they report to police. It reinforced that message to 
those victims who had reported to Victoria Police in the study period (and anyone 
with whom they shared their reporting experience). 
 
Operational police are not always aware of relevant legislation and policy: For 
instance, police continued to take account of consent unclear and delayed reporting in 
non-authorisation. This lack of knowledge was also evidenced in police focus groups 
and interviews. 
 
General observation: Victoria Police has made identifiable efforts to address 
recommendations made by the VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006) 
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concerning research into the reasons behind police authorisation and non-
authorisation of sexual assault complaints. Still, the evidence on police decision-
making found in analysis of case file, interview and focus group data showed that 
challenges remain in meeting calls for improvement.  
 
Caveat: The foregoing main findings do not deny examples where many dedicated 
individual police officers worked with the victim’s best interests in mind as they 




Chapter Seven reports the research evidence and findings on SOCIT police model 
operations within a networking framework.  
 
Lack of best practice: The evidence from the case files, police interviews and focus 
groups, and the OPP focus group indicated that some important elements of 
networked policing were not happening at a level consistent with best practice.  
 
Best practice networked policing: To achieve a best practice framework would 
require a much tighter co-operative partnership than currently exists between police 
and other significant parties without resulting in either inappropriate state control 
extensions into the community or the erosion of the state’s legitimate authority in 
public policing. Whereas the current Victorian SOCIT/MDC model is a step in the 
right direction, there remains much to be done both in structural and normative 
process terms to achieve the democratic, best practice model envisaged and promoted 
in the literature.  
 
Police/OPP interaction and collaboration: There was strong evidence of a serious 
communication gap between police and the OPP, despite a shared normative basis for 
decision-making. SOCIT police and OPP do not enjoy a tightly knit, collaborative 
relationship that enhances prosecution outcomes for sexual assault victims/survivors. 
More formal arrangements and more frequent contact, including a schedule of 
training/liaison meetings, would prove worthwhile. 
 
Limitations on CASA/community agencies’ capacities: Other network players are 
significantly restrained in their capacities to influence the police decision-making 
process and to help SOCITs to improve responses to sexual assault victims and their 
complaints. 
 
Mixed evidence on CASA and other agency referrals: The case file evidence 
indicated poor implementation of the Code guidelines whereas police interview and 
focus group data suggested a strong commitment and practice in accord with policy 
directions. 
 
OPP focus group view on police Briefs and issues in their interactions with police: 
The OPP focus group commentary was similarly mixed in its evaluation of police 
Briefs. However, OPP lawyers cited inconsistent quality of Briefs against review 
deadlines and consequent adjournments; poor particularization and summary of 
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charges; short statements; inappropriate disclosure to defence lawyers and adverse 
impacts on victim credibility due to subsequent defence tactics; and differential 
commitment and unwillingness to learn of some investigators.  
 
OPP critical ‘succession issue’: A particular OPP officer has worked with police as a 
legal prosecution specialist for many years, acknowledged by police interviewees and 
focus groups as well as OPP focus group lawyers as invaluable in provision of advice 
to police, and will be very badly missed once he leaves. 
 
Constraints on prosecution efforts: Police interviews and focus groups indicated 
constraints in terms of victims’ incapacitation, their need to be informed as to the 
court process and their withdrawal of complaints, as well as by resource deficiencies. 
 
Limitations on police decision-making: There are also significant limits to police 
decision capacities in terms of OPP prosecution guidelines and the broader legal 
framework of the courts, juries and existing legislation, as well as legislative 
requirements of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. Although these are 
obviously legitimate within existing law, their extent and nature in impeding SOCITs’ 
effective response to sexual assault require serious re-examination. 
 
Attitudinal blocks: ROs and AOs said some SOCIT members had less than ideal 
attitudes and were judgemental towards sexual assault victims and their complaints. 
 
Inexperienced investigators: Investigators and their superiors alike also 
acknowledged sexual assault investigation experience was lacking.  
 
Complexity of sexual assault cases: There was a very strong consensus across the 
various groups of the complexity of sexual assault work. This was seen as another 
constraint on doing best practice work, especially in view of deficits in recruitment, 
training and development. 
 
SOCIT model questioned: Questions were raised about the effectiveness and viability 
of the SOCIT model design by operational police. 
 
Managing the police response 
 
Chapter Eight reports the research evidence and findings in regard to managing the 
police response to sexual assault complaints and ensuing Brief preparations.  
 
Formal written argument: Both authorisation and non-authorisation processes would 
benefit from greater attention to formal written argument, regardless of whether the 
trigger is arrest and charge or intent to summons. None of the examined files in 
authorisation cases carried formally signed off reports. Cases need to be treated on a 
level footing to avoid an unwarranted presumption that investigators, recommending 
and authorising officers will be in agreement.  
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Support documents: Both would also benefit from a greater focus on support 
documents, with more than half of non-authorisation and slightly less than a quarter 
of authorisation case files showing an absence of these. 
 
Accused interview records: Inclusion of written accused interview records, especially 
in non-authorisation cases, would enhance comprehension in those regards.  
 
Quality completion: Case management could also be expected to improve with 
greater attention to quality completion of documents, and more so in authorisation 
cases because of the higher frequency of poor completion and greater frequency of a 
high number of potential improvement areas in those cases. In particular, this means 
ensuring all evidentiary details and relevant materials are included in reports and legal 
documents where appropriate, and kept consistent and non-contradictory; avoiding 
extraneous inclusions; and not referring to non-existent inconsistencies in victims’ 
and witnesses’ statements. 
 
Management quality control of the Brief authorisation process: Additional to 
formal written arguments, inclusion of all relevant documents and quality completion, 
analysis of data from case files, interviews and focus groups showed greater attention 
can be profitably paid to ensuring all three police officers relevant to a case contribute 
appropriately to the written decision record; and to rationally organising evidence 
items within case files, with investigators being primarily responsible for this quality 
control, and with recommending and authorizing officers ensuring this is done if 
necessary.  
 
Authenticating and positively valuing victim’s stories: Benefits in terms of just 
outcomes for victims would be enhanced further through more considered attention to 
victims’ stories, which were often questioned inappropriately or cast as untrue due to 
one or more of the above noted quality issues. Legitimate testing of victim credibility 
needs to be carefully weighed against doing the job of defence lawyers and second-
guessing Courts. 
 
Uni-focal argument: An overarching consideration was a tendency for one or more 
of the investigating, recommending and authorising officers to put a one-sided view 
that presumed the outcome and - where put by investigators - that dis-enfranchised 
senior police officers charged with quality review. This is particularly problematic in 
respect to non-authorisation argument, since the result is a tendency to ignore reasons 
for prosecution. 
 
‘Unsolved’ and ‘no offence disclosed’ cases: Documentation practice is also open to 
improvement in these cases, especially regarding inclusion of formal argumentation 
and statements by victims and witnesses, as well as the need to include many 
documents observed as missing in the latter type of case. Such improvements could 
be expected to either lead to more authorisations, or more robustly justify not 
proceeding in instances where that is the decision.  
 
Focus on improvement potential: Attention is drawn to elements of police Briefs that 
can be improved primarily because the general level of argument and documentation 
was evidenced at low levels of quality across the case files and this was confirmed as 
current practice through triangulation of interviews and focus groups (including the 
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OPP focus group). Consistent with a continuous improvement philosophy of a 
Learning Organisation, it is culturally desirable to embrace opportunities to enhance 
documentation and argumentation skills, as this would lead to more authorisations, 
efficiencies in interactions with prosecutors, greater Court success and victim 
satisfaction, and an enhanced public image for VicPol as a modern police 
organisation. This would further result in increasing investigators’ confidence and 
pride in Brief preparation, and instil a positive sense of professionalism in sexual 
assault policing and Court presentations by informants and prosecutors. It is likely 
that VicPol is already aware of at least some of these areas and taking steps to 
improve sexual assault policing as a result. Current findings provide additional 
support for those efforts. 
 
Best practice leadership: The police response to adult sexual assault is first and 
foremost a question of best practice leadership as detailed in the literature and 
discussed in the body of this research report. The need for leadership improvements 
was demonstrated by the tri-angulated data and analyses both at the front-line of daily 
SOCIT operations and at higher echelon supports. From the literature, police 
strategies for ‘managing’ victims were also identified that undermine best practice 
leadership and these need to be understood by senior officers and countered where 
found in Brief preparation. 
(Note that such strategies are not necessarily or even likely to be consciously 
employed by investigators, but rather routinely used as everyday assumptions, so they 
too need to learn to be self-critical to avoid these cognitive traps). 
 
Resources and SOCIT morale: The interview and focus group data strongly indicated 
considerable resourcing difficulties that hamstring SOCIT operations, which also 
reflect leadership judgements in terms of budget allocations, those being the 
responsibility of executive level police leaders. These budget factors reinforce a 
morale problem within SOCITs which is intertwined with cultural, leadership and 
quality control system issues at the operational level. 
 
Caveat: Documentation and argumentation difficulties although pervasive were not 
universal among the case files and OPP focus group commentary. While there are 
challenges to be met there is also an existing knowledgebase and skills already 
available in VicPol SOCITs to help address those challenges. 
 
Recruiting, training and developing police officers 
 
Chapter Nine reports the research evidence and findings on the Victoria Police 
training program for equipping police officers to respond to sexual assault complaints. 
 
Contemporary sexual assault policing and Brief preparation knowledge and skills 
training: In a world of rapid and expansive ongoing change police officers require a 
broad, self-critical higher education frame of mind that arms them for their complex 
and challenging daily duties and especially so in sexual assault cases.  
 
ROs meeting the challenge: The interview evidence from ROs was persuasive that 
they support sexual assault victims, ensure appropriate implementation of the Code of 
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Practice and, most recently, have taken up the challenge of recommending 
authorisation in cases that would not have been authorised only a short time ago. 
Their viewpoint was not shared by the OPP focus group, however, whose 
commentary queried the level of quality monitoring of Brief preparations. 
 
Investigators are still learning and being persuaded to abandon unhelpful beliefs: 
The evidence from ROs, AOs, OPP lawyers and SOCIT/VARE sexual assault 
specialist training graduates suggests many SOCIT investigators are yet to shed poor 
attitudes and beliefs to achieve a broader and deeper understanding of the plight of 
sexual assault victims. 
 
SOCIT and higher echelon managers: The need for attitudinal change was also 
found to apply to some SOCIT and higher echelon managers. 
 
VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006) recommendations: SOCIT/VARE 
specialist training thus does not adequately equip SOCIT officers to heed calls from 
the VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006) to improve policing responses to 
the claims of sexual assault victims.  
 
Structural and name changes: Structural and name changes in transitioning from 
SOCAU to SOCIT need to be supported by training and development inputs that 
address cultural, attitudinal and behavioural restraints on achieving real and lasting 
reductions in sexual assault attrition rates. 
 
Course re-structuring: The current course does not meet best practice standards in 
being a one-off, no return model. It has not made the quantum of cultural and 
attitudinal shifts needed for ensuring positive change in sexual assault policing. The 
literature, both specialist and broad, supports returning newly trained investigators to 
a training facility after an initial period in the field to counter contra-learning from 
local unit (SOCIT) cultures.  
 
Ongoing professional development and refresher training: The SOCIT/VARE 
training regime does not provide adequately for necessary ongoing training needs 
expressed by ROs and AOs, and reflected in OPP focus group comments. Regular 
refresher and professional development does not need to be overly resource intensive 
and can take advantage of a range of ICCT technologies and other training and 
development tools and innovations.  
 
Training team and current course soundly based: In general, the trainers, external 
presenters and the course were extremely well received by trainees themselves and 
the course structure and content generally reflects well in terms of the small body of 
literature devoted to specialist training of police in sexual assault matters. However, 
the broader training and development literature and training experts have a lot to offer 
the SOCIT/VARE trainers and the course. Training and development experts could 
assist the SOCIT/VARE trainers to lift their already formidable skills to new levels 
and provide for additional innovations. 
 
Training Needs Assessment based program and evaluation system: More broadly, 
the literature supports a TNA-based program and evaluation structure that would 
build upon the current SOCIT/VARE design to bring it to best practice standards. 




Recruitment procedure: The current recruitment procedure is fatally flawed and 
requires urgent re-consideration and re-structuring to include a set of robust 
recruitment criteria that reflect the essentials of knowledge, skills and aptitudes for 
sexual assault policing and for Brief preparation, supervision and quality monitoring. 
Without this policy and procedure change excellence in training and development will 
be to little avail as it will continue to be ‘white-anted’ at the operational level. 
 





1. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police might wish to consider actively 
supporting research into linkages between offending duration, the victim/offender 
constellation, MISA versus SISA and affective responses of victim/survivors of 
sexual assault. (s. 3.2.5) 
 
2. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake a publicity campaign to 
create awareness through the news-media, as well as CASA and similar agencies with 
information pamphlets, that sexual assault is a crime regardless of who is the alleged 
offender, that there is no time limit for reporting, that victim/survivors are never to 
blame for an offender’s behaviour, and that strangers being the only rapists and 
physical injury being necessary to establish the crime are popular myths. (s. 3.3.1) 
 
3. RECOMMENDATION: All sworn police officers in the State of Victoria should 
be required to read and discuss at unit/team level the foregoing materials on why 
victim/survivors of sexual assault do not report the crime to police and their lived 
experience of not doing so. These materials should also be made available and 
utilized in the SOCIT/VARE specialized sexual assault training course. It is further 
recommended that these materials be available against the background of the research 
literature cited and discussed briefly in the Introduction and detailed further in later 
chapters of this report. (s. 3.3.5) 
 
4. RECOMMENDATION: All sworn police officers in the State of Victoria should 
be required to read and discuss at unit/team level the foregoing materials on why 
victim/survivors of sexual assault do report the crime to police and their lived 
experience of doing so. These materials should also be made available and utilized in 
SOCIT/VARE specialized sexual assault training, and there should be an emphasis on 
the vital role of police in validation of victim/survivors in their positive responses to 
complaints of sexual assault. It is further recommended that these materials be 
available against the background of the research literature cited and discussed briefly 
in the Introduction and detailed further in later chapters of this report. (S. 3.4.5) 
 
5. RECOMMENDATION: The Victoria Police specialist sexual assault training 
course should highlight the value of SOCIT police maintaining regular, helpful 
contact and its efficacious impact on the confidence and willingness of 
victim/survivors to continue with a reported matter. (s. 3.4.5) 
 
6. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should examine the ISVA model and 
seek discussions with other interested parties in the area of sexual assault support 
services in Victoria with a view to supporting the development of an Independent 
Sexual Assault Victim/Survivors Advocate. (s. 3.5) 
 
7. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should require all first responders to 
routinely provide victim/survivors with a Plain English, easy-to-read standard 
brochure of comprehensive information that includes an undertaking of follow-up by 
specialist sexual assault police of all initial reports of sexual assault regardless of 
alleged date of offence. (s. 3.5) 
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8. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police training programs should refer to and 
emphasise the PJO findings where victim/survivors have indicated their concerns 
about rape myths and stereotypes such as victims being at fault for being in situations 
involving alcohol/drugs, date rapes, rape-in-marriage, the need for physical 
evidence/resistance by victims, and the unimportance of historical rape. (s. 3.5) 
 
9. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake an advertising 
campaign designed to raise awareness in the broader community about the nature of 
sexual assault and to dispel myths and stereotypes surrounding this crime. This 
campaign should include posters and other information developed and located 
prominently in public facilities with a clear message that all sexual offences can be 
reported at any time, that there is no statute of limitations to protect perpetrators, and 
that any sexual assault is a crime, regardless of who is the perpetrator. (s. 3.5) 
 
10. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should consider the establishment of a 
specialist historical sexual offences investigation unit to ensure the selection of police 
suitably qualified and trained to respond appropriately to reports of historical 
offences. Particular attention should be paid to recruitment criteria focused on 
attitudinal and aptitude qualities of applicants, with the use of validated psychological 
tests and interviewing panel techniques in the selection process. (s. 4.2) 
 
11. RECOMMENDATION: Aside from understanding the reasons victim/survivors 
report to police within the motivational framework of ‘symbolic protest’, police 
members within both specialist and generalist units should also be made aware of the 
criminal intelligence benefits that arise potentially from victim/survivors’ reporting of 
sexual assault even if the report is not processed to a successful Court conclusion. If 
there is no successful prosecution, reports still can be recorded and placed either in 
the serious crime cabinet or a similar repository to aid policing efforts in relation to 
future sexual assault reports. (s. 4.3) 
 
12. RECOMMENDATION: It would greatly assist victim/survivors and police if a 
consistent presentation of options was presented and supported with uniformly 
worded and clear written material in a standardised format making very clear that 
victim/survivors may take their time to consider reporting options and that may 
include them getting further advice or information from others. (s. 4.5.1) 
 
13. RECOMMENDATION: Moreover, police should encourage victims to make a 
report and highlight that the victim has the power/choice to have that report actioned 
as an investigation or leave it on the police record both in electronic form for Victoria 
wide police access and in local crime cabinets without any action at that time. (s. 
4.5.1) 
 
14. RECOMMENDATION: Subsequent to an initial report police should be 
required to actively follow-up victim/survivors who do not return to pursue a formal 
complaint within a policy regulated timeframe. The result of follow-ups should also 
be duly recorded in electronic and local systems. (s. 4.5.1) 
 
15. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should emphasise the value of taking 
and recording all complaints of sexual abuse, including especially those pertaining to 
the possibility of ongoing abuse and/or child sexual exploitations, for the purposes of 
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building a criminal intelligence base for future reference at both local and state wide 
levels. (s. 5.6) 
 
16. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should develop an online feedback 
survey for victims to complete after contact with police. This exit survey poll would 
enable police to identify both good areas of practice as well as problem areas of 
practice as well as being able to respond appropriately and expediently to any issues 
arising from victim/survivor contact with police. Police to give all victims a card with 
the link to the survey or they can be given a hard copy asking them to comment on the 
service and experience. (s. 5.7) 
 
17. RECOMMENDATION: Authorisation decision-making should be based on 
explicit reasons stated in a formal report for that purpose. (s. 6.2.1) 
 
18. RECOMMENDATION: Police should avoid using highly generalised reasoning 
to justify authorisation and instead cite the exact reasons in terms of evidentiary 
materials. (s. 6.2.1) 
 
19. RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring that all case files 
include reports of formal reasoning for the non-authorisation decision. (s. 6.2.2) 
 
20. RECOMMENDATION: Police should avoid using generalised reasoning to 
justify non-authorisation and instead cite the precise reasons in terms of evidentiary 
materials lacking in the cases concerned. (s. 6.2.2) 
 
21. RECOMMENDATION: Notwithstanding the real challenges involved, Victoria 
Police policy should emphasise the need to seek, create and use every available option 
to encourage and support victims in their complaints, rather than allow them to 
remain ‘uncooperative’ or ‘poor’ witnesses. In making non-authorisation decisions 
police should take active and concerted steps to avoid victim related reasons for doing 
so and to particularly eschew finding reasons to blame victims. A robust quality 
monitoring program should be established specifically to reinforce this policy. (s. 
6.2.2) 
 
22. RECOMMENDATION: Steps should be taken to ensure all operational police 
are fully aware of the legalities concerning issues of consent, corroborative evidence, 
delays in reporting etc and their role in police decision-making. (s. 6.2.2) 
 
23. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should develop and implement a clearly 
articulated classification system of mutually exclusive and comprehensive outcomes 
based on defined criteria and guided by extensive practice examples. This 
classification system should avoid the problem of one outcome being a reason for 
another outcome – e.g., ‘complaint withdrawn by the victim’ should not be a ‘reason’ 
for ‘summons not authorised’. A comprehensive set of concrete and precise reasons 
for decision-making needs to be developed to underpin this classification system. (s. 
6.2.2.2) 
 
24. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police case files should provide a written 
record of the essentials of all interactions with the OPP to allow for accountability and 
provide sound data for training and management purposes. (s. 7.1.1) 




25. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should make representations to the OPP 
to have Specialist Sex Offences Unit lawyers more involved with country circuit sex 
offence cases. (s. 7.1.1) 
 
26. RECOMMENDATION: Serious consideration should be given to formalizing 
an arrangement of regular OPP visits to SOCITs, establishing clear contact guidelines 
and expectations, sharing regular newsletters of mutual interest matters, consulting 
with the OPP with an aim of reconciling currently divergent views, with open and 
ongoing communication on issues as they arise - including in respect to reliance on a 
single OPP legal prosecution specialist and other personnel instability/turnover issues. 
(s.7.1.2) 
 
27. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake a research program to 
examine the overseas experience of unified police/prosecution models for improving 
the CJS response to complaints of sexual assault with a view to adopting a best 
practice model. (s. 7.1.3) 
 
28. RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring there is a written 
record in case files of compliance with Code requirements concerning CASA referrals 
and problems in effecting compliance. These records should be collected together in 
regular memoranda reports and forwarded for advice to management and a state 
monitoring body (see further recommendation in s. 7.4). (s. 7.2) 
 
29. RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring there is a written 
record in case files of all agency contacts and their purposes. These records should be 
collected together in regular memoranda reports and forwarded for advice to 
management and a state monitoring body (see recommendation in s. 7.4). (s. 7.3) 
 
30. RECOMMENDATION: The current SOCIT model should be modified from the 
current variable, hybrid application that has developed across different locations, and 
expanded in concept and built upon in field design to develop fully functioning MDCs 
and unleash the partnership synergies of a ‘best practice’ networked policing 
framework. (s. 7.4)  
 
31. RECOMMENDATION: An umbrella monitoring body should be established at 
the State level whose members are drawn from representatives of the SOCITs, MDCs, 
CASAs and other relevant bodies. Individual members should have non-renewable 
three year tenures to ensure freshness of commitment. This body should have co-
ordinating, advisory and victims’ advocacy responsibilities. (s. 7.4) 
 
32. RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake efforts to alter the 
OPP guidelines to more victim-friendly criteria in regard to sexual assault matters. 
These efforts should involve consulting with the OPP to make appropriate joint 
representations to the Minister and Parliament on behalf of sexual assault victims 
supported by the abundance of research literature evidence on the special problems of 
non-reporting, late reporting and attrition of sexual assault crimes from the criminal 
justice system. In undertaking these efforts Victoria Police should also consult and 
work together with other significant players in the policing network. (s. 7.5) 
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33. RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to reinforcing the importance 
of ensuring there is accurate and comprehensive documentation on case files 
irrespective of whether authorisation or non-authorisation is being sought and before 
forwarding to senior police officers and prosecutors. This mission should be a priority 
of leadership at operational and executive levels of VicPol, as well as calling for a 
review of quality control mechanisms. (s. 8.1.2) 
 
34. RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to developing a set of 
quality assurance criteria to be administered by ROs and AOs in reviewing Briefs. 
These criteria can be informed by although not limited to the foregoing elements of 
argumentation. (s. 8.2.6) 
 
35. RECOMMENDATION: Serious and urgent consideration should be given to 
enhancing the resource allocations for SOCITs. (s. 8.3) 
 
36. RECOMMENDATION: Vicpol should review its quality control systems and 
related policies in relation to sexual assault Briefs and authority delegations with a 
view to removing inept SOCIT members (including ROs/AOs where identified) and 
establishing and maintaining best practice standards of transparent and accountable 
written authorisation and non-authorisation argument. (s. 8.4) 
 
37. RECOMMENDATION: More substantial provision should be made by VicPol 
for providing sexual assault education to generalist police officers. (s. 9.1.1) 
 
38. RECOMMENDATION: The Victoria Police sexual assault training course 
should be re-designed and upgraded to enable challenging of SOCIT unit placement 
antithetical re-learning and poor practices; to consolidate initial learning through 
trainee reports of positive practice effects; and to facilitate construction and 
implementation of an even more robust system for evaluating the course and trainees’ 
learning accomplishments with reference to the Victoria Police (2010) Crime 
Investigative Guidelines – Sexual Crimes v 1.1 and the Sexual Assault Code of 
Practice (Victoria Police 2005). Re-design should take advantage of the benefits of a 
module-based framework in course delivery and evaluation. (See later 
recommendations in this chapter) (s. 9.1.2.1) 
 
39. RECOMMENDATION: Trainers should be provided with advice from experts 
in the field of training and development in how to alter VicPol’s current training 
framework to optimize refresher training. (s. 9.1.3) 
 
40. RECOMMENDATION: A Training Audit and Training Needs Analysis (TNA) 
- complete with learning objectives and evaluation criteria - should be undertaken to 
identify the refresher and additional sexual assault learning requirements of existing 
SOCIT police at all levels. As part of a TNA, the ‘well’ of existing practice wisdom 
of experienced officers should be tapped and taken into the design of future training 
courses. (s. 9.1.3) 
 
41. RECOMMENDATION: An upgraded specialist SOCIT training course should 
take greater explicit account of the distinctive nature of sexual assault policing viz-a-
viz other forms of criminal investigation. (s. 9.1.3) 
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42. RECOMMENDATION: Accreditation of the SOCIT course should be 
conducted bi-annually by a panel constituted of a representative of the SOCIT 
training team and members drawn from a state-wide network monitoring body (see s. 
7.4). (s. 9.1.3) 
 
43. RECOMMENDATION: The SOCIT recruitment process should be overhauled 
and brought up to best practice standards, including defined and robust selection 
criteria that ensure only aptly motivated police officers are taken into SOCIT teams. 
(s. 9.2.1) 
 
44. RECOMMENDATION: SOCIT graduates should receive an annually renewable 
appraisal-linked certificate of SOCIT detective practice status along with a premium 
remuneration package attached to that annual status. (s. 9.2.1) 
 
45. RECOMMENDATION: VicPol should develop and implement a 360° 
performance appraisal system for SOCIT police that includes feedback from sexual 
assault complainants as well as from peers and immediate superiors. This system 
should produce annual appraisals that contribute to whether or not individual officers 
remain SOCIT members. Consistently under-performing officers should be 
transferred out of SOCIT and lose their premium remuneration benefits in the train of 
departure. (s. 9.2.1) 
  
46. RECOMMENDATION: Appropriately de-identified appraisals and related 
statistics should be made available to a state-wide network monitoring body for 
review and advice (see ss. 7.4 & 9.1.2). (s. 9.2.1) 
 
47. RECOMMENDATION: In accord with the earlier TNA recommendation, a 
robust regime of refresher and additional training should be implemented to meet 
ongoing KSA needs of sexual assault police at all levels. (s. 9.2.2) 
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Terminology and abbreviations 
 
 AASW – Australian Association of Social Workers 
 AO - Authorising officer – usually a Senior Sergeant Police Officer 
 CASA(s) – Centre(s) Against Sexual Assault 
 CFGIT(s) – CASA Focus Group Interview Transcript(s), 2010 
 CIU – Crime Investigation Unit 
 Code of Practice - Victoria Police Code of Practice for the Investigation of 
Sexual Assault 
 DTS – Detective Training School – now known as the Advanced Diploma of 
Public Safety (Police Investigations) 
 FGIT - Focus Group Interview Transcript (victims/survivors), 2010 
 Formal reasons/statements: reasons/statements that were stated in a case file 
formal report/memorandum in relation to why a case was authorised or not 
authorised for prosecution, 2011 
 GLLO – Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer 
 HCCU – Hospital Crisis Care Unit 
 HMCPSI & HMIC - Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Services Inspectorate 
& Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
 IIT – Individual Interview Transcript (victims/survivors), 2010 
 Interpose - Victoria Police database program 
 IO – Investigating officer – usually a Senior Police Officer; also often 
Sergeants 
 ISP – Internet Service Provider 
 KSA – knowledge, skills and aptitudes 
 LEAP – Law Enforcement and Assistance Program – Victoria Police database 
program  
 Non-formal reasons/statements: reasons/statements that were not formally 
stated in a case file document in relation to why a case was authorised or not 
authorised for prosecution, 2011 
 OPP - Office of Public Prosecutions Victoria 
 PFGT – Police Focus Group Transcript, 2010 
 PIIT – Police Individual Interview Transcript, 2010 
 Victoria Ombudsman - Office of the Victoria Ombudsman 
 Rationale factors: these are generalised factors that were either abstracted 
from specific reasons stated in file documents, or taken directly as they were 
found in the file documents, 2011 
 RFG – Rural Focus Group, police, 2010 
 RO – Recommending officer – usually a Sergeant Police Officer; also 
sometimes a Senior Sergeant 
 SACL - Sexual Assault Crisis Line 
 SARS - Sexual Assault Reform Strategy  
 SSAE -   
 SSOU - Specialist Sexual Offences Unit (OPP) 
 SOCAU(s) – Sexual Offences and Child Abuse Unit(s) 
 SOCIT(s) - Sexual Offences and Child Abuse Investigation Team(s) 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 26 
 SOCIT/VARE specialist training course: the specialist sexual assault training 
course provided to police by the SOCIT Specialist Development Unit, usually 
delivered at the Victoria Police Academy 
 Specific reasons: these are particular, highly varied and numerous reasons 
stated in file documents, 2011 
 SR – (Online) Survey Respondent, 2010 
 VicPol – Victoria Police 
 VCCAV – Victorian Community Council Against Violence 
 VARE - Video Audio Recorded Evidence 
 VLRC – Victorian Law Reform Commission 
 





Statistics on the prevalence of sexual assault and the criminal justice response 
to victims of this crime are dispiriting. Police are central to the detection and 
successful prosecution of sexual assault crimes. Culturally, symbolically, and 
professionally, police represent the public face of the criminal justice system 
and are the primary, and crucial, entry point into the criminal justice system. 
So it is imperative that the police response is effective (Taylor & Gassner, 
2010, p. 240). 
 
Sexual assault is a vexing problem that continues to present major challenges at both 
the societal level and criminal justice jurisdictions around the world. One in three 
women in Australia in 2002–03 reported experiencing sexual violence over their 
lifetime and 29% experienced physical and/or sexual violence before the age of 16 
years. It is also estimated that one in six men have a history of sexual violence, 
predominantly as childhood sexual abuse or sexual violence in early adolescence 
(Taylor, Pugh, Goodwach, & Coles, 2012, p. 539). Sexual violence is a heinous crime 
and is recognised as a human rights issue. It has a devastating impact on the every 
aspect of personal and bodily integrity and inflicts a serious health burden on victims 
across their lifespan. As a crime sexual violence is marked by serious under-reporting, 
high rates of attrition post reporting and low criminal convictions. Despite decades of 
law reform, social awareness and concerted efforts by police jurisdictions around the 
globe sexual violence continues to be underpinned by, and besieged by inefficient 
responses. This problem within contemporary Western civilisation’s criminal justice 
system is illustrated by the following observation: 
 
if any area of law illustrates the limitations of a law reform process it has to 
be sexual assault: the most consultative, best researched, most gendered law 
reform process will always be, at most, a very small contribution to ending 




The only way to determine whether reforms and innovations constitute 
legitimating devices or material changes is to find out how they are working 
on the ground: not to take legal promises and assertions at face value but to 
subject them to scrutiny (Hunter, 2002, p. 10). 
 
This report conveys research findings in relation to one Western jurisdiction’s 
policing sub-system, that of Victoria, within the context of the wider evidence-based 
research literature, which is described as follows. 
  
1.1 Recognising the problem of sexual assault 
 
Rape law reform was initially undertaken in the United States between 1960 and 
1975, with an upsurge in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Bachman, 1993; LeDoux & 
Hazelwood, 1985). Reforms were introduced in England and Wales, particularly 
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regarding police, following a television documentary in 1982 (Lea, Lanvers, & Shaw, 
2003). Legal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s in relation to rape were also introduced 
across Europe (Regan & Kelly, 2003). One study suggests that global rape law reform 
began incipiently post WWII and slowly increased between 1965 and 1980, then 
substantially picked-up pace from the 1980s (Frank, Hardinge, & Wossick-Correa, 
2009). In Australia, a range of reforms in relation to sexual assault have been 
undertaken in recent years (e.g., Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission 
[CMC] 2003, 2008; Community Development and Justice Standing Committee, 
Western Australia [CDJSC, WA] (2008); Attorney General’s Department [AGD] of 
NSW 2005; Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions [DPP] Australian Capital 
Territory [ACT], and the Australian Federal Police [AFP] 2005). Reforms have also 
occurred in Victoria, as outlined below (s. 1.4). 
 
1.2 Determining the dimensions of the problem 
 
The size and nature of the problem of sexual assault has been the subject of much 
research literature in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia among other criminal justice jurisdictions in the Western world. There are 
several important dimensions of the problem: the sheer number of (recorded) sexual 
assaults, non-reporting and late reporting, attrition rates, antithetical attitudes and rape 
myths, personal and societal effects, and a generally poor criminal justice system 
response.  
 
In regard to the size of the problem, a violent sex offence occurs once in every 600 
households annually in the United States (Stevens, 2006). According to the U.S. 
Department of Justice, between 1992 and 2000 persons aged 12 or older experienced 
an average annual 140,990 completed rapes, 109,230 attempted rapes, and 152,680 
completed and attempted sexual assaults; yet only 36% of rapes, 24% of attempted 
rapes, and 26% of sexual assaults were reported to the police (Rennison, 2002). Basile 
and Smith (2011) cite the US National Violence Against Women Survey (1995 and 
1996) findings that one in six women and one in 33 men have been victims of rape or 
attempted rape in their lifetime (cf, Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). In Britain, the total 
recorded sexual offences has shown an irregular pattern over the past decade, rising 
from 58,890 in 2002/03 to 62,862 in 2004/05, then falling to 51,427 in 2008/09, only 
to rise again to 54,509 in 2009/10 (British Recorded Crime Statistics, 2002-2010). In 
Australia, recorded sexual assaults rose steadily from 14,542 in 1996 to 19,781 in 
2007, an increase of 5,239 assaults (36%) over that period (Australian Institute of 
Criminology (AIC), http://www.aic.gov.au/statistics, accessed 6th April, 2012). 
 
Notwithstanding problems of statistical measures - especially comparing figures over 
time and jurisdictions (e.g., Hofer, 2006), including various definitions of sexual 
assault (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] 2004) - there is a strong research 
consensus that the ‘dark figure’ of sexual assault is significantly higher than shown in 
the official records. The 1996 Women’s Safety Survey (WSS) data showed that 16% 
of Australian women had been sexually assaulted since age 16 (ABS 2004). In an 
Australia wide study it was found that “4.8% of men and 21.1% of women had 
experienced sexual coercion, i.e. being forced or frightened into unwanted sexual 
activity, and 2.8% of men and 10.3% of women had been coerced when aged 16 or 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 29 
younger” (de Visser, Smith, Rissel, Richters, & Grulich, 2003, p. 198). Fitzgerald’s 
(2007) analysis indicated that although 18,000 sexual assault incidents were reported 
to Australian police in 2006, the true figure was 60,000. 
  
Non-reporting and late reporting have been shown to be very serious issues (ABS, 
2004; Kelly, 2001; Legislative Review Committee, South Australia [LRC, SA] 2004; 
Lievore, 2003; Victorian Law Reform Commission [VLRC], 2003, 2004). A study 
utilizing National Crime Victimisation Survey data concluded that “less than one 
quarter of the rape victimizations from this sample were ever reported to police, 
regardless of the victim offender relationship” (Bachman, 1998, p. 25). The 2001 
British Crime Survey (Interpersonal Violence Module (IPV)) showed that 40 per cent 
of sampled rape survivors had not informed anyone (Office for Criminal Justice 
Reform, 2006). Victims of sexual assault have also been shown to be less likely to 
report to police than victims of other forms of physical assault, with the former being 
half as likely to report (Chen & Ullman, 2010). Monroe, Kinney, Dantzler, Weist, 
Reynolds and Spriggs (2005) undertook a state-wide survey of 125 adult victims at 19 
sexual assault centres in the State of Maryland. They found that 69.4% respondents 
did not intend reporting to police. Heath (2007) argued that in South Australia, 
approximately 5,240 rapes were committed in 2003, but only 786 (15%) were 
reported to the police. In Australia, according to Fitzgerald (2007) a conservative 
estimate of about 42,000 sexual assaults (70%) during 2006 were not reported to 
police. 
 
A particularly cogent account of the problematic aspect of attrition is found in the 
Home Office study by Kelly, Lovett and Regan (2005). 
  
Research to date in adversarial legal systems has identified four key points at 
which attrition occurs. The first point is the decision to report itself; estimates 
of the reporting rate range from 5 to 25 per cent. Even using the highest 
reporting rate estimate, three-quarters of cases never reach the first hurdle 
within the CJS. The second involves the police investigation stage – the 
initial response, forensic examination, statement taking, evidence gathering 
and arrest and/or interviewing of suspects – between half and three-quarters 
of reported cases are lost here. The third point relates to the minority of cases 
that are referred through to prosecutors, where a proportion are discontinued. 
The final point is the even smaller number of cases that reach court, where 
between one-third and over one-half of those involving adults result in 
acquittals. At each of the points the possibility of withdrawal by the victim 
exists, although the largest number of these occurs during the reporting and 
investigative stages (Kelly et al., 2005, pp. 30-31). 
 
A later Home Offices study of attrition in reported offences of rape of a female in 
England and Wales in 2003/04 found that 70% of cases “were lost from the system 
between an offence being crimed and charges being brought” (Feist, Ashe, Lawrence, 
McPhee, &Wilson,  2007, p. iii). 
 
The 1996 WSS in Australia found that 20% of women disclosed their sexual assault 
to no one and took no action; and sexual assault defendants were three times more 
likely to be acquitted compared to all other defendants (ABS, 2004). Fitzgerald’s 
(2007) analysis indicated that only 3,600 of the estimated true figure of 60,000 sexual 
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assaults in Australia during 2006 were subject to criminal proceedings by police and 
only 1,800 resulted in a guilty verdict at court. That is, a paltry 3% of sexual assaults 
found a just outcome for victims (cf, Fitzgerald, 2006). In a study of reported rapes in 
Victoria during the period 2003-2006, Heenan and Murray (2006) found that police 
did not proceed with 61.5% of the investigations concerned, with 15.1% of the 
complaints being withdrawn by victims and in 46.4% police decided to take no 
further action. Offenders were charged in only 15% of the examined cases. Although 
attrition occurs across all crime types, it has been found to be particularly problematic 
(i.e., higher rate) in sexual assault cases (e.g., Roberts, 1996). 
 
Antithetical attitudes and rape myths have been shown to be widespread throughout 
society and persistent over time, including the legislature, adversely influencing 
criminal justice responses at all levels, from police investigations, prosecutorial 
decision-making through to judicial and jury deliberations (Campbell, 1995; Feild, 
1978; Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980); and account in some measure for non-
reporting, late reporting and attrition within the criminal justice process (CDJSC, 
2008; Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980; Lievore, 2003, 2005a; Taylor & Norma, 
2011). Even after rape law reform was initiated in the United States and other 
jurisdictions research work found personal attitudes such as belief in stereotypes, 
victim blaming and rape myths influenced an individual’s effectiveness in 
investigating sexual assaults (e.g., Bachman, 1993; Feild 1978; Feldman-Summers & 
Palmer, 1980; Jamel, Bull & Sheridan 2008; LeDoux & Hazelwood, 1985). For 
example, Feild (1978) noted the then relatively sizeable research literature suggested 
prejudicial attitudes to rape were widespread in the general population and influenced 
the views and decisions of the judiciary, jury, legislators and police. In this last 
regard, it has been noted that “various researchers have proposed that these attitudinal 
sets have been influential in … the processing and investigation of rape complaints by 
police” (Feild, 1978, p. 156). Feild (1978) found that police were closely aligned with 
offenders in their attitudes towards rape victims, and very differently so from crisis 
counsellors, and held a basic mistrust of rape victims. That police are not alone in 
being influenced by attitudes in their duties was supported by the work of Feldman-
Summers and Palmer (1980) who similarly found differences between the beliefs of 
members of the criminal justice system on the one hand and those of social service 
personnel on the other hand.  
 
(T)he social service personnel tend to see the causes of rape as being inherent 
in the socialization process of men (e.g., men have been taught to believe that 
when a woman says “no” she really means “yes”; and men who commit rape 
have not been taught that rape is wrong). The CJS participants, however, 
tended to see the causes of rape as lying within the make-up of some men 
(e.g., sexually frustrated men or men who are mentally ill) and being the 
result of women’s behavior (e.g., women using poor judgements about going 
out alone) (Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980, p. 34) 
 
Furthermore there is solid research evidence that some victims/survivors take on rape 
myth thinking themselves, either internalizing prejudicial beliefs and hence not 
reporting sexual assaults; or being deterred from reporting in the knowledge that the 
general public, police, judiciary and juries will not believe their story and that they 
would only be giving themselves a millstone of social stigma and disbelief if they 
were to report (e.g., Bachman, 1993, 1998; Daly & Bouhours, 2010; Jones, 
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Alexander, Wynn, Rossman, & Dunnuck, 2009). Moreover, victims continue to base 
their reporting decisions on stereotypical conceptions of rape (Chen & Ullman, 2010). 
 
Even when victims do report, their experience with the criminal justice system has 
been shown to be often unsympathetic, thus reinforcing a popular view that reporting 
is both futile and likely to result in systemic re-victimisation. Monroe et al. (2005) 
found that of those victims who did report, 46.2% were dissatisfied with the police 
interview. Maier (2008) describes how victims upon reporting are re-victimised by 
both police and health service personnel due to insensitive, judgemental or 
disbelieving questioning. At court victims/survivors must ‘run the gauntlet’ of often 
vicious questioning by defence lawyers under the benign eyes of judges (e.g., 
Burman, 2009; Gregory & Lees, 1996). 
 
Personal and societal effects are intertwined in terms of immediate and long-term 
trauma, medical and hospitalization interventions, spoilt self-esteem and mental 
health problems, familial disruptions, unemployability, drains on the public purse, and 
deleterious impacts on the economy, among other hazards. Sophisticated meta-
analysis research of longitudinal studies covering the period of 1980 to 2008 has 
linked sexual attacks with life-time psychiatric disorders (Chen, Murad, Paras, 
Colbenson, Sattler, Goranson, Elamin, Seime, Shinozaki, Prokop, & Zirakzadeh, 
2010). Aside from immediate medical help following a sexual assault, health impacts 
include sexually transmitted disease, bowel and other health problems, pregnancies, 
and associated monetary and socio-emotional costs (Basile & Smith, 2011; Dumont & 
Myhr, 2000;Taylor, Pugh, Goodwach, & Coles 2012). Australian government reports 
have identified health and financial burdens of physical and sexual violence (Access 
Economics, 2004; VicHealth, 2004). Strains on relationships with intimate partners, 
family and friends have been widely reported in the literature (e.g., Coker, Davis, 
Arias, Desai, Sanderson, Brandt, & Smith, 2002; Lievore, 2005a). In the 12 months 
following a sexual assault victims often take time off work and the 1996 WSS 
indicated that some 40% altered their daily routines such as shopping, child care, 
voluntary and community work as well as social activities, with 17% living in fear for 
their personal safety (ABS, 2004, p. 69). One study found that productivity at work 
suffered for up to eight months after rape (Basile & Smith, 2011). Miller, Cohen and 
Wiersema (1994) estimated rape costs an average of $5,100 in direct expenses and 
$87,000 when a monetary value is placed on emotional distress and lost quality of 
life. Post, Mezey, Maxwell and Wibert (2002) estimated that sexual violence cost 
more than $6.5 billion per year in Michigan alone.  
 
1.3 Addressing the problem? 
 
Efforts to resolve the problem within a criminal justice framework have been made 
across Western jurisdictions since its recognition as a serious policy issue gathered 
pace from the 1960s onwards. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Home Office 
issued circulars in 1983 and 1986 with the first designed to ensure women would be 
treated with tact and sympathy when reporting rape and the second that advised rape 
complaints could be ‘no-crimed’ only when the complaint was withdrawn or found to 
be a false report, but no longer due to insufficient evidence (Gregory & Lees, 1996; 
Lea et al., 2003). In Canada, the legislation on rape was overhauled in 1983, removing 
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past inequities, for example no longer requiring corroboration, repealing the rule of 
‘recent complaint’ and making inadmissible the use of sexual reputation to discredit a 
complainant’s credibility (Dumont & Myhr, 2000). Since the early 1970s many 
jurisdictions – including Australia, Canada, England and Wales, New Zealand, USA 
and Scotland) – have enacted ‘rape shield’ laws designed to protect complainants 
against unnecessary impugning of their character and credibility through questioning 
of their sexual history, life style or dress etc by defence lawyers (Burman, 2009). 
 
There is evidence of some success as a result of such measures to increase reporting 
rates and to reduce attrition rates and incidence of sexual assault. Bachman (1998, p. 
25) tentatively suggested that there was “an increasing propensity for women raped 
by men they know to bring their victimizations to the attention of authorities”. Lea et 
al. (2003) reported mixed findings in their study, however they concluded there were 
grounds for optimism because reforms appeared to be having salutary effects on 
police commitment. In a Canadian context, Dumont, Miller and Myhr (2003) 
similarly reported tentative findings that women were possibly shedding elements of 
the ‘real rape’ myth to report their victimization to police whereas they might not 
have done so in earlier pre-reform times. One study found that the Sexual Assault 
Nurse Examiner (SANE) program in the US improved sexual assault case 
investigation and prosecution due to the collection of high quality medical forensic 
evidence (Campbell, Patterson, Bybee, & Dworkin, 2009). Baumer and Lauritsen 
(2010, pp. 158-9) undertook a sophisticated, multi-variable statistical analysis taking 
account of social and legal changes to conclude that from 1973 to 2005 there was a 
39% increase in sexual offence reports to police in the United States. According to 
Catalano, Smith, Snyder and Rand (2009) the US rates of sexual assault against 
females and males declined between 1993 and 2008 by 70% and 36%, respectively.  
 
Yet progress has been slow and spotty, if not superficial. For instance, Gregory and 
Lees (1996) found an alarming no-criming rate of 43% despite the 1986 Home Office 
circular, as well as downgrading offences. Harris and Grace (1999) also found 
attrition remained a problem, with reductions in no-criming being offset by increases 
in no further action by police. Gregory and Lees (1996) refer to ‘judicial sabotage’ of 
British legislation designed to protect victims from defence lawyers questioning of 
victims’ past sexual history (‘rape shield’ laws). Further, “despite radical reform 
within the administration of the criminal justice system in respect of rape and sexual 
assault cases, attrition remains a serious problem” (Lea et al.,  2003, p. 583) and “not 
enough is being done within the criminal justice system for victims of rape” (Lea et 
al., 2003, p. 598). This latter view particularly concerned inadequacies in 
collaboration by the Crown Prosecution Service with police and in understanding of 
rape victims by judges and barristers; however there were still a significant minority 
of police who held stereotyped attitudes towards women and rape (Lea et al., 2003). 
Burman (2009) argued that, despite many recent reforms including ‘rape shield’ laws, 
complainants continued to be traumatized in Scottish courts, where their sexual 
history was increasingly introduced under the negative influence of outmoded rape 
myths. In Canada, judicial thwarting of legislative intent was seen in the Supreme 
Court striking down the rape shield statute in 1991, with redrafted legislation 
surviving yet another challenge in 2000 (Graycar & Morgan, 2005). Analysis of data 
from 1990 to 2005 by Daly and Bouhours (2010) showed that across the United 
States, Australia, Canada, England and Wales, and Scotland an average of only about 
30% of cases reported to police proceeded to prosecution.  




A similar ‘progressive/regressive’ circumstance applied across Europe where, for 
instance, the definition of rape was widened, including recognition of rape in 
marriage and rape of males, along with training in some countries for police, 
prosecutors and judges (Regan & Kelly, 2003). Also, “less common changes include: 
restrictions on sexual history evidence; reviews of sentencing; introducing degrees of 
sexual assault; allowing NGOs to be party to the case; lowering the age at which 
perpetrators can be charged; and stopping perpetrators being able to cross-examine 
the victim/witness in the court case” (Regan & Kelly, 2003, p. 15). Procedural 
reforms included court-room protections of victims (e.g., screens, video evidence) and 
anonymity of victims and witnesses. Yet, despite difficulties and patchiness in data-
collection, these authors found that “England & Wales, Finland, Ireland, Scotland and 
Sweden share a pattern of increasing attrition, with increased reporting and declining 
conviction rates over decades”; and “the conviction rate has fallen for most of Europe 
since the 1970s, and no country had an increase in convictions that exceeded an 
increase in reporting” (Regan & Kelly, 2003, pp. 12-13).  
 
Despite what have now been decades of reform the prevalence of sexual assault 
remains widely acknowledged as dismayingly high across Western criminal justice 
jurisdictions (e.g., ABS, 2004; Basile & Smith, 2011; Daly, 2011; de Visser et al., 
2003; Koss, 2006; Lovett & Kelly, 2009; Neame &Heenan, 2003; Petrak, Doyle, 
Williams, Buchan, & Forster 1997; Taylor, 2004a; Taylor & Gassner, 2010;Taylor & 
Norma, 2011). Attrition rates also remain disturbingly high (e.g., Burman, 2009; 
Burman, Lovett, & Kelly 2009; de Visser et al., 2003; Heath, 2007; Her Majesty’s 
Crown Prosecution Services Inspectorate & Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HCPSI & HMIC), 2007; Page, 2008;Taylor & Gassner, 2010). A range 
of studies have found that legal and procedural reforms have failed in various ways to 
significantly and consistently deliver on their promise to improve the criminal justice 
response to sexual assault (e.g., Clay-Warner & Burt, 2005; Jordan, 2001, 2002; 
Lievore, 2005b; Page, 2008; Temkin, 1999; Walklate, 2008). For example: 
 
In virtually all countries where major studies have been published, the 
number of reported rape offences has grown over the last two decades, yet 
the number of prosecutions has failed to increase proportionately, resulting in 
a falling conviction rate. (Lovett & Kelly, 2009, p. 5). 
 
In this regard, Lovett and Kelly (2009) distinguish between four types of attrition: 
classic, expected, reverse and anomalous. A classic attrition trend is where there is 
“increased reporting over a sustained period accompanied by a falling conviction 
rate” (Lovett & Kelly, 2009, p. 22), and this was found to characterize 17 of the 25 
European countries in their in-depth, multi-method comparative study. The expected 
pattern of parallel rising report and conviction rates were found in only three 
countries; a reverse pattern both reporting and conviction rates falling in four 
countries; and in one country an anomalous pattern of more prosecutions than reports. 
 
Australia has seen a similar pattern of reforms belied by subsequent realities of 
continuing non-reporting and high attrition rates. For example, the Queensland Crime 
and Misconduct Commission made 23 recommendations concerning the handling of 
sexual assault reports by police and prosecutorial services, which were subsequently 
judged to have been largely implemented successfully (Queensland CMC, 2003, 
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2008). In New South Wales, a task force supported designated police liaison officers 
and a one-stop shop with a specialist police detective on call if a victim wanted to 
make a report (AGD of NSW, 2005). In the ACT, a 2005 report by the Office of the 
DPP and the AFP made a number of recommendations for improvements in the way 
the ACT police handled allegations of sexual assault. These included a 
recommendation to adopt the London Metropolitan Police model of Sexual Offences 
Investigative Techniques (SOIT) officers who were not responsible for investigations 
but who were trained as 24 hour specialist first responders, as well as training of all 
police staff likely to have contact with sexual assault victims. There was another 
recommendation for a one-stop shop approach with a forensic and medical sexual 
assault centre where police would meet informally with victims to explain the 
investigative process and arrange a formal investigation if desired by the victim. 
According to the CDJSC (2008) in Western Australia an increased rate of reporting of 
domestic violence followed the enactment of legislation in 2004. Sexual offence cases 
rose to approximately 20% of the Office of the Public Prosecutor’s (ODPP) workload. 
 
Australian reforms generally recognised a need for a specialised and co-ordinated 
response to managing cases involving sexual assault. However, in New South Wales 
there is no specialised unit in place to deal specifically with reports of sexual assault 
(AGD of NSW, 2005). In South Australia, “although the conviction rate from 1981-
1991 was low and falling, from 1993-2003 the proportion of reports to police 
resulting in a finding of guilty as charged for rape or attempted rape fell still further. 
In 2003 only 1.5% of reports resulted in a finding of guilty as charged” (Heath, 2007, 
p.  175). In Western Australia, despite the 2004 legislative reform less than 15% of 
cases reported to the police were forwarded for prosecution, and less than 9% of 
reported cases secured a conviction (CDJSC, 2008). Further, among the Committee’s 
40 findings were a low rate of reporting (10%) of sexual offences; only 1% of all 
alleged sexual assaults (both reported and unreported) resulted in conviction; and 
operations of the recently formed Sexual Assault Squad (SAS) were restricted to 
cases where the perpetrator is a stranger or highly complicated inquiries. 
 
As will be seen in the literatures reviewed in the chapters of this report, the gist of all 
of the above findings has remained consistently evidenced in various related bodies of 
research over the years.  
   
1.4 Situating Victoria  
 
In 1992, Victoria Police established a Code of Practice setting down guidelines, 
procedures and protocols for investigating sexual offence allegations; and this has 
been revised and updated subsequently (Victoria Police, 2005). Several key reports in 
relation to sexual assault were undertaken in the 1990’s, including the Victorian 
Parliamentary Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee’s reports on Combating Child 
Sexual Assault (1995) and Combating Sexual Assault Against Adult Men and Women 
(1996); the Rape Law Reform Evaluation Project’s 1996 report into the Crimes 
(Rape) Act 1991 (Heenan & McKelvie, 1996); and the Model Criminal Code Officers 
Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 1999 report on Sexual 
Offences Against the Person (MCCOC). In 2002, Victoria Police and the Office of 
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Women’s Policy (Department for Victorian Communities) established the State-wide 
Steering Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault.  
 
Subsequently, the VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006) conducted reviews 
in relation to sexual assault and made numerous recommendations including in regard 
to police practices and management of cases, decision-making, training programs, 
cooperation with community agencies, and evidence-based research activities. For 
example the VLRC recommended police assign detectives to specialised units to work 
exclusively on sexual assault cases. The Ombudsman’s report highlighted 
complainants’ difficulties contacting police assigned to their case and recommended 
access to details of the case by the investigator’s supervisor to facilitate complainant 
enquiries. Both the VLRC and Ombudsman concluded change was needed in 
legislation as well as organisational and administrative processing of sexual assault 
cases. The VLRC and Victoria Ombudsman reports and recommendations are 
discussed in further detail at appropriate points in the text of this report. At this point 
it is noted that those reports jointly cast considerable doubt on the effectiveness of 
police responses to sexual assault at the time, again reflecting the pattern of 
‘progressive/regressive’ movement evidenced in the literature in other Australian and 
overseas jurisdictions. 
 
Following the VLRC (2004) report, the Victorian State Government funded the 
Sexual Assault Reform Strategy (SARS) which incorporated a range of initiatives 
aimed at improving the criminal justice system’s response to sexual assault and 
enhancing support for victims/survivors as well as providing for prevention and early 
intervention. The consultant research firm ‘Success Works’ (2011) recently reported 
on SARS, noting that all the reform recommendations were implemented bar one that 
was found to be unviable. It concluded that reforms had initiated a cost effective and 
real difference for many victims/survivors, with significant cultural change 
exemplified in police being more likely to believe complainants. Based on data from a 
range of methods, it cited as evidence such development as new legislation, the 
Victims Charter, the SOCITs, MDCs (and co-location of services), the Code of 
Practice, and the amount of internal training. It also pointed to improved access and 
support for victims/survivors, as well as improved quality of prosecution Briefs due to 
structural changes in the criminal justice network.  
 
However, it also sounded a note of caution, observing that “(t)his is a journey begun, 
not a journey ended and now is not the time to ‘take the foot off the accelerator’” 
(Success Works, 2011,p. i). It noted that the number of reported sexual offences 
increased steadily (12.9%) between 03/04 and 05/06, declined slightly (5.5%) into 
06/07 and 07/08, but then declined dramatically (19.1%) in 08/09; and “police data 
indicates that the rate of attrition (complaints withdrawn) increased between 2005/06 
and 2008/09 and then decreased substantially in 2009/10, while the court data 
indicates an increase during 2009/10 in cases where the prosecution was withdrawn” 
(Success Works, 2011, p. iv). Between 2004/2005 and 2008/9 about 50% of County 
Court sex offence cases resulted in a conviction, however by 2009/2010 the County 
Court conviction rate declined to 38% (Neave, 2011). As Neave noted, these figures 
might not indicate a long-term trend, but they are not a promising omen, and they too 
suggest the ‘progressive/regressive’ pattern evidenced in the research literature to 
date. Thus, the statistical data on reporting and attrition rates cited in the Success 
Works report do not show a clear positive trend to support optimism based on the 
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various views cited in the report. Rather, that data is mottled at best and contradictive 
at worst regarding cultural change for the better. It remains to be seen whether current 
CJS changes have a real and lasting impact upon the key problems of non-reporting, 
late reporting and high attrition rates.  
 
Under the weight of the research evidence canvassed above, it is vital that further 
work is undertaken in an Australian context and specifically in Victoria to further 
examine the progress and outcomes of reform efforts.  
 
The Policing Just Outcomes (PJO) project was initiated in Victoria - with the Success 
Works (2011) research being largely concurrent - against this background of 
circumstances and travails of sexual assault criminal justice reforms. The current 
report is concerned with the results of PJO project collaboration between Edith 
Cowan University and Victoria Police. It is emphasised that the PJO project 
concerned sexual assault complaints by adults, including adults reporting childhood 
sexual abuse, but not complaints concerning child victims contemporaneously. 
 
1.5 Research aims 
 
The Policing Just Outcomes project is a multiple methods research inquiry into 
reporting and non-reporting of sexual assault and associated policing responses in 
Victoria. Key aims were to: 
 
1. identify and understand the factors and dilemmas that influence the decisions 
made by adult victims of sexual assault on whether or not to report the 
offence/s to police; 
 
2. provide a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) and understanding of police 
responses to adult sexual assault in Victoria and the outcomes generated by 
these responses, using a ‘networked policing’ conceptual framework; 
  
3. develop an understanding of police training and practice concerning adult 
sexual assault; and 
 
4. make recommendations for potential improvements in police practice 
responses and training in relation to sexual assault in Victoria that will address 
non-reporting, delayed reporting and attrition of sexual assault complaints 
which have been identified as serious concerns and priority issues for police 
and the wider criminal justice system. 
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2.0 Methodological considerations 
 
Given the size, duration and complexity of the PJO project the following provides an 
overview of methodological considerations. The first section is an account of 
methods, with more comprehensive descriptions and data collection tools located in 
Appendices one to 11 inclusive. The second section deals with ethical considerations, 
followed by comment on industry partner assistance, with a concluding section on 
study limitations. 
 
2.1 General framework 
 
The PJO project was comprised of three strands of research, each of which 
incorporated a number of studies. The general framework comprised a range of 
specific, qualitative and quantitative, data-collection and data-analysis methods that 
provided for triangulation at the levels of researchers, methods, data sources and over 
time. The three strands shared a theoretical orientation of Action Research and key 
methodological underpinnings, but also varied in specific methods and applications. 
In particular, researchers across all three strands employed qualitative methodologies 
of in-depth interviews and focus groups as well as the complementary procedures of 
the Grounded Theory Method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), 
Meaning Generation Tactics (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and Grid Analysis Method 
(Hurworth, 2000). At the risk of oversimplifying these complex methodologies, it is 
worth briefly explaining them as employed here since they are not always well 
understood even by otherwise experienced researchers, and especially researchers 
who are accustomed to quantitative/statistical methods. 
 
Grounded Theory Method (GTM) procedures use open coding, axial coding and 
selective coding to generate or understand the meaning of raw data through inductive 
reasoning. Open coding refers to reducing a data mass to sensible and manageable 
categories by noting commonalities and assigning labels to various data bits. Axial 
coding refers to examining the open coded categories for connections and disparities 
among the data, which also helps identify new codes and ideas (usually said to 
‘emerge’ from the data). With selective coding researchers concentrate on larger 
themes or concepts developed from earlier inductive analyses. Notably, shifting from 
open to axial to selective coding is a process of moving up the conceptual abstraction 
ladder. In undertaking these coding activities, GTM researchers employ a Constant 
Comparative Method, which refers to cycles of iteration back and forth to data from 
within and among cases – or other units of analysis such as subjects’ responses - to 
check for supportive and contrary evidence in relation to emerging ideas and insights. 
This method is reminiscent of John Stuart Mill’s famous, time-tested methods of 
agreement and difference (Neuman & Wiegand, 2000). Whilst the method of 
agreement looks at what is common within and across cases, that of difference 
searches for what is distinctive. Combined, these procedures allow identification of 
consistencies and inconsistencies within a given case, plus dissimilar cases and 
similar ones, as well as sub-types within a category of cases. GTM relies 
fundamentally on replication logic, where if evidence in one case is repeated in 
another then it is potentially generalisable to other similar cases. In short, GTM is an 
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approach that induces from collected data one or more concepts or hypotheses that 
can be employed to construct new theory. This approach is in direct contrast to a 
deductive reasoning approach that seeks to test hypotheses drawn from an existing 
theory or conceptualisations. 
 
In regard to the Meaning Generation Tactics (MGT) employed, counting refers to 
noting the frequency of data/items at any level of abstraction. Comparison and 
contrast seeks to discover what data are common and what are different, for instance 
among the narratives or more broadly across the cases. Clustering refers to “the 
process of inductively forming categories, and the iterative sorting of things … into 
those categories” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 248). As Miles and Huberman point 
out, clustering can be applied to many kinds and levels of qualitative data, including 
events (eg sexual offending), individual actors/groups (police officers, SOCAUs, 
SOCITs), processes (investigations/Brief authorisation decision making), and cases 
(such as those contained in the VicPol case files). The tactic of ‘subsuming particulars 
into the general’ refers to collecting together data into more general ideas, usually on 
a comparative basis. This essentially refers to a higher conceptual level of abstraction 
than that involved in the former tactics. Factoring provides a definable construct (or 
part of one) that has potential explanatory power. This involves searching for 
conceptual patterns of meaning in the data by constantly asking what similar and 
dissimilar data items might indicate not only at an abstract level, but also “in terms of 
a smaller number of unobserved, usually hypothetical variables” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p. 256). Each of these tactics is a specific means of inducing meaningfulness 
from otherwise raw data that is readily used in concert with GTM coding. Altogether 
these tactics allow identification of patterns of data and associated meanings, and thus 
comprise the particulars in current research use of the pattern-matching technique 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Hurworth, 2000; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Trochim, 1989; Yin, 
1994). 
 
The Grid Analysis Method (GAM) employed here was developed by Hurworth 
(2000) following the work of Miles and Huberman (1994), and it has been 
subsequently utilised and developed in application by other researchers (e.g., Bell, 
Shrimpton, Hurworth, & St Leger, 2004). A grid is essentially composed of a column 
by row arrangement of cells, representing a sophisticated cross-tabulation, similar to a 
computer software spreadsheet format however it can be constructed also either 
manually on PC generated tables, or in hand fashion on “butcher’s paper” or any sheet 
of paper (or other amenable surfaces). This method generally involves listing the 
cases – or respondents etc - down the left column with data types, concepts, themes or 
any other analysis item across the top row. It is an ingenious, simple, efficient and 
highly rigorous and effective means of reducing ‘loads and lumps’ of qualitative data 
to manageable and revealing ‘chunks’ of information (Bell et al., 2004, p. 10). 
Scrutiny of the de-constructed data in the cells allows a summary view of each case’s 
characteristics, as well as relatively easy comparison and contrast between the cases. 
As data are entered into the cells there is a visual demand to review each case against 
all others in respect to the analysis item at hand. The data can be re-constructed to 
reveal patterns across the cases. A great advantage of a grid is that it disciplines the 
mind against favouring preconceptions and ignoring contrary evidence, which is a 
threat if analysis is carried out only on a case-by-case basis with case findings being 
reviewed and ‘added together’ in a linear, sequential fashion. GAM is an inductive 
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method of working with qualitative materials that complements GTM and MGT 
procedures. 
 
Together with other methods used in the three strands of PJO research, this general 
framework provided what Geertz (1973, pp. 6-28), borrowing from Gilbert Ryle 
(Collected Papers), called a ‘thick description’, essentially an in-depth understanding 
of social discourse, a microscopic laying bare of cultural meanings with “densely 
textured facts” and “complex specifics” (28), instead of or additional to a ‘thin 
description’ of statistics, observations and the like. With its application in the PJO 
research project, the policing of sexual assault in Victoria is described and interpreted 
in detail to enhance our understanding of what to do to further improve police 
responses in accord with VLRC (2004) and Ombudsman Victoria (2006) 
recommendations. The research framework also provided important quantitative 
indicators concerning the recent policing of sexual assault in Victoria and VicPol’s 
efforts to respond to attrition rate, non-reporting and late reporting issues identified in 
the research literature, and often mentioned in the mass news-media. 
 
In respect to the general Action Research approach adopted here, Eade (1997), for 
example, argues that effective reform requires the reformers to understand the 
capacity building possibilities that can enable the participants, themselves, to assert 
meaningful change. For this to occur in the investigation of sexual assault, the 
reformers must respect the knowledge and perceptions of the people who experience 
sexual assault and those who investigate it. The important theoretical point here is 
that, as Eade (1997, p. 11) puts it, “awareness, learning, self-esteem and the capacity 
for [social] action are mutually reinforcing”. Implicit in this perspective is a 
realisation that people who suffer forms of disadvantage have the right and the 
capacity to challenge expert or imposed ‘solutions’ to their problems and are capable 
of asserting better alternatives. This approach will enable the development of an 
understanding of the nature of the experience of sexual assault from the perspective of 
victims, police investigators and Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP) officers who 
possess the capacity to be effective drivers of wider system change. 
 
All interview and focus group verbal response data were audio recorded for later 
transcription with the consent of participants and with any identifying information 
anonymised during transcription. Hand-written notes were also made as appropriate. 
Final analysis, integration of materials across the three strands and report write-up 
was undertaken over the period February-July 2012. During the PJO project the 
research team produced four confidential, detailed Briefing Papers for Victoria Police 
for the purpose of sharing and advising of emerging patterns and work in progress 
findings and discussions.  The large size, extensive duration and complexity of the 
project are indicated in the following exposition of methodology. 
 
2.1.1 Strand one 
 
Strand one involved three main researchers, using a mixed methods approach to 
collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data from victim/survivors, police 
members and sexual assault counsellors. This approach entailed three perspectives on 
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the victim/survivor experience, thus providing a rich source of findings and 
recommendations. 
 
A victims/survivors survey was undertaken on-line from December 2009 to May 
2010, resulting in 336 respondents. Of these, 130 reported to police and the remaining 
206 respondents did not. Seventy-seven respondents self-selected to accept an 
invitation for in-depth interview. There were 201 female respondents and 33 male 
respondents with two missing gender sets. The majority of respondents who reported 
their violation to police did so in the previous four years (2006 to 2010), giving 
currency to the meaning drawn from the analysis.  
 
The online survey is the first of its kind anywhere (see Appendix one). It was 
designed to be an innovative and unique data collection tool. Designed by the lead 
researcher in conjunction with her staff and a survey consultant, the survey was 
trialled with survivors in 2008 in a private workshop and again trialled online in the 
latter part of 2009. The survey was not badged with the Victoria Police insignia as it 
was felt it might hinder respondents whose trust we were seeking and to their credit, 
members of Victoria Police we were communicating with at the time understood this 
and supported the decision. 
 
Researchers conducted a total of 64 in-depth interviews with victims/survivors 
comprising 47 individual interviews and five focus group interviews. Of this sample 
36 had contact with police for the purpose of reporting while the remainder (28) did 
not report the sexual offence to police. Three focus groups were all female and one 
focus group of males. Interviews were loosely structured in order to be responsive to 
the interviewee’s needs. Questions focused on the subject of reporting/non-reporting 
rather than on the sexual assault per se and thus reduced the participant’s stress and 
risk of re-traumatisation. Topics included: the decision making process as to whether 
or not to report; barriers, dilemmas and facilitators to reporting and survivors’ 
perceptions and experiences of reporting. 
 
It is of research interest to note the difficulties involved with two individual 
interviews that were originally organised but had to be abandoned. While 64 survivors 
in total were interviewed, some 77 had originally agreed to attend for interview. 
However one interviewee cancelled a scheduled interview time due to feelings of 
anxiety about the interview and wanted to reschedule. Researchers rescheduled a time 
at her request but at the last minute she contacted to advise she simply felt unable to 
attend due to personal feelings of anxiety. She was provided with appropriate contact 
details of suitable counselling services and it was determined not to reschedule an 
interview. The other interviewee attended the scheduled interview which was held at a 
CASA counselling service (where researchers conducted a number of interviews). 
The interviewee became verbally and physically aggressive towards researchers early 
in the interview and the interview was stopped and assistance sought for the 
interviewee. Interview material pertaining to this interviewee was not transcribed and 
was destroyed. The remaining 11 individuals either did not respond to contact made 
by researchers in order to schedule an interview or conversely, elected to attend a 
focus group interview but did not turn up. As a courtesy, researchers made follow up 
contact but did not pursue the individuals any further. 
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In addition to interviews with victim/survivors Strand One researchers conducted a 
total of seven focus groups from 2009 to 2010 across the state involving more than 60 
specialist sexual assault police members. As Victoria Police were in the process of 
trialling and then rolling out Sexual Offence Child Investigation Teams (SOCIT’s) 
during the period of this project our interviews included police from both the then 
Sexual Offences Child Abuse Units (SOCAU’s) as well as SOCITs. These interviews 
provided detailed insights into police perspectives about the reporting behaviours and 
decision of victims and their experiences with victims who have contacted police 
either to report a sexual offence or obtain information and advice. Site visits were 
made to the two trialling SOCIT’s located in Mildura and Frankston that were in their 
infancy in terms of the trial, prior to revisiting them in 2010 for the purpose of 
conducting our focus group interviews. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured lasting approximately 90 minutes with the occasional 
focus group interview extending over a period of 2 hours. In some rural/regional areas 
police from these units travelled to one agreed location in consideration of police 
workload priorities. As with all interviews conducted by PJO researchers these were 
digitally recorded, with the informed consent of participants. A moderator took notes 
that included coding to enable correctly identifying various speakers within the 
groups. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and checked against the moderator 
notes for accuracy in terms of speakers. Moderator notes were then destroyed and the 
participants in the transcripts anonymised in accordance with ethics protocols.     
 
Additionally, six focus groups were conducted with Centre Against Sexual Assault 
(CASA) workers in various locales around the State and a focus group with Sexual 
Assault Crisis Line (SACL) workers. These interviews provided another perspective 
from professionals who work directly with survivors and provide advice and support 
about their reporting options which at times bring them into direct contact with police 
through the reporting process. 
 
Data analysis methods involved statistical analysis of survey responses, using the 
SPSS software package. In conjunction with GTM, MGT and Grid Analysis, 
qualitative procedures involved intensive coding and deep-level interpretive reading 
of transcription materials from focus groups and individual interviews. This 
qualitative analysis procedure relied upon specific methods of close, line-by-line 
reading (Charmaz, 2006a, 2006b) and researcher triangulation (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell, & Alexander, 1990; Minichiello, Sullivan, 
Greenwood, & Axford, 2004; Moran-Ellis, Alexander, Cronin, Dickinson, Fielding, 
Sleney, & Thomas, 2006; Patton, 1990; Perlesz & Lindsay, 2003; Richardson, 2000). 
Appendices one to five inclusive contain further details of strand one data collection 
methods. The entirety of strand one research was undertaken over the period 2009 to 
the beginning of 2011.  This data analysis stream focused on victims/survivors’ 
reporting and non-reporting from the viewpoint of victims/survivors, CASA and 
SACL views on reporting barriers, as well as police perceptions on barriers. Strand 
one analyses and findings are reported in Chapters Three to Five inclusive. 
 
Strand one qualitative analysis was undertaken by the whole team of researchers in 
five two-day team workshops with additional support from a short term Research 
Assistant employed for this aspect of the project. This team approach involved three 
primary techniques used concurrently in grounded theory – coding, memoing and 
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diagramming (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) which is underpinned by multiple layers of 
reading by researchers within a GTM framework, with stringent adherence to in-depth 
coding methods to ensure the highest levels of quality and triangulation.  In respect to 
the coding activities, where researchers identified material in transcripts that was 
interesting but not linked to any theme, it was bolded so that other team members 
were alerted to it. Similarly, for any insight considered unique to that particular 
interviewee but was of interest, it was underscored in the text. This enabled the team 
to consider any similar phenomena if found in other transcripts. Thus, items of 
interest were bolded and highlighted initially that were not at that stage considered a 
theme but might become a theme or phenomenon of interest. Memo writing aids the 
exploration of commonalities and differences in the data and provides hypotheses or 
questions and reflections (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1998). Diagramming results in 
visual representations of the relationships between codes and categories generated 
from the entire data pool and assists in the identification of relationships between 
concepts and categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). This process was of 
particular relevance when comparing interview and survey data from victim/survivors 
and interview data from police members and counsellors.  The methods employed 
facilitate and optimise rigour, credibility, dependability and transferability of findings 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). The approach and method of analysis and coding 
included the follow considerations and applications. 
  
Team members initially undertook verbatim transcription of all interview/focus group 
materials conducted with victim/survivors, police and CASA counsellors with some 
out-sourcing of interview transcription. While labour and resource intensive this 
enabled deep engagement with the material and the value in terms of research 
outcomes was significant in terms of contributing to the quality of analyses. First 
level coding of themes was started individually on the transcripts. With completed 
transcriptions we came together as a team in the first workshop to complete first level 
of coding of interview data. Team members then met for two days of intensive team 
work on the second deeper layer of analysis where themes from the victim/survivor 
interviews were written up for the team to discuss, with a drawing out of the themes 
for further discussion and analysis with new themes also identified, discussed and 
recorded. The research team developed major codes and drew sub-codes and sub-
themes from the major codes. This was ongoing for the next intensive team 
workshops. 
 
The next two team workshops brought together the transcripts of interviews with 
police and CASA/SACL focus groups which had already been coded and analysed by 
two researchers in 2009. This data were examined for common themes and then 
juxtaposed to related codes from the data themes taken from the victim/survivor 
interviews and some survey data. This saw the start of triangulation of codes and 
development of new codes. 
 
Amid the team workshops preparation was undertaken of several significant Briefing 
papers for Victoria Police based on the first two layers of analysis. Preparation of the 
Briefing papers assisted in further development of themes because it enabled the team 
to draw together identified and emerging themes and link them to literature.  
 
Another two days of intense team work involved sharing transcripts among team 
members to double check coding and enhance understanding of context. This was a 
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further phase of team member checking to ensure context and correct theme 
identification and where themes had multiple themes within particular issues 
(thematic complexity).  This also involved team member checking of the police and 
CASA files.  
 
Between team workshop meetings tasks were delegated for drawing together thematic 
matrixes and sharing them among the team. Deadlines were set to prepare Excel and 
word documents of the themes and analysis to share among the team prior to each 
next team workshop. Excel spreadsheets were prepared in the form of data analysis 
grids (Hurworth, 2000). Respondents were listed down the first column and remaining 
columns served to identify themes and issues. Quotations and paraphrased excerpts 
from interviews were entered into each cell as appropriate to each respondent. This 
allowed eye examination across all respondents to extract patterns for each 
theme/issue. In this fashion pattern-matching was facilitated across the respondents 
and across the data sources, thus providing for a highly robust and rigorous analysis, 
triangulated by method, data and researcher. 
 
A final intensive two day workshop was devoted to a close line-by-line reading which 
has been described by Charmaz (2006a, 2006b) as a valuable heuristic device to assist 
with deep analysis. It was particularly labour intensive and required completion 
outside of the workshop. Charmaz (2006a, 2006b) has talked about the value of line-
by-line analysis in order to be really alert to how the data speaks and access all 
possibilities and this enables a more critical reading as opposed to just reading 
‘chunks’ to look for an obvious theme or concept. This final reading revealed another 
theme and identified further examples for other themes. It could not be completed 
over two days and continued among team members for a full three weeks before a 
final meeting. This meeting saw the development of a more comprehensive and 
detailed tool consisting of word documents listing themes and quotations that  could 
then be matched against similar themes and quotations in companion documents for 
police and CASA. 
 
It should be noted that the intensive two day team workshops involved approximately 
12 hour days of reading and working on a whiteboard and butcher’s paper. The 
Project Manager looked after the research team to ensure tea and coffee etc were in 
the room, which was a key aid to keeping team members fresh and focussed on their 
work. The lead Chief Investigator built in a few short, time-out sessions as part of 
ongoing self-care for team members. Some of these sessions were creative and 
involved activities such as going to a quiet nook alone with a pot of tea or cool drink; 
viewing of visual and inspirational photos and validations to support team members 
and take the mind off the data; and going for a short walk etc. The main daily breaks 
were for lunch and an evening meal. On occasions the team met after dinner to do 
further work on the transcripts. Additional self-care sessions were in-built to each 
workshop and involved a trip to a health-therapeutic massage/relaxation service 
where each team member received individual relaxation therapies. In addition, access 
to confidential debriefing was made available for students and staff throughout the 
life of the project. These activities served well to facilitate the self-preservation and 
emotional stability of the researchers on such a sensitive topic.  
 
The above approach is highly valued in research. It is highly regarded for its research 
validity, rigor and reflexivity and it is a highly developed form of triangulation. Team 
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member checks of transcripts and coding via the swapping of transcripts, line-by-line 
reading and whole-team analysis are solid devices to reduce researcher bias and 
enhance coding validity, accuracy and rigor. It is a form of researcher triangulation, 
and this methodology is noted in the work of Patton (1990), Minichiello et al. (1990), 
Minichiello et al. (2004), and Perlesz and Lindsay (2003). Triangulation is considered 
a key strategy in qualitative research to increase rigor and trustworthiness of the data 
and it is employed and recommended by major social theorists such as Miles and 
Huberman (1994), Richardson (2000), and Moran-Ellis, Alexander, Cronin, 
Dickinson and Thomas (2006). 
 
2.1.2 Strand two 
 
The strand two framework blended the complementary methodologies of Action 
Research and Critical Discourse Analysis (Dijk, 1998; Kindelove, 2005) within a 
Case Study approach (Campbell, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1989; Sturman, 1997; Yin, 1994). 
This framework also utilised a battery of data collection and analysis techniques (see 
Appendices six through to 14 inclusive). Specific data collection methods included in-
depth interviews of police; focus groups of police and Office of Public Prosecutions 
(OPP) personnel; discussions with key informants (police); and close reading of 
Victoria Police LEAP case files (hereinafter called ‘case files’) as well as of Victoria 
Police policy and procedure documents. Data were collected by three researchers 
from 90 LEAP case files, 28 AO interviewees, seven RO interviewees, two IO focus 
groups, three key informants, and one OPP focus group. Key analysis techniques 
included GTM, MGT and GAM as described above; Critical Discourse Analysis 
(Dijk, 1998); and case vignettes, frequency data analysis, and document and content 
analysis (Hagan, 2003; Neuman, 1997; Neuman & Wiegand, 2000). The period of 
strand two data collection and analysis was from December 2010 to December 2011. 
(The period of data coverage began earlier – see Appendix six). This data analysis 
stream focused on police decision-making within a networked policing model (Bayley 
& Shearing, 1996; Shearing & Wood, 2000). Strand two analyses and findings are 
reported in chapters seven and eight. 
 
In regard to the case file study, a total of 1000 files were selected from a population of 
approximately 3000 files covering the period 2004-2008. Selection was based on five 
criteria: organisational region and unit, both authorised and non-authorised Briefs; 
cases proceeded and not proceeded with by the OPP; and those that resulted in both 
successful and unsuccessful prosecution. Following requests to the police officers 
who held these 1000 files, copies of 481 files were made available to researchers. Of 
these 481 files, 90 files were selected to ensure coverage of the main decisions 
involved in police authorisation and Brief preparation processes and these 90 files 
were scrutinised and analysed in considerable detail (see Chapter six). Police 
interviewees and focus group members were selected with the advice and assistance 
of VicPol research and police personnel. The OPP focus group members were 
determined in negotiation with the PJO Project Head. Police key informants were 
found via researchers becoming familiar with various police during the research. 
 
The Case Study approach is used in several branches of social science, including 
Anthropology, Sociology, Social Work, Education and Business Management, and it 
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has been extensively developed and utilised in educational research, especially in 
relation to schools. There are a number of conceptualisations of types of cases and 
their uses and a sound treatment of these can be found in Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison (2007, chapter 11). In respect to the case files, present research adopted an 
approach drawing upon several elements of this methodology. The case files were 
examined for narrative accounts (Yin’s 1984 descriptive case study) that are 
ethnographic in nature (Merriam, 2002), with an action research intent (Sturman, 
1997), and where a large number of cases are analysed individually and as a collective 
(Stake, 1998). Although 90 cases is not a sizeable number in quantitative research, it 
is a very large number indeed for undertaking in-depth qualitative case study research. 
Due to this and other exceptional features of the PJO case study research component – 
including the quantity, variety and complexity of data sources and items within the 
files – an extended explanation of the case file research procedures is provided in 
Appendix six. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis is a complex form of research which is generally agreed 
to involve the cultural aspects of language and human communication, and not simply 
accepting at face value nominal or obvious meanings (Dijk, 1998). It involves a form 
of content analysis that requires examination of the contextual aspects of a message, 
not just the message itself. In the present research effort, critical discourse analysis 
involved a process of ‘de-layering’ or ‘digging beneath the surface’ of the text of 
narratives in the case files to understand the construction of messages and their 
purposes and to discover underlying rationales and meanings. For example, in the 
case files this meant examining not only the formal written reasons for the decision to 
prosecute or not to prosecute, but also other reasons that could be inferred from the 
details of the case at hand. That is, as well as clearly stated reasons, readings sought to 
discover reasons not formally stated for (non-)authorisation. De-layering essentially 
involved searching for reasons that underpinned formal rationale statements wherever 
those reasons might be deposited in the case file documents. It also involved 
discovery of non-verbal, contextual aspects of documentation and argumentation in 
the files that structured the messages of authorisation and non-authorisation. This 
enabled a deeper appreciation of the nature of case file discourses, their latent 
meanings, and their consequences for victim in terms of the continuation or 
discontinuation of sexual assault complaints. 
 
In this endeavour researchers conducted a close reading of the case files. This 
involved an intensive, line-by-line scrutiny of case file documents, with the making of 
detailed observations and notes. This allowed issues, themes and patterns to be 
extracted out of the myriad of data contained in the various sources through the above 
described GTM, MGT and GAM applications. (The use of GAM in this respect varied 
in its particulars as described in Appendix six). In turn, this provided a basis for intra-
case and cross-case analyses and hence a deep understanding of the police 
investigation and Brief authorisation process. 
 
As familiarity with the nature and contents of the files increased, what GTM 
methodologists call ‘theoretical saturation’ was achieved In terms of what the files 
could offer, what aspects were of greatest significance, how to extract the greatest 
value from the file readings and what were emerging as potential issues, themes and 
patterns not only at the individual case level but also across all 90 case files. Thus, the 
adoption of a GTM approach meant that the research could take advantage of the 
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saturation effect. The saturation effect occurred when, as additional case materials 
were examined, the sorts of data and insights became repetitive and new sorts of data 
and insights reduced to a minimum and eventually ceased. As a result there was a 
declining need to examine new cases, since they yielded little if any extra sorts of 
significant data and insights. With a GTM approach, therefore, there comes a time 
when further data collection and analysis is of no additional value. The saturation 
effect did eventuate and the case file research benefited in terms of enhanced internal 
validity. Appendices six through to 14 inclusive contain further details of strand two 
data collection and analysis methods.  
 
Authenticity, validity, and reliability of strand two case file research claims were 
addressed through the construction of a chain-of-evidence, researcher triangulation, 
and reliance on key informants (police). Additional validation was provided through 
methods triangulation, where strand two findings were consistent and corroborated 
across the case files, individual interviews, and focus groups, as well as over time. 
These measures are detailed further in Appendix six. Given these combined 
procedures, a high degree of confidence can be placed in the findings not only being 
accurate and reliable, but also being more widely applicable than to the examined 
cases. That is, it is reasonable to make the claim that external validity is also strong, 
and this claim is argued further in the text with reference to the more recent interview 
and focus group findings that supported case file results. 
 
2.1.3 Strand three 
 
The third research strand drew data and analyses from the strand two LEAP case files, 
AO/RO interviews, IO focus groups, one key informant, and the OPP focus group, as 
well as from a separate set of studies. The additional studies examined the 
SOCIT/VARE training course (Appendix 16 provides an outline of the course). This 
examination proceeded via an in-depth interview of two trainers; non-participant 
observation of 20 trainees within the course context; 60 trainee feedback sheets from 
three separate courses; and 44 on-line survey returns from trainees. The 
SOCIT/VARE data-collection was undertaken mainly by one researcher, together 
with a second researcher in the interview of trainers and a third researcher in the 
analysis. Further details on the SOCIT/VARE data collection methods are contained 
in Appendix 15. Analysis methods were the same as for strands one and two, with 
appropriate adaptations to the data source (e.g., observation data were hand-written in 
the first instance). The period of strand three data collection and analysis was from 
July 2010 to December 2011. This data analysis stream focused on the management 
of the police response to sexual assault complaints and its recruitment, training and 
development underpinnings. Strand three analyses and findings are reported in 
chapters nine and ten. 
 
The course was provided principally for police who were or would become 
investigators of sexual assault. However other police also attended as required, 
including supervisors of sexual assault investigators where those supervisors had not 
completed sexual assault training. The PJO program included examination of the 
SOCIT/VARE course that was run twice yearly in 2009 and 2010 and four times in 
2011. 




A total of 44 SOCIT trainees accepted an invitation to complete an online semi-
structured questionnaire about their experience of the course. The invitation was sent 
from one of the SOCIT trainers on behalf of the student researcher and project team 
and included a link to the survey. A follow up reminder email was sent to SOCIT 
Students on October 25, 2011. The survey tool was online from 29 September 2011 
and closed for submission on 4 November 2011. The sample contained trainees from 
each year of the course, 25% in 2009, 39% in 2010 and 36% in 2011.  
 
During each session and at the end of each SOCIT Course, SOCIT trainees 
anonymously completed and returned feedback sheets to SOCIT trainers for ongoing 
formative course evaluation purposes. Daily feedback sheets asked for a rating from 
1- 5 (with 1 being poor, and 5 being outstanding for content and delivery of every 
session. The feedback sheet questions are shown in Appendix 15. Feedback sheets 
provided a large space for comments relating to both content and delivery. An overall 
feedback sheet was provided to SOCIT trainees on the final day of the course, and 
asked for a number of ratings on aspects of the course content and instruction. Due to 
time and resource constraints, feedback sheets were collected in relation to only one 
of the two courses held in each year. This resulted in a variable number up to a total 
of 60 voluntary returns of feedback sheets per question for research analysis. 
Feedback sheet data were transcribed from every individual form provided to the 
SOCIT trainers to an Excel spread sheet, with a separate worksheet for every session 
delivered and a sheet for each question. A similar procedure was adopted for the 
observation, survey and interview data, all of which were entered into Excel 
spreadsheet formats dedicated to each source, with a subsequent collective analysis 
procedure as described below. 
 
A PJO researcher attended as a non-participant observer of the SOCIT course held 
from 16th July until 13th August 2010. The researcher was introduced as a PJO Project 
member who would be observing the course, and writing a report about it at a later 
stage. There were 20 trainees and they were asked to discuss topics openly. No data 
were collected on trainees’ age, personal identifiers, nationality, general and sexual 
assault policing experience. The focus was on trainees’ comments, questions, 
answers, discussion and general observations, which were recorded in hand-written 
notes by the researcher unobtrusively sitting at the back of the room. Casual 
interaction occurred between trainees and the researcher during ‘breaks’ including 
light discussion about the sessions.  
 
Two members of the four member SOCIT training team were interviewed in depth 
over two hours in October 2011. They reported extensive experience in the field of 
sexual violence, one from an operational policing perspective, the other trainer had a 
background in child protection and a degree in psychology. Both had been involved in 
the original design and further development of all education and training regarding 
sexual offences delivered to Victoria Police from 2009 until 2011. The PJO researcher 
was accompanied by Professor David Bradley during the two hour interview, which 
was audio-recorded and later transcribed. Responses and comments were transferred 
to a data analysis template and compared with other views and opinions data. 
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As with strands one and two, the strand three qualitative analysis procedure involved 
GTM, MGT and GAM, although data were collected according to pre-identified 
themes. The collected data from the survey and feedback sheet sources were entered 
into an Excel spreadsheet format dedicated to each source. Each spreadsheet listed 
respondents by ID number down the first column. Other columns were labelled for 
each analysis item, such as content, delivery, or relevance of a session, or course 
improvement comments. Data were entered into the cells of each respondent’s row. 
Cells included qualitative data such as quotations from a respondent concerning the 
content and delivery of a training session, as well as quantitative data such as ratings 
for content and delivery of a training session. Eye examination of cell quotations and 
ratings across respondents permitted analysis and understanding of commonality and 
variability of views, issues and themes. Each spreadsheet thus served the purpose of 
Grid Analysis (Bell et al., 2004; Hurworth, 2010). Data were also grouped into 
themes in Excel spreadsheets for analysis and triangulation with other data sources 
using GTM and MGT procedures. 
 
Similarly, from the non-participant observation of training sessions, the researcher’s 
hand-written notes of observations and comments of both SOCIT trainees and trainers 
were examined for differences and similarities of views, issues and themes. The 
transcribed responses of SOCIT trainers from the in-depth interview were inspected 
for their views as well. Data and findings from these sources were then compared and 
contrasted with those from the on-line questionnaire and feedback sheets. From this 
comparison/contrast across the four data sources a larger picture emerged of the 
SOCIT/VARE training course and its value to equipping trainees with the necessary 
skills, aptitudes and knowledge for investigating sexual assault complaints and 
preparing Briefs of evidence. This larger picture was achieved through the above 
noted MGT and pattern-matching procedures across the data sources. These 
procedures allowed the research to benefit from triangulation, thus adding to the 
authenticity, validity and reliability of data and producing robust findings. 
 
Quantitative analysis was limited to descriptive statistics in the form of count data and 
percentages. Inferential statistical testing was precluded by the small number of 
survey respondents and the lack of reliable information that could have warranted 
representativeness of responses.  
 
2.2 Ethics and Ethical Considerations 
 
Safeguards were appropriately undertaken in terms of consent, confidentiality, 
anonymity and other ethical issues. Researchers fully explained consent issues, 
verbally and in writing - Plain Language Statements - prior to subjects being engaged 
in research, along with signed consent forms. Anonymity was guaranteed and secured 
for all subjects of the PJO project. This was achieved for all subjects who took part in 
strand three research activities, including victim/survivors who completed the on-line 
survey and those who participated in the focus group and individual interviews, as 
well as CASA, SACL and police personnel. It was also achieved for police involved 
in forwarding LEAP case files; those who took part in the 2010 SOCAU/SOCIT focus 
groups, and the 2011 RO/AO interviews and the IO focus groups; those who were 
trainees in the These figures speak for themselves, with victims being concerned with 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 49 
what would happen not only to themselves in relation to other family members but 
also for the sake of other family members as distinct from their own welfare and 
acceptance within the family milieu. SOCIT/VARE course and its designers/trainers; 
as well as key informants. Similarly, anonymity was secured for the OPP lawyers who 
participated in the OPP focus group. Prior to any data-collection approval was sought 
and gained for each PJO study from both the Edith Cowan University Human 
Research Ethics Committee and the Victoria Police Human Research Ethics 
Committee. Appendix 17 carries a typical plain language explanation and written 
consent form in these regards. 
 




‘Adult Sexual Assault: An Evidence-based Policy, Practice and Advocacy Model for 
Victoria Police’.  Approval was granted from Edith Cowan University’s Human 
Research Ethics Committee, 9 October 2008 to 30 June 2012. 
  
Application 51/08 
‘Adult Sexual Assault: An Evidence-based Policy, Practice and Advocacy Model for 
Victoria Police’. Approval of two separate applications was granted from Victoria 
Police Human Research Ethics Committee, 8 August 2008 and 3 December 2008 to 
30th December 2011. 
 
2.3 Industry partner assistance and ground-breaking nature of the 
research 
 
Victoria Police as industry partner in the PJO Project supported the research by 
facilitating access to Victoria Police personnel as participants in the study. VicPol 
members assisted with police focus groups and individual interviews by preparing 
letters and emails to police, and arranging for room facilities. VicPol members 
prepared and forwarded letters/emails to police requesting copies of LEAP case file 
materials to be forwarded for researchers to examine under supervision at Police 
Headquarters. The then Deputy Commissioner sent letters to individual police 
members seeking their cooperation and a Sergeant followed up with reminder letters 
to maximise file materials returns. 
 
A major first for Victoria Police and for police research generally in Australia was the 
agreement to allow researchers to access non de-identified copies of police case files.  
Accessing copies of case files without this restriction allowed researchers to gain 
greater insights into case reports and police responses from the moment of report to 
case conclusion in terms of authorisation or non-authorisation. This decision was 
historical and monumental for both police and the research team and we are very 
grateful to the then Police Commissioner Christine Nixon and Principal Research 
Fellow David Bradley whose insight and support forged the way for this to occur. 
This process was not without difficulty. It required support from the then incumbent 
state government in terms of accessing material of this nature and the preparation of a 
specific and unique document signed by PJO researchers. It was this level of support 
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and belief in the value of this research held at the time by Commissioner Christine 
Nixon and then by Commissioner Simon Overland, that enabled this historic access to 
material to be realised. For that the project team is sincerely grateful. 
 
2.4 Comment on study limitations 
 
The PJO project was subject to a number of limitations, although some of these are 
arguably redressed by the many robust methodological features of the research. 
Moreover, the large-scale and unique scope of the project could have been expected 
to generate even more restrictions than eventually transpired. David Bradley, 
Principal Research Fellow with Victoria Police was the co-originator of this project 
with the Lead CI Professor S. Caroline Taylor AM.  Together they worked to design 
this 5 year project with its 3 unique research strands that would bring a degree of 
research depth and innovation of a scope, duration and scale never before undertaken. 
David was the Partner Investigator on the project from its inception. In March 2010 
David Bradley retired and returned to live in Scotland and while he has maintained 
strong links with the project and undertook a return visit to the project in 2011, his 
retirement left a significant gap in terms of having no partner investigator on the 
project. Complex and at times public, controversial organisational change occurred 
for Victoria Police over the life of the project which meant a project of this sensitive 
nature operating within several regime changes in a short space of time. The loss of a 
central partner investigator was felt by every team member. Personnel changes in a 
large and complex organisation like Victoria Police are to be expected and the project 
experienced significant personnel changes and short term personnel involvement in 
the project which on occasion influenced and impacted the project. Over the life of 
the project at least 20 different police officers and non-sworn police personnel had 
involvement in the project with three Commissioners of Police also across this time 
period. Notwithstanding this, we are grateful for the assistance we did receive and 
remain very grateful for the ‘virtual’ ongoing support and input we received from 
David Bradley from his new home in Scotland.  
 
VicPol LEAP case files were not randomly sampled and there was a low response rate 
of 48% of the 1000 files selected from the parent population of files, as explained 
above (see s. 2.1.2). There was a further reduction in the number of files to allow the 
intensive, line-by-line examination necessary to the deeply nuanced analysis involved 
in this part of strand two research (see s. 2.1.2 and Chapter Six). The examined 90 
files were also often missing important documents, a number of which were listed as 
destroyed, and sometimes files contained minimal documentation. In addition, only 
copies of the original case file materials were actually supplied to PJO researchers, 
which meant another source of potential error in the copying of documents from the 
files. There is therefore no measure of the extent to which findings can be 
extrapolated to the larger population of files for the study period (i.e., external validity 
is problematic). 
 
Against these riders, a number of features of the research ensured sound and widely 
applicable results. Several relevant selection criteria warranted the examined files 
were representative of the ‘best presented’ files in the parent population. Also, the 
large number of examined case files and GTM/MGT/GAM procedures enhanced 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 51 
authenticity, validity and reliability especially in view of the ‘saturation’ effect. As 
discussed earlier, there was also exceptionally strong triangulation at the levels of 
data, methods and researchers. The analysis was painstaking, robust and rigorously 
pursued within its parameters. Finally, the research eventuated in very substantial data 
collection and analysis, as demonstrated in the text. These aspects serve to strengthen 
the findings in regard to the case file analysis and other aspects of the strand two 
methodology. As Lord and Rassel (2000) suggested, statistical analysis is not an 
imperative to establishing worthy policy results.  
 
Researchers were also not allowed access to interview police officers who had already 
undertaken ‘Whole Story’ training. This meant that relatively few of the 300 odd 
SOCIT members were made available for interview in the 2011 strand two research. 
This limitation was also positively counter-balanced, however, by other triangulation 
methods in the form of the OPP focus group and interviews with ROs/AOs in 2011, 
key informants (police), as well as SOCIT/VARE training research sources. A 
number of police officers contacted PJO researchers expressing unsolicited concern 
that they were unable to participate as a result when they had been eager to do so. 
  
To this end however the PJO researchers were often buoyed and grateful for the 
unsolicited feedback received during the project from police via emails, phone calls 
and face to face comments, to either comment on the project and their perspective of 
its value; or to share follow up insights and comments they felt were relevant to the 
research being undertaken. 
 
In respect to strand one research, coordinated and consistency of support from police 
proved difficult at times due largely to constant changing of police personnel and non-
sworn staff. This impacted awareness of the online survey media campaign and 
lessened dissemination of the survey to victims by police. Still, as evident in the 
above account of strand one methodology and the relevant following text chapters, the 
response of victims/survivors was very pleasing and the survey results were 
accordingly very well grounded in a unique data source. 
  
Despite the challenges of this long and complex project, there were eventually a rich 
and rewarding composite of studies, an immense amount of data garnered with 
several rigorously employed methodologies, along with robust findings as a result. 
The following chapters present the substantive analyses, findings and 
recommendations and, as will be seen, the project has produced work that provides a 
substantial and strong evidence base for policy and procedural changes to aid 
VicPol’s ongoing commitment to improve its response to adult sexual assault 
complaints and victim/survivors’ needs. 
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3.0 Reporting and non-reporting by victim/survivors  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
There is a need to understand that persistent problems of non disclosure, delayed disclosure 
and under reporting are the greatest impediments to policing and the criminal justice system’s 
response to sexual violence. Research on complainants who delay reporting the offence is 
understudied, as is research on victim experiences of making a report to police (Connolly & 
Read, 2007; McLachlan, 2007; Taylor & Gassner, 2010).  
 
However, the available body of research evidence demonstrates clearly that the 
underreporting of sexual assault has a negative impact on both victims and society as a 
whole, and that there are numerous reasons why this happens, not the least being that the 
continued underreporting of sexual assault and social reproduction of rape myths undermines 
public confidence in the criminal justice system. The short and longer term health and 
psychological impacts for victims caused by sexual violence are well documented and make 
explicit the potential lifelong burden of ill health and negative social adjustment endured by 
victim/survivors (Ahrens, 2006; Taylor & Pugh, 2010; Taylor, Pugh, Goodwach, & Coles, 
2012). Research has also found impaired recovery risks for victims who did not report and 
concomitantly, such victims are more at risk of future sexual victimisation (Ahrens, 2006; 
Mackey, Sereika, Weissfeld, Hacker, Zender, & Heard, 1992; Miller, Canales, Amacker, 
Backstrom, &  Gidycz, 2011). These studies lend support to claims that victim reporting may 
assist in victim restoration whilst playing a preventive role in future sexual victimisation (see 
Mason, Ullman, Long, & Starzynski, 2009) 
 
Under-reporting of sexual offences is considered a problem driven by personal and/or 
systemic inhibitors. Personal inhibitors that prevent or delay reporting include victim fears of 
being disbelieved; of offender retribution, feelings of embarrassment or shame; rejection by, 
or loss of support from family and friends (Lievore, 2003, 2005a; Taylor, 2004b; Taylor & 
Gassner, 2010; Taylor & Norma, 2011). Systemic inhibitors or barriers are a lack of 
confidence in police or the criminal justice system more widely (Lievore, 2003; Taylor 
2004a, 2004b; Taylor & Gassner, 2010; Taylor & Norma, 2012) especially the legal process. 
Within this context we should note the role of wider society in terms of the maintenance of 
social attitudes and myths that negate the prevalence of sexual crimes and the credibility of 
victims who disclose. In essence, victims have internalized social attitudes that continue to 
question the veracity and credibility of rape disclosures and rape complainants leading to a 
fear of disclosure and non-reporting of the crime (Heenan & Murray, 2006; Neame & 
Heenan, 2003; Taylor, 2004a).  
 
This study builds on this knowledge in order to develop a new epistemological framework 
around what factors motivate and facilitate victim contact with police for the purpose of 
reporting a sexual offence and what factors, circumstances or considerations militate against 
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reporting. This framework takes account of the findings evidenced in the literature and in this 
study that some victims do not overcome barriers such as those just outlined while other 
victims either overcome or ignore them to report. Thus, barriers need to be understood as not 
the sole factors involved in reporting or non-reporting, yet they are clearly significant and 
need to be addressed along with other considerations to fully appreciate how and why victims 
come to report or not to report.  
 
This chapter focuses on the complex area of victim reporting to police and leads to Chapter 
Four which focuses on police views of, and responses to victim reporting. Non-reporting and 
delayed reporting prevents early detection of the crime and inhibits identification of victims 
and apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Consequently, statistics on sexual offences 
cannot reveal the full picture and scale of sexual offending and victimization. Given the 
recognition that so few victims report the offence to police, we should consider an ice-berg 
analogy when thinking about sexual offences, where at least two thirds of the size of the 
problem are submerged and obscured from view. Legal consequences aside, delayed and 
non-disclosure exacerbate victim trauma and compromise recovery and well being across the 
lifespan.  
 
As detailed in the methodology, qualitative and quantitative data were collected from 
victim/survivors who had reported their victimization to police and victim/survivors who had 
not reported their victimization to police in order to draw out a deeply nuanced understanding 
of decision-making around reporting and the process of reporting where applicable, from the 
perspective of victim/survivors. Topics included: the decision making process as to whether 
or not to report; barriers, dilemmas and facilitators to reporting and survivors’ perceptions 
and experiences of reporting.   
 
First there is a brief comment on the online survey from which the in-depth interviews with 
64 victim/survivors were drawn. The survey is attached as Appendix one. This is followed by 
a section that overviews the online survey results. The next section discusses in detail the 
reasons given by victim/survivors for not reporting sexual assault to police. The fourth 
section provides a detailed discussion of the reasons given for reporting. A fifth section is 
devoted to a number of findings and recommendations arising generally from the 
victim/survivor data sources. There is a brief concluding section that includes a summary of 
recommendations.  
 
3.2 Overview of the online survey results 
 
Thank YOU Caroline Taylor, Thank you! I took part in the Policing Just Outcomes 
survey today and at 41, finally, my experiences are of a positive value. Thank you, 
thank you, thank you! (email communication received by Project Manager June 4, 
2010).  
 
I am thrilled to find out this survey existed. Finally! What can I do to help! (SR 234)  




I think this survey is a fantastic idea. (SR 326) 
 
I think this survey is a great idea. (SR327) 
I was thrilled to find out this survey existed! (SR 234) 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this feedback.  (SR 233) 
 
The above written comments from respondents taking part in the survey are very pleasing as 
they indicate the unique opportunity offered through the survey. They are also a telling 
reminder of the importance of having authentic research methods to ‘hear’ what is said by 
victim/survivors and the quote below conveys a powerful message for the importance of 
survivors being able to access police and to receive respect and the utmost dedication to the 
delivery of justice:  
I wish I had the strength to follow through with reporting to police. I still hate myself 
for what happened and I'm scared. I'm confused and I don't know how to get on with 
my life. (SR 154)  
The survey provided a rich source of data that can be overviewed in terms of the 
demographics of the respondents, duration and dimensions of sexual abuse, the main 
reporting trends, fears held by victim/survivors about reporting, and multiple versus single 
incidents and the nexus of affective responses. 
 
3.2.1 Demographic description of the survey respondents 
 
A total of 336 respondents completed the survey. Statistical analysis revealed that just under 
60% of respondents recorded a metropolitan postcode with the remainder coming from 
regional/rural locales. Of the total sample: 
 
• 301 female respondents (88%) 
• 33 male respondents  (12%)  
• 2 missing data sets for gender 
• 14% of respondents were from a non-English speaking background 
• 2.4% of respondents identified as being Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
• 60.1% of respondents did not report the sexual offence to police with just under 40% 
having contact with police with regard to reporting a sexual offence. 
• Age range for entire sample of 336 respondents is as follows: 
At the time of completing the survey 50 years of age (18-68) with a Mean age 
38.6 (SD = 11.98) 
The age range for a first offence was 0-52 with a Mean of 13.5 years of age 
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The age range for those reporting a last offence was 5-57 with a Mean 19.78 
years of age 
• Respondents identified offenders were overwhelmingly male (91%), with very few 
female offenders (2.1%) and a small number of both male and female offenders 
(6.9%).  
• 72% of respondents reported multiple incidents of sexual violence as opposed to 28% 
who reported a single incident of sexual violence 
3.2.2  Duration and dimensions of sexual abuse  
 
PJO Researchers were interested in the duration of sexual violence as a plethora of studies 
highlight the capacity for sexual assault occurring in childhood to consist of multiple 
incidents and to occur over longer periods of time where the abuse is intra-familial (Taylor, 
2001; Taylor, 2004a). Questions were also asked about multiple offenders as this is also a 
terrible reality in the lives of many abuse victims (especially when the abuse occurs within 
the family unit, is repetitive and occurs across a continuum of time); the duration of time over 
which multiple incidents of sexual abuse occurred; and the number offenders and their 
relationship/connection to the victim. In the PJO online survey a total of 242 respondents 
(72%) reported multiple incidents of sexual violence. Questions 8 and 9 in the survey asked 
respondents for the year, or approximate, when the offences began and the year of the last 
incident.  
 
In the following analysis the concept of victim/offender constellation refers to the interaction 
of three dimensions: the degree of familiarity of the victim/offender relationship (e.g., family 
member, acquaintance, stranger); multiple incidents of sexual abuse over time; and whether 
there is a single offender or multiple offenders involved, either in the same offending 
episode, or over time with or without other offenders at any single incident of offending. 
 
A time variance analysis was undertaken with cross-tabulation of the following four 
variables: duration of abuse reported; reports of multiple incidents of abuse; victim/offender 
relationship; and reports of multiple offenders. Respondents where the offender was not 
related to the victim reported a mean length of abuse of 6.2 years. Respondents where the 
offender was related to the victim - fathers predominated as the reported offender - reported a 
mean length of abuse of 9.4 years. Respondents who reported multiple offenders who were 
related as a family member and not related as a family member but known to the victim, and 
were subjected to abuse by various offenders over time, reported a mean length of abuse of 
18.5 years. Applying Anova generated a statistically significant finding for duration of abuse 
and victim/offender constellation: F(2,201) = 24.10, þ < .05. Moreover, for respondents who 
suffered multiple incidents of sexual abuse it was more likely for at least one of the offenders 
to be related as a family member to them (35%) whereas of those who reported a single 
incident of sexual abuse the offender was related in only 3% of those cases.  
 
Keeping in mind the Grounded Theory approach of this research and the critical difference 
between statistical significance and meaningful significance, the following are inferences that 
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can be drawn from the above findings with a view to generating theoretical propositions for 
future research. These findings are interpreted to suggest that duration of sexual abuse is 
associated with the degree of familiarity of victim and offender, and with the likelihood of 
multiple offenders. The closer the victim/offender relationship the more likely the offending 
behaviour will persist over time and the more likely that this will not only result in multiple 
offending incidents but also involvement of multiple offenders. On this interpretation within 
a Grounded Theory framework, there is a suggestion of a widening of the offender circle over 
time as a result of the closeness of the victim/offender relationship. These results can be 
further interpreted to suggest that fathers in particular may introduce their victims to others 
for sexual abuse the longer the offending behaviour goes undetected and unreported.  
 
Theoretical and practical significance of offending duration and the concept of 
victim/offender constellation. From these inferences there is an important theoretical 
proposition to be drawn from the duration of sexual abuse and the victim/offender 
constellation: The closer the victim/offender relationship and the longer the sexual abuse the 
more likely that the victim will be subjected to both multiple offending and multiple 
offenders. This proposition has not previously been put in the research literature and it is 
clearly of great potential significance to police practice and intelligence gathering. It is 
therefore urgent that further research be conducted to examine the validity of this proposition 
and the extent of its import to policing of sexual assault. This finding has particular potential 
significance for police practice in terms of first responders and specialist police dealing with 
sexual assault complaints at the initial report by victim/offenders, which is discussed further 
below in terms of non-recording of sexual assault complaints (s. 4.5). 
 
Within this sample 43% of victims reported experiencing sexual abuse that began in 
childhood and lasted for more than six years. Overall 72% of this particular cohort of 242 
respondents experienced childhood sexual abuse for more than 2 years. Of 205 respondents 
who provided a year of first and last instance of sexual abuse, 43.% (N=88) reported 
experiencing abuse for more than 6 years and overall 72% of this particular cohort experience 
abuse for 2 years or more. These figures support the shocking reality that children sexually 
abused in childhood are vulnerable to not just ongoing abuse but also abuse by multiple 
offenders across their lifespan. Again, this finding strengthens the potential significance of 
the above proposition to police practice and demands urgent research attention to establish its 
validity and coverage. 
 
3.2.3 Main reporting trends 
 
The main reporting trends found in analysis of the survey data encompassed issues of 
reporting versus non-reporting, regret about the (non-)reporting decision, and recent versus 
historical reporting. 
 
• Reporting v. non-reporting 
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o 35% (130) of the sample respondents reported the sexual offence to police, 
with just over half reporting to police within the previous four years. 
o 65% (206) did not report the sexual offence to police. 
• Regret 
o Approximately 30% of those who did report the offence to police ‘regretted’ 
their decision to report. 
o Of the 206 that did not report to police, just on 60% ‘regretted’ not reporting 
to police. 
• Recent v. historical reporting 
o 27.3% of those who reported to police did not report within 72 hours of the 
sexual offence occurring. The overwhelming majority within this reporting 
category were reporting an offender either unknown to them or an 
acquaintance.  
o Only 0.8% reported within 4 to 7 days.  
o Only 4.1% reported within a month.  
o Only 5% reported with 2-3 months. 
o 10.7% reported 4 months to 1 year  
o 8.3% reported 2-5years later  
o 9.1% reported 6-10 years later 
o 34.4% reported the crime to police more than 10 years later.  
The above figures show that the majority of victim/survivors reported historical offences 
to police. This trend is in line with research generally that identifies the delay in 
disclosure and/or reporting of sexual offences. Also consistent with the research corpus to 
date, just over two-thirds of respondents chose not to report to police. That is, the survey 
results in this study support the significant ‘dark figure’ of sexual assault as a 
criminological maxim. Another significant finding is that twice as many victims regretted 
not reporting than those who did report their sexual assault to police. As will be 
demonstrated in later sections of this chapter, victim/survivors endure a range of social 
and health deficits as a consequence of non-reporting and delayed reporting that 
compound and exacerbate the trauma caused by the sexual victimization. Given the 
increasing focus on mental health and well-being this study brings into sharp focus the 
relationship between non-reporting and delayed reporting of sexual offences and its long 
term deleterious impacts for victim/survivors.   
 
3.2.4 Fears about reporting 
 
The severe residue of regret over non-reporting and delayed reporting is explained at least 
partly in terms of fears about reporting held by victims, these fears also being 
substantially documented in the research literature and again validated from the PJO 
victim survey results as follows. 
 
• Family related fears 
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o When the offender was reported as being related to the victim, 88.2% reported 
a ‘fear of family’ with regard to reporting/disclosing.  
o When the offender was reported as non-related to the victim 59.2% reported a 
‘fear of family’ with regard to reporting/disclosing.  
o 42.9% reported a ‘fear of losing family support’ if they reported. 
o 35.4% reported a ‘fear of family breakdown’ if they reported.  
• 53.4% reported ‘intimidation’ by the offender as a reason they feared reporting the 
offence. 
• 66.0% reported a ‘fear of not being believed’ with the result substantially higher for 
females (69%) than males (39%). 
• 66.1% reported ‘concerns for their safety if they disclosed. 
• 33.1 reported ‘concern’ for the safety of others if they disclosed. 
• 43.3% reported ‘experiencing fear’ of others finding out they had been sexually 
victimised. 
• 37.9% reported a ‘fear’ of losing friends if they found out. 
These figures speak for themselves, with victims being concerned with what would happen 
not only to themselves in relation to other family members but also for the sake of other 
family members as distinct from their own welfare and acceptance within the family milieu. 
This family fear consideration was significant even when the offender was not a family 
member. Other fears and feelings of intimidation were also clearly important to the (non-) 
reporting decision. The reporting decision and affective response are elaborated as follows in 
terms of a statistical analysis of the breakdown between multiple and single incidents of 
sexual assault.  
  
3.2.5 Multiple versus single incidents of sexual assault and the nexus of affective 
responses 
 
The majority of survey respondents reported multiple incidents of sexual assault (72%) 
compared to 28% reporting a single incident. In this respect, there was a question of whether 
there were any differences in terms of fears or concerns for respondents who experienced 
multiple incidents of sexual assault (MISA) as opposed to those who experienced a single 
incident of sexual assault (SISA). To answer this question a Chi Square Goodness of Fit test 
of statistical significance was conducted for each of the variables shown in Table 3.1.  

















76.5% 23.5% 66.71 238 .0005 
Feelings of 74.2%   25.8% 60.06 257 .0005 










26.5% 39.92 182 .0005 
Fear of not 
being believed 
 
76.5% 23.5% 61.94 114 .0005 




84.9% 15.1% 57.89 119 .0005 
Fear of losing 
family support 
 
80.4% 19.4% 52.93 85 .0005 
Fear of family 
members 
 
84.8% 15.2% 54.34 112 .0005 
Fear of losing 
job 
 
65.7% 34.3% 3.46 35 .063 not sig 
Fear of bringing 
shame to family 
 
78.4% 21.6% 35.76 112 .0005 
Fear of others 
finding out 
 
71.7% 28.3% 27.37 146 .0005 
Experienced 





13.76 188 .0005 
 
Table 3.1 shows the statistical test results for MISA versus SISA and affective responses 
reported by the survey respondents. Since statistically significant differences were found for 
all the variables (except the fear of losing a job) between those who experienced multiple and 
single incidents of sexual assault, it is inferred that affective responses such as fear, shame 
and guilt strongly influence victims’ likelihood of reporting or not reporting in accord with 
the MISA/SISA distinction. In turn, this implies that police charged with responding to 
sexual assault complaints need to be especially careful not to exacerbate or elicit latent victim 
feelings of these kinds, especially since the majority of sexual assault victims are likely to 
have experienced multiple victimisations. More importantly, it implies that there is a strong 
policy need to address these feelings via proactive outreach programs designed to encourage 
and support victim/survivors to report in the first instance. 
 
Affective responses such as fear have been reported widely in the literature as significant to 
the reasons why victim/survivors do not report sexual assault. There is also a potential 
linkage here between MISA, injurious affective responses and the above conceptual finding 
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of victim/offender constellation and offending duration (s. 3.2.2), and that could serve as a 
further extension of future research to benefit police practice. Current findings in relation to 
reasons for not reporting are now explored in greater detail in the following section. 
 
3.3 Understanding non-reporting by victim/survivors  
 
Utilising data from both the survey and in-depth interviews with victims, analysis and 
discussion now turns to the various inhibitors to reporting as well as victim considerations 
and dilemmas taken into account at the time and which influenced their non-reporting 
behaviours. Victim lack of trust or confidence in police and the courts is cited in scholarly 
literature as a major inhibitor to reporting sexual offences. Present findings lend some 
support to this argument however we found that this was one element of an overall bigger 
picture of barriers, dilemmas and concerns juggled and weighed up by victim/survivors. 
 
Fear and/or lack of confidence in the criminal justice system. Prior to any police contact 
current survey results show that respondents generally had a neutral or positive perception of 
police. Only 17.5% reported a fear of police as a reason that influenced their non-reporting 
decision, however a solid number of respondents reported a lack of confidence in police 
(39.9%) and the legal system (52.8%) as reasons against reporting.  
 
Some examples of the reasons given by survey respondents for fearing police or having little 
confidence in police or the legal system to respond appropriately are: 
 
Being bullied by defence barrister in cross examination. Fear of them getting away 
with it (SR 40).  
 
I didn't want to break up the family and I was told no body, including police would 
believe me, and [the offender] threatened to kill me (SR 66). 
 
Was worried police will not believe me (SR 138). 
 
I was afraid of the process I would have to go through and being re-victimised 
through the system and that the effect of the assault left me very anxious and 
depressed and not able to contemplate this process (SR 162).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police might wish to consider actively supporting 
research into linkages between offending duration, the victim/offender constellation, 
MISA versus SISA, and affective responses of victim/survivors of sexual assault. 
 
Implementing this recommendation has the potential to be highly beneficial to first 
responder police practice and criminal intelligence gathering in relation to sexual assault.  
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Because drugs and alcohol were involved, and I went willingly to the offender’s 
house, I didn't report because I believed there would be no conviction for a very 
harrowing process (SR 165).    
 
[I was] concerned they would lay (sic!) blame it on me (SR 218).   
 
I had concerns about how the legal system treats victims of abuse (SR 241).       
   
I believe the police would have taken the stance that I placed myself in the situation 
so "what did I expect" (SR 265). 
   
My friend reported to the police once and they were so unhelpful and the man who 
assaulted her got off free (SR 276). 
 
The judgement of being a sex worker. I was abused in childhood by an uncle but 
being a sex worker would only mean negative judgement by police and others (SR 
295). 
 
Recent rapes were by clients and a stranger. I'm a sex worker and police have never 
cared about me. Only in Australia does pizza come to your house faster than the 
police do (SR 334). 
 
I knew that reporting the incident would result in no action being taken (sex worker) 
so why would you bother (SR 336).  
        
In the individual interviews a number of participants expressed views in which they either 
had a perception police would judge them on their character or occupation or context in 
which the sexual offence occurred. Two participants reported they were raised in families 
where a fear or hatred of police was instilled as children, and this had a strong influence on 
their decision not to report (Transcripts 12 and 50). Mistrust of police was especially so for 
sex workers, women who knew the offender, where alcohol was involved, or no obvious 
signs of injury or other hard evidence was present. In these instances many women and some 
men determined that police would not respond appropriately to their report and so decided 
against reporting. It was also found for example that sex workers were highly unlikely to 
report sexual victimisation to police and this was due largely to both their suspicion of police 
and internalisation of self worth with regard to how they are viewed by police and the 
community as less deserving of protection and belief.  This trend is in line with other research 
(Halter, 2010; Matthews, 2005; Williamson, Baker, Jenkins, & Cluse-Tolar, 2007). These 
fears and concerns are supported by further discussion in relation to the literature presented in 
chapter seven, which reports findings from data analysis undertaken in 2011 from Victoria 
Police files, police interviews, and police and Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP) focus 
groups. Appropriate recommendations are offered in chapter seven as well. 
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3.3.1 Ignorance, minimisation and blame 
 
Key inhibitors to victim/survivors reporting sexual assault involved ignorance of the law, 
minimisation of offending, and victims erroneously blaming themselves for what happened 
or fearing others would blame them. 
 
Ignorance. It was of concern to the research team to learn how many victim/survivors were 
not sure if what had occurred to them was a crime or would be regarded as a crime by police. 
This belief was almost exclusively held by women in the study and led to non-reporting and 
minimisation of the offences. Some 28.4% of survey respondents were not sure if what was 
done to them was a crime and thus they did not report. The qualitative responses provide 
further insights into the reasons they were unsure or believed it was not a crime. 
 
I didn't realise at the time it were (sic) criminal acts (SR 8).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
I wasn't aware that it was sexual assault (oral). I blamed myself; he was my boyfriend 
(SR 169). 
 
I was unaware at the time that it was rape because he wasn't violent in the ordinary 
sense of the word and I was naive and uninformed (SR 180). 
 
I was not sure until I read a report this year that what happened to me is sexual 
assault. I was so afraid of this man that I just wanted to get away. I am dealing with 
the issues I have tried to ignore for 4 years. I hope you can help others who are in the 
same position as me (SR 187).  
I was unable to process what had occurred to me and thought it was my fault. I did not 
know that what happened was a crime (SR 225). 
   
Didn't feel like it was serious enough, didn't think it was 'assault' at the time 
(SR 268).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
At the time, I wasn’t aware that what was happening was sexual assault until years 
later (SR 280).   
 
Similar uncertainty was expressed by interviewees, for example: 
 
To me it would be like, if it was a stranger I could go to the police and report a crime, 
but being a family member I haven’t got a crime to report, it’s easy to call it a crime if 
it’s not a family member, if it’s like a stranger walking down the street or whatever… 
yeah that’s a crime and it’s not even going to be questioned by most people perhaps 
it’s not going to be questioned looking at the circumstances that it’s a crime (IIT 20). 
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In addition, some victim/survivors were of the understanding that sexual offences are 
governed by a statute of limitations with regards to the time lapse between offence and 
reporting.  
 
Not sure whether sexual assault can be followed up after such a long time (SR 23). 
 
During interviews with some women and men this question came up and researchers advised 
participants that there was no time limit for reporting a sexual offence.  
 
Minimisation, lack of injury and self-blame. Aside from ignorance of whether sexual assault 
was indeed a crime under various circumstances such as those described, many women and 
men in the PJO study minimised the assault, blamed themselves, or formed the view that a 
lack of physical injuries incurred somehow meant the assault would not be viewed as a crime 
against them. This form of self-censure was a strong thread raised in various ways, 
particularly through a dialogue of minimisation as a form of protection against the reality and 
trauma of what was done to them. These beliefs are influenced and mediated by societal 
attitudes and stereotypes about rape and sexual assault leading victims to second guess what 
they feel others might think or say and leading them to remain both silent and often times to 
minimise the harm and impact on themselves. The theme of physical injuries and ‘real rape’ 
is reported abundantly in the literature and this is discussed further in Chapter Six in relation 
to the 2011 strand two data analysis. 
 
What happened to me could have been worse, I did not think the case bad enough to 
report (SR 207). 
 
I was worried that somehow I was to blame for it (SR 275). 
 
[I felt] self loathing and self blame (SR 295). 
 
I think women always minimise what happened no matter how they put it, you still 
minimise it [even] as an adult. I generally take the rule that whatever women say it’s 
about double [worse]… [it] takes a lot of time for someone to work through [feelings 
of self blame] so they’re not sitting in the position of blaming themselves… I did this 
somehow, you know, I said to myself, “I’m to blame or I’m somehow responsible 
(IIT 7). 
 
[I didn’t report] because it was a very subtle kind of abuse in that it wasn’t violent 
sexual assault, so therefore it didn’t hurt me as such you know it’s wrong and its very 
uncomfortable but it’s not like its violent and caused injuries you can see (FGIT 2, 
participant 1). 
 
There were four separate incidents. One was when I was 15 and I was taken away to 
the bushes and raped and always felt it was my fault so I never called that a rape for 
many years (FGIT 2, participant 2). 




I often think back, well you know he didn’t kill me, it can’t have been that bad but at 
the end of the day… it destroys or affects how you feel about yourself, how you 
interact with people… it just destroyed my intimate relationships. It just has this 
insidious kind of [impact] (FGIT 2, participant 3). 
 
I just froze, I don’t know that I would be alive [if I didn’t]…. I just froze at the time 
and even though I hope that I am never in that situation again, I practice in my mind 
ways of fighting harder, of getting over that freeze, and ways of making sure that I am 
not in that situation again [because] I wasn’t bruised I wasn’t harmed so it didn’t 
really happen. To the rest of the world no harm was done to me, so if god forbid I am 
ever in that situation I will fight  my hardest, I will do everything in my power to 
make sure that I can be something other than frozen so I think that I would be fairly 
desperate.  People said, but you didn’t scream, you are not hurt, you can walk so 
people don’t believe you because you are not [injured]…. ( FGIT 3, Participant 2).  
 
But you minimise it like “I wasn’t injured. I’m ok. I’m alive” you try to dampen down 
the real pain (FGIT 3, participant 5).  
 
Because you do tend to block out events. But straight afterwards… you can minimise 
... [saying] hey I’m alive. But that’s, well that, that’s actually the, the… you know the, 
the best case [scenario], the, the worst case scenario while its happening is you’re 
thinking you’re going to be killed or die or damaged or be completely so powerless 
that you, that you split, you know. And so that traumatises you further “cos you have 
to reintegrate after you do the splitting and all of that stuff. So you know…. is this a 
bad thing? The only relation (sic) [it being] worse is being dead. So there’s, there’s 
the template, that’s the gauge you know, so that’s the gauge you’re using then, 
anything… to go, oh yeah I’m alive and I’ve got all my limbs, no real injuries and I’m 
still breathing so therefore... you’re all right (IIT 7). 
 
Fear of blame by others. A significant number of respondents and interviewees feared being 
blamed for the rape or assault and this prevented not just disclosure and reporting to police 
but for some it prevented any help-seeking in terms of counseling or medical aid for fear of 
being blamed for the attack. Comments such as those below were replete in the survey and 
expressed a theme by many in interviews. Interestingly the fear of being blamed or feeling 
blameworthy was more specific to females than males. 
 
My biggest concern was one going through the court case etc and getting no result so 
it would be a waste of my time and humiliate me. But the second concern that I would 
be judged is the worst and the strongest, I didn’t want them picking apart my life and 
laying some blame or responsibility on me I mean I already felt stupid for letting him 
in my house anyway (SR 218). 
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I believe the police would have taken the stance that I placed myself in the situation 
so "what did I expect" (SR 265). 
 
I think it’s because I felt guilty. I felt it was my fault for getting myself into a situation 
where I was vulnerable and [raped] … and because I felt so strongly that I would be 
blamed I couldn’t tell anybody else or [report], I couldn’t bear the thought that 
somebody else, like a policeman would put that on me, blame me, [because] then I 
would never be able to live with that feeling if someone else said it was my fault 
(IIT18). 
 
Life-long impacts. Feelings of self-blame and responsibility for being abused can have 
lasting, lifelong impacts as indicated by these interviewees: 
 
For such a long time I tried to figure out what it was I did that was so bad that would 
mean dad would hurt me so much. I finally stopped trying to figure it out. I thought it 
was a folk story that children internalize blame, but it isn’t. I was “bad” to dad, I 
wasn’t the daughter my mum wanted and now I am not the wife [husband] wants. I 
sometimes wonder why I was born (IIT 31). 
 
I just think…. you feel… in yourself you feel you’re a bad person. You’re a bad 
person for [allowing yourself to be raped], you’re dirty… you’re to blame and looking 
at it now… I have no courage… (IIT 32). 
 
Feelings of self-blame and minimisation not only prevented victim/survivors from disclosing 
and reporting but was injurious to their ongoing wellbeing. It highlights the extent to which 
victims internalize dominant social attitudes that hold victims accountable for abuse whilst 
also making clear the critical importance of delivering a community message that victims of 
sexual violence are never to blame, no matter what the situation, no matter what the context. 
 
Role of the media and popular conceptions. On a number of occasions victim/survivors 
referred to the role of the media in perpetuating negative stereotypes about rape through 
sensationalist reporting of stranger rapes or rapes involving sporting identities. They felt that 
this coverage militated against both community understanding that the vast majority of 
women are sexually victimised by men known to them and the reality that rape seldom leaves 
women with signs of physical injuries. This observation about the role of stranger rapes in 
popular thinking reflects the literature finding that stranger rape is far more likely to receive 
positive criminal justice response than rape involving acquaintance and family member 
offenders (e.g., Heenan & Murray, 2006; Lievore, 2005b; Spohn & Holleran, 2001) and it is 
reflected further in CASA interviewee findings (s. 5.1) and 2010 strand two research (s. 6.4). 
 




3.3.2 Nexus of affective fears such as stigma, shame and guilt 
 
Analysis of the survey and in-depth interview data revealed the large scale impact of negative 
emotions such as feelings of shame, stigma, stigma threat, and guilt experienced by 
victim/survivors, which impeded their capacity to both report sexual victimisation to police 
and to disclose to others. Feelings of shame and fear of being stigmatised resulted in 
significant isolation in terms of fear-induced silence and non-reporting (see also Weiss 2010, 
who identified similar findings).  
 
Stigma threat. A recent study (Miller et al., 2011) on stigma threat provides a useful heuristic 
framework to explore this phenomenon and its relation to sexual violence. As a construct, 
stigma threat relates to individual and collective social awareness of the harm of being 
stigmatised as a consequence of certain information or characteristics that ‘spoil’ the personal 
or group identity of people. Thus people avoid stigma and stigmatic labels by actively 
withholding or hiding certain information about themselves so as not to attract social stigma. 
It is a sad reality that rape and sexual assault continue to foster varying degrees of stigma 
upon victims and in some cases, their family members.  
 
Survey results showed 72.5% of respondents reported feelings of ‘stigma’ and 76.6% of 
respondents reported ‘feelings of shame’ as a result of sexual victimisation. Female 
respondents reported a higher proportion of feelings of shame than males. Some researchers 
believe feelings of ‘shame’ are more likely to be felt by women because ‘shame’ and its 
corresponding beliefs that cause rape victims to self-blame and fear the reactions of others 
are socially mediated through a gendered conduit (Weiss, 2010). Respondents were asked 
about seeking support from others in order to help them access police with a view to 
reporting sexual assault (question 21 of the survey). A t-test of independence was used to 
determine if there was a difference in the number of persons supporting them between those 
who reported experiencing stigma and those who did not. A statistically significant difference 
was revealed in the number of supporting persons between those who did not report feeling 
stigma (m = 6.06) and those who reported feeling stigma (m = 5.19), t(324) = 5.73, þ <.0005. 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake a publicity campaign to create 
awareness through the news-media, as well as CASA and similar agencies with 
information pamphlets, that sexual assault is a crime regardless of who is the alleged 
offender, that there is no time limit for reporting, that victim/survivors are never to blame 
for an offender’s behaviour, and that strangers being the only rapists and physical injury 
being necessary to establish the crime are popular myths. 
 
Aside from the direct benefits to increased reporting of sexual assault crimes, 
implementation of this recommendation would bolster Victoria Police’ current 
commitment to the Sexual Assault Reform Strategy (SARS) and immeasurably help 
promote a positive image of VicPol in the community. 
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This indicates that those who received more support were more likely to feel less stigma, at a 
very high level of statistical significance.  
 
In addition, respondents were asked their experience subsequent to reporting about lack of 
support from family, friends, professionals, community, work colleagues, employer and 
police (question 47g). Analysis of the survey data using Spearman’s Rho revealed a 
statistically significant correlation between reported feelings of stigma and perceived level of 
support or lack thereof in terms of the number of these seven groupings cited as not providing 
support (ρ = -0.31, þ <.0005). As the level of felt support increased victims’ level of felt 
stigma decreased. In this respect, a non-parametric test was used because the ‘total support’ 
variable was skewed and could not be brought into normality with a transformation. For the 
same reason a Mann-Whitney U test was used to investigate whether those who said they felt 
stigma would report having less support than those who did not report feeling stigma. Results 
indicated a highly significant statistical difference with those who said they felt stigma 
responding more often that they had less support (Z = -5.39, þ < 0.0005). Statistical analysis 
of the survey data also found a correlation between feelings of ‘fear’ and ‘shame’ connected 
to reports of being ‘less likely to seek support’ and less likely to report to police without 
external support.  
 
Importance of positive support from others. In essence, the research indicates a statistically 
very strong relationship between positive support from others in helping to reduce feelings of 
shame/stigma and thus to facilitate greater capacity to report the crime. Those who had 
stronger levels of support, especially from more than one source, reported less feelings of 
stigma. Those who reported little or no support reported greater levels of feelings of stigma 
and shame. Again bearing in mind the GTM inductive reasoning adopted here, as well as the 
need to examine these findings with more stringent and comprehensive causal models in a 
future research design, this complex potential relationship needs more research to validate 
this important emerging trend. Additional research is especially warranted in light of recent 
research that makes explicit the deleterious impact of shame as an emotional element that not 
only inhibits sexual assault victims from being able to report but has a debilitating effect on 
their health and emotional wellbeing (Weiss, 2010). 
   
Feelings of stigma/shame, levels of support and reporting behaviour. PJO research findings 
lend very high levels of statistically significant support to the role of shame/stigma and its 
deleterious impacts on victims in terms of their ability to report the offence to police or 
elsewhere disclose to others as reported by survivors themselves in the qualitative data. As 
reported below in terms of the qualitative evidence (ss. 3.3.3 and 3.3.5) victims’ health and 
well-being were also part of the complex relationship between shame/stigma and their ability 
to report. 
 
Furthermore, fear of stigma and feelings of shame by respondents as a result of sexual 
violence were woven through self reports of affective impacts such as self-blame, low self-
worth, low self-esteem, self-loathing, depression, self harm, suicidal thoughts and suicide 
attempts and other deep social and psychological wounding. These self-reports sat alongside 
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accounts of the impact of loss of support and connection to family, friends and community 
and the havoc it wreaked across their lives as highlighted in the following examples. 
 
[I felt] too ashamed to talk about it to anyone… Things may be getting different now 
but the shame of incest has been too much for me to bear. It has destroyed much of 
my life. I don't believe I have been the best wife or mother I could have been. I cannot 
talk about it to anyone because of the shame I feel (SR 21). 
  
I did not want my feelings of shame and humiliation to be reinforced or repeated in 
my dealings with the police (SR 233). 
 
Not for myself but perhaps other sex workers who have been raped by these same 
perpetrators as a result of my silence. There are many considerations in relation to 
reporting sexual assaults including history, culture, context, stigma etc. It's a complex 
issue. Any adult that knew me as a child should have known I was suffering from sex 
abuse due to my behaviour but no action was taken. There were many paedophiles 
operating in the area and I managed to find 3 of them so it was happening at home 
and in the community. How could the child I was trust any adult let alone make a 
police complaint and now as a sex worker how on earth can I tell police I am also 
being sexually assaulted by men when we are also paid for sex? (SR 295). 
 
[I feel] shame, because I feel I am a broken person and I feel I should cope better. I 
don’t apply this standard to others, just myself. I felt so much horror that I needed 
time to process the rapes as a kid and a teenager… because few people in my family 
treated [offenders] like criminals. I was ostracized from family gathering and 
[offenders] were not… it takes a long time to get the true non-mythical story from the 
self-serving delusions from your family and your community (SR 302).  
 
Yeah I am a pretty open, liberal about stuff, but there’s a huge embarrassment thing 
so shame really, I think shame is a public thing. Guilt’s private, but shame’s public 
(IIT 8). 
 
Interviewer: You haven’t reported to police. Have you ever considered reporting to 
police?  
Participant: Yes. 
Interviewer: What stopped you doing that?  
Participant: I guess a bit of shame (crying) (IIT 10). 
 
So I didn’t report due to shame… scared [of] my life being a free for all for so many 
people that I knew and worked with… (IIT 15). 
 
If you don’t tell your friends, how are you going to tell the police? You know because 
there’s the shame of silence, you hide it inside to protect yourself (IIT 25). 
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I had to get over the feelings of shame first, before I could tell anyone I had to deal 
with that and then think about how stigmatized I would be once I decided, you know, 
to speak out… the shame really stops you speaking out and you worry about how 
others are gonna, you know, treat you once they know (IIT 31). 
 
I didn’t want to cause my family to feel shame like I did because I knew it would just 
destroy them… it’s bad enough that I feel stigmatized without sharing the burden on 
them…. (IIT39). 
 
And ‘cos of that I didn’t want to (report) ‘cos it would bring shame on our name 
(FGIT 42, Participant 1). 
 
These self-reports and their implications could serve as the basis for more research focussed 
on the impact of stigma and shame to identify its duration and intensity and the journey and 
strategies used by individuals to restore and reform identity6. Fear of stigma and actual 
experienced stigma was a theme that emerged from the PJO project in interviews with 
victim/survivors. A pragmatic avoidance of social stigma is offered as one reason why 
women do not report sexual assault to police. Yet research might also explore the ways that 
the reproduction of a passive community acceptance of the social stigma (and social death) 




Notwithstanding this, many survivors reported the additional burden of stigma being a 
consequence for parents and family members – especially mothers - leading many survivors 
to the selfless decision to not report for fear of exposing the family to both public knowledge 
and legal process that they believed would both stigmatise and traumatise family members. 
As such this form of stigma threat became a militating element against disclosure and 
reporting. 
 
That girls and women internalise a sense of responsibility for sexual crimes against them is 
well documented in the research on sexual violence against women with examples 
highlighted in this study. Shame, guilt, and fear of social stigma act as powerful barriers to 
reporting to police. In Miller et al.’s (2011) work on stigma threat the researchers report that 
the fear of stigma is pervasive and the resulting barrier to reporting may also result in victims 
being re-victimized sexually. Their results “provide strong evidence that the threat of social 
stigma among female sexual assault survivors — not necessarily experienced stigma — is 
related to increased risk of future sexual assault” (Miller et al., 2011, p. 126). 
 
                                         6 Research on identity loss and restoration has already been undertaken by Taylor and is currently in press at the time of this report. 7 Note that Caroline Taylor is currently completing a manuscript developing a theoretical paradigm around social death post disclosure of sexual violence based on a large Australian study she undertook 2006-2010 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 70 
In a related vein this was often internalised by victims through what PJO researchers came to 
identify as self-censure - noted in the preceding section -where victims, in particular female 
victims, considered how others might view the crime committed upon them including 
concepts such as blame attribution, disbelief (especially in the absence of physical injury or 
forensic evidence) and awareness that their report may cause difficulties for others (such as 
family, work colleagues, friends) and thus censured themselves against disclosure and/or 
reporting. Self-censure also entailed a sense of self-blame, but for many this self-blame was 
driven also by a fear of stigma in how family and community would react to the victim’s 
disclosure of sexual victimisation (see next section).  
 
Several participants reported feelings of shame and guilt triggered by responses they received 
from police when they sought to report the offence or from friends and family when they 
disclosed. In either case, the inappropriate response shut down any intention the victim had of 
reporting to police. 
 
Yeah absolutely I felt very disappointed [with police response] but more than 
disappointed it made me feel guilt and shame and all of those things all over again 
because I felt like “What are you complaining about”? This was your husband this 
wasn’t real rape so all of those feelings that had made me so sick in the first place had 
come back (IIT 17). 
 
Nearly 80% of survey respondents reported feelings of ‘guilt’ as a factor that impacted their 
reporting decisions and while some who experienced feelings of guilt and shame did report, 
as the above example demonstrates, a poor or insensitive response by police sharply 
exacerbated and/or triggered feelings of shame and guilt for victim/survivors. Feelings of 
guilt were complex though, as indicated by the varying examples below. While many 
respondents and interviewees struggled with feelings of self-blame, shame, embarrassment 
and stigma, feelings of guilt were sometime tied to a sense of misguided responsibility that 
disclosing would cause others, especially mothers, to experience ‘guilt’ about the sexual 
assault of their children. Many also expressed feelings of ‘guilt’ as a consequence of non-
reporting, fearing their non-disclosure and non-report may well have allowed offenders to 
repeat their offending against others. 
   
I am ashamed of what happened and I feel, I felt guilty because I let it happen (FGIT 
20, Participant 5). 
 
While I still have family members alive, I didn’t want them to feel that they should 
have known and feel guilty for not knowing (SR 30). 
 
Unfortunately it happens a lot to young women that I [cannot] fully integrate the bad 
experience into my life without guilt and shame (SR 226). 
 
  I didn't want to tell my mum, she would feel incredible guilt (SR 145). 
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I sometimes wish that I had, for justice - so that he didn't get away with it so easily. 
But overall, I still probably wouldn't have simply to protect my family from small 
town gossip and to save my mother from experiencing the probable pain and guilt that 
a parent would feel (SR 180). 
 
There is the recurrent theme of victim’s blaming themselves for their enforced silence and 
taking responsibility for the protection of others. In a related vein, it was this feeling of 
responsibility to protect other known or unknown victims from a perpetrator that led many 
survivors, particularly females, to forego their own feelings of fear and their own feelings of 
safety or retribution, and report to police. They did so because they felt a social and ethical 
responsibility to protect others. The research team identified this concept as a form of 
‘symbolic protest’ and it is discussed further below (s. 3.4.1). 
 
3.3.3 The ties that bind: Family as a barrier  
 
As noted earlier (s. 3.2.4) an overwhelming majority of survey respondents reported being 
fearful of family member reactions to disclosure and/or reporting. Family members were 
identified as a major barrier to reporting to police and this barrier was not isolated to families 
from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds but rather a general trend not confined 
to any specific socio-cultural or socio-economic group. In line with the statistical reality that 
the majority of offenders are related to or known to the victim, the men and women in this 
study often encountered aggressive opposition to their disclosures of sexual violence by 
persons related to them. Notwithstanding this, many victim/survivors also encountered 
dismissive responses or responses minimizing the incident where the offender had no specific 
link or friendship to the family. 
  
Family responses. Families obstruct survivors through a range of responses. The most 
common responses being to disbelieve their disclosure; convey prejudiced views about sexual 
assault through minimising or trivialising disclosures; attempt to discredit survivor 
disclosures to other family members, health professionals or police; and threaten them with 
physical harm, expulsion from the family, or withdrawal of emotional support.   
 
Offender threats. Quite a number of female victim/survivors of intra-familial abuse spoke of 
the offender either threatening to sexually abuse their younger sisters if they did not succumb 
to repeated abuse, and/or the personal fear of victim/survivors that if they tried to prevent 
abuse of themselves, the offender would turn to their younger siblings. Taylor (2001, 2004a) 
has elsewhere noted this common theme in intra-familial abuse, especially where the offender 
is the father of the victim, as was the case for many in this study.  
 
Fear of the offender was a reason for both non-disclosure and non-reporting and not 
surprisingly this was heightened where the offender was a family member or well known to 
the family. In the survey 72.5% of respondents reported feeling intimidated by the offender. 
One respondent was fearful of reporting because they were aware the offender had a gun 
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license (SR 215). Others were fearful of the offender using violence against them, or they had 
experienced threats against them and/or had threats to harm their family, their pets or threats 
of them being killed (SR 15; 17; 31; 33; 91; 190; 196; 209; 210; 215; 228; 248; 264; 269; 
274; 277; 291; 292; 303; 313; 317; 324). 
  
He threatened to kill me if I told anyone (SR 33). 
I didn't want to break up the family and I was told nobody, including police would 
believe me, and [offender] threatened to kill me (SR 66). 
I’d been told by my father that he’d kill my mother and that he’d kill me if I told 
anyone and he was very physically abusive so I had this fear in the back of my mind 
that I couldn’t [report] (FGIT 35, Participant 1). 
Firstly he told me he would kill me but first he would kill my mother in front of me 
(IIT 44). 
 
Explicit threats of death to victims or their mother or other family member were terrifying 
barriers that inhibited reporting and disclosure either completely or for many years. As 
Taylor’s (2004a) work has revealed, these threats are sadly not uncommon but are often a 
standard tactic deployed by offenders, especially within the family unit. Police working in 
this field are generally cognisant of this fear and generally understand that these threats are 
not only terrifying for victims, but that offenders are capable of causing injury and carrying 
out certain threats made to victims (Taylor, 2004a, 2004b). 
 
Protecting family members, especially mothers. Sadly, but not surprisingly, it was not 
uncommon for victim/survivors to take on board a sense of responsibility for family unit and 
welfare, leading them to non-disclosure and non-reporting on the basis it would either 
distress, disrupt or destroy the family unit. In particular many victim/survivors sought to 
protect their mother. It was almost as though there was an implicit consensus amongst 
survivors that women bear the emotional burdens within the family unit and thus many 
survivors, especially females, sought to protect the feelings of their mother, especially if the 
abuse was intra-familial. This trend has been noted elsewhere by Taylor (2004a). The 
following are instructive examples of taking account of the welfare of the mother by non-
disclosure.  
 
My mum still doesn’t know and I won’t tell her because it will destroy her, it really 
will. And she’s… she’s in remission from cancer and her cancer’s brought on by 
stress (FGIT 35, Participant 1). 
 
My mum is great at being practical and pragmatic but doesn’t do well with emotional 
stuff and I was very protective of her so I didn’t tell her anything about anything that 
went on [because] it was too hard for me. I was looking after myself and my mum 
[and] my younger brother at the time… so it would have been just too much [to 
report]. I was struggling as it was (IIT 6). 




I don’t want to traumatize them [parents]… I haven’t told my own children cos I 
don’t want to traumatize them and I don’t want them to have to carry some of the 
trauma I’ve been through because what that does is that it means the perpetrator has 
damaged another person. If I tell [them], [they] go away with some information and 
knowledge that may damage [parents] emotionally… (IIT 7). 
 
It I sit down and talk about it with mum there is nothing she can do about it as such. I 
just think “Oh God, it would kill her to hear about it”, cos then there is the other thing 
where she would be like “Oh I failed as a mother and I should have been there” and I 
don’t want her to think about that. I would rather say that I was a bad, bad teenager 
[to explain behavior in adolescence] so she doesn’t have to feel bad (IIT 10).   
 
My mother is still alive and I have always said that while my mum is alive I will 
never come out and openly admit it. And I made my sister promise me that she would 
never, never, ever. I said what’s the point in making mum feel bad? (IIT 19).  
 
From a young age I remember protecting mum. I was, I know protecting my mum. 
She always had migraines and was often in bed with bad headaches, probably from 
the stress of living with dad (IIT 32). 
 
Fear of ruining family dynamics or feeling responsible for the potential reactions of family 
members loomed large in the decision making for many with regard to both disclosure and 
reporting the offence to police. 
 
I had concerns about destroying my family (SR 10).            
 
Maybe had I reported the situation, I would not have had the weight that I have borne 
all these years. It would have fractured the family at the time. But I was so young and 
confused; I tried to deal with it myself but actually did nothing except kept quiet. In 
hindsight, I should have reported it regardless of the outcome. It left me with no 
confidence or trust, questioning everything and everyone. Deep, dark secrets just 
make you bitter and twisted! I can't believe how I've tolerated family social events 
subsequent to that period. Fortunately, now, I have little to no contact... but I'm still 
hurt and confused by what happened. I've managed to bury the experience but as 
more and more is reported in the media in recent decades, I've had to confront issues 
all over again. So the experience is never really buried. It has certainly made me 
admire anyone who can verbalize their assault experience (SR 25). 
 
[I was] worried it would affect my family and would cause family breakdown 
(SR 94).         
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In the first case, I didn't want to upset my sister whose friend was the offender. The 
second offence was a different person, years later. I didn't want to stigmatise myself 
in my group of friends by reporting the incident (SR 118).             
 
[I feared reporting because it would be] breaking my parents' hearts (SR 147). 
 
Also the guy that abused me had a lot of heart conditions as well… and I’m thinking 
if my dad punches him it could potentially kill him, you know, and I’m thinking and 
then my dad’s gonna end up in gaol and it’s all gonna be my fault. And you know, 
you go through that whole scenario over and over… (IIT 5). 
 
I didn’t want to be responsible for taking away somebody else’s dad. I didn’t want to 
be responsible for ruining the relationship between me and my mum (IIT 21) 
 
I was really scared that if I reported it would ruin [my] dad’s business because we’re 
in a small community and everyone knows him…. (IIT 22). 
 
I was worried about… I know I should report but it feels like, I would have just sent 
my dad to gaol and I broke up my family again and my dad’s earning the money for 
my mum and sister, and now they’ve got no money but if he doesn’t go to gaol… (IIT 
24). 
 
My grandfather is one of the offenders and all my family love him so I’m scared that 
if I tell [family] it will destroy everyone’s relationship with him… and I’ll be the one 
blamed for that… (FGIT 23, Participant 3). 
 
Fear of negative family response. As the selection of responses below highlight, for many 
the fear was more nefarious in that they feared the response of their family and potential 
negative ramifications for themselves and other family members or had received a negative 
response and thus feared any further disclosure or reporting of the crime. 
 
I felt like it was partly my own fault. My father ridiculed me when I told him and I 
felt no one else would believe me either (SR 103). 
 
[I was] too scared of how [my] family would react (SR 157). 
 
[I] told mum 3 years after the fact and she said it was all over with now (SR 215).       
 
[I feared] getting into trouble from my father (SR 250).  
 
[My] parents were not supportive – [they said] “I must have brought it on myself” 
(SR 300).   
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Fear of the reaction of family members where the offender was within the family unit was 
significant. In the PJO online survey 89.8% of those sexually victimized by a family member 
reported they experienced family related fear about reporting, compared to 10.2% whose 
offender was external to the family. That is, those sexually abused by a family member 
reported far higher rates of family related fear with regards to reporting the assault to police. 
Receiving support from family is clearly important and family responses influenced the 
willingness or ability of so many survivors to feel able to report the matter further. 
 
‘Get over it!’. The tendency for families to believe that victims should ‘get over’ sexual 
assault was heightened in the case of survivors disclosing to family members after a delayed 
time period. Accounts were given of victim/survivors disclosing to parents and other family 
members only to be met with dismissive rebuttals. One young woman was told by her father 
to ‘get over it’ when she disclosed she had been raped three years previously (FGIT 24, 
participant 4). Another victim/survivor, seeking support and advice from her mother when 
she disclosed sexual assaults by a family member in her childhood received the response that 
as the abuse occurred years ago ‘it was all over with now’ and that the daughter should 
simply move on (SR 215). One interviewee received a particularly violent verbal response 
from her family at a time that she was near breaking point and felt a strong need finally to 
report the matter to police. 
 
I put myself out there to my mum and my brother and sister. I said, look I don’t know 
what to do anymore. I can’t live like this anymore, I need to [report] and my mother 
said to me, she said, “you’re just pathetic, you’re fuckin’ so pathetic. Get over it you 
idiot (FGIT 35, Participant 6). 
 
These dismissive responses impeded not just recovery but, for many, the confidence and 
capacity to report the offence to police. As one respondent stated ‘people telling you to just 
get over it never helps… ’ (SR 51). A poignant example is the woman with a history of 
sexual assault by several family members and friends of the family when the woman was a 
child and adolescent. One family member was convicted many years previously. At interview 
the woman discussed the personal pain and distress she endured because she was unable to 
talk to either family members or professional counsellors about having sustained childhood 
sexual abuse because her husband and adult children believed she should have ‘gotten over 
it’ now she was aged in her fifties. This was in spite of the fact that she suffered ongoing 
psychiatric illnesses and health problems as a result of the sustained childhood abuse. Her 28-
year-old son blamed her for ‘dragging down’ the family finances because she was 
psychologically unable to manage paid work and required ongoing therapy and on occasion, 
hospital respite. When her newest grandchild was born her son advised her that he did not 
want her to have contact with the new born child on the basis she was a ‘depressed 
grandmother’ and thus unfit to have contact with him and his newborn. When she was later 
hospitalised for medical treatment linked to her ongoing depression both her husband and 
eldest son refused to visit her on the basis her medical issues were impacting negatively on 
the family. The woman in this case believed herself to be a ‘burden’ to her family and a ‘poor 
role model’ of a wife and mother as a consequence of not being able to recover from a 
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childhood and adolescence of prolong sexual abuse by multiple sex offenders from within her 
family unit (FGIT, Participant 3). 
 
Delayed disclosure and ‘recovery’. Families can misunderstand delayed disclosure as 
somehow indicating successful ‘recovery’ and a cultivated ability to cope with the crime 
sufficiently enough to open up about it. Families may not understand that a victim’s 
‘recovery’ may be wholly unrelated to their motivation for disclosing sexual assault. On the 
contrary, survivors may disclose to family members precisely at a time when they find 
themselves no longer able to cope with the memory and feelings of victimization and thus, as 
Taylor has elsewhere noted, disclosure may be crisis driven and therefore the initial response 
and actions are critical to the survivor’s well-being (Taylor, 2004a, 2004b). 
 
One interviewee expressed the view that disclosing was something she did because ‘she 
could no longer face living anyway’ (FGIT 35, participant 2). Another woman spoke of 
having approached police in a disassembled psychological state after reaching the point 
where she felt no longer able to deal with life and felt unable to rely on her family for 
appropriate support and care (FGIT 23, participant 6). In the case of these two women, 
reporting was driven by personal crisis, and was embarked upon as a last-ditch attempt to get 
relief from the emotional and mental pain of living with the consequences of the crime. The 
comment by a survey respondent reflects something of the tenor of feelings endured by 
victim/survivors who encounter apathy and blame when they seek to disclose and to report a 
sexual offence. 
 
Actually I feel more anger than fear in relation to my parents not wanting to 
know about what happened to me and anger at those who blame the victims/ 
survivors (SR 255). 
 
Disbelief. While family members may adopt a disbelieving stance in terms of being unable or 
unwilling to understand the effects of sexual assault as being serious and far-reaching, 
survivors also spoke to researchers about family members expressing disbelief on the 
grounds that they were unable to see how they could have been unaware of abuse occurring 
within their own household. One woman recalled of her and her sisters’ disclosure of intra-
familial sexual assault to their parents that, ‘unfortunately… there was a lot of disbelief from 
our parents’. She speculated this disbelief arose from the fact her parents: 
 
were probably shocked and really unable to deal with the enormity of what was being 
told to them, and really hard to comprehend that this had been going on for a number 
of years in their home and they either didn’t see it or weren’t able to recognise the 
signs (IIT 2). 
 
Alternative resolutions. Even when family members do believe their relatives have been 
sexually assaulted, this belief does not necessarily prompt them to appropriately support 
victims in approaching police or seeking the help of social services. One interviewee noted 
that ‘[m]y mum thought what he [the perpetrator] did was a mistake and not like he had 
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murdered anyone, [and mother] was in the process of moving back in with him, and I suspect 
will support him at the court case’ (IIT 20). One respondent noted that her abuse occurred in 
childhood and her disclosure to her mother resulted in the mother seeking to deal with it 
personally rather than involve police which led to longer term feelings of distress for the 
victim/survivor (SR 51).  
 
Family members blaming the victim/survivor and/or siding with perpetrators. Family 
members may alternatively attribute the crime to the victims themselves. A survey 
respondent wrote that her family thought “I must have brought it on myself” (SR 300); and a 
survivor of extra-familial sexual assault noted that “[m]y father ridiculed me when I told him 
and I felt no one else would believe me either” (SR 103). In the aforementioned woman’s 
case, her grandmother told her she was the ‘evil’ one in the situation where her grandfather 
was abusing her as a child (IIT 2).  
 
The possibility that victims might report to police declines even further when family 
members ‘disbelieve’ their disclosures to the point where they openly side with perpetrators. 
In the case of sexual assault perpetrated by extended family members, there was evidence 
from interviewees that family members disbelieved survivors according to which side of the 
family (maternal or paternal) the perpetrator came from. In the words of one survivor: 
 
[M]y father absolutely did not believe that his own father, my grandfather, could have 
sexually abused three girls, his own three granddaughters. It caused such devastation 
really for dad he was absolutely horrified and I never actually spoke with dad directly, 
mum said to me that dad had said his father would never have done that, it’s just not 
true, and he actually said that us three girls were lying, we must be lying because his 
dad would not do that (IIT 2). 
 
Another survivor interviewed by researchers was conversely disbelieved by her mother who 
was the perpetrator’s sister, in spite of the fact that her father believed her. Her mother took 
active steps to protect the uncle after disclosure, despite the fact that he had prior convictions 
for sexual offences (IIT33). 
   
Even in cases where women have obviously nothing to gain and everything to lose from 
disclosing sexual assault (which was the case for many of our interviewees), family members 
may still remain skeptical. Published research by Taylor (2004a) is replete with detailed 
analysis of the familial fallout associated with disclosure and not only its impact on 
victim/survivors but its direct consequences and influences within the criminal justice 
process. PJO researchers heard many accounts of women and men disclosing to their family 
and facing a virtual interrogation by multiple family members who felt it was their right to 
denounce the allegations and conduct a kind of kangaroo court leading not just to further 
distress for the victim/survivor, but strengthening the battle lines that are so often taken 
among family members and friends. Should police become involved, they are often 
unwittingly caught up in complex and often hostile family dynamics that have a catastrophic 
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impact on the victim/survivor and others and very often impede and harden the task for 
police. This aspect will be discussed from the perspective of police in Chapter Four. 
  
One respondent feared not only the violent reaction of family members but a greater fear that 
reporting would not result in belief or protection, thereby making her situation as a child even 
worse. 
 
One of the reasons I didn't say anything to anyone was that I was scared what would 
happen if nothing was done and [I] still had to live under the same roof [as offender]. 
[Offender] drum it in you that you won't be believed and threaten more harm and 
there isn't enough information or evidence to know that the legal system will back you 
up (SR 66). 
 
This victim/survivor had a realistic appreciation of the possible consequences of speaking up, 
as shown in the following commentary and other examples from the strand one research. 
  
‘Social death’. In an all too common scenario made explicit by Taylor (2004a, 2004b) a 
number of victim/survivors were rejected wholly by their family post disclosure with what 
Taylor has described as a sense of ‘social death’ occurring in the lives of many as a 
consequence of broken and shattered family links. For some the varying degrees of 
exculpation from the family unit impacted on their help-seeking behaviours, including their 
capacity to report. The family rejection led to an extreme sense of isolation and fear as well 
as a belief that the loss of family support may well be interpreted by others as a lack of 
credibility about their abuse. The following examples are illustrative of this distressing reality 
in the lives of many survivors, especially those who experienced abuse within the family unit. 
 
My whole family rejected me. And so did every living relative, all my friends and 
family. None of them would have a bar of me from the moment [of disclosure]. It’s 
like I’d done this thing, and no, we’re not going to have this, you can’t break that 
secrecy… when [I disclosed] my parents got really vicious and assaulted me 
violently. So I ended up leaving home with a broken hand and broken arm… going to 
the police wouldn’t be an option for me now (IIT 5). 
 
I didn’t tell in order to protect my four younger siblings [from possible abuse by the 
perpetrator] but when I did eventually tell, I wasn’t believed… I made second, third 
and fourth disclosures but my family didn’t believe me and in the end I was fearful of 
what would happen… I don’t have that much support now (FGIT 23, participant 1). 
 
One of our young interviewees shunned by her parents and other family member upon 
disclosure and reporting to police found herself mired in family court and civil matters in 
order to obtain access to visit her younger siblings. More distressing was the fact that one of 
her younger siblings was suffering a terminal illness and was not expected to live long. This 
young woman reported the abuse for fear that the offender, her biological father, was likely 
abusing or would abuse her younger siblings. Refused any contact with her younger siblings 
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the victim/survivor was forced to go to court to obtain permission to contact her siblings and 
to see her dying sibling. Communication was restricted to phone calls and letters that were 
‘vetted’ by the victim’s mother prior to the siblings receiving them. While the victim/survivor 
in this case was able to visit her younger sibling before she died, she endured the harrowing 
experience of obtaining a court order to allow her to attend her sibling’s funeral, where she 
was the target of hostile reactions and isolation.  
 
Of particular distress to this young woman was the outright rejection by her mother and her 
isolation from her siblings and other relatives. On two occasions she initiated contact with her 
grandparents and while they spoke to her in a civil manner they were distant and cool and 
made it clear that they disapproved of her reporting her own father to police. Suffice to say 
that the victim/survivor feels unable to maintain any contact with them. The case is due to 
proceed to court and this young woman is very aware that she will face the ordeal without the 
support of any family and while she has resigned herself to this fact, it was evident that this 
complete loss of family connection, especially contact with her siblings has had a significant 
effect on her sense of identity and her capacity to trust others and form new friendships (IIT 
24). 
 
Police and court exposure of the family. Examples were given of family members being 
reluctant or fearful of police involvement and the potential legal processes that might follow. 
Some family members expressed concern for the wellbeing of the victim as a means of 
expressing reservations about reporting whilst others were concerned for themselves and the 
family having to be drawn into police contact or legal process and foisted these concerns onto 
the victim in an effort to persuade them against reporting. In a related vein to the earlier 
discussed notion of victim/survivors experiencing feelings of shame and the fear of stigma 
threat (s. 3.3.2), on occasion these elements influenced family members with regard to their 
willingness to support a victim to report the offence to police. One respondent spoke of her 
family’s ‘complete meltdown’ when she told them she was going to report the sexual abuse 
she experienced in childhood to the police. 
 
(T)hey didn’t want to know about it, they didn’t want me to do it, to go through with 
it, my dad said, we can’t handle it, we don’t want to go through it and I said to them 
“I can’t handle it. Sorry, it’s happening with or without you… I’m go to report it” (IIT 
15).  
 
For another interviewee, her parent’s concern that she not report the matter to police stemmed 
from her father’s insistence that she had somehow brought the rape on herself by ‘dressing’ 
in the manner that she did and attending a specific night club on her own (IIT 14). In this 
case, victim blame initiated by the attitude of the father led to family members being 
reluctant to support the victim’s desire to report the crime to police. Another interviewee had 
a very similar experience from her father upon disclosing date rape and advising her parent 
that she wanted to report the matter to police. Her father argued that she was at ‘fault’ for 
going out with a man she barely knew and to a place she was not familiar with, and that in his 
view police would hold a similar view of her report. As such she decided against reporting. In 
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another example, it was the interviewee’s sister who at first supported the victim/survivor to 
report the matter to police, however once the sister realized the extent of police involvement 
the sister not only withdrew support but verbally abused and threatened the victim/survivor 
against taking the matter further saying she would not be party to putting the offender in gaol. 
Feeling confused, distressed, frightened and isolated from support the victim/survivor in this 
case withdrew her complaint (FGIT 35, participant 1). 
 
Positive family reactions – the exception proving the rule? Not all family reactions were 
negative. However positive support from family members in this study was often the 
exception rather than the rule and it was more likely to occur in cases where the offender was 
external to the family unit. At times the positive support still involved a degree of caution as 
it did in every case, including negative family reactions, where the involvement of police and 
the potential legal component and public knowledge of the crime was met with trepidation 
and sometimes fear and even anger. This aside, a small number of interviewees reported 
parents being very supportive of the disclosure and follow up reporting, despite the 
‘overwhelming’ legal processes that may follow. 
 
I would not have contacted police if it were not for the support of my family. I had in-
fact hidden it from everyone except for one cousin and she therefore told my mother 
and then that is when we started to report it (SR 174). 
 
I am not saying it’s been easy but yes, I think my mum and dad have been really 
supportive. Obviously from a personal point of view there is going to be a part of 
them that is shattered because there is a primal thing about looking after your children 
(IIT 8). 
 
My parents have been great and really supportive, but they are just as in the dark as I 
am with [the legal process] and just as overwhelmed as I am a lot of the time at what 
we have to deal with and the fact they have to come along and sit through [legal 
meetings and processes] which are all pretty awful (IIT 18). 
 
For one participant, the support of her parents was most welcome, given that she had received 
negative responses from her friends and work colleagues; however she struggled with her 
mother wanting to tell others about the crime because of the associated media coverage of the 
rape at that time. While the interviewee knew her mother believed and supported her, she 
found herself at loggerheads with her mother’s desire to tell others that the case in question 
involved her daughter. The interviewee felt it was perhaps her mother’s way of dealing with 
the issue, however it meant that the privacy of the interviewee was lost and at times this 
caused her to feel anxious and depressed as she felt she had ‘lost control’ of who knew about 
the rape (FGIT 23, participant 2). 
 
CALD versus non-CALD family fears. Notably, there was a propensity across the PJO strand 
one study for counsellors (and police) to express a view that reluctance to report due to a fear 
of family member reaction was isolated to victims from CALD backgrounds. A belief that 
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family members may retaliate against a victim for reporting, or will not support them to 
report, or that a victim brings ‘shame’ to the family by disclosing sexual violence was most 
often connected to CALD families by counsellors and police. From the preceding research 
evidence, this is not borne out in interviews with victim/survivors themselves, many of whom 
reported family as a significant barrier and most of whom came from non-CALD 
backgrounds. 
 
Summing-up. For some, family dynamics and environment were contributing factors that 
militated against disclosure. For some, transient family matters created a sense of poor timing 
in terms of disclosing to family and pursuing a police report, while for others family 
problems such as the ill health or disability of a parent or sibling, led victim/survivors to 
renounce a desire to disclose or report the matter to police (examples include Transcripts 1, 2, 
9, 11, 12, 16, 23, 36, 39, 42, 44). Some spoke of not wanting to be a ‘burden’ to their family 
and in particular of not wanting to distress, upset, burden or cause feelings of guilt for 
parents, especially mothers. For others, factors such as parental unemployment or financial 
hardship were considered not conducive to disclosing and seeking to report the crime to 
police. In some cases, chronic family dysfunction was intuitively regarded as a reason not to 
add to poor family functioning. For many others, negative family reactions were not enough 
to stifle them from making the courageous decision to report, however PJO researchers also 
found examples where the report could not be sustained as a consequence of family members 
intensifying the pressure, threats or retaliation leading victim/survivors to withdraw 
allegations. Sadly, these various negating considerations also meant that help-seeking from 
professionals was also voided, leaving victim/survivors very much alone and dealing in 
fraught isolation with the trauma inflicted by sexual violence. 
 
These factors aside, as the interviews and survey revealed, the decision against reporting and 
disclosure to family was not taken lightly and the associated findings are almost unanimous 
in terms of the deleterious immediate and enduring impacts experienced by victims. It is a 
salutary observation that so many victim/survivors take on board consideration for the well-
being of parents and family at the expense of their own needs and well-being that lead to 
months, years and even decades of regret and various psychological and health sequelae. 
 
3.3.4 Fear of rejection by peers/friends and the influence of rural locale 
 
Family barriers aside, fearing the loss of friendship or social standing among peers and the 
community were very real for some victim/survivors and has been identified in other studies 
(e.g.,Vopni, 2006). More than a third of respondents in the PJO survey (37.9%) feared losing 
the support of friends if they reported the offence while 43.4% reported ‘experiencing fear’ of 
others finding out about their sexual victimisation. Further, comments were heard first hand 
from interviewees about their fears that reporting would expose them to a public knowledge 
both through gossip/discussion and media exposure that may well result in rejection, social 
isolation or judgement from their peers or others in the community that would affect them. 
Some respondents spoke of their fear of social isolation should they report (SR 49, 74). Some 
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expressed concern of being ridiculed, disbelieved or that their ‘reputation’ and social standing 
or that of their family may well be lost as a result of reporting.  
 
[I feared losing] my integrity and standing among friends and the community (SR 88). 
 
I was embarrassed about my peers not believing me about the sexual assault incident 
and I was blamed by this friendship group for disrupting the friendship dynamics of 
this teenage social group… (SR 226). 
 
Some victim/survivors from rural locales spoke of their fears of disclosing and reporting 
within a small community. Many elucidated that non-offending parents and other family 
members also feared the involvement of police and the legal process in a community where 
anonymity would be impossible and they would have to deal with a very real issue of 
community judgement and gossip. The difficulty of disclosing and reporting sexual offences 
in rural communities has elsewhere been discussed at length (Taylor, 2003-2004).  
 
[I did not report because I was] not wanting my family to be subjected to small town 
gossip (SR 180). 
 
 One interviewee commented that in rural areas the community: 
  
‘can be so naïve, they just think “nobody I know, it hasn’t happened to anybody I 
know” [and] for all [they] know it could have happened to someone they know [but] 
maybe they didn’t say anything… there is such a stigma attached to [sexual 
assault]…’ (IIT 21).  
 
Other interviewees expressed concern about the capacity to report in a rural locale saying: 
  
(The) country people’s mentality is still that, rape is where an intruder has broken in 
through your bedroom window and violated you and leave via the bedroom window 
again’ (FGIT 22, Participant 4). 
 
You just face the fact that you might not win at court. You are going to look like an 
idiot, especially coming from a small town like [names town]. Because you go to 
court and people know you there’ (IIT 39). 
 
3.3.5 Feelings of regret and guilt for non-reporting 
 
The majority of women in the PJO study had not reported the crime to police at the time of 
consultation. For most women, it was years if not decades since they had sustained the last 
assault. Survivors expressed a range of emotions, ranging from intense sadness, regret, anger, 
grief, confusion, and most of all a sense of a life diminished by the inability to report the 
crime to police. Some had disclosed to family, friends, and professionals, and some had their 
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disclosure rejected or minimised, with many experiencing levels of family rejection and other 
repercussions. In a related vein, PJO researchers were touched by the sad and often poignant 
self-blame and self-recriminations expressed by very many victim/survivors for their inability 
to report the crime to police. 
 
The nature of victim/survivors’ guilt. Many respondents spoke of their regret at not being 
able to report and linked this regret to feelings of ‘guilt’ whereby they felt their inability to 
report may have led to more children or women being raped and sexually abused and/or 
general feelings that the perpetrator was never made accountable. This misguided sense of 
blame and responsibility haunted many and was clearly something with which they continued 
to struggle. 
 
My guilt was about other girls who were abused because I hadn't spoken to someone. 
I told people 15-20 years after it happened and found it had happened by the same 
offender to my sister and her friend (SR 11).  
 
I feel regret for not reporting it as I now know he didn’t stop at me and 
I thought I was the first in his line up (SR 24).  
 
I sometimes wish that I had, for justice - so that he didn't get away with it so easily. 
But overall, I still probably wouldn't have simply to protect my family from small 
town gossip and to save my mother from experiencing the probable pain and guilt that 
a parent would feel (SR 140). 
 
[I am] worried it may have happened to others and maybe I could have stopped it 
happening to others (SR 157). 
 
I was 8 years old, I didn't know what to do, and for many years I tried to pretend it 
never happened. It was a shameful secret I kept for 35 years. In many ways I would 
like to report it to police now but my self esteem and confidence is destroyed, and I 
am afraid it would destroy too many families. (SR 197).   
 
I should have reported it to the police because I am sure he has attempted or has 
assaulted again because I have read about it in the news. He actually got away with it 
again and I should have reported it in order to have stopped him, he hurt other people 
and it’s my fault (SR 200). 
 
This happened a long time ago. I would not want everyone I know to find out what 
happened. I feel very guilty that this person may have done this to others because I 
was not brave enough to report. I fear not being believed now as there is no proof (SR 
206). 
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At the moment I'm trying to find the courage to report what happened to me to the 
Police. I really don't think I'm the only one this happened to at the hands of this man... 
(SR 212). 
 
Maybe if I [had] reported it would prevent it happening to others but no one gives a 
damn about prostitutes getting assaulted (SR 294). 
 
[I regret not reporting]. . . other sex workers who have been raped by these same 
perpetrators as a result of my silence (SR 295). 
 
I guess it still resonates with me a bit because I still have done nothing really about it . 
. . I am angry these guys have got away with it. I was a young kid and they had 
control and power which I couldn’t do anything about, so for all I know they could 
have done it again and [yet] they could have been caught and they could have been in 
gaol... (IIT 16). 
 
I regret the fact that my fears about how my family would react prevented me from 
reporting and seeking some kind of justice… but my mother’s wellbeing had to come 
first… I don’t believe she would have coped with the knowledge or the legal process 
but I get angry, I don’t think the perpetrator should get away with it that easily… (IIT 
39). 
 
Denial also featured where women respondents in particular reported that they worked hard 
to block it out, like respondent 206: “I wanted to pretend it had never happened”, only to 
comment later in the survey about experiencing significant feelings of ongoing distress linked 
to the abuse and feelings of ‘guilt’ and regret of not being able to report (see s. 3.2.3). These 
conflicting emotions around non-reporting and feelings of regret and guilt form a significant 
theme throughout the findings. 
 
These expressions of regret were difficult to read and listen to also because they showed the 
great value that survivors attached to the act of reporting. In this light, the many barriers that 
currently stand in the way of women reporting to police are particularly lamentable for the 
compounding hardship they place on survivors of sexual assault. 
 
A consequential issue that resonated in interviews and online survey responses relates to the 
mental health and well-being of survivors who are unable to report their victimization. The 
burden that women bear across their lifetimes as a result of being unable to report sexual 
assault crime was illustrated in the comments of a number of survivors. 
 
I wish I had the strength to follow through with reporting to police. I still hate myself 
for what happened and I’m scared. I’m confused and I don’t know how to get on with 
my life (SR 73). 
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Maybe had I reported the situation, I would not have had the weight that I have borne 
all these years. It would have fractured the family at the time. But I was so young and 
confused; I tried to deal with it myself but actually did nothing except kept quiet. In 
hindsight, I should have reported it regardless of the outcome. It left me with no 
confidence or trust, questioning everything and everyone. Deep, dark secrets just 
make you bitter and twisted (SR 82). 
 
I wish I reported it when it first happened. Now I feel that if I had I could have done 
better in school and had a happier life (SR 124). 
 
I felt very guilty for a long, long time thinking about how I allowed him to ruin the 
lives of other young girls because [I didn’t report] and there was nothing that I could 
do. I tried to tell my parents but it didn’t work and so I did nothing... I should have 
reported it... (IIT 33). 
 
As the foregoing data and discussion in this section highlight, police must never under-
estimate how the capacity of their responses when skillfully and sensitively applied can 
enhance and restore aspects of well-being. Conversely, poor, insensitive and inappropriate 
responses can lead to secondary victimization of victims/survivors and perpetuate victim lack 
of confidence in the criminal justice system. 
 





3.4 Understanding the reporting experience  
 
A feature and strength of the PJO study was the focus on asking victim/survivors what 
facilitated and supported their decision and/or capacity to report sexual offences to police. 
Many studies have examined why victims do not report but few studies have examined 
appositionally victim behaviour that motivates or facilitates reporting (Taylor & Norma, 
2011; Vopni, 2006). Kelly, Lovett and Regan (2005) have noted the importance of a more 
nuanced understanding of what motivates victims to report will benefit police training and 
praxis, as well as policy makers to not only understand what motivates and facilitates 
reporting but also how to build on such knowledge in order to improve reporting rates. Kelly 
et al. (2005) observed that rape survivors may decide to report when they have a particular 
interest in pursuing justice for themselves or protection of others, though there remains a 
paucity of research and a lack of in-depth research around the reasons that motivate or 
facilitate reporting. 
 
It is notable that the findings of the PJO study reflect particularly the motivations of 
childhood survivors of intra-familial sexual assault in reporting to police, given that this 
RECOMMENDATION: All sworn police officers in the State of Victoria should be 
required to read and discuss at unit/team level the foregoing materials on why 
victim/survivors of sexual assault do not report the crime to police and their lived 
experience of not doing so. These materials should also be made available and utilized in 
the SOCIT/VARE specialized sexual assault training course. It is further recommended 
that these materials be available against the background of the research literature cited and 
discussed briefly in the Introduction and detailed further in later chapters of this report. 
 
Implementing this recommendation will serve to facilitate a widespread appreciation 
among police officers of the problems and dilemmas faced by sexual assault victims. It 
will thus deepen understanding of the courage and need for active police support of 
victim/survivors who do report. Implementation of this recommendation will aid 
enhancement of a learning culture across Victoria Police in relation to improving the 
criminal justice system’s response to sexual assault complaints in accord with the 
recommendations of the VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006). It will help 
support specialist police in SOCIT teams in their complex and difficult tasks of 
investigation and Brief preparation (see s. 8.3 especially). This recommendation should be 
considered conjointly with those made in later chapters of this report especially pertaining 
to the role of first responders, police sexual assault complaint decision-making processes, 
and the recruitment, training and development of specialist SOCIT police (see Chapters 
Six, Eight and Nine especially). This recommendation is further underpinned by the PJO 
research evidence on why victim/survivors report to police and their experience in doing 
so including both positive and negative police reactions. 
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population of women are even less likely than other survivors to report the crime and also 
less likely to participate in formal research (Taylor & Norma, 2011). The data as a whole 
generated by the PJO Project constructs a comprehensive and detailed picture of the reasons 
why this vulnerable group of women decide—perhaps counter-intuitively—to approach 
police. 
 
Findings from the in-depth interviews with victim/survivors and online survey have enabled 
PJO researchers to develop and build a theoretical framework that supports factors that 
motivated and supported the decision to report a sexual offence to police. Consequently, two 
important concepts were identified with which to discuss and analyse victim reporting 
behaviours. They are ‘symbolic protest’ and ‘responsibility, sacrifice, report’.  
 
Approximately one third of survey respondents made contact with police with a view to 
reporting the offence committed against them. As noted earlier (s. 3.2.3), nearly 30% of those 
who reported to police regretted the decision. Of the women in the current study who had 
contact with police, a significant minority described experiencing varying degrees of loss and 
grief as a consequence of reporting to police. As further detailed in the preceding section, 
many told of harrowing experiences as a result of family rejection, retribution by offenders 
and disbelief from observers. Many underwent court processes with few describing positive 
outcomes from such a process. Some were currently involved in investigations and court 
processes at the time of the interviews. 
 
In the PJO study victim/survivors made decisions to approach police even when they 
anticipated severe personal costs (e.g., loss of any contact with family members, fear for their 
own safety and well-being, being publicly identified and stigmatised), when they did not have 
family or community support, and in situations where they did not expect police or the courts 
to respond appropriately to their report, or see justice served.  
 
In interviews and focus groups, PJO researchers discussed with survivors the outcome of 
making reports and associated benefits and costs they bore as a result. Nonetheless, and 
perhaps counter-intuitively, many survivors concurrently expressed the belief that they had 
done the right thing in reporting to police and recommended other victims do the same. Of 
those survivors who reported an unhelpful or negative police response, many retained a 
strong belief that their decision to report had been the right one.  
 
3.4.1 Symbolic Protest 
 
To understand this apparently paradoxical position occupied by survivors, the present 
analysis draws on philosopher Hill’s (1979) notion of “symbolic protest” to describe a 
situation in which someone decides to take action against injustice heedless of the fact that 
the “perpetrators of injustice will not be moved, protest may be inconvenient or risky to 
oneself, and its long-range effects on others may be minimal or may include as much harm as 
help” (p. 83).  




Hill identifies four defining conditions of “symbolic justice”, but of particular interest here is 
his second condition, in which people protest injustice in spite of the fact that the “protest 
cannot reasonably be expected to end the injustice, to prevent its recurrence, or to rectify it in 
any way” (p. 84). Hill believes there is rational cause for people to protest injustice even 
when there is no reason to think the protest will change an unjust situation. Hill formulated 
his understanding of “symbolic protest” solely to describe the actions of people who protest 
injustice done to others, but it is contended here that his concept is useful also for 
understanding women’s apparent self-sacrificing decisions to report their own sexual 
victimization. Sexual assault survivors report the crime to police even while recognizing they 
are likely to be harmed by this decision through family rejection or public alienation, and 
even while recognizing that the perpetrator is unlikely to be brought to justice. 
 
The term symbolic protest is introduced to identify and analyse a key motivator for the 
reporting decisions of victims of sexual violence in our study. It is contended that reporting 
sexual assault crime to police is an important expression of “symbolic protest” at a criminal 
justice system that does not generally serve women’s interests. Women show great courage 
and self-sacrifice in reporting sexual assault crime, and three major factors are identified that 
motivate them to do so, namely: (a) the need to have sexual assault recognized as a crime and 
consequently have it reflected more accurately in crime ‘statistics’, and thus a sense of 
reporting as a civic duty; (b) a desire to raise community awareness of sexual assault; and (c) 
a desire to protect other women and girls, and thus motivated by a sense of selflessness and 
common good. The symbolic nature of women’s reporting of sexual assault is not generally 




Reasons given for reporting: 
 
• The vast majority of survivors said they did not view reporting as something that 
would personally benefit them but would benefit others – known or unknown to 
them - and benefit the ‘criminal justice system’ (‘altruism’). 
• Need to make the criminal justice system more accountable and contribute to 
more ‘accurate statistics’ (sense of ‘civic duty’). 
• To put it on record in case other victims now or in future come forward - to help 
police identify and arrest the offender/s and help past/future victims who may 
report. 
• Need to prevent further rapes being perpetrated upon others or fear of others being 
similarly victimised, whether perpetrator known or unknown (‘sense of 
responsibility’, ‘civic duty’ and ‘altruism’). 
• Knowledge of other victims (especially within family unit). 
                                         8 Taylor and Norma have published these findings in an international journal and presented them at several international conferences and to international police organisations. They have generated considerable interest among academics, police and policy makers.  




Barriers, dilemmas and fears associated with sexual assault and its impact on the ability to 
report and/or disclose did not markedly differentiate reporters from non-reporters. In other 
words, those who reported the crime to police were not individuals who had less concerns, 
fears or barriers than their non-reporting counterparts. Present findings make clear the tipping 
point for reporting was linked to the above mentioned factors and more specifically, 
knowledge of other victims, either first-hand knowledge or learned knowledge gained from 
mediums such as the media, family or community/social networks. This was especially so for 
victim/survivors when the offender/s was a family a member or well known to the family. 
The second major tipping point was a ‘sense of responsibility’ or ‘civic duty’ to prevent 
further crime, read as further victimization of other women and children. 
 
For some the report was historical, months, years or decades later but linked to the above. 
This knowledge/belief led survivors to set aside fears for their own safety and wellbeing. 
That is they did not overcome the barriers in terms of negating them; they reported in spite of 
them and many incurred layers of loss, blame, retribution and stigma. The driving factors 
outweighed personal costs. Where survivors sought family support to help them report, many 
experienced hostile or unhelpful responses, especially in intra-familial cases. In a high 
number of cases victim/survivors bore significant personal costs and this was sometimes 
exacerbated by a poor police response. 
 
Reporting as a form of altruism where the decision to report was motivated by a sense of 
responsibility or duty to protect or benefit others was a strong theme in the PJO study. Many 
felt anxious or fearful about reporting but did so in order to protect the interests largely of 
other known or unknown victims both in the present and the future. This sense of a greater 
good outside of their own feelings for privacy or safety or their fears was admirable.   
 
I am glad I reported to the police so that it is on record in case of future victims. 
However, in hindsight I would reconsider whether it's worth proceeding further as I 
have totally lost faith in the legal system (SR 40).  
I don’t regret reporting even though it was a horrible experience but I do 
regret that he just got away with it leaving the community at risk (SR 231). 
 
For me personally… reporting is pointless [but] it bothers me that he may be doing 
this to other people for sure and that would be the main thing that would drive me [to 
report] (IIT 6). 
 
Firstly no paedophile fucks just one kid. There is [sic] always others and as I got older 
I realized there obviously would be more, I could not be the only one… it was 
wonderful to have this release valve [by reporting]… I’ve played my part in the 
process, to have a taste of justice… to [report] it gets others talking about it and 
[perhaps] telling others and perhaps telling someone at some stage, because if you 
don’t you die a horrible slow death internally… so I thought well you know, [I have] 
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to use this opportunity… and its going to lead you to some not necessarily nice areas 
[but] life is different now [since reporting] and that is a good thing (IIT 8). 
 
I was sexually abused from about 8 through to 17 and I didn’t report until my thirties. 
No one knew till I reported it… it was just prior to me reporting it… I found out 
[offender] had been looking after my nieces so I guess that played on me a little bit 
and I thought, well if I could stop it from happening to someone else I should do that 
because I know how it felt to me. So, yeah, I was at home one day and was on my 
own and was thinking about it and I thought, I’m just gonna do it. I didn’t tell anyone. 
I just rang the police station and made an appointment and went in and made a 
statement (IIT 11). 
 
I felt a duty to put it, to put the experience where it belonged... with police so they can 
take action and get this guy and make sure he gets no other victims … (IIT Transcript 
29). 
 
I decided to report my experiences… I do not believe [case] could be readily verified 
as it was too long ago but I need to take a stand. I do not expect my [family members] 
to believe me but I need to do what I can to protect my niece. I am afraid of what this 
might cost me, but I am prepared to pay the price (IIT 31). 
 
I found out (family member had been sexually assaulted by the same offender)... and I 
thought, that’s it I don’t want to be a statistic. I’m gonna try everything I can in my 
power to do something about it... I knew it would be a harrowing experience [to 
report]... [but] whether it goes to court or whether it doesn’t I’ve done everything in 
my power, you know, to prevent [further rapes], to do the right thing by reporting 
(FGIT 42, Participant 2). 
 
This motivation to report out of a sense of responsibility to other women and girls 
is not uncommon. Jordan (2001) noted that one third of her interview respondents 
reported sexual assault crime to police out of a desire to “protect others” (p. 686). In the 
current research, this factor was voiced repeatedly and was often cited by survivors as the 
sole factor that had driven them to report. In other words, women expressed the view that 
they would not have reported their assailant to police if they had not become privy to 
information that he was targeting, or was likely to target, other women and girls. Many 
women cited the prospect of offenders being “locked up and off the streets and unable to 
harm anybody else for 5-10 years” as their only motivation in reporting the crime, even when 
they expected the reporting and court process would be personally detrimental (IIT 6). 
 
For others a sense of civic duty or responsibility to report was based on the view that the 
criminal justice system must be made more accountable, and society too, when it comes to 
the crime of sexual violence, with a number of survivors making comments that reflected a 
view that sexual assault crime must be officially recognized and recorded. Some had 
discussed their victimization with family, friends, counsellors, but, for them, this private or 
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domestic action was not sufficient in terms of where the story and reality of their experience 
should reside. 
 
I am glad I reported to the police so that it is on record in case of future victims. 
However, in hindsight I would reconsider whether it's worth proceeding further as I 
have totally lost faith in the legal system (SR 40). 
 
I do not regret my decision to report the incident to the Police because at least I am 
trying to seek justice and influence and have an input into the Justice system to try 
and improve outcomes for future victims of sexual assault and bring the offender to 
the attention of the Police in hopes that he will not reoffend (SR 74). 
 
It’s almost like I need to do it because no-one around me is going to 
do it, and in the end I’m going to have to do it, and also because I understand about 
how much more it’s important that we get the statistics right. If nothing else, I want it 
recorded for that reason, so the reality [of sexual violence] is being reflected 
somewhere (SR 79). 
 
Although I had a bad experience during my reporting to police I would always report 
an incident. It is important for communities and crime statistics that community safety 
is correctly reflected (SR 173). 
 
[E]ven if it took the rest of my life to go to court it doesn’t matter—it’s not the point. 
The point is reporting, the point is to let people know that this is what’s happening . . . 
they have the right to know (IIT 4). 
 
I  feel it’s like a duty I have to do... its [sic] been years of course but I feel the need to 
put this event where it belongs... with police and hope that one day if... there are other 
victims and I am sure there are, then my experiences are there and they might help 
others (IIT 29). 
 
(W)hilst I still wrestle with [reporting experience] I know that I have at least done 
what I could and I believe I have safeguarded my nieces from his sexual predation 
(IIT 31). 
 
I’m happy I reported because it puts [the offence] in a folder with police, so… you’re 
not only contributing to the statistics but it’s like I’ve placed it in a forum where it 
actually belongs because it was a crime. So even if it doesn’t go any further and it 
doesn’t get to court, in this forum [police] I’ve been able to put it down, as opposed to 
writing it down in a journal that’s home under the bed (FGIT 23, Participant 5). 
 
For many the act of reporting to police was understood as a social contribution of extreme 
symbolic worth, regardless of the outcome of their report or the personal costs they bore.   
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3.4.2 Reflections on and experiences of reporting 
 
Researchers found that “personal empowerment” needs such as the need for “closure” was 
articulated by women as reasons why they had reported to police. Overall, however, 
respondents cited this kind of “empowerment” need as driving their decisions to report much 
less than they cited considerations that reflected other concerns, such as a desire to protect 
others or a desire to inform the community about the prevalence of men’s sex offending.  
 
Making the crime real. For some reporting also enabled a sense of the crime to be 
understood in a more tangible manner – as a ‘criminal act’ and not simply a shocking, albeit 
secret incident that lives only in the heart and trauma filled memories of the victim. As one 
interviewee commented about her experience of finally making a formal police report, years 
after the offence:  
 
Suddenly, reporting made it real... putting it down in black and white actually means 
it’s... real... it’s tactile... it is evidence. This is what happened, actually happened to 
me... it’s a relief and validates me and what occurred... (FGIT 42, participant 3). 
 
Another woman reiterated this sentiment when she told researchers that her decision to report 
constituted “verification that you’re not mad. It’s verification that . . . this actually happened, 
it’s not in your head” (FGIT 35, participant 5). 
 
Protecting others. Even when women cited personal benefits as behind their decision to 
report, these benefits were often bound up with a desire to protect others. 
 
While I still feel that there is not much chance that my attacker will be arrested, 
charged and brought to court, let alone sentenced, I am certain that reporting to the 
police was a very worthwhile action. The response of police restored some of the faith 
in my community, and even generally in humanity, that was lost after the assault. The 
feelings of helplessness and futility were lessened and some power and agency were 
returned to me through my participation in the investigation and the police process. 
Most importantly, the act of reporting and the seriousness with which the police 
responded to my report ensured that responsibility for my assault was attributed to my 
attacker. They assured me, and their actions confirmed this, that I was not to blame. 
The power of these positive responses to heal some of the trauma cannot be 
underestimated. Thank you for the opportunity to provide this feedback (SR 233). 
 
I will go to the police and I will tell them I am doing this out of concern for my 
cousin… I will stick up for her, I will look after her… coming in here today [to the 
interview] has made me realize too that it is not just about protecting me it’s about 
protecting other people from him. Someone has to do it. I really don’t think I would 
feel good if I didn’t do anything about it knowing that he has got a young child in that 
house (IIT 33). 
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I feel a lot lighter than I used to. I feel like some of the weight’s been lifted but I 
know I have to finish what I’m doing before I can let go of this completely. I do, for 
whatever reason, I believe in the belief. I believe in justice, I believe that people 
deserve justice and I fight very, very hard for people that are suffering. And I thought 
one day, why not fight for yourself! I’ll continue on this journey until it is completed 
(FGIT 35, Participant 6). 
 
There were a significant number of interviewees who expressed the view that they did not 
regret reporting because it had allowed them to fulfill their sense of responsibility to other 
children and adults. One woman who had experienced child sexual abuse at the hands of a 
family member regretted that she had never reported it but said she felt powerless to address 
the abuse until the day she was contacted by another family member who advised her that 
one of her children had disclosed sexual abuse by the same family member who had abused 
her in childhood. 
  
that was it... the minute my niece called me and told me, it was the very next morning 
that I went to [police station] because I think the reality of the situation hit me: if I 
don’t do this and help [child victim] there is going to be other [victims] and she is 
child (IIT 4).  
 
Up until the time this woman found out about her own niece, she had been unable to 
overcome the obstacles that stood in her way of disclosing or reporting. However, her desire 
to protect her niece overrode the hardship she perceived she would face as a result of 
reporting not just her niece’s abuse but her own also. Her self-sacrificing decision in this case 
was clearly made on the basis of a deeply held belief that authorities should intervene to 
protect a child she became aware of as being sexually victimised. These data show that the 
decision to report can be dependent on circumstances that might change. In other words, at 
some stage in their lifetimes, any survivor may reach a point where they are strongly 
motivated to approach police, irrespective of the barriers that might have originally prevented 
them coming forward for week, months, years or decades. For authorities like police, this fact 
should be taken into account in devising strategies that aim to increase reporting rates for 
sexual assault. 
 
This study demonstrates that victim/survivors often seek to protect others through reporting 
to police, and that those they seek to protect do not necessarily have to be known to them. 
Even the expectation that the offender will target other children or women at random is 
enough to cause survivors to make a ‘split decision’ to subordinate their personal interests 
and needs and approach police, even after years of having kept their victimization secret. One 
woman in interview said she had not wanted to approach police because of the personal 
hardship she knew it would bring her. But she coached herself into a state of mind that 
enabled her to view reporting as something she was doing for ‘other people’ who she knew 
would have been victimised by him. 
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I just sort of made that split decision that yes I am going to follow this because I know 
other girls were involved so I just sort of kept that in my head that I am doing this for 
the other people that I know would have been affected by him (IIT  49). 
  
From their own experiences of victimization, survivors understand that girls in particular do 
not possess the ability to withstand the manipulation and deception that sex offenders 
exercise to commit their crimes (e.g., Armstrong, 1983;Taylor, 2004a). They therefore see 
their decision to report as undermining the power that offenders have in this regard and as a 
means of preventing the emergence of other victims. One woman discussed the fact that she 
knew that his [the perpetrator’s] good friend had just had a child.  
 
And I know how manipulative and smart he is and how easy it would be for him to do 
that to that child and I couldn’t have that on my conscience. So, that was another 
reason why I sought to report it (FGIT participant 4). 
 
Making others aware of the personal impacts of sexual assault. One survey respondent was 
clear in linking the personal effects of sexual violence on victims to her own decision to 
report the crime to police. Once again, the survivor in this case is cognizant that the act of 
reporting is not just about making the criminal justice system more accountable but to 
highlight to the community at large the impact upon the quality of life for victims. 
   
... the way in which it curtails the ability of women to live successfully in a 
society where they have been dealt a “life sentence” through sexual assault: Making 
the initial report provided my impetus to pursue justice not just for myself (my case) 
but equally for all those who have been affected by their own personal experiences of 
sexual abuse . . . [people need to understand the] magnitude of emotional impact these 
types of crimes have on victims, ie. : their entire lives are affected, their ability to 
cope with not only the normal, everyday experiences but also any additional burden 
placing weight on their capacity to show resilience, fortitude, continuity, even 
rationalism. It is a life sentence (SR 85). 
 
Making offenders accountable. Women were realistic about the fact that sex offenders were 
unlikely to discontinue their behavior unless the police or courts intervened. In the words of 
one woman: “to me it’s like the dog that bites. They do it once, they’ll do it again. [They] do 
it and get away with it, they’re gonna keep on doing it” (IIT 36). Another wrote that “[i]t 
keeps the perp[etrator] going by not reporting” (SR 4). 
 
Seeking to hold offenders accountable for their criminal actions did not, however appear to 
be based on an urge toward punishment or retribution. Rather, they were motivated by a 
desire to protect others or, as many commented, to finally free themselves of the terrible 
burden of secrecy that had infiltrated and affected so many areas of their lives. 
 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 95 
3.4.3 Police responses that validated the decision to report to police 
 
A number of interviewees expressed the opinion that they were personally validated through 
approaching police and that police had assisted them to come to terms with crimes that had 
been perpetrated against them. This was obviously a stronger theme among survivors whose 
experiences with police had been positive.  
 
Validation, personal empowerment and healing. One interviewee expressed this opinion 
vividly when she commented that: 
 
(I)n that first hour [of dealing with police] I reckon she [the police officer] got rid of 
80 per cent of my guilt and my grief [about the crime] … I felt that for the first time 
in my life, coming out of that police station, I noticed how I walked tall. I had always 
walked around with my shoulders stooped and my eyes lowered, but after reporting 
and having the police understand... to walk out of that building with that burden lifted 
off you is amazing and the other 20 per cent takes a while... to have someone believe 
you and be on your side and actually doing something for you. Even if it doesn’t go to 
court, just reporting it I think is a really empowering thing to do. It’s a very hard thing 
to do but just to hear someone say this is illegal and this is wrong, just to hear that, for 
that alone it was worthwhile (IIT 12). 
 
Another interviewee commented similarly: 
 
The first time I ever heard that officer say to me that it would go to the county court 
was the first day I actually realised the significance of what he had done to me, on a 
bigger picture, the significance of his actions and the significance of the person that 
he actually is, and that was huge to realise that, huge to realise that the county court 
would hear my case potentially. So I think until, ... if more women believed that their 
abuse was real and important enough... it’s healing, it’s empowering, it’s the right 
thing to do. It certainly gives back the shit that was given to you, back to the 
perpetrator essentially (IIT 4). 
 
Once again, the sense of personal empowerment and sense of some healing was expressed by 
a survey respondent who believed:  
 
(T)he act of reporting and the seriousness with which the police responded to my 
report ensured that responsibility for my assault was attributed to my attacker. They 
assured me, and their actions confirmed this, that I was not to blame. The power of 
these positive responses to heal some of the trauma cannot be underestimated (SR 
233). 
 
Another respondent sexually assaulted by a taxi driver contacted police only because of the 
positive support she received from her family, especially her father, and found the experience 
uplifting in terms of voiding her fears and concerns. 




My experience with the police since reporting the assault has been very positive. Prior 
to the assault I had not really had any contact with police. At first, I did not want to 
report to police because I expected that it would be a negative experience. I was 
aware of horror stories surrounding the response to rape victims and felt that if the 
police treated me poorly, dismissed me or did not believe me that I would not be able 
to cope with that on top of the trauma I was already experiencing. I did not want my 
feelings of shame and humiliation to be reinforced or repeated in my dealings with the 
police. My family however strongly encouraged me to report it, especially my dad 
who said things had changed greatly in police culture. Since reporting, I can say my 
initial expectations have been completely debunked. Throughout the process, 
although it has been very difficult to the extent of repeatedly re-traumatising me, the 
police have treated me with courtesy, respect and dignity. They believed my story and 
repeatedly assured me that this was a serious crime and would be taken seriously. 
Everything they have done since has confirmed this statement… I felt confident about 
the police process and this confidence was completely unexpected. I am now very 
glad that I chose to report to police and would now strongly encourage other victims 
to do so, also (SR 233). 
 
Echoing similar sentiments about the unexpected positive response from police were these 
two survey responses: 
I had never imagined how empathetic and supportive the police could be, nor how 
informed, nor how empowered they could make me feel. I have had a lot of 
councilling [sic] over the years (casa etc) but found that initial contact with the female 
police officer who specialised in this area was the most helpful and healing for me 
(SR 220). 
I didn't report the incidents immediately as I thought the police may not believe me or 
may blame me for what happened. When I finally reported it, the opposite was true - 
all the police I spoke to seemed to believe me straight away, they were very 
supportive and considerate of me and my emotions. Making a statement was easier 
than I thought - I had to come back several times but it was fine, I just talked through 
what happened, occasionally the police officer asked questions and everything flowed 
smoothly. Since making this statement I have a high opinion of police officers and I 
know I can count on them if anything happens in the future and they will believe me, 
help me and support me. I feel like they are on my side (SR 238). 
 
Survey data showed though that those who reported more positive experiences with police 
were often those reporting an offence by a stranger or person not related to or intimately 
known to them (see also ss. 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 5.1 and 6.4). Notwithstanding this point, these 
examples of positive responses from police had a powerful impact on multiple levels for 
those reporting. For some it enabled them, perhaps for the first time, to have someone 
sanction the criminality of the conduct, thereby reinforcing the victim/survivor’s 
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blamelessness; reducing levels of shame and embarrassment and giving back a profound 
sense of self-worth and dignity that had often been stripped away over the years.  
 
Police countering family negation. To their credit, some police, upon realising the fear some 
victim/survivors had with regard to advising their families of the report, took the initiative to 
go and speak to the family members in question. In a couple of cases this occurred in rural 
locales and was due largely because of the smaller size of the community which can be both a 
plus and a negative in terms of community knowledge and friendships. In one particular case, 
upon learning of the victim/survivors fears that her father may react badly to the news of both 
the sexual assault by a member of the community and that the daughter had reported the 
offender, the police officer attended the family home and requested a ‘quiet word’ separately 
with the father. The interviewee in this case found this of enormous benefit not just to her but 
her family generally as she found that her father handled the news much better and realised 
the importance of supporting both the daughter and the police in their investigation and not 
doing anything that might hamper police efforts (IIT 11). 
 
In a similar scenario a victim/survivor feared telling her parents that she had reported the 
sexual offence to police because of their opposition to her reporting the offence. Upon 
advising her parents that she had been in touch with police her parents became “angry” and 
reinforced very strongly their view that the matter should not be reported, but dealt with 
privately within the family. However, upon learning of this dilemma the survivor reports that 
the police officer involved in the case met with and “encouraged” the survivor’s mother to be 
“supportive” of the daughter and her decision to come forward and make a report to police 
(SR 177). This action secured much needed family support for the victim which was of 
paramount importance to her – as it is for all victim/survivors but sadly often lacking. 
  
Of interest also were comments from participants who were surprised and relieved to receive 
a positive response to police based on their preconceived knowledge and fear that police may 
not believe them or may be dismissive of them when they sought to report. Alternatively, 
there were many who experienced a negative response when they sought police contact and 
as such it highlights the importance of the first response victim/survivors receive from police 
as it can either make or break the courageous decision made to contact police. 
 
3.4.4 Negative police responses 
 
Many felt glad they had reported to police, even in cases where their experiences of 
approaching police had been a negative one (SRs 143, 165, 201, 231, 235, 247; IITs 23, 29, 
33, 36, 37, 39, 40; FGIT 51 participants 2 and 5). That said, many of these individuals were 
sad, angry and even distressed by the poor response they received from police at the time, but 
still believed that their actions in seeking to report was the right thing to do despite the 
negative response. Many believe they had succeeded in at least ensuring that something was 
noted with police and that other ‘good’ police would somehow utilise this information should 
the situation arise.  




Betrayal of trust and non-reporting. But for just as many, this was not the case at all. A 
negative response from police at the time of making a report resulted in many failing to go 
through with the act of reporting and others feeling a deep sense of betrayal of trust by police 
resulting in feelings that they would never again trust police or seek their assistance in future. 
 
I only regret [reporting] because I never thought I would feel like the one on trial or 
that the detective handling the case would be so incompetent and try to make light of 
it telling me I was young and can make a new start as though I could forget it 
overnight… The detective handling my case treated my mother and I like shit. He 
didn't care, didn't keep in contact. We had to keep chasing him up and he thought we 
were a nuisance. I was suicidal and he made comments to my mother basically saying 
I was mad and wouldn't have credibility in front of a jury. My father is a wealthy 
professional and the police seemed to believe him over me and my mother… (SR 18). 
 
I regret ever having made a police report because it has made me feel more angry and 
powerless to get justice. Because my case is historical (age 3 onwards) the police will 
not prosecute the offender due to lack of evidence. I have just become another statistic 
with my life in ruins and that monster gets away with it. I have a life sentence! (SR 
36). 
 
Police just didn't care - they were ignorant of my situation/feelings/rights. They did 
nothing due to sexism and because it was my husband they made it clear I had wasted 
their time! I now view police very negatively and do not trust them or believe they 
respect women or rape in marriage. And when others found out about what happened 
to me they judged me like it was my fault. I trusted police to go to them and they 
betrayed that trust and the respect I had for them (SR 88). 
 
The initial contact with police was traumatic due to their blasé attitude... I loathed the 
initial two policemen but have great respect for the officer who investigated the 
incidents. It is a pity that I was only treated well by ensuing officers. I felt like 
retracting my report when faced with the original two officers who seemed to me to 
be fatigued and not in the least bit interested in the events. Ironically, the first two 
officers were meant to be 'specialists' in the field of sexual assault… I would not 
recommend to anyone to report it. The humiliation, trauma and pain of the assault was 
exacerbated by my dealings with the initial police. A good deal of my counselling has 
been taken up by my coming to terms with my dealings with the initial police officers 
(SR 98). 
 
[Police] have not been in contact with me since I went in and told them. I now believe 
it was a waste of time going in there and telling them! (SR 120). 
 
I have a mental impairment and were [sic] worried about going to police at first but 
my friend said I should. I told police I have a psychiatric illness and take medication 
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and they treated me as though everything I said was suss [sic] or that I gave consent 
or something. I could tell they did not believe me but I went ahead and nothing 
happened. They didn't charge him and I think the offender just told them I am mad 
because I am on medication. Police should show more respect (SR 144). 
 
[I] just consider that the whole experience with the police was pointless & 
exhausting… my mother took me to the police station, I spoke with a "female" police 
officer who was not very sympathetic, had EXTREMELY poor interpersonal skills... 
she seemed to both my mother (who accompanied me) and myself to be blaming ME 
for getting drink-spiked, abducted and raped BECAUSE I WAS DRINKING 
ALCOHOL AND HAD BEEN TO A FEW DIFFERENT BARS/CLUBS that 
night...!! [original emphasis] (SR 147).  
  
I was treated by Police as though I was a hassle - as though they had better things to 
do than listen to me. They told me they would contact me but never did (SR 156). 
 
As with many situations in our communities, experiencing something first hand is 
often very different from perusing policy documents at election time! I had always 
believed it was an urban myth that police were [sic] uphold a judgemental attitude 
about sexual assault. The[then] Police Commissioner would have us believe that the 
force is progressive and fair and uncorrupted by personal beliefs, but unfortunately 
that is not the case… The sexual assault was demoralising and upsetting. The 
behaviour of the police was just disappointing (SR 173). 
 
I feel bad that other people might be hurt because I can't go back and report. I don't 
trust them. I'm angry that the chance I had to report to police was so upsetting I will 
never even think of reporting again (SR 310). 
 
My initial report to a [police officer] was entirely unsatisfactory.  Although head of [a 
particular] SOCA Unit,   [police officer] was cold, disrespectful and discouraging of 
my making a report. I was extremely distressed by the experience (SR 312). 
 
The testimony of the following survivor reflects her sense of ‘betrayal’ by police for a range 
of reasons to do with their handling of her police report, which was motivated by her concern 
for her young nieces. But she remains firm in her conviction that reporting the offence was 
the correct step in ensuring that at the very least there was awareness amongst some of her 
family about the potential conduct of the offender. 
 
Though I feel betrayed by the eventual way the police officer dealt with my statement 
and my case... I would still have taken the steps that I did because although I have 
now lost any place in my extended family, my integrity would not allow me to sell out 
the innocence and safety of my nieces in order to enjoy a position in a family... at the 
very least I have done something worthwhile for the future welfare of [nieces] and 
any future children [and] I cannot put a price on that (IIT 31). 




It is important for police, the criminal justice system and the community as a whole to both 
appreciate the significant barriers and fears that women ignored in order to report, the 
personal costs many bore as a result and the potential sense of empowerment it gave 
victim/survivors, not to mention the potential intelligence gathering opportunity for police.  
 
‘Responsibility, sacrifice, report’. In essence, survivors in our study underwent a process of 
what Taylor9
 
 has termed ‘responsibility, sacrifice, report’ where victim/survivors adopt a 
sense of responsibility, most often for the welfare and protection of other known or unknown 
victims or potential future victims; and determine that regardless of their own fears or 
concerns, that they have a duty to sacrifice their own concerns for the greater good of others, 
thus leading to them making a report to police. The courage of women and men to report, 
despite it not serving their interests, their well-being and in some cases their own sense of 
safety, marks the pivotal importance placed on the responsibility many felt to report for the 
sake of other victims, known or unknown, current or in the future. Police need to be aware of 
the enormous sense of personal sacrifice and courage entailed in this type of reporting and the 
fact that for many the decision to report is fuelled almost exclusively by altruism and as such 
victim/survivors in this category may be very fragile and in need of additional care and 
sensitivity to their well-being. 
CASA discouragement. It is also of interest that several victim/survivors reported that CASA 
counsellors had advised them against reporting from CASA counsellors on the basis that 
police were unlikely to either believe them or pursue the matter appropriately. In these 
instances it was as though counsellors were second guessing and anticipating the kind of 
negative police reactions they themselves are aware of as being levelled against victims by 
police. A number of police interviewed in strand one also commented that they were aware of 
CASA counsellors ‘talking’ victims out of reporting and believed it was based on counsellors 
having a negative and/or misinformed view of police. As commented on by Taylor and 
Gassner (2010) there is an inherent and real danger in applying ‘downstream’ reasoning in 
these respects.  
 
3.4.5 Changes in perception of police pre- and post-contact with police 
 
It was decided to analyse the survey data on respondents’ views about their interaction with 
police for the years 2005-2010 inclusive and Pre 2005. This decision was based on several 
key factors that would provide a useful gauge for Victoria Police in respect to the Final 
Report (2004) of the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s Inquiry into Sexual Offences. 
This Inquiry produced a discussion paper, preliminary report (2003) and Final Report (2004). 
The Lead Chief Investigator of this current study was a member of the Advisory Board for 
                                         9 Lead CI of the project Professor S. Caroline Taylor coined this term in 2010 based on the analysis of the given reasons, factors and dilemmas that motivated survivors to report a sexual offence against a background of seemingly in surmountable barriers and dilemmas and even where their personal safety and well-being may be jeopardised.  
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the duration of this inquiry, attending round table discussions hosted by the VLRC, 
contributing to the recommendations and dissemination of the report. The research team and 
Partner Investigator from Victoria Police agreed it was appropriate to consider this distinct 
timeframe as useful to Victoria Police policy and procedure development. 
 
The online survey asked respondents who had contact with police a range of questions about 
their perception of the responses they received from police. Questions were linked to the 
Police Code of Practice for Investigating Sexual Offences such as police providing service 
information to victims and treating them with respect (questions 25-36). Respondents were 
also asked about police maintaining regular contact with victims post a report, which is a 
requirement in the Code (questions 40-42). 
 
Respondents were asked about their attitude towards police before deciding whether to report 
(question 11) and after contact for those who did have contact with police (question 45). If 
their attitude did change respondents were further asked to comment on reasons for the 
change (question 46). With regard to changes in attitude to police pre- and post-contact the 
majority of survey respondents provided answers in the neutral to positive range in terms of 
their attitudes to police and this remained consistent for those who had contact with police.  
 
Questions 25 through to 33 were based on a Likert-type Scale and focused on perceptions of 
victim/survivors of the initial response they received from police. Analysis sought to 
determine if there were any significant changes in attitudes of police responses pre-2005 and 
post-2005. For this purpose t-tests were employed with pre- and post-2005 data. Statistically 
significant differences were found pre- and post-2005 in two types of police response: “police 
showed concern about my safety” (pre-2005 M=2.92, post-2005 M=3.42), t (127) = 2.11, 
p<.05; and “police explained to me my choices about going further with my report” (pre-
2005 M=3.05, post-2005 M=3.61), t (127) = 2.29, p<.05. From the surveyed victims’ 
perceptions these findings suggest police improved with regard to asking about victim safety 
and providing information on reporting options. Similarly, a very highly statistically 
significant improvement was also found for question 36 which asked respondents “did police 
give you information about other support services you could contact?” (pre-2005 M=1.71, 
post-2005 M=2.35), t (127) = 4.1, p<.0005. This finding suggests that police improved very 
significantly on providing information to victims with regards to accessing other services. 
 
In regard to changes in police attitude, data responses to questions 11 and 45 were linked to 
responses to questions 25 through to 36; and the latter were tested for inter-item internal 
consistency reliability using Cronbach’s alpha. A high level of inter-item reliability was 
evidenced with an alpha of .90. Alpha ratings of .70 are generally considered to be reliable. 
The high reliability rating indicates that participants’ responses were accurately measured and 
that participants took the survey seriously and did not answer in a random fashion. Internal 
consistency reliability tests are appropriate for attitudinal surveys, as they are able to 
establish at one testing if respondents are reading, understanding, and answering the 
questions in a consistent fashion. Test-retest reliability measures are not appropriate for 
measuring the reliability of constructs that may change over time, as it is impossible to 
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determine if variations in response are due to a non-reliable instrument, or due to a change in 
attitudes. 
 
Among the most important findings were those relating to police practice in terms of 
frequency of police contact with victim/survivors post-report (question 40); the value of this 
communication as ‘helpful’ to victim/survivors (question 41); and ‘confidence’ to continue 
with reporting (question 42). In relation to regularity of police contact (question 40) the data 
shows a change in the regularity of police contact with victim/survivors post-reporting to 
police from 2005 onwards. In respect to these three questions, question 40 was written in a 
way that lower numbers meant more contact with police; whereas questions 41 and 42 were 
written so that higher numbers indicated police were more helpful and made victims feel 
more confident, respectively. Spearman’s Rho was applied to the data set of these three 
questions. A statistically significant relationship was found between how often police 
contacted victim/survivors following the report and the victim/survivor’s feelings that police 
contact was helpful and, more specifically, helped them feel confident to continue reporting. 
In terms of the questions put, the more frequent the police contact with victim/survivors, the 
more strongly they agreed that contact was helpful (ρ = -.498, þ <.0005); and  the more 
strongly they agreed that police contact helped them feel confident to continue with their 
report (ρ = -.426, þ <.0005).  
 
Value of regular, helpful police contact with victim/survivors. The importance of these 
findings are that they provide evidence-based support for the value of maintaining regular, 
helpful contact and highlights its efficacious impact on the confidence and willingness of 
victim/survivors to continue with a reported matter; to essentially stay the distance in what is 
most often a drawn out and extremely difficult emotional process. This has strong relevance 
in addressing issues of attrition and victim’s withdrawing their reports post making a 
statement to police. This is also significant for police training as police have acknowledged 
that maintaining regular and helpful contact is an area in need of improvement. More 
importantly both victim/survivors and police in this study discussed the difficulties and 
problems of regular contact and its impact. 
 
It is easy to see from the above correlational evidence that police contact is related to victim 
confidence. While the ‘frequency’ was largely confined to monthly or 3 monthly contact and 
while victims highlighted the importance of contact, many still commented in the survey and 
in interviews that they would like the contact to be more regular. Moreover, a number of 
victim/survivors expressed their annoyance, disappointment and even distress at the poor 
level of police contact post-report with many commenting that they were often the ones 
chasing police up with phone calls and leaving messages and waiting weeks or even months 
before police got back to them. As a consequence, some discontinued with their report on the 
basis that communication was either so poor, unhelpful, or both, they simply gave up. For 
some, the fractured, poor and unhelpful contact led them to feel anxious, or express 
annoyance or a reluctance to engage with the police officer in question, which sometimes led 
police to accuse victims of being uncooperative or disinterested, or worse, to accuse them of 
lying or making a false report based on their apparent disinterest in police eventually 
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returning their calls or initiating contact months down the track (examples can be found in 
IITs 23, 24, 29). Many linked poor communication with unprofessionalism and rudeness of 
police as indicating that they simply did not care about a victim’s welfare or the case in 
question (examples include SRs 248 and 259 and IITs 23, 29) 
 
Many of the above examples from victim/survivors related to recent reports to police in both 
SOCA and SOCIT units. A specific case example of the dynamics of poor communication 
and its deleterious effects on reporting confidence is instructive in this respect. 
 
CASE STUDY ONE: The impact of irregular, unhelpful police contact 
 
 
One interviewee, a young woman aged only 19 with no family support reported the sexual 
offence to a SOCIT detective and since that time has found the process exhausting and 
difficult due largely to the poor communication and perceived lack of understanding of the 
officer involved. The victim/survivor has a restraining order against the offender who was her 
father.  Her family lived very near the police station where the SOCIT office was located and 
since reporting the victim had moved quite a distance away. The detective insisted the young 
woman in this case travel to the SOCIT office for meetings, despite the fact she had no 
vehicle and transport was difficult to arrange. She was also very fearful of traveling to the 
area given the fact her parents lived only a couple of streets away, but the detective was 
adamant that his work load did not enable him to travel the distance to meet with her. 
Mustering all her emotional energy the young woman travelled to the SOCIT office for the 
meeting only to be advised the detective had been called out and would not be available for 
the rest of the day. This caused the young woman enormous distress and she found police 
unable to understand the extent to which this had upset her.   
 
This young woman advised that she had to initiate much of the ongoing contact and was 
often left waiting months for a return phone call: 
 
I rang him in January and it’s what? now June and I’m still waiting for him to ring me 
back… it’s so annoying… and then when he does ring… I’d say well this has 
happened and this has happened, and he’d say, well why haven’t you told me? [and 
I’d say] because you haven’t returned my phone calls (IIT 24). 
 
This lack of contact and thus lack of confidence the survivor has in the officer and the 
process has been detrimental to the building of trust and understanding. The young woman in 
this case found herself accused of ‘lying’ to the detective when he rang her and requested 
detailed information over the phone relating to one of the areas in her statement. The young 
woman had a lot going on in her life at that time and became confused with what she was 
being asked and struggled to recall some of the details given they occurred nearly 8 years 
before, prompting the detective to accuse her of being difficult. 
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We had this conversation over the phone one day where he wanted me to give him 
details about something to do with what happened at primary school and I just 
couldn’t remember. It’s not that I didn’t want to give it to him, and he just got very 
annoyed with me and started saying that if I can’t answer my questions and you’re 
withholding information then obviously you don’t want this to go forward and why 
are you lying about all of these things and did you make it all up? Just tell me now it 
will be easier for you further down the track. I said, look, I have been going through 
this for 2 years with you and at first you believe me, now you are telling me that that I 
have made it all up… anyway I’m just not very happy with him (IIT 24). 
 
 
Perhaps the most distressing break-down in communication for this young woman occurred 
when the case was listed for trial. Advised of the trial date in a letter the survivor spoke to the 
detective the week before about the trial. With no family support and few friends she was 
extremely apprehensive about attending court, knowing that she would likely come into 
visual contact at least with family members. On the day of the trial she arrived at court and 
waited for several hours alone and very afraid. Fearful of why she could not see or contact 
the detective she became extremely distressed and was assisted by court staff who then 
advised her that the case had been adjourned for 9 months. This young woman had steeled 
herself for the commencement of the trial and had not been advised by police that the matter 
had been adjourned off. Phone calls to the detective went unanswered for more than a week 
and the net effect caused the survivor to suffer a mental breakdown, requiring her to be 
hospitalized and put under psychiatric care for 6 weeks. Her fear now is that the defence 
barrister will find out about her breakdown and use this against her in court in an attempt to 
discredit her character. At the time of the interview this young woman explained that while 
she was determined to pursue justice for herself, she felt extremely let down by the police. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION: The Victoria Police specialist sexual assault training course 
should highlight the value of maintaining regular, helpful contact and its efficacious 
impact on the confidence and willingness of victim/survivors to continue with a reported 
matter.  
 
Implementation of this recommendation goes to addressing issues of attrition and victim’s 
withdrawing their reports post making a statement to police. Accordingly its 
implementation would positively impact the central issues raised by the VLRC (2004) and 
Ombudsman (2006). 





3.5 Other victim/survivor commentaries and recommendations 
 
In addition to the foregoing, there were a number of specific observations and 
recommendations made by victim/survivors in interviews and the on-line survey that are 
worth noting. 
 
It is of particular interest that victim/survivors in this research themselves generally proffered 
four recommendations to address sexual assault reporting and to enhance the likelihood of 
victim/survivors continuing on after initially making a report to police. 
 
At the end of interviews, victim/survivors were asked for recommendations they thought 
would improve the police response to sexual violence. PJO researchers considered this an 
important area of investigation because those who are most affected by both the crime and 
the array of criminal justice responses they encounter, ought rightly to have their views taken 
into consideration when seeking ways to both reform and improve the processes they must 
endure. Interviewees gave thoughtful and insightful consideration to this question with many 
expressing gratitude that their opinions and views were sought. Four themes dominated the 
views on recommendations from across the 64 interviewee sample. They are as follows. 
 
The need for an independent advocate. Interviewees spoke of the need to have a person who 
was not a police officer and not a CASA counsellor, who could advocate for their needs and 
help them to access the varied services and supports they needed; a person who could liaise 
on their behalf with police and, where necessary, prosecutors, to ensure their rights and 
welfare were supported from the moment of the assault through to the final outcome. Even 
victim/survivors who had been through SOCIT where they had one officer as contact point 
RECOMMENDATION: All sworn police officers in the State of Victoria should be 
required to read and discuss at unit/team level the foregoing materials on why 
victim/survivors of sexual assault do report the crime to police and their lived experience 
of doing so. These materials should also be made available and utilized in the 
SOCIT/VARE specialized sexual assault training course, and there should be an emphasis 
on the vital role of police in validation of victim/survivors in their positive responses to 
complaints of sexual assault. It is further recommended that these materials be available 
against the background of the research literature cited and discussed briefly in the 
Introduction and detailed further in later chapters of this report. 
 
Implementing this recommendation will serve to further facilitate a widespread 
appreciation among police officers of the problems and dilemmas faced by sexual assault 
victims and, importantly, the factors that motivate and facilitate reporting and police 
responses as detailed in sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.4 inclusive, as well as the additional benefits 
cited in relation to non-reporting above (s. 3.3.5). 
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for the whole case thought a dedicated, independent advocacy person would be worthwhile. 
They saw this as especially needed as detectives were often busy in investigation and with 
other cases making contact more difficult. Many victims were aware of an officer’s work 
load and did not want to worry the officer as a result, an attitude reminiscent of their self-
sacrificing approach in reporting even when it seemed futile in terms of an eventual criminal 
conviction. 
 
In many ways what they wanted already exists in the UK – that of the Independent Sexual 
Violence Advocate/Advisor (ISVA). The PJO Project Leader has undertaken site visits across 
the UK to examine this role more closely and whilst a visiting scholar at King’s College, 
London in 2011 undertook site visits to various police, prosecution and sexual assault 
services and met with senior police, prosecutors, sexual assault services. These visits 
included the much lauded St Mary’s in Liverpool/Manchester, as well as ISVAs and ISVA 
educators/trainers. A recent review of the police and criminal justice response to sexual 
violence in the UK, conducted by Baroness Stern, concluded amongst other findings, that the 
ISVA role was the most successful and important reform to date in terms of improving both 
victim confidence in the criminal justice system, and the police response to victims (Stern, 
2010).  
 
Many interviewees were exhausted by the process of seeking resources and assistance to help 
them recover from the abuse. This included persons who, as a result of the crime and/or 
disclosing it to family members, found themselves homeless or having to leave their 
community or job or being harassed or financially disadvantaged and had little recourse and 
access to services; were unaware of their rights and too distressed or lacking in confidence to 
be able to advocate for themselves and negotiate government services. This often exacerbated 
the trauma and little wonder many victims are unable to sustain or withstand the legal process 
as this was another area of burden and trauma to deal with. Advocates in the UK were in a 
position to assess the immediate and longer term needs of victim/survivors and develop and 
action the services and supports needed and this has been shown to be of greater assistance 
both to recovery and for victim/survivors to stay the distance with the police process that is 
occurring concurrently. This also supports police because the victim is being supported in 
ways that strengthen them as the key witness for any future proceedings. This has been a 
finding from the UK ISVA model (Stern Review of Rape Reporting, 2010). 
 
Interviewees who made formal reports to police and experienced the police process spoke of 
their awareness that police were busy professionals and they appreciated that police were not 
always available. They were also adamant that they were not comfortable to speak to police 
about some of the specific fears or needs they had and would like to have someone outside of 
police they could liaise with, but who could be a conduit to communicating with police where 
appropriate. Many believed that an independent advocate would mean the victim could 
communicate with one person and have that person advocate on their behalf and also ensure 
two way communications with police and prosecutors that did not require the victim to be the 
one initiating contact or chasing up police for updates or prosecutors for that matter. In 
addition, given the problem of police not maintaining the regular contact victims would like, 
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an advocate is in a better position to undertake this role in a professional capacity and it has 
benefits to police also in terms of allowing them to focus on the investigation knowing the 
welfare needs of the victim are being taken care of and that they have a liaison person to 
assist them with their communication to the victim. 
  
While Victoria has CASA services this is not the same as an independent advocate. 
Counsellors have a specific role that ought not to be blurred by taking on the role of 
advocating for a victim which requires advice and decisions that are outside the boundaries of 
counselling and may indeed have a conflict of interest with a counselling role. That many 
interviewees were aware of this point lends itself to the desire to have an independent 
advocate who is not a police officer and not a counsellor. 
 
  
Historical reports, standard brochures and active follow-up. Many interviewees discussed 
how they felt pressured to make a decision at the time of speaking to police as to whether or 
not they would report with many being aware they were actively being talked out of 
reporting, and felt they needed to be quite determined to make a report against what they felt 
was a lack of support or empathy from police regarding the significance of the factors that led 
them to police in the first instance. This area of recommendation has two elements as the first 
relates to historical offences and the second to offences generally.  
 
Historical reports. Interviewees felt that police needed to better understand the trauma and 
emotional state of victims, even those where the offence is historical, at the time of reporting. 
This is an area the Project Leader has addressed in SOCIT/VARE lectures at the Victoria 
Police Academy but it is clear there needs to be a specific and sustained focus on this given 
the dominance of this thread amongst PJO interviewees. Many believed that police viewed a 
report of historical offence as a type of ‘johny-come-lately’ decision, that is, a decision made 
to report a ‘dated’ incident with no real emotional urgency or fears held by the victim as there 
may be for recent reports. This issue was identified by interviewees in terms of police on 
occasions dissuading victim/survivors against reporting historical offences and 
victim/survivors both experiencing this response from police and being cognisant that police 
were actively dissuading them from reporting and/or showing no real interest in the historical 
offence. It was clear from interviewees’ comments that this had a detrimental impact for them 
and their recovery but also for justice as police were voiding any opportunity to gather 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should examine the ISVA model and seek 
discussions with other interested parties in the area of sexual assault support services in 
Victoria with a view to supporting the development of an Independent Sexual Assault 
Victim/Survivors Advocate. 
 
Implementing this recommendation will strengthen victim/survivors’ capacities to report 
sexual assault crime by enhancing their confidence thereby helping to address attrition 
rates of this crime. 
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intelligence on sexual crimes that could very well involve multiple victims. Victim reports of 
historical offences have led to police uncovering multiple victims of serious and sustained 
sexual abuse, as demonstrated in Case Study Two reported below (s. 4.5.2). Further, the 
courts can and do convict offenders of historical sexual offences.  
  
Standard written handout of information for victims and active follow-up. Interviewees 
also considered that police needed a better understanding that the presence of trauma and 
fear, coupled with the novel experience of speaking to police about the sexual crime, meant 
that many victims could not always comprehend what was being said to them in the first 
instance. They consequently thought there was a need for more information in places easier 
to find for victims to seek advice about reporting before and after reporting. Further, many 
interviewees who did not report after initial contact with police believed their actions were 
influenced by what they perceived as a lack of police interest at the time and would have 
liked someone to follow up with them so that they could revisit their decision a few days 
later. In sum, many interviewees said they would like police to provide clearer information 
that was not weighted with their own personal views; and for police to ensure follow up 
contact with victims after the initial meeting to find out the wishes of the victim with regards 
to reporting.  
 
Strand one research showed that some police were cognisant of these aspects of victim 
reporting/non-reporting and made sterling efforts to ensure victims could go away with clear 
and concise information with the opportunity to follow up afterwards, thereby ensuring they 
left their meeting with police knowing the door to reporting remained open, so to speak. In 
this regard, one police unit had developed their own written brochure they gave to victims 
because of their understanding that many were not able to process and make informed 
decisions at the first meeting when they were hearing a lot of information that might not 
always be digested at the first meeting (see s. 4.5.1).  
 
 
Training. Interviewees said police need specific training to remove stereotypes around 
certain types of sexual offences and the context in which they occurred. Many felt that police 
still judged victims and blamed them for certain types of offences occurring – such as those 
where alcohol or drugs were present or where they knew the offender. Others felt that police 
also disbelieved certain victims such as those reporting boyfriends, partners or other 
offenders known to them. Many victims of historical offences believed that police viewed 
them as a ‘second-class’ victim – as a victim who waited a long time to come forward and so 
they had probably moved on from the abuse when in fact they remained haunted by and 
deeply impacted by the crimes. They were also either concerned or indeed sure the offender 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should require all first responders to routinely 
provide victim/survivors with a Plain English, easy-to-read standard brochure of 
comprehensive information that includes an undertaking of follow-up by specialist sexual 
assault police of all initial reports of sexual assault regardless of alleged date of offence. 
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had offended against others either in their family group or community. Many interviewees 
believed that police continued to view sexual offences as crimes perpetrated using violence or 
physical force and that the victim had little or no prior contact with the offender and that if 
this was the police view, then it would be impossible to have the community change their 
attitudes. 
 
   
Community and victim awareness of what constitutes sexual assault. Many interviewees 
were concerned at the lack of community awareness around sexual violence as a crime with 
an emphasis on addressing stereotypes around sexual violence. Linked to this was a general 
lack of information about where to get help and knowledge that any sexual offence could be 
reported at any time and there was no statute of limitations for reporting a sexual offence. 
There were a plethora of examples in the PJO online survey and in interviews of 
victim/survivors being unaware that certain offences, and offences committed by certain 
persons were a crime and would be taken seriously by police as a crime. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police training programs should refer to and emphasise 
the PJO findings where victim/survivors have indicated their concerns about rape myths 
and stereotypes such as victims being at fault for being in situations involving 
alcohol/drugs, date rapes, rape-in-marriage, the need for physical evidence/resistance by 
victims, and the unimportance of historical rape. 
 
Implementing this recommendation with specific reference to the recent PJO research 
evidence will strengthen the existing coverage of the SOCIT/VARE training course in 
these regards. 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake an advertising campaign 
designed to raise awareness in the broader community about the nature of sexual assault 
and to dispel myths and stereotypes surrounding this crime. This campaign should include 
posters and other information developed and located prominently in public facilities with a 
clear message that all sexual offences can be reported at any time, that there is no statute 
of limitations to protect perpetrators, and that any sexual assault is a crime, regardless of 
who is the perpetrator. 
 
Implementing this recommendation will serve to help address the problem of the dark 
figure of sexual assault, increase reporting and reduce attrition from the criminal justice 
system. 
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3.6 Summary and recommendations 
 
The symbolic nature of women’s reporting of sexual assault has not been explicitly identified 
in previous research (Taylor & Norma, 2011). As a concept it allows us to understand 
something of the resilience and capacities demonstrated by victim/survivors to defy 
seemingly insurmountable barriers and dilemmas to report; as well as the courage to 
undertake this course of action with the prior knowledge that they may bear significant social 
loss/impact. A strong sense of ‘civic duty’; ‘responsibility’ and desire to ‘protect’ others and 
community was a powerful thematic finding in the PJO study. Given the explicit fears, 
dilemmas, emotional suffering and lack of appropriate support it appears that reporting is 
counterintuitive; however survivors had a rational basis for seeking to report that was driven 
largely by altruism. These findings highlight not only a new theoretical framework for 
understanding factors that motivated and facilitated reporting for some victim/survivors, but 
they remind us further of the critical importance of an appropriate first response by police, 
given the enormity of the personal sacrifice and accompanying fears these survivors were 
cognizant of at the time of seeking contact with police with a view to making a report. 
 
It was not surprising, therefore, that although personal “empowerment,” validation, and 
“closure” are factors that certainly motivate some women to approach police, researchers did 
not find these as predominating factors. Even if these motivations are strong in women’s 
decisions to report they are significantly qualified by the heavy personal cost that survivors 
bear in going ahead with reporting in terms of emotional, financial and relational hardship. 
For most survivors, these costs outweigh any potential personally “empowering” benefits 
they might derive from approaching police. Rather, for women who come forward, 
considerations relating to other people—and not themselves—often drive them to disregard 
personal consequences and act in a self-sacrificing way. The extent of hardship observed to 
be borne by victim/survivors as a result of their decision to report sexual assault to police 
illustrates the depth of the ‘symbolic protest’ of sexual assault crime survivors wage on a 
personal and individual basis. 
 
As the data and findings in this chapter reveal, victim/survivors in this study who reported to 
police did not necessarily find a way to avoid the disbelief, ostracism and reprisals that 
survivors generally sustain when they disclose, seek to report or do report sexual assault to 
police. Many reported to police often in the absence of family support and also in the face of 
community hostility and rejection. Many police are cognizant of the extraordinary difficulty 
faced by victims with regard to reporting, though this recognition was not necessarily 
conveyed in terms of appropriate responses, as detailed by many of those who took part in 
this research. The next chapter which focuses on data gathered from police, also highlights 
that police can be found wanting in certain areas and at certain times, thus lending support to 
the experiences articulated by our interviewees and respondents. 
 
A striking feature in current research findings is the impact of non-reporting on the life-long 
emotional wellbeing of victim/survivors. More than 60% of respondents in this study 
‘regretted’ not reporting to police. The vast majority identified poor social adjustment and 
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ongoing health issues as factors they attributed from their inability to report. More poignantly 
were the reasons for non-reporting with barriers such as family pressure; feelings of shame; 
fear of, or lack of confidence in police and the criminal justice process; and fear of being 
disbelieved predominating.   
 
Highlighting the excruciatingly difficult decision to report to police, just over 30% of 
respondents in the present study who reported the sexual offence to police regretted their 
decision to report. When asked why they regretted the decision to report the offence to police 
respondents fell into two categories: those who experienced negative responses from police; 
and those who were then subjected to negative reactions and consequences from family, 
friends and community post reporting. A closer analysis of the negative responses from 
police and others will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
 
Notably, victim/survivors themselves proffered recommendations to enhance sexual assault 
reporting both initially and subsequent to first contact with police. These recommendations 
were in terms of an independent advocate to work with victims; more information in places 
easier to find for victims who needed advice; and dispelling rape myths by utilizing PJO 
research materials and findings in Victoria Police training course and through community 
education programs. With these victim/survivor thoughts as to what is needed, the following 




RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police might wish to consider actively supporting 
research into linkages between offending duration, the victim/offender constellation, 
MISA versus SISA and affective responses of victim/survivors of sexual assault. (s. 3.2.5) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake a publicity campaign to create 
awareness through the news-media, as well as CASA and similar agencies with 
information pamphlets, that sexual assault is a crime regardless of who is the alleged 
offender, that there is no time limit for reporting, that victim/survivors are never to blame 
for an offender’s behaviour, and that strangers being the only rapists and physical injury 
being necessary to establish the crime are popular myths. (s. 3.3.1) 









RECOMMENDATION: All sworn police officers in the State of Victoria should be 
required to read and discuss at unit/team level the foregoing materials on why 
victim/survivors of sexual assault do not report the crime to police and their lived 
experience of not doing so. These materials should also be made available and utilized in 
the SOCIT/VARE specialized sexual assault training course. It is further recommended 
that these materials be available against the background of the research literature cited and 
discussed briefly in the Introduction and detailed further in later chapters of this report. (s. 
3.3.5) 
RECOMMENDATION: All sworn police officers in the State of Victoria should be 
required to read and discuss at unit/team level the foregoing materials on why 
victim/survivors of sexual assault do report the crime to police and their lived experience 
of doing so. These materials should also be made available and utilized in the 
SOCIT/VARE specialized sexual assault training course. It is further recommended that 
these materials be available against the background of the research literature cited and 
discussed briefly in the Introduction and detailed further in later chapters of this report. (S. 
3.4.5) 
RECOMMENDATION: The Victoria Police specialist sexual assault training course 
should highlight the value of SOCIT police maintaining regular, helpful contact and its 
efficacious impact on the confidence and willingness of victim/survivors to continue with 
a reported matter. (s. 3.4.5) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should examine the ISVA model and seek 
discussions with other interested parties in the area of sexual assault support services in 
Victoria with a view to supporting the development of an Independent Sexual Assault 
Victim/Survivors Advocate. (s. 3.5) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should require all first responders to routinely 
provide victim/survivors with a Plain English, easy-to-read standard brochure of 
comprehensive information that includes an undertaking of follow-up by specialist sexual 
assault police of all initial reports of sexual assault regardless of alleged date of offence. 
(s. 3.5) 




RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police training programs should refer to and emphasise 
the PJO findings where victim/survivors have indicated their concerns about rape myths 
and stereotypes such as victims being at fault for being in situations involving 
alcohol/drugs, date rapes, rape-in-marriage, the need for physical evidence/resistance by 
victims, and the unimportance of historical rape. (s. 3.5) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake an advertising campaign 
designed to raise awareness in the broader community about the nature of sexual assault 
and to dispel myths and stereotypes surrounding this crime. This campaign should include 
posters and other information developed and located prominently in public facilities with a 
clear message that all sexual offences can be reported at any time, that there is no statute 
of limitations to protect perpetrators, and that any sexual assault is a crime, regardless of 
who is the perpetrator. (s. 3.5) 
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4.0 Police perceptions of victim reporting and non-reporting  
 
4.1 Introduction and overview of sample 
 
As detailed in the methodology chapter the research team interviewed more than 60 police 
members from specialist sexual offence units located across Victoria, including both 
SOCAUs and SOCITs during the transition period to the new SOCIT arrangements. While 
police in the SOCA unit were first responders and took victim statements but did not 
undertake the criminal investigation and laying of charges, they, like the current SOCIT 
police, were and remain gatekeepers to victim access of the criminal justice system.  Both 
SOCAU and SOCIT police, with a number of police from the latter group being former 
SOCAU police and now SOCIT detectives, are the specialist police who respond to victims 
seeking information or to make a formal report. As such they have the power to determine 
whether a case is recorded in the first instance and in providing advice to the victim/survivor 
about their case. 
 
PJO researchers were impressed overall with the willingness of police to speak openly and 
frankly with their experiences and opinions. During some interviews police disagreed among 
themselves about various opinions expressed and enabled PJO researchers to gather 
important insights about institutional tensions and attitudes that police hold and grapple with. 
In addition, police generally expressed compassion and concern for the victims of sexual 
violence they encounter in their daily work and it is acknowledged that they deal with 
difficult and often complex cases. Notwithstanding this, the interviews revealed that the 
majority of police perceived and categorised victims in ways that influenced the police 
response and often the outcome of both the initial contact/report and investigation. These 
factors involved what has been identified in the literature as a tendency for police to place 
victims into categories of ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ (e.g., Jordan, 2008; Reiner, 2010; Segrave & 
Wilson, 2011; Spears & Spohn, 1996) following the conceptualisation first framed and 
utilised by Nils Christie (1986). These factors are discussed both in this chapter and in the 
chapter on police decision-making. 
 
The next section of this chapter reports police beliefs about barriers preventing 
victim/survivors reporting sexual assault to police. The third section is a discussion of 
findings on police beliefs about aspects of sexual offences that influence police decision-
making. A fourth section presents findings on the non-recording of sexual offence crimes. 
This is followed by police perspectives on the recent Victoria Police initiatives to improve 
the police response to sexual assault complaints. A final section provides a brief concluding 
comment with recommendations. 




4.2 Police beliefs about barriers that prevent reporting 
 
With regard to barriers that may prevent or make reporting difficult police members 
recognised institutional, social and cultural barriers that contribute to a fear of reporting. 
Institutional barriers noted by police focussed on victims’ lack of confidence in the legal 
system. While some cultural groups have a heightened fear of police as authority figures 
(Bartels, 2011), police interviewees reported that a lack of confidence in police as an 
organisation is not isolated to specific cultural groups. Some police also considered 
conservative cultures would impact negatively on the capacity for women to report rape 
because of the strict codes pertaining to women’s sexual chastity and social behaviour. Social 
barriers were consistently identified as those relating to an emotional nexus derived either 
from the victim themselves (e.g., feelings of embarrassment, stigma or shame, not wanting 
others to find out, being affected by alcohol or drugs at the time) or external social barriers 
such as pressure from family, friends or perpetrator against reporting or fear of family 
reactions and lack of family support to make a report.   
 
Importance of family factors. Police were generally aware that family can play a significant 
role in either supporting or inhibiting the willingness and capacity of a victim to report a 
sexual offence. This included an awareness of victims feeling responsible for protecting 
either the reputation of the family, keeping the family unit intact or protecting certain 
members of the family. 
 
How they are going to be perceived by the family. Keeping the family name or my 
family can’t let this out because [it’s] unfair to them. There is that issue. Then the 
other issues kick in once they speak to us and they know the process it’s like oh god I 
don’t want to go through that (PFGT 6, officer 2).  
 
Family perceptions. [Victims telling us] I have waited this long to [report] because I 
wanted mum to die [first] because I didn’t want her to be upset by finding out this had 
happened, or I want to report this but I want to wait for grandma and grandpa to die… 
so many times it’s actually the people sitting there agonizing about [it]… they don’t 
want to make it official because [they] are really worried about, say if it’s a particular 
family member and it’s the offender and they are worried about how mum will cope 
(RFG 2, officer 2). 
 
These comments are clearly reminiscent of the victim narratives reported earlier (ss. 3.2.4 
and 3.3.2-3.3.4 inclusive).  
 
Some police felt this was more an issue for victims either from culturally diverse 
backgrounds or rural locales. Police in one of our focus groups (PFGT 5) discussed a case 
that they, as an office, had been trying to manage in terms of supporting and assisting both 
the victim and her mother. 




Officer 1: I still have one victim that’s trying to keep the facts from her father because 
he is Turkish, she is [a teenager]… and the offender [is] 28 and the father, her father 
still doesn’t know the exact extent of the sexual activity because the mother and girl 
are too scared to tell [him]… he was fairly wild when he first came in [to police unit] 
not knowing the extent of it. So we are still trying to work around [him] trying not to 
tell him. [victim and mother] are scared to death.  
 
Officer 2: [you should] send him away for a weekend [when the case is on] so he is 
not around. 
 
Officer 3: [No,] sedate him. That’s the best idea…  (laughter from the other officers). 
 
Despite the humor, these officers were sincere and serious in their efforts to ensure this 
particular case was managed successfully to court and to try and protect the fears of the 
victim and her mother and to not lose the case due to their valid fears.  
 
Two other officers discussed the family related fears of victims they often encountered in 
their work with victims and how they often encouraged the victim to discuss their fears with 
them. One officer said this meant she could work through scenarios and give advice about 
how they might broach or frame the discussion and had previously offered to speak to family 
members, with the permission of the victim, to help secure better family support or discuss 
the concerns or fears held by family members. These officers believed this was often a 
crucial issue for police working in rural areas because barriers and fears were often 
heightened in smaller communities (RFG 2, officer 1). These examples highlight police 
officers being very proactive in their engagement with victims and seeking to build trust and 
maintain the victim’s connection to, and commitment to reporting. It is also demonstrable of 
police with a great deal of empathy, passion and commitment in their work. 
 
Unhelpful police views. Police generally, especially those in metropolitan locales, did not 
seem to appreciate the extent or gravity of some barriers with many believing that ultimately 
a victim retained the prerogative power to report. The following is a telling example. 
 
I think a lot of the girls watch too much TV and won’t report because they don’t want 
that much involvement in their lives and they would rather suffer the trauma than 
have the cops know (RFGT 2).  
 
Several other police also blamed TV shows but with the view that it meant victims either had 
an unrealistic expectation of how quickly police could get results and progress the matter to 
court. Officers felt this television stylised version of crime created difficulties for victims and 
for police because there was a clash between perception and reality in terms of the process 
and time duration involved in the criminal justice process ( RFG 1 and PFGTs 5, 6 & 7). 
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PJO researchers were pleased that police consistently identified a range of factors that may 
well impede or prevent reporting. However mixed with this awareness were police who held 
a less than charitable view of victims who grappled with family pressures and/or reporting 
abuse that occurred within a family setting or by someone intimately known to them. Some 
examples are given below in relation to ‘options talk’ (s. 4.5). For instance, some police 
considered victims reporting historical offences involving family members to be ‘time 
wasters’ and the reports as ‘wasting’ police and court resources. These views were based 
largely on beliefs that such cases were historical and thus less urgent or important; that the 
cases were complex and time consuming to investigate with a higher likelihood of victims 
withdrawing complaints, or refusing to formalise them for investigation; and of those that do 
proceed to court, police consider a conviction unlikely. Some police were aware of the family 
‘fallout’ instigated post a police report which in their view made these types of cases 
extremely difficult for the victim and for the investigating police. 
 
(T)here is something about these cases that they are not going through with it… we 
have so many reports coming in… [but they] don’t want to go through the legal 
system… the majority of those would be the offenders are known to them so you have 
a high degree of already personal involvement between your victim and your 
suspect… it is a component of knowing the suspect and what it then, how their life is 
then going to proceed post the report. So that is a definite aspect [of complaints 
withdrawn] (RFG 2, officer 1).  
 
Some police officers were sympathetic to this conundrum faced by so many victims, however 
there were other officers who viewed reports of historical offences, especially those involving 
offences that occurred within a family setting as wasting of police resources and of matters 
mired in family politics that made them somewhat unpalatable cases to get involved with, 
hence the practice of some police talking victims out of making a formal report (see ‘options 
talk’ in s. 4.5).  
 
Alternative police strategies concerning historical reports. Other police jurisdictions such as 
Queensland Police have recognized the need for police specialization to undertake victim 
statements and investigations into historical offences. Queensland Police have a specialized 
unit within the sexual offences unit that focus solely on historical offences. Officers working 
in this unit are carefully selected for their personal and professional characteristics and skills 
required to undertake police work of this nature. Police in this unit possess the sensitivity 
required by police and the specific skills and patience to undertake the often painstaking 
process of assembling a case involving the complex investigation and gathering of evidence 
that may be years and even decades old. The Lead Investigator of the PJO project has visited 
this unit twice and has been impressed with the level of commitment and motivation of staff 
but also their profound understanding of, and patience with, the factors that inhibit victim 
disclosure for years and often decades and their capacity to conduct sound investigations and 
process them successfully through the courts.   
 




Rigors of the legal process. A number of police expressed a view that victims did not 
understand the rigors of legal process and were put off reporting when they realised the 
extent of the information and the process entailed in making a report. 
 
A lot of people don’t want to go to court; a lot don’t want to be out in public, they 
don’t want to sit through 4-5 hours of taking statement and have to give it all in 
gruesome detail. I think a lot of people look at TV and on TV they say I was raped for 
5 years and it was really bad and there are tears and that’s the end of the show. 
Whereas we want them to tell every single time in explicit detail it’s not 
particularized it’s no use to us and all that sort of thing so I think that there is no 
concept oh gee we are really going to have to get into nitty gritty details of I put my 
hand here he did this I did this he did that and so on. I don’t think there is an 
understanding that that’s the amount of detail we need. So I think that’s a barrier 
(PFGT 6, officer 1). 
 
Rural locales emphasis. Police in rural locales were more apt to highlight social barriers to 
reporting. This is not surprising given the extent to which social factors often mediate 
reporting decisions in smaller communities where issues of confidentiality, anonymity and 
family, offender or community reprisal may be heightened and more damaging to the private 
and public lives of victims and those who support them (Taylor, 2003-2004). In smaller 
communities victims could also encounter a ‘community backlash’ or offender retaliation in 
far more nefarious ways as a consequence of their higher visibility, potential geographical 
isolation and conservative community attitudes. Some police recognised that victims could 
also fear losing their jobs, social standing in the community and thus have their sense of 
identity significantly harmed because of locale factors. In addition, the social standing of the 
offender can also be a barrier not just for victims and reporting but the potential disbelief and 
backlash that might follow. Several police gave examples such as allegations of rape against 
a popular and well known football player or business leader or offender from a family with 
strong community status or ties as barriers not just for victims to report, but for delivering 
justice within these small communities. These views echo similar scenarios and examples 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should consider the establishment of a specialist 
historical sexual offences investigation unit to ensure the selection of police suitably 
qualified and trained to respond appropriately to reports of historical offences. Particular 
attention should be paid to recruitment criteria focused on attitudinal and aptitude qualities 
of applicants, with the use of validated psychological tests and interviewing panel 
techniques in the selection process.  
 
Implementation of this recommendation is strongly indicated from PJO data and findings 
given the extent to which sexual offence reports are historical in nature and involve a 
perpetrator known or related to the victim. This would be a positive response and would 
allow Victoria Police to identify and select police who possess an aptitude for this 
complex and difficult area of police investigation and Brief preparation.  
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provided to researchers by victims and CASA counsellors across the state (ss. 3.3.4, 3.4.3 and 
5.4). They were not confined only to rural locales however locality certainly amplified the 
barriers, the fears and the range of repercussions experienced by victims, which included 
challenges for communities dealing with such cases at the criminal court level. 
 
Police in rural locales realised that smaller communities were often a barrier within and of 
themselves and some police were frustrated that these barriers negated and hampered victim 
reporting.  
 
I am really keen for this research to come through because it frustrates me having 
been… sort of lifers in this area of work that, why people don’t report more?… if they 
could only see that we are normal everyday people who get our groceries at Coles 
clean our teeth and all that type of thing; that you can assist them so much if they 
haven’t said anything and they don’t have to go through a legal system but that 
[reporting] might get them to CASA or counseling or [just telling them] you’re not 
the only ones and sometimes that’s all they need to be told. Just how much of an 
improvement on their lives would it be? This is my job, and this is what I can offer 
them but I am not even getting to them they are not even coming to me. That 
frustrates me… and I still hear people saying they are too frightened to go to the 
police.  Well why are you, why are you frightened to go?... get [research results] out 
there (RFG 2, officer 2).   
 
One of the big questions is “I want to report but I don’t want my name in the paper” 
and so you have to explain that it is illegal for the name to go in the paper unless they 
give written consent… but then they might say in a small community that would have 
to be [victim] wouldn’t it and [victim] can lie their head off and say “no not me”… 
and most people will just go “oh shit and back off…”(RFG 2, officer 1).  
 
(T)he other aspect that is well documented as far as people reading [newspapers] as to 
how many offenders get off [and] the case is really well documented too (RFG 2, 
officer 2). 
 
One officer believed that rural locality was sometimes used by police to dissuade victims 
from reporting or proceeding and suggested they were aware of police member they would 
‘avoid giving the case to because the first thing they are going to do is say to the victim 
“you’re a nice lady, you don’t want to have to be dragged through this, it’s a small town of 
people” (RFG 2, officer 3). For these reasons they believed that sensitivity and understanding 
of the pressure and politics of smaller communities and the additional burdens for police who 
live in those communities was an important factor needed by police to successfully work in 
this area. 
 
Rural police social role strains. One officer recounted an awkward scenario when several 
years ago a member of his family became friendly with a person who had reported to police 
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that she had been raped by a family member. One evening the victim attended the police 
officer’s home as she had been invited by one of his family members to attend a social 
function at his home and: 
 
I am thinking “oh shit I know her father [offender]” but I couldn’t tell anyone from 
my family obviously. So that was interesting (RFG 3, officer 4).  
 
PJO researchers heard similar examples from a number of police working in rural locales and 
also acknowledging that the ‘wearing of different hats’ within a rural community made them 
more visible and could lead to situations where they were in social contact with a victim or an 
offender on occasions that were awkward and at times needed them to avoid the situation. 
Researchers heard also from officers in rural communities who were unable to, or felt unable 
to patronise certain businesses or activities as a consequence of their work bringing them into 
contact with an offender or those supporting an offender who had targeted police as a 
response to the report they investigated. Police working in rural locales were thus exposed to 
varying ramifications in their professional and personal lives as a consequence of their work 
and for these reasons many were quite sensitive to the fact that locality impacted on victim 
capacity to report. As one officer said, working in rural locales meant working within your 
own community cohort and subsequently knowing and interacting with the ‘darker side’ of 
their local community (RFG 3, officer 6). 
 
Police critique of other criminal justice actors. Police generally were highly critical of the 
judiciary, defence barristers and the court process as a whole, believing this was a major 
factor that prevented victims from reporting. Many linked sexual offences allegedly 
occurring in social settings where alcohol and/or drugs are used or are present as a prime area 
of under-reporting on the basis of how this would be viewed in court. Contrary to the above 
reported views of victim/survivors (s. 3.3), and their awareness of some lack of confidence in 
the police as authority figures at an organizational level, police in PJO interviews did not 
regard victims as ever having this same negative perception of police as individuals in terms 
of their fear of reporting. 
 
4.2.1 Withdrawing complaints 
 
PJO researchers collected many examples of victims withdrawing a report as a consequence 
of external pressure and/or negative reactions from family, friends or the community. While 
some police officers in interviews were aware this happened there were other officers who 
believed that withdrawal of a report or a decision to make a ‘no further police action’ report 
were an indicator of a false report, rather than perhaps a victim feeling pressured to withdraw. 
Police from rural locales were more often attuned to the reasons why a victim would refuse to 
formalise a report or withdraw a report because of family or community based fears than their 
urban counterparts. Some police were quite resistant to researcher suggestions that 
withdrawal of a report could also be linked to other factors other than a false report (RFGs 2 
and 3; and PFGT 5). 




4.3 What might influence or facilitate reporting 
 
Police generally in this study were far less unsure about what would motivate or facilitate 
reporting. Those who had a view generally believed reporting was either driven by a victim’s 
mental state leading to a report out of a sense of desperation; or to report because another 
person was also being abused, which was linked almost exclusively to abuse within a familial 
setting; or a need to get it off their chest, which was linked exclusively to historical reports of 
sexual abuse. 
 
Given the lack of focus in published research to date on the factors that motivate or facilitate 
reporting, PJO researchers are not surprised that police also had not really considered this 
question. However it was pleasing that some police did consider that victims’ concern that 
others may be victimized was a factor for reporting, even if it was isolated to familial 
settings. 
 
Several police recognized that for some, reporting may not lead to a court process or 
conviction but was a way of ‘lifting that responsibility and lifting that weight from their 
shoulders and passing it onto the police and saying [to us] “now it’s your baby to deal with, I 
have got rid of it” (RFG 2, officer 1). This echoed sentiments from victim/survivors in our 
study who felt a need to report the matter to police as a sense of personal responsibility and 
putting the incident where it belonged, with police (see s. 3.4.1). 
 
Because they just want it acknowledged I think firstly that it has happened; that they 
are the victim survivor of this; and [that] we believe them.  I also think the fact that 
there is a black mark against [the offender’s] name.  They just want someone to know 
that this is what he has done (PFGT 5, officer 2).   
 
They justify it by… they do… they say “oh I just want this [on file] if he does it to 
anyone else I just want you to know (RFG 3, officer 2). 
 
As recommended above (s. 3.4.5), the findings from this study with regard to factors that 
motivated and facilitated victim reporting should be widely available to police as part of their 
ongoing training to both help them understand what factors can influence or motivate 
reporting and reinforce the recognition some police have that victim/survivors may wish to 
report as a means of unburdening themselves, and how this contributes to their healing and to 
police intelligence gathering. 
 




4.4 police beliefs about what aspects of a sexual offence matter influence 
police decision making  
 
Police were asked to consider what types of sexual offence matters they believed were likely 
to be easier to investigate and to succeed at court and what types of matters they believed 
were more difficult to investigate and successfully prosecute. PJO researchers are grateful for 
the honesty demonstrated by police in responding to these questions and their willingness to 
discuss scenarios and issues they took into account when dealing with victims and responding 
to reports. The following discussion is notably consistent with the weight of existing research 
literature which is discussed at length in Chapter Six; with the data and findings reported in 
that chapter relating to the 2011 case file, investigator focus groups and RO/AO interviews 
analysis; and with the CASA viewpoint presented in the next chapter. 
 
The ‘classic rape’. Not surprisingly the majority of police highlighted what one called a 
‘straightforward’ rape where there was ‘obvious’ evidence such as victim injuries, forensic 
DNA left by the perpetrator, offender admission or other corroborating witnesses. Clearly the 
scenario they are subscribing to in this instance is the ‘classic rape’ where the victim has 
sustained injuries, has DNA evidence on her body and/or her clothes, has made a prompt 
report with the potential for witness corroboration and preferably an assailant who is 
unknown or a mere acquaintance of the victim (Anderson, 2007; Dumont, Miller, & Myhr, 
2003; Jordan, 2001; McGregor, Wiebe, Marion, & Livingstone, 2000; Vopni, 2006; 
Williams, 1984). 
   
The following comments by officers highlight this perceived conundrum. 
 
Yeah [if] its black and white, the issue is black and white we’ll run with it [but] if the 
issue is a little bit grey we’ll tend to not yeah… (PFGT 5, participant 6). 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Aside from understanding the reasons victim/survivors report to 
police within the motivational framework of ‘symbolic protest’, police members within 
both specialist and generalist units should also be made aware of the criminal intelligence 
benefits that arise potentially from victim/survivors’ reporting of sexual assault even if the 
report is not processed to a successful Court conclusion. If there is no successful 
prosecution, reports still can be recorded and placed either in the serious crime cabinet or a 
similar repository to aid policing efforts in relation to future sexual assault reports. 
 
Implementing this recommendation with a view to criminal intelligence gathering can be 
expected to alert both specialist and generalist police to potential sexual assault recidivists 
if future victim/survivors report a similar modus operandi and/or the same offender(s) 
cited in earlier reports. 
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In [locale]… I looked at the case, the victim was known to the offender and although 
not even directly known, a couple of the older police of course said ‘oh do you really 
think that it happened, I mean she knows him’ (RFG 3, Participant 2).  
 
Competing priorities, physical evidence and limited resources. A more senior officer 
discussed the problem of competing ‘priorities’ for police due to resourcing difficulties 
saying: 
 
[You’ve] got to prioritise and it gets to a stage sometimes that certain matters that 
may have or should be investigated a bit further and you just can’t do it because you 
can’t do them all. You have to cut the line off somewhere... we can’t physically do 
them... you can only do x (sic) amount of work... and... unfortunately some of the, I 
suppose more minor instances get screened out. Just get’s cut off [we] say [to 
ourselves] is this or isn’t this happening and there are no injuries or something similar 
to that, then it’s usually, oh well... (PFGT 1, officer 3). 
 
In the above example resourcing issues are claimed as a problem driving some police 
decision making and in this case, the lack of physical evidence may well determine police 
willingness to take the report and support the victim. As discussed in some detail in Chapter 
Six, a study by Heenan and Murray (2006) on sexual offences reported to Victoria Police in 
the time period 2000-2003 identified the presence or lack of physical evidence as a factor in 
police decision making with regard to the progress of cases. 
 
Resourcing was an issue raised by many police in interviews with some linking a lack of 
proper resourcing by way of staffing levels, facilities and resources as impediments to police 
being able to do their job properly. Police in other focus groups linked lack of resources to 
police screening out cases, with police in rural domains suggesting this was a significant 
issue that Victoria Police were aware of but struggled to address (RFGs 1 and 2, PFGT 4). 
 
Known offenders, alcohol and victim credibility. Closely aligned to the stereotypical rape 
was the belief that an offender previously known to the victim or with whom the victim had 
an intimate relationship, became an issue of victim credibility that led to these types of cases 
being regarded as difficult cases to prosecute. One officer in our interview sample recounted 
an example of this police resistance they have encountered with colleagues: 
 
... and he said, oh you know, a woman that has either been at a nightclub and she is 
having drinks with a bloke that she knows or has been in a relationship with and she 
knows him well and all of a sudden she has got back with him and thought she 
shouldn’t have had sex with him so she is going to do whatever, or she has had loose 
sex and decided that [she regrets it, and makes a false report] (PFGT 5, officer 4). 
 
In respect of false reports, I hate to say [but] often the number of suspect reports goes 
up incrementally with the amount of alcohol consumed... and then you have the ones, 
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yes I had an argument with my boyfriend and then I get raped because [tried to leave]. 
As I said, you have your suspicions (RFG1, officer 4). 
 
The comment about the presence of alcohol in sexual offences was an issue of distress and 
contention for many in this study with a number of victim/survivors either self-censuring, 
blaming themselves or fearing they would not be believed by police and others because of the 
presence of alcohol at the time of the offence (see ss. 3.3, 3.4.4 and 3.5) and some police 
commenting that alcohol was a factor that created suspicion or at least muddied the water in 
terms of how victim credibility and recall may be viewed (see also s. 4.2).  
 
However a victim/survivor from our interviews praised police for helping her to both 
appreciate what was done to her was a crime, and encouraging her to continue with her 
report: 
 
I even did ask the detective a couple of times and I was really upset at the start when 
he was calling me with things, I said “I am worried because I was drunk and I am not 
a reliable witness. I am worried about how people will see that or what I remember or 
what I don’t remember.” He said that is just not relevant. It is a crime whether you 
were drunk or not, and in fact being drunk that actually makes it more of a crime 
because you can’t give consent when you are drunk. So having that confirmation from 
police in a sense, they saw it as a crime before I did. It took me a while to really let go 
of my own feelings of guilt and to kind of go yeah it was that, he was the criminal 
who did something criminal and I am the victim of that (PIIT 18). 
 
‘False reports’. On the issue though of false reports, another officer believed false reports 
were a major issue that Victoria Police were reluctant to address adding that they believed 
false reports were predominantly made by women against boyfriends, ex-boyfriends and 
husbands or when caught out in extra-marital affairs. This position was supported by several 
other police in the focus group though no one was able to put a figure on the rate of false 
reports other than to say it was high and was ‘constantly in the back of [their] minds’ when 
dealing with reports of this nature (PFGT, officers 3 and 7). This attitude is very worrying 
given that some of these views were articulated by SOCIT members. Another strand of 
current research also showed that a number of police who had undergone the specialist sexual 
offences training course for SOCIT police maintained these views post the training which in 
part addressed the issue of false reporting and stereotypical attitudes about sexual violence 
(see s. 9.1.2). 
 
‘Regrettable sex’ reports. To this end PJO researchers heard from a number of officers about 
police who held a view of what they termed ‘regrettable sex’ reports. The term was given to 
reports by women, especially young women, who they believed had either engaged in casual 
sex with an acquaintance or had re-acquainted with a previous boyfriend or partner resulting 
in sexual contact and ‘regretted’ their sexual activities the next day usually because they 
feared their current partner or boyfriend discovering this liaison. To cover themselves, their 
reputation and their current relationship they made a report of rape to police. Essentially, 
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where cases were word against word and it was established that the victim had a prior 
intimate relationship with the alleged offender, perceptions about victim credibility and 
context played a significant role (see also s. 6.2).  
 
Victim credibility has been highlighted consistently across scholarly literature globally as a 
factor influencing police and prosecutor decision making (Beichner & Spohn, 2005, 2012; 
Taylor, 2004; Taylor & Gassner, 2010). Whether taking a report or investigating a matter to 
determine whether or not charges can be laid, police make assessments about the credibility 
of all social actors involved in a case but none so carefully as the victim. Police interviewed 
from the SOCA/SOCIT units discussed the importance of victim credibility both real and 
perceived. Police discussed how they felt they needed to take account of victim credibility for 
the purpose of projecting it forwards to weigh up how other decision makers such as 
authorising officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers, and even jurors may view the credibility 
of the victim. This reflects the argument by Taylor and Gassner (2010) that there is a problem 
of circularity in police projecting credibility to how it will be interpreted by others and thus to 
be safe there is an appeal to juror and community and legal stereotypes and avoid cases 
where victim credibility may be an issue. Similar issues are canvassed elsewhere in the 
literature in terms of ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (see Chapter Six) and “‘downstream’ concern 
with convictability” (Frohmann, 1991, 1997, as discussed in Chapter Six). 
 
Assessing victim credibility was not just around believability but also police assessment of 
victim blameworthiness or a victim’s willingness or ability to withstand the rigors of a legal 
process and so basically whether or not they had the staying power to see the report through 
(see also s. 6.2.2). This latter point was particularly linked to victims making a report of an 
historical offence and/or offence involving allegations against family members. As canvassed 
above (s. 4.2), some police in interviews expressed genuine concern that the protracted and 
damaging nature of the legal process would do more harm to victims than good, especially in 
cases involving historical matters or those that involved family members or partners or 
boyfriends as offenders where disbelief of the allegations is considered a more likely attitude 
of jurors.  
 
4.5 Non-recording of sexual offence crimes 
 
As gatekeepers to the Criminal Justice System police exercise considerable power in terms of 
deciding whether or not to record a report (e.g., LaFree, 1979, 1981; Lea, Lanvers, & Shaw, 
2003; Soulliere 2005) and  ‘no criming’ of sex offences has been an issue of some concern to 
police both nationally and internationally (Kerstetter, 1990; Lea et al., 2003; Taylor & 
Gassner, 2010; Schuller & Stewart, 2000; Soulliere, 2005). In the current study, as indicated 
in the foregoing section, some police expressed a reluctance to record certain reports made by 
victims on the basis they perceived problems either with the case itself or with the victim, 
which in some instances was about the credibility of the victim or police judgements about 
their ‘blameworthiness’. Some police believed this action preserved victim dignity and 
ensured police resources were not ‘wasted’ on cases they believed had no hope of 
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progressing beyond an initial report – and as such no report was recorded. However, the 
previously reported finding on the victim/offender constellation and offending duration (s. 
3.2.2) gives pause as to the real significance of police determinations of victims’ initial 
presenting behaviour and subsequent practices of non-recording.  
 
4.5.1 Non-recording and the role of the ‘Options Talk’ 
 
Police are required, as part of their victim protocol, to provide to victims a range of options 
open to them when they first seek contact with police. Known as an ‘options talk’, it is 
formally detailed in the Victoria Police Crime Investigative Guidelines version 1.1 – Sexual 
Crimes (2010, pp. 78-80), which set out clear and detailed expectations to avoid misuse of 
this tool. However, as will be seen in the following report of PJO research findings, police in 
practice very often do not meet such clear expectations. Options talk entails a discussion 
where the police officer explains the reporting options for the victim/survivor that include 
making a formal report for further action and what that process may entail; making a report 
but requesting no further police action at this stage and what that process may entail; or 
having an informal discussion  with police and receiving advice and information which the 
victim/survivor  may consider and use to determine whether or not they wish to proceed with 
a report. That is how it works in theory.  
 
In interviews police talked at length about the options talk as they considered it a most useful 
tool and strategy in their communication with victims.  What was clear was that for nearly all 
police interviewed the options talk or the talk, was viewed uncritically as a neutral process – 
as an act of imparting neutral and impartial information which the victim can digest and make 
decisions about reporting. They believed the options talk allows victims to be in full ‘control’ 
of the reporting process.  
 
Managing victims’complaints. Yet from the interviews it became clear that many police 
utilise the options talk in a way that led victims into a decision cul-de-sac, meaning the 
options talk was often framed or weighted by police to secure a particular outcome. Police 
themselves acknowledged this, but did so largely on the basis it was for the victim’s own 
good. 
 
Some police interviewees often weighted the options talk in various ways to heighten certain 
aspects or scenarios whilst down-playing others in order to garner a particular response or 
decision by the victim. Some police were of the view that weighting the options talk in way 
that led to a particular reporting outcome was done out of a sense of obligation and concern 
for the ‘welfare’ of victims and the Code of Practice protocol that victims remain in ‘control’ 
of the process. Others felt that weighting the options talk against making a formal report was 
beneficial for victims whom they believed would not be able to withstand the rigors of the 
legal process or where they believed the emotional fallout from family and friends would not 
benefit the well-being of the victim.  
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However for other police, the options talk provided a clear strategy to gate-keeping access to 
the criminal justice process on the basis of judgements about the victim or the context of the 
case. Some officers believed the options talk proved a useful tool in helping ensure the 
‘genuineness’ of victims suggesting that police received ‘a lot of false reports’ – so many in 
fact that they ‘got excited’ when they received a ‘genuine case’. In their view, telling victims 
not just about the reporting options but focussing on the detail police would need was enough 
to ensure that only genuine victims proceeded with a report (PFGT 4, officer 6; examples 
also in RFGs 1 and 3). 
 
Historical and familial cases. It was found that historical offences and/or those involving 
family members as offenders were cases police considered ripe for the options talk process 
on the basis that these types of cases often ‘wasted’ both police and court resources because 
either the victim’s often withdrew these reports (attrition) or they were unlikely to lead to a 
conviction. One officer said that ‘historical and familial cases’ tended to be ‘blah blah blah 
cases’ that generally went nowhere and that when reported ‘upset other family members and 
the victim’ and were ‘complex’ to investigate. Therefore this officer was likely to ‘caution’ 
victims about whether they really wanted to report historical familial abuse and urged them to 
‘go away and think about’ whether they wished to proceed with a report. This officer’s view 
was based on the idea that such cases were complex and thus time consuming for very little 
success in terms of conviction, while another officer from the same focus group expressed a 
similar experience: 
 
You don’t want that information because it creates extra work for us and we don’t 
have the resources to do that, [and] it’s not only going to upset them and their family 
but is wasting court time etc. if we follow through on some report that was never 
supposed to go there in the first place (RFG 2, officer 1).  
 
Other officers supported this view on the basis the options talk was a necessary and useful 
component of police management, especially when resourcing was an issue. In these respects, 
there was a tone from many police that allegations involving family members were too 
difficult to deal with and they tended to be ones they discouraged. Yet the vast majority of 
abuse occurs in family settings and reports are historical so in essence they are rejecting and 
discouraging reports from where most abuse occurs. 
 
‘Resource-limit’ gate-keeping. Lack of resources was mentioned earlier in this report as a 
factor that influenced the decision making of some police with regard to whether or not to 
take a report further (ss. 4.2 and 4.4). One officer discussed this as a form of necessary 
‘screening’ (s. 4.4). This officer elaborated on this further with regard to using the options 
talk as a means of further limiting and screening cases they would accept. 
 
Once you get to a certain amount [of cases]... this is virtually unmanageable from the 
Senior Sergeant down to everyone [else]... you get to the point where you have to get 
rid of some of them... I know of [other police locales with] very similar 
circumstances... [it’s] something that we have been doing for a long time... the gate-
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keeping... [if understaffed] we will probably take advantage of [non-recording] 
because they are vulnerable and because they are vulnerable [victims] they are less 
likely to arch up like someone who has been belted in the street, they are more likely 
to say I want something done about this by banging on the counter whereas the victim 
of sexual assault is less likely to be emotionally strong enough to jump around and 
maybe that’s giving us [police] a false sense of satisfaction (RFG 1, officer 3). 
 
In this example the officer with nodding support from other SOCIT officers is acknowledging 
the unpalatable option of gate-keeping to block formal reports from some victims based on 
their work load and resourcing issues. This officer also mentioned that they felt a duty of care 
to the welfare of their staff in terms of just how much they could take on.  
 
The ‘thumbnail sketch’. An officer from another unit said they were generally able to 
‘detect’ which victims would benefit from the options talk that would lead to them leaving 
the unit without making a report and without them ‘having to turn on the computer’ (to 
record the crime) (RFG 2, officer 5). Other police said if they sensed ‘apprehension’, 
‘nervousness’, ‘ambivalence’ or ‘fear’ when speaking to victims they used the options talk to 
dissuade the victim from going any further with their ‘story’ and dissuaded them from 
reporting. Officer number five explained that in their office they had a pre-orchestrated 
options talk they gave to victims that appeared ‘hesitant’ or ‘worried’ about making a report. 
 
We have actually discussed [this] with our staff and said, and myself I have done this, 
well with a particular person who is very cautious, we say “don’t tell us what’s 
happened at the moment, what we will do is… [get a] basic, basic hypothetical, not 
hypothetical, we get a thumbnail sketch of what has happened without telling [police 
officer] enough detail to fill out a LEAP report and [police officer] will tell you 
(victim) what happens if the investigation is commenced and all those sort of things. 
So we actually find ourselves at the moment working around policy (RFG 2, officer 
5).  
 
In a contradictory vein, this officer raised concerns about claims by the VLRC (2004) and 
Victoria Police about the underreporting of sexual offences. This officer was sceptical of the 
claims, suggesting that low reporting may well indicate that sexual offences do not occur as 
regularly as stated and moreover that a ‘sexual offence industry’ might be touting such claims 
to improve business. Further, this officer expressed a concern that the ‘sexual assault 
industry’ had provoked changes to police practice that proved a burden on police work. That 
said, the same officer then suggested that if sexual assaults really are underreported then 
police should be in there ‘jackboots and all’ to get victims reporting so they can prosecute 
offenders (RFG 2, officer 5).   
 
Other officers in this focus group interview agreed, expressing strong criticism of the VLRC 
(2004) inquiry into sexual offences on the basis that it criticised police non-recording of 
crimes and these police believed that the push for all offences to be recorded added another 
layer of procedural work that was both time wasting and potentially meant that crimes that 
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would normally never have made it through the reporting process must now be recorded and 
counted. For these reasons they opposed the notion that every victim seeking to make a report 
should have the matter recorded and investigated. 
 
Priority of police assessments over policy. Some police officers believed their considerations 
based on their assessment of the victim and of the case as well as issues of resourcing should 
take precedence over the Victoria Police-wide directive that police record and investigate all 
sexual assault complaints in order to reduce rape attrition rates at the reporting stage. This 
view was expressed by an officer who thought it was: 
  
fair enough that officers follow the Code of Practice with regard to ensuring victim 
‘control’ over the reporting process, but it was less fair that police be under an 
obligation to record and investigate all complaints (RFG 2, officer 1).  
 
This same officer suggested that prior to the Victoria Police edict that they must record and 
investigate all report their preferred method of practice had been to: 
  
sit down with the [victim] and they would tell us all… they have made an 
appointment and come in and they are ready to tell someone… now we are finding 
ourselves saying [to victims] don’t quite tell us because we might have to do some 
reports then you might lose some control (RFG 2, officer 1). 
 
The interpretation amongst some police officers that the VLRC report (2004) that criticised 
police not recording all offences as taking away ‘choice’ from victim appears to have led a 
number of police to make personal and subjective spot assessments about the merit of a case 
or the victim based on cursory information and probable stereotypes about the victim and the 
type of case they are seeking to report. Moreover it appears to have led some police to use the 
options talk to deliberately orchestrate a particular outcome.  
 
Several police officers interviewed, including SOCIT trained officers, were open in 
discussing advice they gave victims seeking to report intra-familial and historical cases of 
abuse of how difficult it would be not just to get these matters to court in the first instance but 
also the length of time this process can take and the likelihood of no conviction. Some asked 
victims to consider the impact or fallout the report may cause within their family and whether 
they could deal with or withstand those personal costs. Some believed that framing potential 
outcomes which invariably led to victims not formally reporting was a real option for victims 
they determined were either too fearful or vulnerable to follow a case all the way through; the 
case was complex or unlikely to be successfully prosecuted or where police resourcing was 
an issue.  
 
These comments raise a number of concerns, not the least that police are determining cases 
based on limited information and ‘thumbnail’ sketches of the sexual victimisation of a person 
but moreover that they are able to use the options talk to determine a particular outcome 
based on pre-determined judgements. Many held the view that victims who decided against 
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reporting once they had undergone the options talk was an unavoidable outcome because the 
process of making victims aware also led to victim attrition even before reporting had 
occurred. Providing victims with information about reporting options is a necessary task and 
formal element of police work, however the imparting of this information should be a neutral 
exercise, whereas from the PJO study it was clear that police used the ‘talk’ or ‘options talk’ 
as a viable strategy for ‘screening’.  
   
The above findings of non-recording and options talk related also to matters mentioned by 
some officers interviewed who believed that police who were ‘lazy’ or ‘not competent’ talked 
victims out of reporting to avoid having to do an investigation or lack of police resources 
(examples in RFG 1 and PFGTs 4, 5, 6 & 7). The following examples highlight attitude and 
lack of resources. 
 
Officer 2: I think it’s in the past [but] it was one of the things, a lot of the time it 
would be too hard to go through the court system and I think the police did actually 
pass that onto the victim [and prevent reporting]… 
Officer 1: (I)n managing LEAP as a supervisor you see tones and trends with 
particular members and their NFPA’s you can [tell], yeah… 
Researcher: When you say tones and trends you mean you see characteristics of the 
case… 
Officer 1: Yes, that it [was] going to be an NFPA by the way they have written it up, 
because they are avoiding [having] to do the work. 
Officer 3: I think it’s still around, it’s just the luck of the draw with that person that 
[whoever they] go to report to… (PFGT 4). 
 
Notably, regardless of individual police officer’s motivations, the findings on how the 
‘options talk’ is employed as described above is consistent with research literature on the 
strategies law enforcement officers employ to persuade victim/survivors to agree with them 
(e.g., Frohmann, 1998; Lievore, 2005; McLachlan, 2007; see Chapters Six and Eight for 
comprehensive accounts of this body of literature). 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing commentary, there were also a number of police interviewees 
who expressed other views and, indeed, showed understanding and compassion in regard to 
victims’ reporting and how to optimise their reports. 
 
Dissenting police opinions on the use of the ‘options talk’. Within focus groups there was 
dissent on issues and with regard to the options talk some police held different opinions. 
Some officers acknowledged there are police who use option talks to circumvent the 
reporting process but were firm in their view that the options talk should be a neutral process 
and that the job of police was to enact a clear process of investigation and not make 
individual judgements about the individual or their case. 
  
If I can explain from my point of view our job is simply to elicit admissible relevant 
evidence to prosecute, bearing in mind that you look after the victim. So when you 
look at that it doesn’t matter what your opinion is you may have an opinion but it has 
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nothing to do with the investigation that you are doing, now I will leave that open for 
other people, but that’s the way that I look at it. My opinion doesn’t matter I have to 
do my job follow the process and investigate it to its absolute maximum and get a 
conviction because that’s what they are here for from a police point of view (PFGT 5, 
officer 4). 
 
[Personally] I would never ever tell a victim not to report or not to continue. It would 
be so wrong. If someone has the courage to come and report it there would be no way 
on this earth that I would tell them never to report (RFG 1, officer 2). 
 
Some of them have absolutely no idea and [giving reporting options] is important 
because it’s no good if it’s all pie I the sky, it’s like it’s on the TV or something and 
everything is going to be finished within a couple of weeks… you have got to tell 
them the pros and the cons of making a report… people, to my mind if they are 
informed about a process they feel they have more control over it, they are more 
relaxed about it, they feel they are more able to cope with things that may come up… 
I will say to them go through all the [information], give them some brochures [and] I 
will say I have given you a lot of information, perhaps it is too much have somebody 
come in [with you] and we can go through it all again… if people are informed, 
educated [about reporting options] they are better at coping and making good 
decisions (PFGT 7, officer 2). 
 
Managing victim information over-load. Other officers were aware that providing all the 
options may result in both information over-load for a victim who is already traumatised and 
partaking in a process that is both foreign and frightening to them, they were very careful in 
how they framed the options talk. One officer felt that the options talk tended to make victims 
“get ahead of themselves because they want to know “‘what’s the process from here and how 
long do you think that will take and what are they likely to ask me and will I have to face 
them in court’”. From this officer’s point of view, however, “you can see the [victim’s] brain 
ticking over, so I respond, ‘let’s just take one step at a time and let’s not get ahead of 
ourselves’” (PFGT 4, officer 2). As such, the officer worked with victim/survivors to break 
the process down into chunks to enable them to have time to digest information and take the 
reporting process as a series of steps in a longer process which they believed was much more 
helpful for the victim. 
 
Written information. Likewise, officers from another unit also expressed some caution in 
delivery of the options talk on the basis that providing such information at a first meeting was 
not beneficial because victims cannot mentally process the advice when they first approach 
police. 
 
I have this options talk, but you will actually find that [it is] slightly different [to 
others]. We have a [special] handout that we give people so we have become [known 
that that particular booklet is from our unit]. We actually [opted] out of the options 
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[talk] because we know that when they come in and talk to us they are not listening, 
so they can take away [the booklet] and have a read of it (PFGT 6, officer 1). 
 
In a very positive light these officers took pride in the fact that they developed written 
material to assist victims based on their knowledge that victims at a first meeting were in no 
state usually to determine a course of action from the information provided and further they 
recognized that there was a lot of ‘inconsistent practice’ in the delivery of the options talk 
and they wanted to ensure that victims were empowered and armed with information they 
could digest in their own time to make informed decisions over the course of time.  
 
The issue of victims not necessarily being in a state of mind at the time of reporting to absorb 
information in a way that allows them to make an informed choice is important. A number of 
victim/survivor participants in the PJO study commented on the struggle they had to make 
sense of information and reporting options being presented to them by police. The following 
comment reflects the tone of concern in this respect. 
 
I mean [police] have given me information but I often feel like they give you too 
much information at one time so you just don’t take it all in, and it’s so new like I 
have not had any experience in this and so it takes a long time to get your head around 
it I think which is a problem. [Police] tell you things and you think you kind of 
understand but you don’t and you don’t know that until it’s too late, which I think is 
not really productive, I think there could be, I think there must be better ways of 
giving that information to people. (IIT 18). 
 
Regardless of the good intentions of police to impart information and choices to victims at 
the time of reporting, it is likely they are unable to absorb the information in ways that enable 
them to process that information and make choices. It was clear that police would also invite 
victims to consider the information offered in order to help them digest it before making a 
decision. However it was also clear that some victims found the process too fraught with 
difficulty and at times made decisions they would later regret, or conversely, felt 
overwhelmed or intimidated by the information or felt they were being pushed into a 




RECOMMENDATION: It would greatly assist victim/survivors and police if a 
consistent presentation of options was presented and supported with uniformly worded 
and clear written material in a standardised format making very clear that victim/survivors 
may take their time to consider reporting options and that may include them getting further 
advice or information from others. 





The just mentioned recommendations are further strengthened from a consideration of the 
role of NFPA statements in relation to ‘options talk’. 
 
4.5.2 No Further Police Action statements (NFPA’s) 
 
In conjunction with the ‘options talk’, the provision for victim/survivors to make a NFPA 
statement presents a robust means for police to exercise discretionary power in relation to 
whether or not a victim complaint of sexual assault receives an appropriate response at the 
gate-keeping point of the criminal justice system. 
   
Therapeutic NFPAs. Police generally believed that the ability of a victim to make a no 
further police action statement provided avenues for victims to discuss a matter or make a 
NFPA statement in scenarios where the victim needed some kind of ‘release’. Some 
considered the process of making an NFPA was ‘therapeutic’ for victims and those who were 
driven by a need to have the matter recorded without the burden of taking the matter further 
at that time or ever. As such many police believed it was a positive reporting option open to 
victims. 
 
‘Resource-limit’ NFPAs. Interestingly several police who discussed actively using the 
options talk as a means of screening and vetting reports that victims wished to have 
investigated, regarded victims wishing to make a NFPA report as a matter that police should 
RECOMMENDATION: Moreover, police should encourage victims to make a report 
and highlight that the victim has the power/choice to have that report actioned as an 
investigation or leave it on the police record both in electronic form for Victoria wide 
police access and in local crime cabinets without any action at that time. 
RECOMMENDATION: Subsequent to an initial report police should be required to 
actively follow-up victim/survivors who do not return to pursue a formal complaint within 
a policy regulated timeframe. The result of follow-ups should also be duly recorded in 
electronic and local systems. 
 
Implementing these recommendations will help ensure that police record all complaints 
made to them by victim/survivors and avoid police presenting options that lead to victims 
leaving without making any kind of report and without police noting the victim’s visit. 
The third recommendation if implemented can be expected to result in a more accurate 
record of sexual assault complaints and in prosecutions and successful Court outcomes, 
thus reducing the dark figure of sexual assault and the currently very poor attrition rate. As 
will be seen from discussion in the next section, there will also be a reduction in the 
number of NFPA statements by victim/survivors. 
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give time to largely on the basis the report at that time did not require any further 
investigation and was less demanding of time and resources.  
 
(W)e don’t say “I don’t want to hear anything see you later”, and I would be very 
unhappy if that was to happen. I expect my people to be using their powers of [taking 
an NFPA] for good... and at least having a meaningful chat and at the very least [have 
the victim] walking out with a very solid referral [to other services] and making sure 
they are physically ok... we leave the gate open [in these cases] it is not closed, it’s 
open [for] as long as you want to come back to us. That’s always a given. I don’t 
think any [victim] goes away without realizing that (RFG 1, officer 4). 
 
Another officer took a very different view believing that victims should not be allowed to 
make a NFPA report on the basis that a crime is a crime and is either reported or not reported. 
They felt the option of making an NFPA report was both a ‘bum covering exercise’ for police 
and one that reinforced the problem of under-reporting and low convictions and advised that 
they were very reluctant to allow victims to make a NFPA adding they knew such a view was 
not popular or in keeping with policy but they were very keen for victims to formalise a 
report so that it could be investigated. This police officer was aware of the barriers and 
dilemmas victims faced and was very sympathetic to the problems encountered by victims 
but felt strongly that NFPA’s made addressing sexual crimes harder and not easier (PFGT 7, 
officer 3).  
 
Helping victims? One officer was very clear in advising how victims were helped who they 
thought were worried, unsure or fearful of reporting by asking them about what their fears 
were so that they did not feel that their fears and ambivalence to reporting should prevent 
them from making a report. This officer believed police had a duty to help victims overcome 
their fears. 
 
I say to [victims] by making that report a formal report (whether NFPA or formal 
investigation) is the most powerful thing they can do legally. I say legally with a 
funny look and that always gets a bit of a laugh... if they don’t get the chance to make 
a report they are always going to be under the thumb, the power of the offending 
person... (PFGT 7, officer 1). 
 
This same officer linked an inability to report sexual violence with a form of ‘grief’ and 
believed that the ability for people to access police and put on record what was done to them 
was an important service and potentially a way of helping with the healing and recovery of 
victims. 
 
Yet, while it is true that victim/survivors need information about the process in terms of 
reporting and their options what PJO researchers found was missing generally was a view 
from police that they can be of assistance to victims who have fears about reporting. This 
could take the form of police finding out exactly what are victims’ fears as exemplified by 
the just mentioned officer, and determining which ones if any can be alleviated or addressed 
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by police (e.g., by obtaining an intervention order; or enacting a peace order to enable a 
victim to go to their place of residence and remove their belongings if they need to move out 
of that particular dwelling; or speaking to others in order to ensure better support or safety for 
victims); and other areas that might be addressed by other services such as counselling or 
emergency housing and the like.  
 
‘Options talk’ as a discouraging device. Victim/survivors in this study were generally not 
naive about the rigorous and arduous journey involved in pursuing a criminal justice process. 
While they wanted and appreciated an honest assessment of their case and the processes that 
would follow a report, many did not appreciate the options talk they were subjected to by 
police as they regarded themselves as being discouraged from reporting. 
 
Police were okay. They listened to me and seemed respectful which is good. But I got 
a sense they thought that I should just get over it. They said it was such a long time 
ago and there was not much chance the case would be approved to go to court and 
asked if I saw a counsellor (sic). It made me feel a bit fobbed off. I know it may be 
hard to press charges but you shouldn't make someone feel after all these years they 
should just move on and forget about it. I haven't forgotten it for over 40 years (SR 7).  
 
During my interview with a police officer… I experienced significant distress at 
recalling the abuse. She asked a few questions, but advised me that as the abuse had 
occurred in the past, and that no physical evidence was available, and that the 
offender was my husband at the time, it was pointless making a statement or trying to 
pursue the matter further. I think police need to have a lot more empathy about sexual 
abuse and be systematic [in their] advice… on legal options, and not tell victims that 
you are putting yourself through a lot of angst for nothing, you would get nowhere 
with this case (IIT 17). 
 
(W)hile police were respectful and told me about CASA and other services I felt they 
weren't that interested to [investigate] after all these years because they said it would 
be my word against his and how tough the court process is and I might not get a good 
outcome. I knew that when I went to them so I expected them to act on what I said 
rather than talk to me in a way that basically dissuaded me from going any further. 
That is why I ended up not making a statement, because they made me feel it was a 
waste of my time and theirs (SR 115). 
 
I try to tell myself at least I tried to report. Police indicated the case would be too hard 
to prosecute and more or less told me it would not be worth the distress and effort on 
me to make a statement! Afterwards the perpetrator abused me in the street and I had 
property stolen and I felt stalked by the [offender]… (SR 291). 
 
My initial report to [police] officer was entirely unsatisfactory. [Officer] was cold, 
disrespectful and discouraging of my making a report. I was extremely distressed by 
the experience. Later when my solicitor attended with me as support [officer’s] 
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attitude changed. The [second] officer who later took my report was friendly, 
respectful and helpful (SR 312). 
 
I could not believe that I was basically being told not to report my [sexual assault] 
simply because this supposed specialist sexual offence officer did not believe it would 
go anywhere! How would they know this when they didn’t even allow me to make a 
statement let alone investigate it! Never again. I don’t trust them and lost every ounce 
of faith in them and pity any other poor girl who gets raped or assaulted only to be 
told by the police themselves that it’s not worth reporting it! (email communication 
from one of the victim’s relating to IIT52). 
 
Police need to find ways to support the genuine fears or nervousness of people who were 
victims of all forms of rapes and abuse and were seeking help as opposed to weighting an 
option talk in ways that lead victims away from reporting. This latter skewed understanding 
only makes it worse for victims when police communicate actively the negatives of making a 
report rather than finding ways to enhance the experience and assist survivors grabbling with 
fears about family reactions and possible family retaliation. 
 
Victim vulnerability and the weighted ‘options talk’. What came through on many occasions 
was that police holding unhelpful views and acting on them were driven by stereotypes and 
the qualifier of a lack of resources used as a backdrop for determining a subjective selection 
process both in types of cases and also victims. In this regard, it appeared that the more 
vulnerable victims who had complex histories and/or complex cases were more likely to be 
given the weighted ‘options’ talk. For example, police in Focus Group five commented on 
the options talk they often give victims with a cognitive impairment based on the belief that 
such victims lack an awareness of understanding of ‘consequence’ in making a report, with 
police believing victims often just wanted to tell police but not have anything done about it. 
Another police officer believed victims with a cognitive impairment, including psychiatric 
illnesses were regarded as ‘nuffys’ within the community and areas of the criminal justice 
system and as such their credibility as a witness was so low that police felt they were 
protecting them from a humiliating legal process by not formally recording their complaints 
(RFG 5). Police did not suggest this was necessarily correct or fair, but they did acknowledge 
that some police still held this view. While the problems of progressing cases against 
vulnerable victims are acknowledged, examples like this highlight that some police continue 
to sideline cases involving vulnerable victims without realising perhaps the reinforcement of 
their vulnerability to sexual victimisation and vulnerability to have a legal system work 
against their interests. 
 
Overall many police appeared to lack both knowledge and sound judgement of seeking ways 
to engage victim/survivors who were obviously seeking to either report or get advice and 
were dissuaded from going any further. Some police almost appeared to see their role as that 
of advice giver and as police are recognised as gatekeepers to the criminal justice system it 
was as though some police were operating as ‘bouncers’ rather than facilitators of quality 
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control. The following case study taken from PJO interviews is exemplary for highlighting 
attitudinal errors driving the options talk and it impact on a case. 
 
CASE STUDY TWO: The value to criminal intelligence of recording and responding to 
all sexual assault complaints. 
 
 
Three victims unknown to each other at the time attended at separate times the same 
specialist sex offence office to report a sexual offence by the same offender. Each woman 
was strongly discouraged from reporting after police in that unit advised them, separately, 
that the assault was unlikely to lead to a conviction and that the women were basically 
wasting their time to make a report that would not go anywhere. One woman told us she was 
more insistent and to her distress, was further told that the allegation she was making was 
‘probably’ not even a sexual assault given the context in which it happened. ‘Shell-shocked’ 
the women left without any report being lodged. One woman was so incensed she contacted 
the owner of the business where the sexual assault took place to inform her of the allegation 
that one of the employees of the business owner had sexually assaulted her. The owner of the 
business was horrified and immediately advised the woman to contact police. Upon learning 
the woman had contacted police and police had discouraged her from reporting, the business 
owner offered to attend the police with the woman to ensure a report was made. Both 
attended the police station and to the horror of the business owner, the police once again 
discouraged the victim from reporting on the basis the allegation was ‘weak’ and the case 
would not go anywhere. 
 
The business owner went immediately and sought legal advice for herself in terms of dealing 
with the allegation and the employee. In the coming days another client (victim four) of the 
business owner made contact to advise that she had been sexually assaulted by the same 
employee. The business owner urged the victim to report the matter to the nearest specialist 
police sexual assault unit, which was the same place the other three victims had attended. The 
fourth victim was also discouraged from reporting and received the same advice that the 
allegation was weak, unlikely to lead to any charges; that the victim had ‘willingly’ gone for 
a massage and therefore the allegation was in a very ‘grey area’ because issues like ‘consent’ 
would go against the victim. The victim had been receiving therapeutic massages in relation 
to a medical injury and alleged the sexual assaults occurred during these massages – as did 
the other three victims. Distressingly, two of the victims advised the business owner that their 
sole reason for seeking to report was their concern and their fear that there may be other 
victims and thus they wanted to let police know about the offender in case other women ever 
came forward. They were not to know that indeed four women in total had come forward and 
on four occasions police from the same unit discouraged their reporting. The business owner 
recounted the mounting distress experienced by victims that she advised to go to police and 
report: 
 
By this stage there were other girls that I had spoken to and said would you please go 
down and tell the police what has happened and they would come back as well as 
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[first victim]. They would come back into my [business] crying saying that they just 
wouldn’t take a statement… some of the women were already blaming themselves 
and to have police blaming them and refusing to let them make a report and [they 
were] feeling so distressed, and because by the time a person is prepared to walk into 
a police station and make a charge they’re pretty traumatised… it just made it worse 
for them all… they were all coming back to me and I just couldn’t believe it and 
neither could they… these women went in already with a sense of shame and self 
blame like so many victims do and then [police officers] well they blamed them again 
really and put it all on them by not letting them report… (Transcript 52) 
 
Moreover, as one of the women later recounted, it took enormous courage for her to ‘walk 
through the doors’ to speak to police. She felt a sense of terror because of feelings of shame 
and fear of others finding out and a fear that her anonymity would be lost within the 
community and that she would have to tell her family what had happened. She set these fears 
aside on the basis that ‘other women needed to be protected’ from the offender – as such the 
response from police was as ‘insulting and offensive’ to her personhood as the offender. 
 
With police discouraging victims at the outset from making a report, these four victims, 
unknown to each other at the time, yet allegedly sexually assaulted by the same person, had 
no record anywhere linking them as alleged victims of a serial offender. When the business 
owner became aware that this next victim had also been turned away without being able to 
make a report she herself rang police to make sense of why they were refusing to accept these 
reports. As a professional, ethical and compassionate woman she was at a loss to understand 
what was going on. Police refused to discuss the matter with her. 
 
Still seeking further legal advice the business owner took affirmative action on two critical 
fronts. First she began to go through her extensive client list of women and contacted women 
on the pretext of asking if they were happy with the therapeutic massages they had been 
receiving from this employee. Given the business owner had been away for a couple of 
months, the contact was couched as a courtesy call.  The business owner also contacted a 
friend who was a retired police officer who lived elsewhere in Victoria and advised him of 
the experience two of her clients had with police. She was not aware at this time that in fact 
four of her clients had been actively discouraged by police against making a complaint of 
sexual assault.  She also advised that now further women were disclosing and she was simply 
too afraid to advise any further women to contact police.   
 
The business owner herself was in a state of shock, disbelief and distress at both the treatment 
of the women by police, and learning of the sexual assaults and seeking legal redress in how 
to deal with the employee. The retired police officer offered to contact a detective working at 
the same police station but not in the specific unit, to ask if they could provide any assistance. 
This proved a critical turning point in the events. The detective in question found that police 
had not recorded any details at all of the four victims who attended their office to report the 
sexual assaults. Relying solely on the information provided by the business owner the 
detective made contact separately with the woman and with the four victims who had been 
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turned discouraged from reporting. Three of the victims provided the detective with 
statements. The fourth victim was so distressed by the police response she refused to have 
any further contact with police, despite the good efforts of the detective. For this victim, the 
sense of ‘minimisation’, ‘betrayal’ and police rejection of her desire to report the crime were 
so great that she determined to never discuss the matter again, causing further detrimental 
outcomes to this victim’s health and well-being.  
 
Eventually the SOCIT officers who originally discouraged and rejected the four women who 
sought to report the sexual assault had to become involved in the case given the nature and 
extent of the offences. As the detective continued his investigation he could identify more 
than 20 victims of the one offender. As the case grew some of the victims became aware that 
other women who were clients of that business were victims also. Some of them shared their 
distressing stories about their encounters with police and, understandably, some victims felt 
fearful and apprehensive of making a statement to police for fear that the assaults would not 
be taken seriously, would be insensitively handed, or indeed not handled or investigated 
properly. 
 
The offender was charged with a considerable number of charges including rape and other 
sexual assault charges and the matter went to court in two separate trials to hear the rape 
allegations in one case and the sexual assaults in another trial. He was convicted by a jury in 
both cases and sentenced to a ten year prison term. Through this process the business owner 
supported the women with the same level of professional ethics and personal compassion as 
she had shown from the beginning, despite the hardship the offender’s conduct caused her 
business. 
 
At sentencing the judge publicly acknowledged the efforts of the business owner in not only 
believing these women but in making sure every effort went into their care and protection, at 
the expense of her own professional interests. The judge also became aware and 
acknowledged the efforts of the business owner to help the first victims to disclose to access 
police, despite the poor response by police, making clear that it was the efforts of the 
business owner and victims that forced police to investigate the offender. One of the women 
believed the case developed in the way it did at the beginning because of the type of decision 
driven errors made by police: 
 
Well, I know that the police today in all sorts of matters would like to sort things out 
and not take statements. All this paperwork that they are weighted down with, you 
know if they can settle something and become judge and jury of an issue then they 
don’t have this paperwork. And I understand that they could go through cost and time 
and then because of the legal system and the way it’s structured if they haven’t got the 
proof to nail someone even if they are at fault, and they know the person’s at fault but 
they can’t prove it at court it’s such a waste of time, money and human resource. So 
that’s on the down side for them. So they try and settle something before it starts... 
But, if you do that, fish are getting outside the net. They need to take the statements 
fully, hear everything. I know its paperwork but that’s what it’s about, that’s what we 
do. It’s like a chef saying well I don’t want to cook. You can’t have the police saying 
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I don’t want this paperwork burden. They’ve got to take all that information down… 
so they can take up [offender’s] name and then make [the link] and say look, this has 
happened before [to another victim].   
 
The business owner believed the police were largely driven by stereotypes about the victims 
and the case. 
 
Preconceptions misconceptions things like… you don’t even know what things some 
people are thinking. I heard some amazing comments come out that just disgusted me 
and revolting conclusions made by [other] people without the information or the 
insight as to what really went down. But if you’re going to get that kind of attitude 
and it filters through society, as I said the first point is with the police they’ve got to 
say “No this isn’t appropriate, let’s look into this, let’s listen, let’s take it.” I don’t 
know the answers as to why the [police discouraged reporting], and I do know that I 
spoke to [senior officer at the specialist unit] and I remember [officer] being very 
sharp and inappropriate and I spoke to [officer] and I said, “look I know you have a 
stressful job, and I’m not the victim, but to be speaking like this is not helpful”… this 
kind of work has takes a toll on people who are doing it day after day after day after 
day and so their approach is so coloured by this that they’re judging it, they’re pre-
empting it. They’re not beginning something because they think at the end it might 
not work… but you can’t be a chef and not cook and you can’t be a police officer and 
not listen to people and listen to all of what they are wanting to say and allowing them 
to put it in a statement… that is what police are supposed to but [in this case] they 
didn’t not just do it once or twice but again and again and again and again… they 
formed a view but it was dangerous because it didn’t let them join the dots that would 
show a serial offender… 
 
The business owner and many of the first victims to disclose talked of their high respect for 
the detective who initiated the investigation. They have remained deeply perplexed and hurt 
by the police response:  you shouldn’t do this work if you have attitudes that are harmful to 
women who are raped and you shouldn’t do this work if you don’t actually want to take the 
time to actually set aside your judgements or worry about the paperwork that’s going to be 
done if victims want to report… you have to listen and respect and record… that is why 
[victims] came in the door on those occasions… it was to make a report and to be 
respected… the judging is going to be done by a jury and yeah, that’s another tough area 
where rape victims get a hard time… but we don’t need police doing from the outset to us 
when we go to them to make a report… 
 
 
This case study is a disturbing and sobering reminder of the capacity for attitudinal factors to 
drive police decision making in ways that can be catastrophic for victims. The extraordinary 
courage of a woman business owner who supported the courage, dignity and determination of 
her female clients to alert police to what became a serial sex offender proved the cornerstone 
of this case. In interviews with CASA counsellors from the same police region as this unit, 
researchers were given examples of clients who had sought to report a sexual offence with 
many reporting they were actively discouraged from making a report or questioned in a way 
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that made them uncomfortable to proceed with a report (CFGT2). Counsellors expressed that 
this was a real concern. 
 
Helping victims. That said, a shining example among police interviewed were two officers 
who told of the various ways they sought to support people from the outset who they felt 
were fearful or anxious about reporting. They talked of the importance of building rapport 
with them and not simply giving them the options, knowing that with their feelings of fear 
and anxiety they would likely not report. These officers spoke of giving victims information 
about how police and indeed other services might assist them should they experience 
difficulties as a consequence of reporting. 
 
I say particularly if it’s a family member and it’s the offender and they are worried 
about how mum will cope, I can say to them you will probably find when mum 
spoken to she has had an inkling for years she has been worried not knowing what to 
do and she will be so relieved or grandma and grandpa will be so relieved to know… 
If they have no idea[s] [police] find with the right support and help… [victim] will 
cope they might be sad or whatever but they will cope (RFG?, officer 1). 
   
Several victim/survivors, as noted earlier in this report (s. 3.4.3), reported positive 
experiences where police took the step to speak to family members to ensure appropriate 
support and understanding for the victim. While these victims made a formal report that was 
being investigated at the time, their experiences show that some police understand that 
support structures in place for victims and a reduction of their fears greatly enhances their 
personal well-being and capacity to continue with a report.  
 
Discouraging victim complaints. Yet other police felt driven to discourage victims from 
reporting on the basis that they were protecting victims from a harsh process or believed they 
were saving victims from family disintegration; or due to personal attitudes of disbelief or 
wishing to avoid a lot of effort and paperwork. These views are not only misguided or 
otherwise unacceptable but discourage victims who show enormous courage to take the first 
step in speaking to police.  Overall, the data suggest police decision-making can be adversely 
influenced or driven by two separate but interrelated factors: institutional pressures in the 
form of resourcing issues, and attitudinal factors whereby judgements are made about certain 
types of sexual assault or certain types of victims. In a number of instance a confluence of 
both is involved whereby the process of non-reporting and talking victims out of making a 
report in the first place or from formalising a report is driven by beliefs that the victim and/or 
the type of case are not worthy of police time and resources, and even court resources. 
 
In sum, there is an apparent ambivalence in police interacting with victims and responding to 
their complaints. In this respect, NFPAs in conjunction with ‘options talk’ provide a 
convenient device for police so disposed to avoid a positive, helpful interaction that results in 
optimising outcomes for victims. Notably, the three recommendations listed at the end of the 
preceding section also arise consequent to the foregoing data and findings in relation to 
NFPA decision-making. 
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4.6 Police perspectives on Victoria Police initiatives 
 
A number of police from both the SOCA Units and detectives who had moved to the SOCIT 
model expressed strong reservations about the latter model.  
 
Role tension and conflict. Two detectives from a recently transitioned SOCIT believed the 
amalgamation of one officer to take full responsibility for all aspects of victim care and 
victim report whilst undertaking all aspects of the criminal investigation misunderstood and 
undermined the two roles of investigation and victim care. They believed the separation of 
police who focused on victim care and obtaining high quality victim statements and police 
whose strength was offender investigation was creating an already perceptible ‘gap’ in the 
service given to victims as SOCIT detectives were already feeling the strain of having to take 
care of victim welfare whilst focusing on an offender investigation. 
 
(Officer 1) [SOCIT] is gonna be just another squad and victims will just be a sideline 
of the investigation then. 
(Officer 2) yeah, the investigation will take precedence and it always does, because 
the offender becomes the focus of the enquiry… I reckon there’s gonna be a massive 
gap in that service and it’s not going to be anyone’s fault… well at our level it’s not 
going to be anyone’s fault… 
(Officer 1) Yeah. 
(Officer 2) It’s just gonna be unfortunately a side effect of what the department are 
trying to do… I don’t think the service is appropriate as we’ve got it, but I don’t think 
SOCIT’s the way to go either (RFG). 
 
Another group of police from both SOCIT and SOCA units had similar offerings. A female 
officer suggested that there were colleagues in her office who “don’t like interviewing 
victims… it’s not [colleagues’] strength to interview victims” (PFGT 4). The other officers in 
the interview agreed with this observation with some saying they preferred to interview 
suspects because that required a different set of forensic techniques that they felt were their 
particular strengths. This female officer went on to state: 
 
My and [police colleague] strengths is to deal with victims and get right in there and 
help them and so it complements [other colleagues]. I hate interviewing offenders… 
and that’s what the police department’s not taking into consideration is that [officers] 
like me have stayed in this role for 22-23 years and… love doing my job and 
following the role right the way through and being able to differentiate between being 
a support person for the victim rather than being the investigator… and while[Victoria 
Police] are saying you’d have a far better Brief if you were to do everything, no they 
wouldn’t because I would have a nervous breakdown after 3 or 4 [cases] and you’ll 
have a shit Brief and they’re not taking that into consideration… when you’re sitting 
with a victim who’s just been so traumatized and… you’re looking after their interests 
and getting one thing done at a time and if [you] have to do this and go and do this 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 143 
and that… you can’t take that part of your brain out and put it away to [do the 
investigation]. 
 
These sentiments were echoed by a number of police interviewed, including officers working 
still in SOCA Units. Many were unhappy that they were being forced to either undertake the 
training to become a ‘detective’ in order to work in SOCIT and undertake full detective 
duties or be removed altogether from working in the area of sexual violence and child abuse. 
One SOCAU officer spoke of a ‘heated’ meeting with senior police personnel to discuss their 
concerns and had been told that if they did not agree to undertake detective training they 
would find themselves “working on the divvy van as of next Monday’… so all my passion 
and work over the years means nothing unless I agree to become a detective.”10
  
 
Loss of victim focus. Another officer was concerned that the necessary imperatives of getting 
an investigation underway and especially in terms of identifying and seeking the whereabouts 
of a suspect is very likely to clash with the immediate and longer term needs of the victim, 
leading to victim claims of not being treated fairly because the detective is required to put 
significant efforts into locating the suspect and gathering evidence (PFGT 4, officer 6). 
 
In this same focus group another officer believed the SOCIT model had not been well 
thought out as an alternative. 
 
It just seems to me the SOCIT project… it seems to me that you know, whether 
there’s been a lot of research or not, there’s obviously been one or two or three 
models that they’ve said, “these are the current models we’re gonna consider and 
they’ve either picked (a) the cheapest (other officers give a loud ‘sigh’), which is not 
unlikely, or they’ve picked the easiest and you know there definitely appears to be an 
agenda where… those higher up the chain have seen the SOCAU as a bit of a 
hideaway… that’s a lot of garbage… the victims are in your face everyday… (PFGT 
4, officer 3). 
 
This officer went on to express views that the focus on victims will be lost and that 
specialization of those who deal very effectively with victims and their needs and those who 
can undertake quality investigations will be weakened if not entirely lost, adding that 
“SOCIT will fail, I’m convinced it will fail” (PFGT 4, officer 3). 
 
Insufficient resources and trialing of SOCIT. The maintenance of staff and resources was a 
concern expressed even by those working in current SOCIT units. 
 
[The Commissioner] is giving us lip service [re SOCIT]… we might be stealing staff 
from other [areas] to [staff SOCITS]… you will end up sucking staff out of [other 
areas] and [staff] will still do the best they can for victims, but eventually, it’s not the 
                                         10 Correspondence received by email to the PJO research team 20/8/2010 
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victims’ fault it’s the staff, [they] will end up toppling over if they don’t resource it 
properly (RFG 1, officer 3). 
 
A number of police were concerned that the SOCIT model trialed well because it was done 
under pristine conditions with ‘buckets of funding thrown at it and purpose built facilities 
with strong support’ and a ‘very manageable workload. One group of officers from an 
established SOCIT shared concerns about the future of their SOCIT now that alternative 
aspects of funding were being wound back and the reality of management within a more 
uniformed budget was to occur. They indicated they were already seeing changes that were 
impacting on their work and some resources being slowly lost or taken back and they were 
very aware of the debates and concerns that had been raised by fellow officers at other 
SOCIT transitioning locales and were concerned that the model required significant funding 
and significant support for officers to be sustainable (PFGT 5, officers 1 and 3). 
 
Multiple victim caseloads and ‘normalisation’. Some police commented on cases that 
involve more than one victim and the potential overload both in terms of work and emotional 
impact for police dealing with a single case that may have multiple victims, requiring 
significant management of many victims, each with their own needs and problems. Thus, 
many police felt very concerned that once a ‘normal’ and/or ‘fuller’ workload occurred 
SOCIT detectives would have: 
  
Ten or more cases on their hands and/or cases involving multiple victims in each case, 
police would potentially be investigating ten or more rape cases and managing the 
statements and after care and well-being of perhaps 20 or more victims at once… 
some of whom have complex and chaotic lives and are highly vulnerable… I know 
because I have been in this field for more than 20 years and I know how exhausting it 
is and if [detectives] are to handle all this on our own there is no way this can be 
sustained over time… in order to handle the workload the victim will be the first 
casualty because police will be driven to focus on the investigation and [detectives] 
will suffer badly if they are also having to manage the care of upteen victims… they 
will start to leave the job and then you have lost really good detectives who are good 
at this work and who are often really good with victims… but you will drive them out 
with the current model… it just can’t be sustained… (RFG 2, officer 1). 
 
The rural view. Rural officers expressed similar views with added issues: 
 
I think that inherent issue of being in the country is what I want to talk about. Victims 
in the country [suffer], its not through choice. The code of practice [for sexual 
offences] is set up for Melbourne I have no doubt, so is SOCIT, it was written in 
Melbourne, it is designed for Melbourne because there are SOCA, SOCITS or 
whatever we are going to call them at the moment, all over Melbourne, so there is 
always a chance of a cop out there… [and] there is always a night shift and night shift 
on call so it’s all dealt with there and then. We do on call we have an on call member 
[but] it’s a massive area we cover the division so we have got [indicates large areas of 
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Victoria they cover] as well as [having] to travel, sometimes a seven hour return 
drive, so it’s a huge situation where you cannot possibly give the [victim] service that 
they are going to get in Melbourne in the country without losing one aspect or another 
(RFG 2, officer 4).  
 
… and what about rural areas who are scratching for police and resources… how do 
they go with victim care and tracking down the offender when they might have to 
drive the victim for four hours for after care whilst managing the crime scene and 
chasing the bloke... how will this model work in rural locales with just one or two 
SOCIT’s to cover a vast area? (RFG 2, officer 1). 
 
The officers and colleagues making the above comments discussed the ‘tyranny of distance’ 
and how it has always impacted on their work as a SOCA Unit and how they feel this will be 
exacerbated with the new SOCIT model which will mean the detective must attend to the 
victim and the offender and the crime investigation. They provided examples of where in the 
past SOCAU officers have had to ask a victim of a sex crime to drive themselves to a 
particular medical or counseling locale to meet them, or have someone else drive them, 
because of the distance between where they live and the police locale and police workloads.  
 
Other police in rural locales provided similar scenarios expressing concern for the role of a 
SOCIT officer having to care for the victim’s needs which may entail long distance driving, 
waiting for many hours with victims while other services are completed and also secure the 
crime scene/forensics and attend to the alleged offender and the investigation in a 
geographical locale that is challenging as well as the challenge of resourcing in smaller rural 
locales (RFG 3). These concerns also included the potential overload both in terms of work 
and emotional impact for police dealing with a single case that may have multiple victims, 
requiring significant management of many victims, each with their own needs and problems.  
 
Not surprisingly this was a considerable concern for police in rural locales, especially those 
covering larger districts because they said rural locales had always experienced problems in 
terms of resources such as staffing levels, equipment and access to facilities and training. 
Overwhelmingly, police from rural locales were concerned the SOCIT model would 
exacerbate these ongoing issues rather than alleviate them.  
 
‘Burn-out’. One officer crystallised a fear that in the longer term the new model would 
possibly ‘burn-out’ good police. 
 
I think [there’s] lot of the uncertainty that’s coming from the transitions in a lot of 
units is that nobody knows exactly how it is going to work nobody tells us anything. 
There is uncertainty as to what our roles are going to be and how much is going to be 
expected of us and a lot of it is about… a lot of the people that have come into [these] 
units… have wanted a completely different sort of lifestyle. Now we are being pushed 
back into a lifestyle that a lot of people didn’t want. So although there are benefits in 
having the victim and following the whole investigation through and keeping contact 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 146 
with that victim the whole way through and seeing a result go through to court 
possibly, which is a good thing, if they don’t give us the resources to manage that, 
that is going to be extra stress, we are going to be following the whole thing  through 
doing warrants and stuff like that… we stay back and we do warrants and follow the 
whole thing through and then interview the offender when we are dead tired but 
people who have come to these units because they have families and want to go home 
on time are not going to be able to do that anymore (RFG 2, officer 2).  
 
These many concerns were echoed in the later police interviews and focus groups conducted 
in 2011 (see s. 8.3). 
   
4.6.1 Police views on training and resourcing 
 
As just described, police generally regarded sexual offence units to be seriously under-
resourced and under-valued by fellow colleagues and police Command. Police officers in 
rural locales were especially vocal about specific areas of resourcing such as facilities that 
were superseded by technology; in poor working order or not working at all; access to 
vehicles; funding of necessary overtime; access to refresher training and other training 
opportunities due to distance and staffing levels. Some police also considered support was 
variable across different units and varied in level and type of support apart from the rural/city 
difference. This appeared to be linked to both different management styles and resources 
made available: that is, how hard their manager fought basically to secure funding (RFG ). 
These observations are consistent with 2010 strand two findings reported in Chapter Eight, 
showing that the rural perception of under-resourcing and lack of appreciation by Command 
and city colleagues, as well as the observed general variability in management style, were 
still challenges to be met by Victoria Police to ensure that policy is faithfully translated into 
sound practice at the local level of SOCITs (see s. 8.4 particularly). 
  
The risk of insular learning and practice. A number of police cited a need to have an avenue 
to confirm or disconfirm current practice, otherwise they become insular to themselves. One 
officer provided a particularly insightful commentary on the dangers of peer support and 
becoming insulated into a local view or local culture within the unit. This officer reflected 
that there was a real need for refresher training away from the local SOCIT unit or at least 
with external input to help SOCIT members avoid reinforcing what could be unwittingly 
developed practices that were not ‘best practice’. This could result from peer support as they 
often found themselves referring to each other for advice on cases etc within their peer group 
to validate or get advice and this could be unhelpful (or worse) and it would be better to have 
a chance to refer to an outside source (PFGT). In the words of this officer:  
 
I think it goes beyond that and I think it goes to the point where we will probably 
need to start looking at management at a higher level and having best practices issues. 
Like there are things that I have seen since I have come into my office that I just look 
at and just think this is fraught with danger, just practices that have come into play 
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because you don’t have feedback [and refresher training] because you think that you 
are doing the right thing, practices that have come into play that could be of great 
detriment later on down the track but it’s not seen at this stage and that is the result of 
not having the feedback [or refresher training] which could be 2 ½ years down the 
track by the time we come through the member may not be there but then it comes 
down to management where you’ve got the managers need to say right best practices 
and have it consistent across the board… It’s inconsistent and practices like that; you 
know some practices are fraught with danger... (PFGT, participant 2) 
 
Training needs. There was a strong consensus among all police that training needed to be 
ongoing, conducted as a regular in-service component of their work, and with an emphasis on 
refresher training around skill-based techniques such as interviewing and developments in 
research within the Criminological sub-discipline of Victimology (as distinct from the 
SOCIT/VARE training component that is also called Victimology). The emergence of 
technology assisted crimes such as ‘sexting’ and IT assisted sexual offences or other trends in 
sexual crimes such as different types of drug spiking etc were areas they believed should be 
provided regularly through in-service training with trainers able to travel to their unit to save 
on time, travels costs and staffing issues, especially in rural areas. 
 
Chapter Nine provides a detailed discussion of PJO research conducted on the specialist 
sexual assault course as well as 2011 police interview and focus group data on recruitment, 
training and development that is consistent with findings from the 2010 strand one police 
interviews and focus groups. This triangulated data over time and different methods and data 
sources provides very strong findings on specialist sexual assault police perceptions of their 
training needs and gaps, and these perceptions are shown to be consistent with other data 
perspectives as well (see s. 9.1.3). 
 
4.7  Summary and recommendations 
 
Police interviewees provided many insightful and honest comments on victim reporting and 
non-reporting issues. Their perceptions of the barriers to reporting were largely consistent 
with those presented by victims themselves. Police were particularly cognisant of the 
importance of family factors as barriers or facilitators in regard to victims reporting. A 
significant difference was the general lack of awareness by police that victims considered 
police themselves to be part of what police identified as a problem with the broader criminal 
justice system. That is, police were often unaware that they too presented obstacles to victims 
reporting due, for example, to stereotyped beliefs and myths about what constitutes ‘real 
rape’, including the commonly perceived necessity of physical evidence and the role of ‘false 
reports’ and ‘regrettable sex’ reports in their thinking. Unhelpful police beliefs included some 
regarding historical offences as not worth expending valuable police resources, a view that is 
questioned by the Queensland strategy of a specialist historical sex offence unit. The PJO 
research evidence also illustrated how the ‘options talk’ in conjunction with NFPAs provide a 
ready means for police who are so disposed not to respond appropriately to victim/survivors’ 
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complaints of sexual assault. In these respects, it was notable that some police use ‘thumbnail 
sketches’ and prioritise police assessments over policy requirements. 
 
Despite these findings, it was also evident that many police interviewees were not only 
committed to their task but also innovative in its positive pursuit. Thus, some police spoke of 
the need for and ways in which they managed victim information over-load, for example by 
providing standardised written information and allowing victims sufficient time to grapple 
with emotional and other problems. Some also noted the risk of becoming parochial in their 
policing approach and wanted to address this to ensure they were able to adopt ‘best practice’ 
activities.  
 
In relation to recent Victoria Police initiatives, police interviewees generally expressed 
skepticism as to the long-term success of SOCIT arrangements and they cited inadequate 
resourcing and training as hamstringing the likelihood of success in that respect. They also 
cited role tension and conflict with a loss of victim focus as inherent in the new model, which 
they saw as already being hybridised and unviable. Police in rural locations were of the view 
that problems were especially dire in their areas due to distance, technology and other factors. 
Some police also recognised the crucial importance of proper recruitment procedures to the 
success of any initiative to improve police responses to sexual assault complaints. In that 
respect, although the SOCIT/VARE specialist sexual assault training course provides a sound 
basis for further development, any training input is of no consequence if the trainees are 
poorly selected in the first place – this vital component of the police response is further 
examined against the PJO research evidence in Chapter Nine. 
 
The recommendations arising from considerations in this chapter are as follows. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should consider the establishment of a specialist 
historical sexual offences investigation unit to ensure the selection of police suitably 
qualified and trained to respond appropriately to reports of historical offences. Particular 
attention should be paid to recruitment criteria focused on attitudinal and aptitude qualities 
of applicants, with the use of validated psychological tests and interviewing panel 
techniques in the selection process. (s. 4.2) 







RECOMMENDATION: Aside from understanding the reasons victim/survivors report to 
police within the motivational framework of ‘symbolic protest’, police members within 
both specialist and generalist units should also be made aware of the criminal intelligence 
benefits that arise potentially from victim/survivors’ reporting of sexual assault even if the 
report is not processed to a successful Court conclusion. If there is no successful 
prosecution, reports still can be recorded and placed either in the serious crime cabinet or a 
similar repository to aid policing efforts in relation to future sexual assault reports. (s. 4.3) 
RECOMMENDATION: It would greatly assist victim/survivors and police if a 
consistent presentation of options was presented and supported with uniformly worded 
and clear written material in a standardised format making very clear that victim/survivors 
may take their time to consider reporting options and that may include them getting further 
advice or information from others. (s. 4.5.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Moreover, police should encourage victims to make a report 
and highlight that the victim has the power/choice to have that report actioned as an 
investigation or leave it on the police record both in electronic form for Victoria wide 
police access and in local crime cabinets without any action at that time. (s. 4.5.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Subsequent to an initial report police should be required to 
actively follow-up victim/survivors who do not return to pursue a formal complaint within 
a policy regulated timeframe. The result of follow-ups should also be duly recorded in 
electronic and local systems. (s. 4.5.1) 
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5. The CASA view 
 
This chapter reports the views of counsellors from the Centres Against Sexual Assault 
(CASA) with regard to their professional dealings with both victim/survivors and 
SOCAU and SOCIT police. Interview data from CASA counsellors (here in referred 
to as ‘counsellors’) lend strong support to many of the findings in this report. 
 
5.1 Barriers and dilemmas 
 
Counsellors were very aware of the barriers and dilemmas that impact on a 
victim/survivor’s well-being and decision-making with regard to whether or not to 
report to police. 
  
From my experience fear is I think the biggest factor for most of my clients in 
terms of reporting. Fear of perpetrator, fear of family, or fear, kind of based on 
their own kind of anxiety and the fear of the court process [such as] how they 
are going to cope with it if they have struggled with anxiety and depression 
and the fear of being re-traumatised by the process. Fear of not being believed, 
shame, embarrassment, fear of not getting a conviction; sort of going through 
a long drawn out process and not getting a conviction. And fear because of the 
horror stories about the court process, being grilled and their personal integrity 
being questioned and all that kind of thing. In terms of fear of the perpetrator 
or family members I have had a client who did actually report [to police] and 
was physically attacked and seriously assaulted by a family member and the 
perpetrator as well so [fear] is often warranted (CFGIT2, participant 3). 
 
I [had experiences] of cases where it has been to keep the family together, 
[victim] has realised the impact that it can have on the family and it will be 
kind of harsh and that is a big influencing factor on withdrawing [complaints] 
(CFGIT3, participant 1). 
 
There are families who support [reporting] and the other, the other side of that 
is the ones where the family are pushing not to report. They don’t want it 
[reported]...and other’s do want [it reported] and it’s all this pressure on [the 
victim]... and the victim [might] not want to, or might want [to report] and the 
victim doesn’t even want some [family] members to know...and some 
members will believe [victim] and other members won’t believe, so…the 
dynamics change (CFGIT 4, participant 3). 
 
I worked with a, I worked with a family and [the victim reported] and it totally 
split the family, absolutely split the family apart. You have siblings and 
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[family members] affected and then they split up and you have some of the 
family members will side with the perpetrator and some will side with the 
victims and victims parents and so it really can dissect the family (CFGIT 4, 
participant 4). 
 
Family. The role of family as a major barrier to police reporting was discussed across 
the focus groups with counsellors reflecting on numerous examples of victim 
experiences along a continuum from fear of family reaction; threats from family 
members against reporting to expulsion from the family unit and active repercussions 
involving physical violence. This concurs with the experiences recounted by many 
victims in the strand one study as well as recognition by police that family can be a 
significant place barrier to reporting. This is not to discount the positive support 
received from family members however, sadly examples of this were few by 
comparison to families reacting in ways detrimental to the needs, rights and wishes of 
victim/survivors. 
 
Stranger rape. Several counsellors believed there remained a tendency for police to 
react very differently to cases involving a stranger as offender as opposed to those 
cases where the victim is known to the victim and the abuse is ongoing, a point that 
has been commonly reflected in the research literature (e.g., Lievore, 2005b), as well 
as 2010 strand two findings (s. 6.4) and findings reported above (ss. 3.3 and 3.4.3). 
 
If you have an unknown assailant [victim] gets a lot of pressure to report 
because they are representing that community... police [feel] they are doing 
real police work in these cases... cordoning off areas and [media] coverage and 
jumping on things and [the case] moves very fast and there is a very big 
difference in the responses between an unknown offender and known 
offender... [so] when it a rapist [victim] hasn’t seen before [police] are quite 
good. If [offender] is known [to victim] it’s not necessarily [a good response] 
(CFGIT 6). 
 
Negative police response and repeat victimisation. Many counsellors were cognizant 
of the reality of repeat victimisation for victim/survivors and highlighted that if they 
experience a negative response from police at the time of reporting a first offence, or 
a negative court process, the experience inhibits future reporting. This has dire 
consequences for victims as findings from the PJO online survey supported other 
literature in the field regarding the level of multiple offences for many victims across 
various time spans (see s. 3.2.5). As such a negative experience with the criminal 
justice system leaves vulnerable victims unable to seek protection from police via 
reporting. 
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Impact of disbelief on victims. Building further on this theme counsellors also 
discussed the potential impact for a victim who made the decision to report, only to 
have the report lead to no further action or no charges after an investigation: 
 
For [some] there [are] social implications that can have further implications 
for the person because they are like, well the police haven’t believed me so 
does that mean my social network are now going to [not believe me or reject 
me] and [counsellor] have found friends and family might have been called in 
for questioning so it’s actually had quite a huge impact for [victim] where 
[there is] no further action... (CFGIT 2, participant 3). 
 
And it’s a big problem... if it was a family member [as offender] and the rest 
of the family are not particularly believing and now the police aren’t believing 
you either. Mind you it is just really great when it works the other way. Really 
marvellous then (CFGIT 2, participant 5). 
 
In the above two comments the feeling from victims is that they are not believed, 
whereas it is very possible that police simply do not have enough evidence to lay 
charges. However the perception of being disbelieved is huge for the victim and those 
in their social network and family setting.  
  
Self-blame, alcohol/drugs and police. Like many of our victim/survivor respondents, 
counsellors were too often aware of cases in which victim’s self-blame and self-
censure, fearing others would blame them, and resulting in a lack of confidence to 
make a report to police. This finding is in line with reports from victims themselves 
who believed that they were to blame or pre-empted blame from others, including 
police, and as such did not report (see s. 3.3.1). Counsellors also reported that clients 
experienced a form of ‘judgement’ by police about the veracity of their report or a 
sense of blame for the context in which the assault occurred such as the presence of 
alcohol or drugs, being known to the offender, or being in a social setting such as a 
party or nightclub. Some counsellors said that victims had their memory affected by 
alcohol and drugs and while this caused distress in terms of blurring or blocking recall 
of the events, it also led them away from reporting. Counsellors told researchers that 
the presence of alcohol was a major barrier to victims both blaming themselves and so 
not reporting. The complex interplay and influence of alcohol and drug use in sexual 
abuse is detailed further in the discussion of literature in Chapter Six and findings 
from analysis of data from police case files reported there (see ss. 6.2.2 and 6.3 
especially). 
 
Physical evidence. Counsellors also suggested that some police continue to rely on 
the presence of physical factors to determine their response, or experiencing a 
negative reaction by police on the basis the victim did not have overt injuries or other 
forensic evidence. 




To sum it up it is [police tell them] that there was no physical evidence. It’s 
like you have to prove it all the time (CFGIT 3, participant 1).  
 
Withdrawing of complaints. Many CASA counsellors (for example CFGIT 6), as 
well as many police, spoke of the lengthy and exhaustive process for victims to get a 
matter to court. A number of counsellors and police believed this led victims to 
withdraw from a case. This was due to the length of time, losing support over the long 
time delay from reporting to court, the associated ‘emotional exhaustion’, and 
wanting to get on with their lives. 
 
5.2 Experiences of their client base reporting to police 
 
Variability of police responses and the SOCIT ‘model’. Across the research 
interviews counsellors both lauded and lamented police responses noting some 
victims received excellent and wonderful responses whilst others received poor 
responses which had a deleterious impact on victims. Counsellors often expressed 
frustration at the inconsistency in police responses which they saw as a mainstay of 
policing, regardless of recent developments such as the SOCIT model. They 
acknowledged the clear improvements police have made and recognised that many 
excellent and dedicated police worked in the field of sexual offences however they 
were at the coalface of dealing with the many victims who continued to encounter 
negative or poor police responses. One counsellor in a  senior management role had 
undertaken site visits to SOCIT units and was somewhat dismayed that the units were 
‘already hybrid, and that’s really interesting because the one in [names locale] and the 
others in [names locales] are quite different...has different philosophies [and] different 
cultures and the personalities and the police officers attitudes [at different locales]’, 
noting further the relationship between CASA and police in one unit remained ‘very 
separate’ and not as ‘user friendly’ for victims as envisaged (CFGIT 3, participant 4). 
As discussed previously, this view of variability in police responses and hybridisation 
of the SOCIT model was shared by a number of police interviewees (s. 4.6). 
 
Training of police. Another counsellor in the same focus group commented on what 
they believed to be gaps that remain in the training of SOCIT police, particularly with 
regard to attitudes towards sexual offences generally and their communication with 
victims which they had raised with the Sergeant from the SOCIT Unit in question. It 
was positive that the Sergeant in this case took seriously the feedback from the 
counsellor and addressed the issue with the police officer (CFGIT3, participant3). 
  
Counsellors who had strong links with SOCIT police had many positive experiences 
with police from the unit and reported that they often deliberately sought them out 
when referring a victim on who wished to have contact with police, because they were 
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confident that that particular officer would provide an excellent response. In such 
cases counsellors felt confident to refer victims on for reporting and to encourage the 
process. The concern was with some officers whom they believed held certain 
‘attitudes’ towards certain scenarios of sexual violence. In other words, some police 
maintained certain stereotypes about sexual offences that counsellors found led to 
victims having poor experiences. In this vein counsellors in this group were of the 
view that police would benefit from specific training around stereotypes and to have 
police reflect on their attitudes to certain types of sexual offences that led them to 
either judge the victim or the context of the crime in ways that negated the credibility 
of the victim (CFGIT 4). 
 
Police validation. Counsellors identified that a positive police response was linked to 
greater feelings of well-being for victims in terms of their willingness and confidence 
to continue further with their report and subsequent process through the criminal 
justice system. Feeling ‘validated’ by police was expressed as an important element 
by victim/survivors (ss. 3.4.2 and 3.4.3), and counsellors also recognised the 
importance of this, even suggesting it held more sway than validation from 
counsellors or friends. 
 
It’s one thing for a counsellor or friend to say that it’s terrible and not your 
fault but when the police say that, it means so much more (CFGIT 7, 
participant 2). 
 
‘if they have a positive experience they want to continue on with [because] 
they felt supported, acknowledged, validated and they definitely want to 
continue with [process](CFGIT 3, participant 2). 
 
The sensitivity and the understanding [from police experienced by some] 
clients... has been brilliant and they have felt great after the experience even 
when it hasn’t necessarily been one that they would have hoped for... but the 
way that [police] have responded to them is fantastic. And I have had others 
where they have come back feeling like... what they have said hasn’t been 
acknowledged... [instead it has been] that the situation [of the assault wasn’t 
good enough or wasn’t awful enough to worry about, but it was awful to them 
so that’s the difficult concept for them to grasp. [To police] it just doesn’t 
count (CFGIT 3, participant 5). 
 
Conversely, a negative response can be devastating for victims and affect their 
opinion of police into the future. 
 
In a [case that involved use of alcohol] that was thrown out by police...so 
[victim] said “this is it, I will never report again. I don’t care what happens if I 
ever get assaulted again I will never contact the police and that’s a familiar 
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theme [for victims], if they have reported [and have a negative experience] it 
is highly unlikely that if anything happens in the future that they’d report 
again (CFGIT 3, participant 2). 
 
Another counsellor highlighted good police practice and how beneficial it is for 
victims, relaying a case where a police officer needed to advise the victim that the 
case would not be proceeding after an investigation. Having regard both for the fact 
the news was not positive, and that the victim in the case had been struggling 
emotionally, the police officer contacted the counsellor to seek advice and support to 
meet personally with the victim in order to deliver the news and to ensure that the 
victim had the counsellor present to ensure emotional support for the victim upon 
hearing the news (CFGIT3, participant 3).  
 
5.3 The Options talk 
 
Gate-keeping, screening and quality assurance. Counsellors across the state gave 
examples of police using the options talk in ways that often actively discouraged 
victims from reporting – even if this was not the original intention by police at the 
time. Many believed that police discouraged reporting of cases they believed would 
either be too difficult to prosecute at court, thus their motive was a form of 
benevolence, or cases where they had made judgments’ of the victim and/or the 
circumstances of the assault and dissuaded them from reporting. These examples 
suggest a form of gate-keeping and a form of quality assurance and screening out of 
cases that individual police have developed a particular view about. Counsellors 
expressed disappointment that this happened, noting that it had a detrimental 
emotional impact on victims as well as continually promoting a view that the legal 
system was all but impervious to a small and narrow type of sexual offence case. 
 
I had a woman on the phone the other night who had just reported a historical 
sexual assault form her childhood... she felt when she [talked to police]that it 
had just been brushed aside and she was livid, she finally got the courage to do 
it, she had the right to do it... (CFGIT 1). 
 
I find that the police just dealt with the bare facts right so you have that 
extreme... those extreme sexual assault cases then they are more likely to 
follow through than most of the ones that I have dealt with... The police decide 
whether somebody is going to be a good witness or not (CFGIT 5). 
 
Again, one of those barriers is that when you get there that you are more likely 
than not to be met with the response that explains how very hard this is going 
to be before you even start. It’s almost like they say “yeah well we will take it 
but it aint going to go very far, you realise that don’t you? Rather than 
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emphasize [to victims] how supportive the process is, can be, its ‘what a 
problem [the process is]’ (CFGIT 2). 
 
Another counsellor in the same focus group, but from a difference service, agreed, 
adding: 
 
There are often judgements made around [reporting offences by family or 
intimate partners] “well how’s that going to stand up in court”, so the person, 
if they do go through with [making] the statement it’s not going to be easy or 
they decide not to because they get the message that the system is not actually 
going to believe them (CFGIT 2). 
 
‘Listening’, non-verbal cues and victim discouragement. Another counsellor 
reported that victims often felt that police were judging their story from the start, 
rather than listening to the whole story, and consequently victims took from this that 
police were either disbelieving or discouraging the victim from making a formal 
report, 
 
Sometimes the crisis for our clients can be one where when they are going to 
tell their story [to police] instead of just listening at the beginning and taking 
down the information they can sometimes feel that they are being judged from 
the minute they have walked in as to whether their story is credible enough... 
or has enough evidence... I think the client’s first impression [of police] is 
sometimes they feel like they are being judged rather than heard [and] can 
make the difference between whether they feel comfortable... they are already 
feeling embarrassed [and thinking] maybe I should have done [to prevent 
assault] differently or maybe what they’ve done [is viewed negatively] so 
when they’re confronted with [are you] a credible witness... (CRFGIT 3, 
participant 2). 
 
The notion of listening, asking appropriate questions to get the whole story and 
avoiding anything that might be interpreted as showing judgement was important for 
victims. Victims are often tuned in to non-verbal cues and it is important that the 
initial police response builds confidence for victim/survivors to share their 
experience(s). Several counsellors discussed a belief from their experience and that of 
clients that some police sit in judgement of victims. 
 
To me it would depend on the police officers, there are some really, really 
good police officers and there some members that tend to sit on that 
judgemental side... it depends on their attitude and personality (CFGIT 5, 
participant 2).  
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The victim’s whole story. As noted earlier in chapters three and four, some 
victim/survivors were aware they were being discouraged by police from reporting as 
a consequence of explicit or implied responses and police officers told researchers of 
instances where they actively discouraged victim reporting or asked victims for 
cursory details only (‘thumb nail sketch’) upon which they would determine the likely 
success of the victim continuing with a report. As victims in this study made clear, 
and this is reinforced by counsellors, for many victims when they have made the 
decision to approach police, they do so with great courage and clearly expect police to 
listen to their whole story before determining the value of the victim proceeding 
further (ss. 3.2.4 and 3.4).  
 
5.4 Urban versus rural locales and difficulties 
 
Not surprisingly, counsellors from rural locales were particularly aware and sensitive 
to the additional layers that impact on victim disclosure and reporting as well as 
issues affecting police in rural locales such as resourcing and attitudinal issues that 
may be more heightened in a rural community, of which police are a part. 
 
‘Reputation’ and family name. The notion of ‘reputation’ and ‘protecting the family 
name’ in smaller communities was considered a major barrier for victims to report 
and the likelihood that police within a rural community may know the victim or the 
offender were also barriers for reporting (CFGITs 2 and 3). One counsellor recounted 
the problem of an alleged offender in a small rural community targeting family 
members of the victim using tactics of intimidation and fear, leading the family to 
pressure the victim into withdrawing her complaint (CFGIT 2, participant 2). 
 
Another counsellor told researchers of victims who, fearful of being identified in rural 
communities, travelled distances to a CASA service or police station in another 
community, on the basis they could enter the premises in anonymity. 
 
reasons might be... “I don’t want anyone to see me going in there”, and, you 
know, “I have a friend that attends that [service] “people will see me coming 
into the centre [so] people will know [I am a victim of sexual assault]... so it 
comes down to that rural thing, that everybody knows everybody... [many] 
clients travel huge distances to get to [service] or location that they think 
they’ll be safe to go into (CFGIT3, participant 2). 
 
Sadly this practice of travelling huge distances to access services on the basis of 
protected identity and anonymity is not unusual in rural communities (Taylor, 2003-
2004) and the maintenance of it reminds us of the potential barriers for accessing 
police and other services encountered by rural victims. 
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The impact for victims in rural locales has been discussed elsewhere (Mason et al., 
2009; Taylor, 2003-2004) and sometimes seeking to travel to another location does 
not solve the problem, as a telling example by a counsellor highlights. Upon 
becoming aware the some victim/survivors were finding it difficult to travel to other 
services due to remoteness, her service travelled to the locale to provide a half day 
service in that community to save women having to travel long distances. They 
located the service at a hospital, believing this may make it less obvious that victims 
are attending a sexual assault service. However, they ‘withdrew’ the service after only 
a few months “because [word spread] and everybody can involve deliberate actions to 
intimidate victims from accessing services”.   
 
Interestingly counsellors from metropolitan areas told researchers that it was not 
uncommon for victims from CALD backgrounds to seek support from a service 
outside of their suburb area on the grounds they were fearful of anyone finding out 
they were a victim of a sexual offence (CFGIT 6). 
 
Victim anonymity and police reputation. The lack of anonymity for victims was also 
considered an issue with regard to police. Several counsellors who had worked 
previously in rural locales believed that the reputation of police can be a barrier for 
victim reporting’ 
 
The police do have certain reputations and those reputations follow them in 
country towns. If [police officer] has not treated [victim] very [well], it gets 
around... (CFGIT1, participant 1). 
 
There is a fear this will get around, like if someone has an uncle or brother or 
father that’s a police officer... or they know someone [who has] been out with 
a [police officer] it is about it getting around... there is a [certain] attitude in 
rural communities... and what police represent is the community... it gets 
around (CFGIT1, participant 2). 
 
Offender’s social status. The social standing of the alleged offender was also a factor 
mentioned by many counsellors from rural locales as victims feared either 
repercussions from an offender well known in the community and/or the potential not 
to be believed because of the status of the offender in their community or simply their 
status via their particular occupation. Counsellors from metropolitan areas touched on 
this also suggesting that an alleged offender with a strong public profile or significant 
status through their occupation can be a way of attracting credibility to the detriment 
of the victim’s allegations. 
 




5.5 Relationship between CASA and police 
 
The general CASA/police working relationship. Some counsellors enjoyed very 
positive relationships with police from specialist sex offence units and not 
surprisingly felt that this enabled a greater sharing of information, enhanced victim 
reporting, and addressed quickly and proactively issues or misunderstandings. 
 
Inconsistency in the relationship. However a number of counsellors spoke of the 
inconsistency in terms of their working relationship with police and this was true even 
of some counsellors from SOCIT Units. Some counsellors said they enjoyed 
reasonably regular scheduled meetings and open communication with police, while 
others lamented that despite their best efforts police seemed to control the level of 
contact and information sharing. Quite a few counsellors noted that personal 
relationship building with police was paramount to creating an environment that 
fostered sharing of information and regular contact. This could be problematic on two 
fronts. If police members moved on, it required this process to start over again, or if 
there were problems in the building of the relationship, then the professional 
relationship could be jeopardised. 
 
A shared protocol? Thus PJO researchers heard of some services having excellent 
relationships with police from sexual offence units and others along a spectrum of 
good or reasonable relationships to those counsellors considered difficult at best. This 
suggests that a shared protocol around CASA and police interaction around sexual 
offence cases was the exception rather than the rule. Many counsellors said they 
would like contact to be more consistent and regular, rather than the often ad hoc 
formula instituted by incumbent police in charge of the specific unit. Further, they 
wanted police to be able to ‘hear’ feedback and critique as a tool that helped both 
organisations to assist victims, as opposed to a process of blaming and uninformed 
criticism. 
 
Leadership/management style. A senior counsellor/manager believed that individual 
personalities and styles of management most often drove the relationships their 
services had with police so that protocols about working relationship and what must 
be adhered to by both parties could fall by the wayside if the leadership and 
management style of police did not reflect the philosophy of the police Code of 
Practice. The pivotal importance of police leadership is examined further in Chapter 
Eight. 
 
If the [police] team leader is really open and very empathetic to sexual assault 
you find that you work better with them. However if you get a team leader 
who is there because they want a promotion or [it’s] a stepping-stone to 
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getting [somewhere] they bring their baggage with them and their 
stereotypical beliefs with them (CFGIT3, participant 4). 
 
The manager of this particular CASA explained that they had a very positive working 
relationship with the former Sergeant from the sexual offences unit but that officer 
left, and the new replacement did not seem as keen to develop a close working 
relationship. 
 
[It’s] one of those key roles [and] they could not see the need to keep [regular 
scheduled] meetings going and just said “we will talk to you when we have 
got something to [share] (CFGIT3, participant 4). 
 
The manager noted that soon the other two sexual offence units in the region 
‘followed suit’ so that regular scheduled meetings were not sustained and this she felt 
impacted on their professional confidence with police and with victims they sought to 
assist in the reporting process because ‘the relationship we knew’ had changed 
making both counsellors and their clients feel ‘less comfortable’ and less ‘confident’ 
with a police service with which they do not have a strong, positive working 
relationship. 
 
‘Police shopping’. Counsellors in another service noted that different ‘personalities’ 
and ‘attitudes’ among police led to them seeking out contact with police with whom 
they had developed good working relationships. They noted that some police were 
very open to feedback from counsellors, especially with regard to victim experiences 
and believed this was invaluable in terms of helping police to understand issues of 
victim sensitivity or why a particular victim may have behaved as they did or sought 
to withdraw a case, thereby allowing police to be better engaged with victims. 
However, this communication and feedback was something they had to manage and 
negotiate with specific police, taking us back to the point that if those police moved 
on from the unit, the professional relationship suffered a setback (CFGIT 2). This 
point was also noted by other counsellors who told researchers that a positive working 
relationship with police allowed them to feel confident to approach them. If they 
received feedback from a victim who had a negative experience with police or was 
fearful of contacting police, the counsellor could act as a conduit. However police 
with attitudinal short-comings circumvented communication strategies (CFGITs 2, 4 
and 5). 
  
‘Regular contact?’ With regard to regularity of police contact with victims, some 
counsellors believed clarity was needed around this expectation because of the 
inconsistency in contact by police: ‘I don’t know what the police’s idea of ‘regular 
feedback’ is because it’s definitely not what I think or the client thinks’(CFGIT 3, 
participant 2). This same counsellor noted some positive examples where police kept 
regular contact with the victim, showed concern for their welfare or any fears about 
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the criminal justice process and kept the victim informed of the process of their case. 
Poor communication and long hiatus in contact was not only upsetting for victims, but 
in some cases victims found out information about their case from other sources, 
thereby losing confidence in the police process. Some counsellors acknowledged that 
police are busy professionals however maintaining regular, appropriate contact with 
victims was not only part of their job but was considered vital for victims in what is a 
complex and often frightening process. 
 
It is something that’s such a small change that police could make [to improve 
regularity of contact]... that has an emotional impact [on victims] just in 
general (CFGIT 7, participant 5). 
 
Comments were made by various counsellors about victims losing confidence with 
their report, beginning to doubt themselves and believing that police doubted them, 
and considering withdrawing their statement or withdrawing from the process as a 
consequence of irregular and/or unhelpful feedback (CFGITs 2, 3, 5 and 7). These 
considerations are reminiscent of views expressed by victim/survivors themselves as 
reported earlier (s. 3.4.4). 
 
One counsellor felt the Police Code of Practice booklet was itself inconsistent with a 
copy they had noting police should keep ‘regular’ contact with police noting that it 
gave no idea of what police meant by ‘regular’ but that a version of the code of 
practice available on the police website at the time noted police should contact the 
victim every fortnight at least. This counsellor believed police were ‘under-resourced’ 
and often ‘time poor’ which meant that contact was often sporadic or only occurred 
when police felt they had a specific piece of news to impart to the victim. But like 
other counsellors and victims interviewed, this counsellor highlighted that irregularity 
of contact often had a negative impact on victims in terms of their recovery and level 
of confidence in how police were handling their matter (CFGIT 6). 
 
Police Code of Practice availability. Building on this lack of communication a CASA 
manager recounted a recent example where she attended a meeting with senior police 
management to discuss some specific problems they had with police responses to a 
few cases. The manager took along the Police Code of Practice so she could cite their 
own protocols only to find them unaware of the protocols in question, prompting the 
manager to provide them with her copies and advising them ‘that’s your homework’ 
and requested they study the Code of Practice to ensure the problems were addressed( 
CFGIT 3, participant 4). Other counsellors referred to the Code of Practice believing 
that the theory is not always lived out in ‘process and procedure’ (CFGIT 2). 
  
Potential areas of improvement. When asked about areas of improvement police 
could make many counsellors believed that resourcing of police was an issue and 
believed this often added strain to their work. A number of counsellors discussed 
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better training for police that focussed largely on attitudinal factors that they felt 
continued to hamper some police and maintained a culture of certain beliefs and 
stereotypes about sexual offences (CFGIT 2, 3 and 6). In a more explicit vein 
counsellors from two different CASA services amplified the relationship of attitudinal 
values and procedures that were discussed in the group as an area of police 
improvement needed. 
 
One of my points is the police put a lot of effort into trying to come up with 
procedures that will make it work better and it’s about process and half of 
what we have been talking about here today is about value base, not process. 
If you get the value base better you will get the processes that you want 
(CFGIT 2, participant 6, emphasis added). 
 
I think one of the things for me to come back to is, to, and I have heard a bit 
recently about the new risk assessment processes and all of those shared 
things, but again it is about process and procedure that the training is done in. 
Let’s do some training in changing about value based stuff and I suppose my 
experience about training over the years as a trainer in this field as well, is if I 
could train or change and challenge peoples’ values about [sexual assault you] 
would get a better [outcome] from [police] ( CFGIT 2, participant 4, emphasis 
added). 
 
Several counsellors believed the ‘screening’ of police to work in the area of sexual 
assault was necessary ‘to get the right people in the job... because that seems to be the 
key, to get the right personality’ (CFGIT3, participant 3). These observations resonate 
strongly with several findings from strands two and three research discussed in the 
later chapters of this report. 
 
5.6 Comments in support of reporting to protect others  
 
The PJO study found a significant theme among victim/survivors being motivated to 
report for selfless reasons or sense of civic duty for the purpose of seeking to protect 
other potential victims known or unknown to them. Significant examples of this were 
garnered from victims themselves and developed the conceptual frameworks of 
symbolic protest and recognition, sacrifice and report to identify the various reasons 
that motivated a victim report against a background of barriers and dilemmas that 
remained very real for the victim at the time of reporting (see s. 3.4.1). Few police 
interviewed were cognisant of this significant factor that led many victims to report.  
 
Building police intelligence. However a number of counsellors were very aware of 
this fact, not surprising given many victims shared this reasoning with them. This 
desire to report, even if victims themselves do not wish the matter to go further for 
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themselves, offers a rich vein of police intelligence for police and it is regretful that 
many victims told us of being talked out of reporting or having police view their 
desire to report an historical or dated offence. 
 
The following examples from counsellors support the testimonies heard from victims 
about motivations to report in order to protect others or ensure that police were aware 
of the extent of sexual offences within the community. 
 
One of the main motivators I’ve found is that women are wanting to report 
because they’re actually scared [for] other children who come into the family 
and they have this enormous fear because they know the perpetrator [and what 
they did] when they were little and there are [other children] in that family and 
they somehow feel responsible should [the offending] continue (CFGIT 6, 
participant 1). 
  
Or they’ve got information, or something’s happened and that can lead to 
determination that [it has to] be reported (CFGIT 6, Participant 3)  
... so then the victim/survivor quite often says I would like to make a report so 
that it’s there on file so that it’s there, so that if he does it to anyone else 
(CFGIT 7, participant 1). 
 
[victim] made a report and didn’t want it to go any further, but wanted it on 
record so if this person ever did anything again it [is on record] (CFGIT 2). 
 
One counsellor spoke of the ‘guilt’ and fear some victim/survivors feel if they have 
determined to make a report and the report does not lead to police action against the 
alleged offender. 
 
(T)hat often weighs heavily on the victim/survivor if there has been no further 
action [by police] and this person has access to other children or adolescents 
or fearing that they might offend again against someone else (CFGIT 2, 
participant 4). 
 
Another counsellor recounted the example of a victim who ‘forced’ herself to report 
to police in order to protect a younger sibling from the offender. In this case the girl 
was from a socially disadvantaged background and was fearful of reporting because 
she herself did not want to go to court for fear of the offender and the court process, 
however wanted her younger sibling protected. The counsellor reported that police 
seemed mystified by the girl’s actions in terms of seeking to make a report yet being 
both frightened and firm in her insistence that she did not want her own report to go 
any further. Police were reluctant to take her report given she did not wish for it to go 
any further and that her demeanour was that of a difficult witness. In reality, as the 
counsellor recounted, what drove the report was intense fear that her younger sibling 
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would also become a victim of the alleged offender, leading her to an emotional crisis 
that led her to basically force herself to contact police. While it may be difficult for 
police in this situation as they grapple with information from a victim who does not 
wish to take the matter any further, it is clear that victims in these circumstances need 
specific supports to assist them and for police to realise the importance of still taking 
the report as an exercise in intelligence gathering (CFGIT 2, participant 3).  
 
  
5.7 False Reporting 
 
A solid number of interviewed counsellors expressed concern about the number of 
clients who have felt intimidated or unable to proceed further with a report after 
police have emphasised either the consequences of making a false report or 
challenged victims that their report is false. Researchers were told of victims who, 
through feelings of shame or fearing negative judgement by police, withheld certain 
information at the time of reporting the crime, only to be advised later when the 
information was revealed that police believed they were lying and thus open to a 
charge of false report. One case involved a sex worker who did not want police to 
know she was soliciting at the time of the alleged physical assault and rape. Another 
victim/survivor withheld some information about the context of the crime for fear of 
arousing anger from her family because of the circumstances in which the assault 
occurred. Counsellors believed that some police need to be more sensitive to the 
embarrassment and fear of judgement that may cause victims to withhold certain 
information rather than adopt the view that gaps in a story were evidence of falsity. 
This illuminates more broadly the difficulty experienced by victim/survivors who fear 
a negative judgement or feel embarrassed or shamed not just about the crime but also 
the context in which it has occurred, leading to self-recrimination and a general fear 
or disclosing and reporting to anyone, not just police. 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should emphasise the value of taking 
and recording all complaints of sexual abuse, including especially those pertaining 
to the possibility of ongoing abuse and/or child sexual exploitations, for the 
purposes of building a criminal intelligence base for future reference at both local 
and state wide levels. 





5.8 Summary and recommendations 
 
While many CASA counsellors were hopeful that the new SOCIT model would 
deliver a more coordinated and coherent police response from the moment a victim 
accesses to police through to the outcome of the report, some CASA counsellors who 
had experienced with the SOCIT model felt that greater work relationships were still 
to be built across the board with all police and that included trust in terms of greater 
sharing of information. As mentioned, it was already recognised that the SOCIT 
model was hybridized before its complete roll out across the state and this was of 
concern to some counsellors on the basis that its differing structures and procedure 
already weakened the model thereby reducing its intended efficacy. 
  
Counsellors recognised the difficulty of working in the area of sexual violence and 
many accounts were heard of the excellent work undertaken by many police and the 
strong work relationships counsellors often had with various police members and 
sometimes a whole unit. However this did not prevent recognition that there remained 
police working in this field who were not suited to the area of work, regardless of the 
training the police had or their years of experience. 
  
The issue of attitude towards sexual violence per se was a feature of discussion and 
the maintenance of stereotypes which led some police to continue to judge victim 
worth or the credibility of a case based on the context in which it occurred or the 
credibility of the victim.  
 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should develop an online feedback 
survey for victims to complete after contact with police. This exit survey poll 
would enable police to identify both good areas of practice as well as problem 
areas of practice as well as being able to respond appropriately and expediently to 
any issues arising from victim/survivor contact with police. Police to give all 
victims a card with the link to the survey or they can be given a hard copy asking 
them to comment on the service and experience. 
 
Implementing this recommendation is necessary in order to help police improve 
their response to sexual assault complaints. In particular it would provide real 
time feedback anonymously that will give a continuous feedback loop and 
address issues and problems as they arise. It will also improve victim confidence 
in the reporting process. 




RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should emphasise the value of taking 
and recording all complaints of sexual abuse, including especially those pertaining 
to the possibility of ongoing abuse and/or child sexual exploitations, for the 
purposes of building a criminal intelligence base for future reference at both local 
and state wide levels. (s. 5.6) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should develop an online feedback 
survey for victims to complete after contact with police. Police to give all victims a 
card with the link to the survey or they can be given a hard copy asking them to 
comment on the service and experience. (s. 5.7) 
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6.0 Police decision-making  
 
Research has shown that, as the gate-keepers to the criminal justice system, police 
significantly impact whether or not sexual assault complaints reach the Courts for 
adjudication (e.g., Heenan & Murray, 2006). The importance of this gate-keeping role 
has been emphasised by both the VLRC (2004) and the Victoria Ombudsman (2006). 
Also, since victims develop perceptions around police responses, police decision-
making processes are important to whether or not victims report in the first instance 
or continue with their complaints (see ss. 3.3 and 3.4). An understanding of police 
decision-making is therefore crucial to any effort to address the generally 
acknowledged serious problems of non-reporting, delayed reporting and attrition in 
sexual assault. 
 
Accordingly, there has been an increasing call to better understand Victoria Police 
decision-making in this area of crime in particular. In August 2004, the VLRC 
provided its final report relating to the responsiveness of the criminal justice system to 
the needs of complainants in sexual offence cases. The VLRC made major 
recommendations to Victoria Police that covered: 
 
• undertaking research to gain a better understanding of the reasons why 
there has been an apparent increase in the numbers of people who 
make complaints and then withdraw them; 
• giving written reasons to complainants when a decision is made not to 
continue with an investigation or not to lay charges; 
• reviewing the process of authorising cases for prosecution to ensure 
decisions are consistent and transparent; 
• regularly evaluating decision–making about prosecutions (VLRC 
2004: xxiii). 
 
The Office of the Victoria Ombudsman in its report entitled Improving responses to 
allegations of sexual assault (2006, pp. 36-39) made a number of observations in 
relation to police decision-making, withdrawn complaints and non-authorisation, and 
elaborated in its recommendation 29 for Victoria Police to ‘introduce mechanisms to 
systematically analyse all sexual assault Briefs to identify patterns and characteristics 
of Briefs that are authorised for prosecution and Briefs that are not’. 
 
Fitzgerald’s research (2006, p. 11) concerned the attrition of sexual assault offences 
within the New South Wales criminal justice system and similarly raised the question: 
“What are the precise reasons why police and prosecutors do not commence criminal 
proceedings?” (cf., Heenan & Murray, 2006). Taylor and Gassner (2010) stressed the 
importance of failing to answer this question in terms of a two-fold effect: 
 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 168 
It inhibits understanding and identification of the decision-making process 
brought to bear on cases, making external assessment and evaluation of the 
phenomenon very difficult, if not impossible. It further creates difficulties for 
victim/survivors where reports exit the criminal justice system without clear 
reasons or for reasons that suggest arbitrary decision-making by individual 
officers (Taylor & Gassner, 2010, p. 245). 
 
The most directly relevant study of reasons for decisions by police in Victoria relating 
to sexual assault was the 1991 Victorian Community Council Against Violence 
(VCCAV) study of reported rapes over the period of 1987 to 1990, which included an 
examination of reasons police proffered for terminating investigations. That report 
noted a limitation of analysis of the reasons for cessation of rape investigations was 
that it was based solely on information provided by the police. The reasons were 
categorized (along with the number and percentage of cases from a total of 121 cases) 
in terms of: 
 
 false report not charged (44 cases, 36.4%) 
 false report charged (27 cases, 22.3%) 
 no offence detected (20 cases, 16.5%) 
 complaint withdrawn (11 cases, 9.1%) and 
 insufficient evidence to proceed (19 cases, 15.7%). 
 
In relation to the first category, the false report was seen as either unintentional where 
someone else had reported the matter without full knowledge of the situation; or the 
alleged victim was not held fully responsible due to an emotional problem, attention-
seeking, or immaturely avoiding trouble with parents. It included also some cases 
where police perceived the victim was ‘getting even’ with a boyfriend or partner. 
Interestingly, the false reports that resulted in charges against the alleged victim did 
not, the study found, appear to differ systematically from those where no such charges 
were forthcoming, except that these latter false reports involved no third party reports 
and less evidence of psychological problems. 
 
Regarding complaints withdrawn it was noted that these were documented by police 
from their perspective and that it would be “extremely illuminating to have access to 
the victim’s explanations and opinions” (VCCAV, 1991, p. 70). It was also noted that 
victims were commonly unable to recollect events clearly and they were influenced 
by alternative explanations from others (e.g., police, family, friends) to be less 
confident or desirous of pursuing the matter. Lievore (2005a) argued that this 
category of reason concealed a "Hobson’s choice" because victims were "forced to 
make what is apparently free choice when in reality they perceive that there is no 
choice at all" (Lievore, 2005a, p. 49). McLachlan (2007) similarly discussed how 
South Australia police subtly and sometimes not so subtly pressured women to 
withdraw complaints by referring to the unlikelihood of success and waste of 
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resources; with performance measures for police dependent on cases ‘cleared’ which 
included a large proportion via withdrawal (cf. Frohmann, 1997, p. 535). “It benefits 
investigators’ clearance rates to encourage victims/survivors to request no further 
police action and clear a case rather than file it" (McLachlan,  2007, p. 163), a point 
made elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Gregory & Lees, 1996, p. 5). The Home Office 
study by Kelly et al. (2005) reported that victims’ withdrawal of complaints 
represented between half and three-quarters of cases lost due to attrition in the 
criminal justice system. 
 
In the VCCAV (1991) study the insufficient evidence category was further explained 
as meaning one or more of the following: there was no medical evidence of sexual 
intercourse; delayed reporting resulted in victims having showered and washed 
clothes; the absence of physical injuries to substantiate the victim’s claim; the 
presence of drug problems, intellectual disability and mental or psychological 
problems that seemed to suggest police questioned victim reliability; and lack of 
victim cooperation that suggested some police viewed this as indicative of the sexual 
assault claim not being genuine.  
 
No offence disclosed cases involved situations where the victim was ignorant of the 
law pertaining to what constituted rape, someone else mistakenly reported a rape, or 
police surgeon forensic examination failed to establish an offence. 
 
Heenan and Murray (2006) undertook a similarly germane study of police decision-
making in Victoria relating to reported rapes over the period of 2000-2003. Like the 
authors of the VCCAV (1991) work they also cited restraints on data-collection, 
which reduced the quality of data and reliability of overview of police responses. 
They found that rape victims who were most likely to see charges laid were male; 
physically injured; medically examined; not influenced by alcohol or drugs at the time 
of the offence; subject to other offences alongside the rape; and, raped by offenders 
well known to police for previous sexual offending. The strongest influences were 
evidence-based (63 per cent) or offender-based (33.7 per cent). Cases that resulted in 
no further police action were typically more likely to involve younger victims; 
victims who were acquainted or who had a cursory relationship with the offender; 
and, victims who had consumed alcohol or other drugs around the time of the offence. 
In almost 40 per cent of these cases the police decision seemed predominantly based 
on victim-related reasons. Heenan and Murray (2006, p. 45) emphasised the 
difficulties and less responsive approach police adopted in relation to rape cases 
involving the mentally ill/psychiatrically disturbed and/or those in residential 
institutions. These were factors that reduced the likelihood of positive police decision-
making to take the cases forward. Lievore (2004) studied prosecutorial (not police) 
decision-making in sexual assault based on 141 case files across five Australian 
jurisdictions to find underlying factors of: physical or verbal non-consent by victims; 
victim injury; evidence linking the defendant to the assault; use of force; severity of 
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the assault; defendant was a stranger; and the defendant was a non-caucasian 
(considered to be related to the over-representation of indigenous offenders in the 
sample).  
 
Although there is limited research that directly examines the reasons for police 
decision-making in sexual assault cases (Fitzgerald, 2006; Taylor & Gassner, 2010), 
there are studies that shed light on police decision-making in a number of ways. A 
key factor influencing the likelihood of prosecution in sexual offence cases has been 
found to be the victim/offender relationship (Brown, Hamilton & O’Neill, 2007; 
Kennedy, Easteal, & Taylor, 2009; Krahe, Temkin, & Bieneck, 2009; Lea et al., 
2003). Lievore’s work (2005b) found ‘stranger rapes’ were significantly more likely 
to proceed than ‘acquaintance rapes’, whereas partners and former partners were more 
likely to have their cases withdrawn. By contrast, research also indicates that cases 
involving known suspects can be significantly more likely to result in arrest, with the 
explanation being offered that this might occur due to the greater ease of locating the 
perpetrator (e.g., Alderden & Ullman, 2012). 
 
The likelihood of a case being progressed to court has been found generally to be 
associated with ‘hard evidence’ factors (see below, s. 6.1). For example, a Home 
Office study found that significant predictors of the decision to prosecute were: “that 
the assault was linked to sexual offence against a separate victim; the victim’s 
medical history was obtained; the offender threatened the victim; forensic evidence 
was recovered; and, where witnesses were present” (Feist et al., 2007, p. iv). Analysis 
of data from 1990-2005 across the United States, Australia, Canada, England and 
Wales, and Scotland revealed cases involving evidence in terms of physical 
resistance, a witness, or use of force and/or a weapon were more likely to proceed to 
prosecutions (Alderden & Ullman, 2012; Daly & Bouhours, 2010). Heenan and 
Murray (2006, p. 27) similarly noted that “police confidence to charge appeared to 
increase proportionate to other evidence being available to support the allegations, 
such as witnesses, physical injuries or other physical evidence”. 
 
Research also shows that police are likely to decide not to progress a sexual assault 
complaint if the victim suffers from a psychiatric condition, intellectual impairment of 
some kind, alcohol/drug incapacitation, perceived immorality and/or working in the 
sex industry, or not exercising prudent judgement to avoid or withdraw from ‘risky’ 
situations (e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, 1997; Campbell et al., 2009; Heenan & Ross, 
1995; LaFree, 1981; Lea et al., 2003; Lievore, 2004, 2005b; Neame & Heenan, 2003; 
Page, 2008; Schuller & Stewart, 2000; Spohn, Beichner, & Davis-Frenzel, 2002; 
Spohn & Holleran, 2001).  
 
These kinds of factors have been linked to how police appear to routinely think about 
victims and consequently make decisions about sexual assault claims (e.g., Bryden & 
Lengnick, 1997; Dumont & Myhr, 2000; Frohmann, 1991, 1998; Lea, Lanvers & 
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Shaw, 2003; Spears & Spohn, 1996). Following Christie’s (1986) thesis of police 
perceptions of ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ victims, a number of research pieces have 
garnered evidence that police think categorically about sexual assault victims and this 
has consequences for their decisions (e.g., Jordan, 2008; Reiner, 2010; Spears & 
Spohn, 1996). Segrave and Wilson (2011) found that general duties police in Victoria 
distinguished between ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ victims, with the ‘ideal’ victim being a 
‘respectable’, law-abiding citizen engaging in legitimate business activities at the time 
of the offence. Police investigators were more likely to respond positively to an 
‘ideal’ victim in terms of a ‘bedside manner’ approach to the victim’s complaint and 
additional attention compared to the ‘non-ideal’ victim. In the words of Spears & 
Spohn (1996, p. 201) a victim was ‘genuine’ “if her background and behavior at the 
time of the incident correspond(ed) to traditional gender-role expectations and if she 
made a prompt report to police”. A key element of the ‘real rape’ and ‘real victim’ 
myth has been shown to be the presence of physical signs of resistance by victims 
and/or perpetrators’ use of force, evidenced visible bodily harms, and this element has 
been evidenced in the research literature as a determinant of women’s likelihood of 
reporting to police (Dumont et al., 2003) and it is evidenced further by victims in this 
study (see s. 3.3.1). McLachlan (2007, pp. 149-152) similarly drew an emblematic 
link between ‘real’ rape myths and a culture of disbelief by police in relation to 
victims who do not fit the stereotype. 
 
In these respects, issues of victim credibility and consent are at the heart of most 
sexual assault claims. This is due to the preponderance of sexual violence occurring 
within known if not intimate relationships, without witnesses and behind ‘closed 
doors’ (cf, Burman, 2009). 
 
The ultimate battle in acquaintance rape trials, where consent will almost 
always be the determinative issue, is whether the victim or the offender is 
telling the truth. Yet it is only the victim whose veracity is questioned because 
most offenders will safely stand mute, insulated by the constitutional 
protections of the presumption of innocence and the privilege against self 
incrimination (Hopkins & Koss, 2005, p. 695) 
 
Perceived victim credibility has been one of the most frequently found factors to 
influence the police decision to charge a perpetrator of sexual assault (e.g., Schuller & 
Stewart, 2000). Heenan and Ross (1995) found that police in Victoria often 
disbelieved victims due to perceived inconsistencies in their accounts, lack of 
corroborating evidence, mental health or psychiatric issues, or if they were ‘known’ to 
the police. 
 
Frohmann (1991) found that victim credibility was questioned through two 
mechanisms: inconsistencies between the investigator’s report of the victim’s claim 
and the victim’s account to the prosecutor, with the assumption being that the 
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investigator’s report would be correct; and inconsistencies between the victim’s 
complaint and the typical story of particular kinds of rape with which police have 
become familiar from past investigations and subsequent expected normal behaviours 
(typifications), with the assumption being that the typification should be re-produced 
in its key elements in any real rape of its kind. She found that, using these essentially 
decision-making mechanisms, prosecutors’ assumptions resulted in discrediting 
victim allegations and hence in case rejections. The literature supports this finding in 
various terms, such as victims’ perceived immorality and poor character, exemplified 
in promiscuity and prostitution (e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, 1997; Kerstetter, 1990; La 
Free, 1979; Lievore, 2004, 2005b; Neame & Heenan, 2003; Page, 2008; Spears & 
Spohn, 1996; Spohn & Holleran, 2001). 
 
Similarly, there is research evidence that ‘risk-taking’ victims receive less positive 
police attention. For instance, Lea et al. (2003) found an association between no 
further action by police and the victim willingly being in the home of the perpetrator; 
and Spohn et al. (2002) found that prosecutors were more likely to pursue a complaint 
if the assault did not occur in the victim’s or offender’s residence. Frohmann (1998) 
provided compelling examples of how drug/alcohol influenced victims were 
discredited and their sexual assault complaints consequently failed at the prosecutorial 
point. Similar findings about alcohol and drug affected victims have been reported by 
other researchers (e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, 1997; Campbell et al., 2009: Segrave & 
Wilson, 2011). Heenan and Murray (2006) identified how a victim being under the 
influence of alcohol/drugs reduced the likelihood of charges being laid, whereas 
sobriety raised the likelihood of charges. They also found that victims with a 
psychiatric disability or mental health issue were among those least likely to see 
charges laid. As reported earlier, this ‘risk-taking’ factor was supported by data from 
victims in strand one and some victims got negative responses from family and others 
about the locale of the rape and the use of alcohol or date rape etc (see s. 3.3). 
 
Researchers have also observed that what has come to be called ‘uncertainty 
avoidance’ or a ‘concern with convictability’ characterises police and prosecutorial 
decision-making in relation to sexual assault complaints (e.g., Albonetti, 1987; 
Frohmann, 1991, 1997; Lievore 2005b; Schuller & Stewart 2000; Spears & 
Spohmann 1996). Frohmann (1991, p. 214) noted that prosecutors’ behaviours were 
organised “more to avoiding the error of filing cases that are not likely to result in 
conviction than to avoiding the error of rejecting cases that will probably end in 
conviction”. Uncertainty avoidance is related to what has been found in the research 
literature to be the importance of corroborative evidence to complaint continuation 
(e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, 1997; Gregory & Lees, 1996; Kerstetter, 1990; Lievore, 
2004, 2005b; Spohn & Holleran, 2001; Spohn et al., 2002; Taylor & Gassner, 2010). 
This finding reflects a strong tendency for police to seek corroboration of the victim’s 
claim of sexual assault independent of the victim’s word versus that of the alleged 
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offender. Fitzgerald (2006) reached a similar conclusion in her New South Wales 
study of the attrition of sexual assault cases from the criminal justice system. 
 
In short, the literature suggests that police construct images of victims and make 
assumptions about them in terms of broadly defined factors and use these as a 
simplifying tool to make sense of often highly fluid and complex situations in their 
decision-making. The police narrative thus serves as the vehicle for communicating 
and pursuing certainty and avoiding uncertainty in authorisation and non-
authorisation decisions. Simplification for purposes of uncertainty avoidance mixes 
together both legal and non-legal considerations, including cultural stereotypes of 
‘real’ sexual assaults and ‘genuine’ victims in relation to ‘questionable’ situations of 
sexual assault involving victims’ memory, credibility, consent, character and moral 
issues.  
 
Against the background of research to date, this chapter reports the PJO study 
findings on how and why operational police in Victoria make their decisions 
concerning sexual assault complaints (see also s. 4.4 in relation to the literature just 
discussed). Data were drawn mainly from the 90 case files examined in detail, with 
triangulation to the police interviews and focus groups conducted in 2011, as well as 
the OPP focus group also conducted in 2011. There is also triangulation of the 
research evidence garnered across the strands. Findings are first presented on police 
evidence gathering techniques and practices. There follows a discussion of specific 
reasons and broad influencing factors apparent in police decision-making in 
authorising and not authorising criminal proceedings. There is an account of other 
considerations, including a description of unusual arguments found in a small number 
of cases. Analytical comparison is then made of authorisation and non-authorisation 
decision-making. The main findings and recommendations are presented in the 
conclusion.  
 
6.1 Evidence gathering techniques and practices 
 
Common police practices. A number of common practices emerged during analysis 
of the case files. These included the following: 
 
 CASA and hospital/medical examinations were involved in sexual assault 
cases as per the Code of Practice 
 Medical and DNA evidence was obtained as soon as possible after the alleged 
offence was reported. 
 Seizure of materials relevant to alleged offence was undertaken as soon as 
possible – eg bedding, clothing, condoms 
 Statements were taken from the victim as soon as possible after CASA and 
hospital referrals. 
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 VATE interviews were conducted for underage and mentally impaired victims 
 The practice of ensuring the phrase “I did not consent to (the accused) doing 
what s/he did” appeared at the end of the victim’s statement. No victim 
statement excluded this phrase. 
 Pretext telephone calls 
 Police line-up parades 
 Interviews with the accused were audio taped and these commonly included 
the following: 
o Informed accused of rights 
o Checked for Aboriginality/Torres Strait Islander  
o In presence of accused unsealed 3 audio cassette tapes and inserted in 
recording unit 
o Corroborator present at accused’s interview  
o Checked master tape for voices 
o Gave accused a copy of the typed interview 
 Checks were made for any drug/alcohol background of both victim and 
accused 
 Witness statements were routinely taken where appropriate.  
 Identification of photo statements and production of photo-boards 
 Taxi Directorate was included in matters relating to taxi drivers – e.g., cases 
11, 41, 89 
 VicRoads was included in matters where a vehicle was significant  - e.g., case 
17 
 FACE images of accused 
 CCTV footage 
 Specialist police units were utilised where appropriate, for instance 
o Computer forensics – e.g., case 33 
o Dog squad in cases where the crime scene was part of a larger search 
area – e.g., case 27 
 Crime scene area and or location plans 
 
Unless authorisation appeared very likely or subject to an arrest having been made 
already, it was also common for the authorising officer to first listen to the audio-tape 
of an accused interview before making a decision, rather than bearing the cost of a 
transcript. A transcript then would be sought only if the decision became likely to be 
authorisation. 
 
Tiers of evidence. Tiers of evidence can be presented in a general rank order of 
importance from the police viewpoint of likelihood of obtaining a conviction. This 
ranking is not mutually exclusive and sometimes a lower ranked evidentiary item can 
be of greater import than one that is generally ranked higher. These categories are also 
not considered definitive and exhaustive, and in less common instances a case is 
referenced.  




 Police witnessing the actual sexual assault – transit police case 
 Accused confession in record of interview 
 Police presence at crime scene whilst accused still there – e.g., cases nine, 
50 
 Police arrival at crime scene shortly after the alleged offence – e.g., case 
nine 
 Physical harm evidence - obvious physical injury suffered by victim 
 Medical evidence – e.g., victim shows physical signs of sexual assault such 
as vaginal or anal tears, splitting of the skin etc 
 DNA evidence of sexual penetration – traces of semen and other bodily 
fluids mixtures of victim and accused 
 Photographs - bodily injuries of victim 
 CCTV footage of offender at scene or in area  
 Victim statement(s) that are forthcoming, consistent, coherent and credible 
 Accused record of interview showing inconsistencies or partial admissions – 
eg case 50 for latter 
 Pretext telephone calls – e.g., case 12 
 Telephone records - printout of mobile simcard records – e.g., case 17 
 Computer forensic evidence of text messages – e.g., case 33 
 VicRoads Registration Extracts – e.g., case 17 
 Audio/text evidence of first complaint or disclosure 
 Witness statements 
o Witnesses to actual assault 
o Witnesses to immediate aftermath of assault 
o Witnesses to events related to the alleged sexual assault 
o Credible witnesses in relation to the victim’s account 
o Consistent account of victimization across multiple victims 
o Consistent account between witness of first complaint and victim  
 FACE images of accused 
 Photographs – victim, crime scene 
 Crime scene area plans  
 Non-forthcoming accused record of interview 
 
In cases involving taxi drivers police also tendered evidence from the Victoria Taxi 
and Tow Truck Directorate (VTTTD), such as the CD-R disc “evidence of defendant 
turning off taxi surveillance just prior to exposing the victim’s nipple and breast” in 
case 11. In that case, police also produced in evidence expert testimony from the 
Directorate Officer who had knowledge of the taxi camera system. These pieces of 
evidence were in addition to CCTV footage within the vehicle showing the victim and 
her fellow passengers. 
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Importance of the particular circumstances. In addition to the above common types 
of evidence, individual cases saw police gathering evidentiary items peculiar to the 
circumstances of the alleged offending. For example, in case 15, aside from I4 
photographs of a video camera and PC tower, the computer and video camera were 
also seized as evidence. In case 26, a copy of the motel account record was placed in 
evidence. In case 59, police sought a copy of a film screening timetable, a copy of a 
singles newspaper advertisement, and a letter from New Zealand police confirming 
that the victim was not wanted for making false reports. Hence, it is important to 
qualify the notion of common types of evidence as being a general rule not a 
prescription. 
 
‘Hard evidence’. Evidence gathering techniques and practices reflected a tendency 
for police to rely upon ‘hard evidence’ consistent with the uncertainty avoidance 
principle reported in the research literature. ‘Hard evidence’ included a variety of 
tangible items as just indicated, including medical/DNA materials, physical crime 
scene items (e.g., bedding), witnesses, photographs, CCTV footage, telephone/text 
message records and offender admissions. ‘Hard evidence’ was also emphasised in 
the investigator focus groups and RO/AO interviews conducted in 2011, although 
those data sources made it clear also that Briefs have been prepared based only on the 
victim’s word. In this regard, it was earlier exemplified how the 2010 strand one 
research flagged similar findings on the use of ‘hard evidence’ in police thinking as to 
whether or not a matter was likely to be easier to investigate and/or succeed at Court 
(s. 4.4). Investigators cited corroborative evidence to include statements of first 
complaint, birth certificates to prove the victim’s age in historical cases, various 
records (e.g., medical, phone, banking), DNA, CCTV footage, fingerprints, footprints, 
photographs and witnesses. ROs/AOs considered corroborating evidence highly 
preferable and pointed out police know that if there is no corroboration a jury will not 
convict. OPP focus group commentary also pointed to the importance of 
corroborative evidence to a jury, including visible signs of injury or DNA or medical 
evidence, as distinct from unseen psychological trauma. This ‘hard evidence’ policing 
approach is anchored in the legislative context of criminal proceedings and reflected 
in OPP prosecutorial guidelines (see below s. 7.5 on limitations to police decision-
making); and it was apparent in the reasoning found to explain the ‘why’ of police 
decision-making, as shown in the following findings. 
 
Caveat on the ‘hard evidence’ tendency. Again, as with the commonality of sorts of 
evidence, the tendency for police to rely on ‘hard evidence’ is not to be taken as a 
universal rule, applied regardless of the particulars of a sexual assault allegation. That 
said, however, the research data collected and analysed from the case files and across 
the strands go to demonstrating that this is indeed a strong tendency, the rule rather 
than the exception.  
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6.2 Authorising and non-authorising of criminal proceedings  
 
Analysis of police decision-making in terms of the reasoning applied to sexual assault 
cases utilised GTM procedures (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and 
Meaning Generation Tactics (Miles & Huberman, 1994) within a Critical Discourse 
and Action Research theoretical framework (Dijk, 1998) – see Appendix six. Within 
this framework, analysis was inductively driven by the data not by hypotheses and 
theories, nor therefore by the existing literature. First, file documents were scrutinized 
and reasons were extracted from the collected data. Reasons ranged from the highly 
specific – e.g., victim provided 6 pages of notes by rough date, place and account of 
what had happened and how - to the very general – e.g., insufficient evidence. 
Reasons were categorized into a set of rationale factors that were manageable in 
number for purposes of analysis of police authorisation and non-authorisation 
decision-making.  
 
Before proceeding, seven clarifying comments are pertinent in relation to the 
following analysis and discussion. First, wherever there is a bracketed number it 
refers to a particular case, not the number of cases. This number is merely a nominal 
coding identifier to distinguish cases in data-collection and analysis. Secondly, and 
more importantly, a particular factor in any case could be indicated by more than one 
specific reason, and those reasons were often highly nuanced. This was especially true 
in non-authorisation reasoning where, for example, in case 13 ‘victim’s word only’ 
evidence was indicated in terms of police formally citing three reasons as no 
witnesses, no corroboration, and no corroborating medical evidence; and in case 75 in 
terms of no visible injury, assault not witnessed, and absence of security footage. 
Thirdly, wherever this occurs the factor is counted once only in analysis for each of 
the concerned cases. This means the factor count is less than that of specific reasons, 
which reflects the more abstract nature of factors for analytical purposes. Fourthly, 
specific reasons are not duplicated across the factors since once a reason was counted 
as indicating a factor it was not also used as an indicator of another factor. Fifthly, in 
all of the authorised cases and many of the non-authorised cases, it was pragmatically 
necessary to rely entirely on inferring reasons from various file documents in the 
absence of a formal report, as well as fitting within the theoretical framework of 
critical discourse analysis which does not take for granted the reasoning offered in 
formal narratives. These are labelled non-formal reasons in the text for convenience 
of phrasing. Sixthly, with a handful of exceptions (cited below), only reasons for the 
eventual decision outcome were typically evident in the case files. Hence, the 
following analysis does not ignore reasons contra-indicating the decision outcome - 
which might appear to be the situation - but rather reflects the mono-directional nature 
of the police decision-making process discovered in this research. This mono-
directional character of police argument is taken up in Chapter Eight. Finally, it is 
noted that the reasons found for non-authorisation did not include some of those 
coded in the LEAP system such as underage, deceased etc (see Appendix 12) nor that 
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of the ‘public interest’ among others cited in the OPP guidelines (see s. 7.5 for a 
discussion of these guidelines). 
 
6.2.1 Authorisation reasoning 
  
In respect to the 36 examined cases that were prosecuted or clearly intended for 
prosecution – see Appendix 13, Grid 1 - none were authorised formally with given 
reasons and signed off by an authorising officer in a report for those purposes. 
Reasons were either not stated at all in a formal report, or not declared as reasons 
even if noted in a document other than a formal report, or declared in generalised 
fashion on the Brief-head.  
 
 
Taken-for-granted decision-making. Authorisation cases were therefore ‘taken-for-
granted’ in terms of prima facie evidence and/or authorised by virtue of an officer 
having arrested an accused at the crime scene or otherwise early in the investigation. 
In the absence of formally cited rationales, authorisation reasons were inferred from 
reading various documents on the file (see Appendix six for a detailed explanation of 
the reading procedure). This involved de-layering the various narratives of police, 
victims, accused and witnesses within a critical discourse theoretical framework. De-
layering resulted in identification of twelve factors in police authorisation decision-
making.  
 
Table 6.1 shows frequency data in relation to identified authorisation factors by case 
by outcome. For the sake of completion, it also includes three cases where no reason 
was found. Two outcomes are distinguished according to whether the accused had 
been taken to Court (‘prosecution outcome’) or yet to reach there (‘offender 
processed’ via charge or intent to summons). 
 
Table 6.1. Authorisation factors identified in various documents by case by 
outcome  
RECOMMENDATION: Authorisation decision-making should be based on 
explicit reasons stated in a formal report for that purpose. 



































































































































3  x      x x x x   
4         x     
15    x     x     
16    x     x     
17         x     
18  x       x     
261 x      x  x  x x  
27 x  x   x x  x     
34   x  x    x  x   
453           x   
46             x 
47             x 
48             x 
Prosecution outcome 
5    x   x  x x x   
6 x x        x x   
7     x      x   
8 x  x         x  
9   x   x x x x     
10    x     x     
11       x  x  x   
28   x   x   x     
29   x x     x     
30        x x x    
31      x   x     
32    x  x   x     
35    x   x  x     
37  x  x      x    
38    x     x     
39 x  x x x         
40  x  x x    x     
41 x        x     
42 x   x     x     
44   x   x x  x     
49   x   x  x      
50   x x  x x x x     
55 x  x           
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90 x  x x          
NOTE: n = 37. 1. Case 26 is included here although it was not formally authorised (see ‘unusual 
argument cases’). It was the only case classified as ‘charge withdrawn by prosecution’ and that was 
despite already also being ‘complaint withdrawn by the complainant’. 
 
Three of the factors shown in Table 6.1 require no detailed explanation: multiple 
victims were found in five cases (14%), offender admissions in 14 cases (38%), and 
medical evidence in eight cases (22%). The strong influence of these factors is 
consistent with findings of the 2006 Heenan and Murray study and they serve to 
emphasise the importance of ‘hard evidence’ in authorisation decision-making. While 
each of these factors is clearly significant by itself, further analysis below shows they 
are even more important when conjoined with other reasons in a case. 
 
In eight files (22%), police wrote that there was sufficient evidence or that the matter 
was self-explanatory or a prima facie case (3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 26, 34, 45). By itself this 
factor clearly does not explain precisely why police decided to progress the case to 
court. Use of such generalised wording promotes vague Brief preparation that can be 
carried through to prosecution, increasing the likelihood of no conviction at court. 
From a discourse analysis viewpoint, this form of obscure reasoning serves the 
function of appearing to explain whilst not in fact doing so. The OPP focus group also 
commented on this as making their job harder in terms of not being immediately 
aware of the rationale for charging and strengths of a case. So they often had to try to 
determine what elements the police relied upon or else contact the officer to discover 
precisely what was being relied on to support the charges (see s. 7.1.2). 
 
Two reasons were not readily placed into a broader category and these were 
categorised as ‘other reasons’. One of these reasons was the apparent influence of a 
professional body investigating and deregistering the accused for breach of 
professional ethics (8). In this case police executed a warrant to search and seize the 
professional body’s records for use as an exhibit in prosecution. Case 26 was 
prosecuted to apply pressure to the accused not to seek financial claim against VicPol, 
where the victim had already withdrawn her complaint. In this case a CIU letterhead 
memorandum noted: “matter to proceed unless defendant provides a written 
undertaking re financial claim if charge withdrawn”. While the materials in case 8 
RECOMMENDATION: Police should avoid using highly generalised reasoning 
to justify authorisation and instead cite the exact reasons in terms of evidentiary 
materials. 
 
Implementing this recommendation will not only facilitate court success in and by 
itself, but also will help with future opportunities for improvement of police 
practice and training if included in case training materials. 
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might have some evidentiary value at court, in case 26 the prosecution intent was 
clearly unrelated to the crime at hand. 
 
A range of specific reasons with nuanced meanings found in the case files are 
employed to illustrate the remaining identified rationale factors. Each of these factors 
is thus defined descriptively in the text of the following analysis.  
 
The significance of witnesses to authorisation. From Table 6.1, the frequency of 
witnesses as an evidentiary class is a significant finding. Witnesses included ‘eye’ 
witnesses to the actual offence or part thereof (3, 10, 16, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35); or a 
range of other witnesses involved shortly before or after the offence, or providing 
character testimonial, or evidence of ‘first complaint’ or about events and places of 
some import to the offence (3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 38, 
40, 41, 42, 44, 50). Witnesses thus featured in 25 of the 37 cases (68%), with ‘eye’ 
witnesses in eight cases (22%); and other witnesses in 18 cases without any ‘eye’ 
witness (49%). In cases four and 17 witnesses were the only apparent reason for 
authorisation and in case 41 witness evidence was supplemented only by a credible 
victim. These findings suggest witnesses were important to the likelihood of a case 
being taken forward, and the single most frequent reason, although not necessary for 
authorisation to occur.  
 
‘Hard evidence’ policing. Table 6.1 data also demonstrate the importance of ‘hard’ 
evidence to the authorisation decision. Medical and/or other ‘hard’ evidence was 
found in 12 (32%) of the 37 cases. Other ‘hard’ evidence included: surveillance 
footage that showed the victim stepping back from accused (5) or the victim and 
friends in a taxi (11); a bite mark on the victim (9, 44 ); victim attacked with a 
dumbbell (50); motel records (26); and items of victim’s (27) or offender’s (35) 
clothing that were retrieved at or near the crime scene. However, ‘hard’ evidence 
arguably includes not only these factors, but also multiple victims, offender 
admissions, ‘eye’ witnesses and police at the crime scene directly observing the 
offending conduct. On that basis, ‘hard evidence’ reasons were apparent in 27 (73%) 
of the cases. From this analysis, it is concluded that police authorisation decision-
making relied heavily on one or another form of ‘hard evidence’, further 
demonstrating the ‘hard evidence’ policing approach described earlier (s. 6.1), which 
was also reflected in 2010 findings (s. 4.4).  
 
These findings on the importance of witnesses and ‘hard evidence’ more generally 
were further evidenced in RO/AO interviews and the focus groups with investigators 
as indicated earlier (s. 6.1). For example, in response to what kinds of evidence are 
essential to include in a Brief: “Look, they’re probably the two most critical:  the 
physical evidence and I believe the witness” (RO). 
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The role of victim factors. Reasons associated with victims were reinforced by other 
reasons as a rule, rather than being sole or even main drivers of prosecution intent. 
Apart from multiple victims, Table 6.1 shows data on two other categories of victim 
reasons found to play a role in police decision-making: the credible victim and the 
vulnerable victim. 
 
A credible victim was someone who fitted one of the following descriptions. The 
victim provided 6 pages of notes by rough date, place and account of a lengthy period 
of intra-familial abuse of her as a child (55). The case file reflected a poignant, 
convincing statement of victim’s ordeal (39, 55, 90). The victim was a fruit seller who 
had no ulterior motive to accuse his elderly customer (5). The victims were council 
cleaners and a passer-by (6). The victim was a mature female manager who took 
immediate action to report to both a taxi company and the police (41). The 
investigator believed the victim (8, 26, 42, 54, 60). Altogether there were nine cases 
(24%) where the victim was seen as credible, although none of these went to court 
solely for that reason. 
 
A number of victims were vulnerable in some way that appeared to influence police 
reasoning: medicated hospital patient (8); elderly Alzheimer’s patient (29); elderly 
and found wandering semi-naked (27); elderly, severely harmed and seen 
immediately after rape by police (28); held at knife-point, escaping semi-naked to a 
neighbouring house (9); unable to defend herself and subjected to realistic death 
threats (44); intra-familial sexual assault victims (39, 46, 55, 90); and victim tied up 
by the offender (49, 50). Vulnerability of the victim was apparent in 12 cases (32%) 
yet (as with the credible victim) all of those cases also reflected other reasons for 
prosecution. 
 
In case 55 the only reasons apparent for authorisation were that the victim was both 
credible and vulnerable. This was a case where the victim as a mature young woman 
reported her father’s sexual abuse of her as a teenager over many years. It was marked 
by an especially compelling and detailed account by the victim of her ordeal. This 
case appears as the exception to the rule that victim related factors other than multiple 
victims were not alone significant to police authorisation. 
 
Many of these reasons are reminiscent of the ‘ideal’ rather than ‘non-ideal’ victim 
found in the literature to be related to the prospect of police taking a matter forward 
(e.g., Jordan, 2008; Segrave & Wilson, 2011; Spears & Spohn, 1996). Interestingly, 
victim credibility and vulnerability (in senses described here) did not appear in the 
police interview and focus group data as significant to authorisation decision-making. 
 
Nor were any of the remaining three factors dominant in authorisation, all being 
supplemented by other factors in police reasoning. Indicators of culpability involved 
cases where the accused was already known to police, either having been investigated 
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previously for a similar incident (7, 34); having a prior record of an indecent assault 
of a 16 year old (39); or having charges already authorised of a very similar nature in 
relation to other victims (40). Four of the cases reflected this factor. Police at the 
crime scene included police who observed actual offending in a surveillance operation 
(30); where the offender attacked police with a knife at the scene (50); and where the 
offender was arrested at the scene (3, 9, 49, 50). Five cases reflected this factor. 
Public open space sexual assault refers to cases where the offending was highly 
visible, for example in a hotel, store, street, public park or tram (3, 6, 30, 37). In these 
four cases it was inferred that the public nature of the offending was part of police 
reasoning. 
 
Average number of factors per case. Table 6.1 shows that the above 12 factors were 
spread unevenly across the 37 cases, with a total of 108 factors found across all cases. 
The number of rationale factors for authorisation ranged from one to six, with six 
evident in only one case, five in five cases, four in six cases, three in eleven cases, 
two in ten cases, and only one in four cases. From this data authorisation most often 
occurred on the basis of relatively few rationale factors, with 2.9 factors considered 
on average. 
 
Absence of decision rationale. In three of the 37 examined cases that were taken 
forward no reason could be discovered from scrutiny of key file documents, which 
represents an 8.0% absence of rationale for prosecution over the total of examined 
cases. That is, in each of these cases key documentation did not clearly demonstrate 
the case against the accused. This finding is further explored in Chapter Eight.  
 
Two stage decision-making in authorisation cases. Another interesting feature of this 
analysis is the general gap in frequency of rationale factors between cases where the 
accused had been taken to Court and those where the alleged offender was yet to 
reach there. This is a puzzling result since investigation and Brief preparation are 
supposed to be completed by the ‘offender processed’ phase. One interpretation of 
this result is that there remains an important potential before an alleged offender 
arrives at Court for additional evidence and/or evidentiary reasoning to come to light. 
Or there might be a process of further decision-making nearer to the reality of a Court 
appearance that sharpens the mind of the police involved, possibly related to the 
interaction between the prosecutor and the informant and the more pressing need to 
inform the prosecutor as to evidentiary details of the case. Another possibility is that 
‘paperwork’ receives greater attention nearer to the Court date than earlier in the 
process of investigation and Brief preparation. This finding is consistent with an OPP 
focus group observation to the effect that police Briefs are often returned for further 
work before an OPP prosecutor could proceed with the case. It is also consistent with 
the observation by interviewed Sergeants that it is not unusual for a Brief to be 
forwarded to the OPP before completion due to running short of time. In any event 
there is evidence of two decision stages of taking the matter to Court and not just two 
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outcome categories. These two stages are tentatively identified as: Brief preparation 
without a systematic, structured argument; followed by interaction with prosecutors at 
the pre-court level. 
 
6.2.2 Non-authorisation reasoning formally stated 
 
Regarding cases that were not authorised, reasons were extracted first from formal 
statements in a report and/or Brief-head. Where these reasons are reported below in 
specific terms the wording is taken verbatim or as close to verbatim as possible from 
the case file as cited by police. That is, more elaborate or detailed explanation could 
not be discovered from file materials made available to PJO researchers. Formally 
stated reasons were sourced predominantly to the investigator; and recommending 
and authorizing officers normally indicated no reasons or simply agreed with those 
cited by the investigator, most often ticking-the-box on the Brief-head.  
 
Formal non-authorisation argument. In contrast to authorisation cases, the decision 
to not authorise was framed within formal argument giving reasons in 38 (81%) of the 
total of 47 examined cases that were not taken to Court (see Appendix 13, Grid 1). 
Nine cases involved no formal reasoning evident on file (see s. 6.2.2.1). There were 
seven other cases with a ‘no offence disclosed’ or ‘unsolved’ status (see s. 6.2.2.2). 
 
Table 6.2 presents data on formally stated non-authorisation rationale factors in 13 
categories. Two outcomes are distinguished according to whether the victim withdrew 
a complaint - thus relieving police of the formal decision - or whether the summons 
was not authorised even if the victim wished to pursue the matter. Notably these two 
outcomes are not conceptually exclusive since a summons might not be authorised 
because the victim withdraws a complaint (Appendix 12). Moreover, although police 
distinguish between ‘complaint withdrawn by the victim’ and ‘no further police 
action’, this is a conceptually ‘muddy’ distinction that is not utilized in the following 
analysis. Nor were there any cases found with a ‘charge withdrawn by prosecution’ 
status except case 26 (see Table 6.1 footnote and s. 6.2.2.3 for this unusual case). 
 
Table 6.2. Non-authorisation factors identified in formal reports by case by 
outcome  
RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring that all case files 
include reports of formal reasoning for the non-authorisation decision. 










































































































































Complaint withdrawn by victim 
54   x  x   x      
77  x x     x x  x   
78     x         
79 x    x         
81   x           
82   x  x  x      x 
87   x  x  x      x 
88     x        x 
  Summons not authorised 
1      x    x    
2  x x x  x  x x  x  x 
12 x  x x  x  x x x x   
13  x x x  x x x x  x x x 
14   x x  x  x   x   
33    x    x   x  x 
36 x    x         
431   x x  x    x   x 
56 x  x x x x  x x     
57 x x x x  x  x  x x  x 
58 x    x         
59 x   x x   x      
60        x      
61  x x     x     x 
62 x x x   x   x  x   
63 x    x  x       
64   x   x  x  x x   
65 x x  x x x    x x x x 
66 x   x  x   x     
67 x   x   x      x 
68 x  x x  x x x      
69  x x  x  x x      
70   x   x  x  x x   
71   x    x x     x 
72 x  x     x      
73 x  x    x     x  
74  x x     x x   x  
75   x          x 
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76 x x x     x   x   
89       x       
NOTES: n = 38; 1. Case 43 is listed here under SNA although it was in fact prosecuted at least to a 
committal hearing, having been formally not authorised beforehand, without clarification on file. 
 
Table 6.2 data show that police referred to ‘insufficient evidence’ in 16 cases (42%) 
and/or ‘success unlikely’ in ten cases (26%) in their decision-making. Although these 
two factors appear similar they are separated out in analysis because police cited them 
separately in formal reports in four cases, indicating different goals of police decision-
making, the former being a matter of simply lacking evidence and the latter 
suggesting a need to ‘win’ at court. The former was phrased in various terms of 
insufficient evidence; no sufficient admissible, substantial and/or reliable evidence; 
and/or with reference to prosecutorial guidelines (12, 36, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 65, 
66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 76, 79). The latter was phrased in either terms of no reasonable 
prospect of conviction (2, 13, 57, 77) or successful prosecution unlikely (61, 62, 65, 
69, 74, 76). Police referred to one or both of these two factors in 22 cases (58%). The 
VCCAV (1991) study found on the basis of police advice that ‘insufficient evidence’ 
referred to the lack medical evidence, absence of physical injuries to the victim, 
uncooperative victims and so on as noted earlier. 
 
An AO interviewee explained that generalised wordings such as ‘insufficient 
evidence’ and ‘complaint withdrawn’ are all that is required for the LEAP database 
system and the entire investigation folder complete with any evidentiary items is filed 
in the serious crime management file for future reference. However, where utilized in 
formal reports that are supposed to provide clear explanations, these generalised terms 
do not explain the reasoning behind non-authorisation, which has been observed as 
problematic in the literature (e.g., Fitzgerald, 2006; Gregory & Lees, 1996; Taylor & 
Gassner,  2010) and the redress of which has been called for by the VLRC (2004) and 
Victoria Ombudsman (2006). Frohmann (1997) has argued that such ‘explanations’ 
conceal unofficial justifications for not going forward with complaints. Clearly 
documented reasons are needed to ensure police non-authorisation decision-making is 
transparent and accountable. From a discourse analysis viewpoint, this is another form 
of obscure reasoning that has only the symbolic appearance of explaining.  
 




The significance of victim related factors. Five distinct victim related factors were 
induced from reading the case file formal reports justifying non-authorisation: 
victim’s word only evidence; victim a poor witness; victim uncooperative; victim 
blameworthy; and other victim related reasons. Only case 60 did not reflect a victim 
related factor in authorisation. Each of these factors was reflected in terms of a variety 
of formally stated specific reasons. 
 
Victim’s word only evidence was indicated as a reason in the following terms: no 
victim evidence (64, 87), no corroboration (12, 13, 43, 57, 68, 70, 71, 73, 76), no 
physical evidence (12, 14, 77, 81, 82), no DNA evidence (62, 65, 72), no 
corroborating medical evidence (2, 12, 13, 56, 76), no forensic evidence (14, 61, 68, 
69, 77, 81, 87), no useful forensic evidence since accused admitted and claimed 
consent (64), no visible injury (57, 75), victim not injured (69, 77), assault not 
witnessed (70, 71, 75), CCTV footage erased (65), no (independent) witnesses (2, 13, 
14, 54, 61, 69, 74, 81, 87), and absence of security footage (75). As shown in Table 
7.2, the victim’s word only was a decision-making factor in 24 of the 38 examined 
cases (63%). It was also reflected in a total of 50 specific reasons across those 24 
cases, showing this as an especially frequent line of reasoning. One notable aspect of 
these reasons is the appearance of the ‘physical harm rule’’, which can be inferred in 
many and clearly indicated in the ‘no visible injury/victim not injured’ reasons. 
 
The victim was cited as a poor witness in non-authorisation reasoning in several 
ways, including: the victim had emotional problems/difficulty in coping with Court 
pressures (2, 63, 68), victim’s memory appeared scattered (14), victim was unable to 
recall some events (56), victim’s “clarity and reliability of events is questionable” 
(57), victim had no recollection (65), victim was vague (67), victim was inconsistent 
(56, 66), victim credibility would have been ‘sorely tested’/an issue in Court (12, 13, 
57, 59, 67), and VATE statement did not clearly disclose a criminal act (33, 43).The 
victim as a poor witness was a factor in 13 cases (34%) and cited 17 times in terms of 
specific reasons.  
 
RECOMMENDATION: Police should avoid using generalised reasoning to 
justify non-authorisation and instead cite the precise reasons in terms of 
evidentiary materials lacking in the cases concerned. 
 
Implementing this recommendation is necessary to fulfill the requirements of the 
relevant recommendations of the VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006): 
ie., to enable decision-making that is consistent and transparent, provide for 
adequate written explanations to complainants, introduce mechanisms to 
systematically analyse all sexual assault Briefs, and allow for regular evaluation of 
prosecution decision-making.  
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Police formally referred to the victim being uncooperative also in several ways: the 
victim withdrew the complaint (36, 54, 60, 63, 71, 78), reluctance of the victim (36, 
68, 82, 87), lack of available evidence without victim’s assistance (57, 79, 82), the 
victim failed to keep a number of appointments (78), victim was hostile to police at 
scene and not prepared to provide further assistance (79), the victim refused to 
complete a statement or to make a statement of no complaint (58), and the victim did 
not identify crime scene (81). Uncooperative victims were thus also evident in police 
reasoning in 13 cases (34%), again with some 17 specific citations.  
 
As noted at the front of this section, these and other specific reasons reflect police 
records as closely as possible to the verbatim written statements by police. Further 
elaboration is either not possible or adds no substantive detail of explanation. Thus, in 
respect to the ‘lack of victim assistance’ for example, in case 57 the RO wrote that the 
victim “refused to participate in medical exam, and therefore no forensic evidence and 
no witnesses”. In case 79, the RO simply stated “victim not prepared to provide 
further assistance to police”. In case 82, the RO wrote “lack of available evidence 
without victim’s assistance”. 
 
Police wrote of the victim as blameworthy in many terms as well, including: the 
victim reported an earlier indecent assault on herself which she later withdrew (13), 
the victim was not heard to yell and denied to witnesses that anything took place (14), 
the victim did not complain to friends at the earliest opportunity (65), the victim’s 
behaviour was questionable or belied the allegation (12, 31, 64, 66, 70), the victim 
was intoxicated by alcohol (56, 57, 65, 68), the victim  instigated meeting with the 
accused (1), the victim had ulterior motives for reporting (2), the  victim did not see a 
doctor (12, 62), the victim had sex with another male (2, 43), the victim “did not 
object to what he was doing and pretended that she was enjoying it” (56)’ and the 
victim did not physically demonstrate sex was non-consensual (64). Victim blaming 
was part of the police rationale against authorisation in 14 cases (37%), being 
mentioned 20 times across those cases.  
   
There was a range of other victim reasons that were not readily categorized as a 
distinct factor, including: no obvious motive for a false report (13), the victim liked 
the accused (57), victim did not wish to proceed (63), victim’s complaint was due to 
pressure from family members (67), the victim was doing year 12 and needed no extra 
pressure (71), the victim was healing and not expecting to go to court (73), the 
victim’s wishes outweigh public interest factors (82), family concerned for victim 
(who had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital subsequent to the rape) (89), police 
similarly concerned for the victim’s well-being (89), and victim had a better 
understanding of the process and believed investigation would be futile (87). 
Additionally, other victim reasons were mentioned in formal non-authorisation 
decision-making in 10 cases (26%), with a total of 11 reasons. 
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Table 6.2 data demonstrate that one or more of the victim related factors were cited in 
formal non-authorisation argument in all but one of the 38 cases (97%). Non-
authorisation decisions predominantly involved reference to the victim’s word only 
(63%) and/or one or more negative assessments of the victim, especially in terms of 
victims being poor witnesses (34%), uncooperative (34%) or blameworthy in some 
sense (37%). A negative assessment of the victim was evident in the specific reasons 
cited in 26 cases (68%). The above detailed itemization of police reasoning against 
authorisation shows partial exceptions to this line of typical reasoning in the ‘other 
victim factors’ reason set, albeit those also included negative or ambiguous reasoning 
about victims. In short, the victim was a key focus of non-authorisation decision-
making and that focus was heavily oriented to finding fault with the victim rather than 
looking for ways to support the victim in making and sustaining a complaint. Chapter 
Eight provides further data and analysis on the management aspects of preparing 
Briefs as distinct from the reasons which are the focus at this point.  
 
Current findings from the operational police case files are consistent with the 
commonly reported findings in the literature that victim’s word only evidence is not a 
significant driver of police response to sexual assault (e.g., Heenan & Murray, 2006) 
related as it is to issues of victim credibility and consent (Hopkins & Koss, 2005). 
Interview and focus group data collected in 2011 also supported these findings, as did 
the views of victim/survivors, police and CASA counsellors drawn from the 2010 
interviews (ss. 3.3, 4.4 and 5.1 respectively). Investigators cited the easiest Briefs to 
write are recent with corroborative evidence: “the easiest ones to write, which are the 
most difficult for the victim, are recent rapes. You know, where you’ve got forensic, 
medical” (Investigator). AOs/ROs similarly said the easy ones were where there are 
good, reliable, competent victims (clear memory, articulate, consistent story). As one 
RO put it: Easy ones are where there is “a clear recollection, it’s truthful, it’s honest, 
it’s open … nothing in their history that makes you doubt … (and) corroborative 
evidence and when offender confesses.” Another RO indicated: “There’s evidence of 
sex. There’s evidence of rough sex. There’s evidence of, you know, scratches and 
where you’ve got forensic evidence. They’re the easiest ones.”  
 
By contrast, among the most difficult Briefs to write and supervise were those where 
victims were alcohol/drug affected, intellectually or hearing impaired, suffering 
mental health problems, and historical cases, since these typically were those where 
“the defence will pick holes in that particular person’s credibility” (RO). Policing of 
sexual assault cases generally is very demanding and complex and is replete with 
vexed issues such as the need to obtain particularisation of the offence despite the 
difficulties the victims have with memory and recall due to the trauma itself as well as 
those cases complicated by the use of alcohol and/or drugs, including spike-drinked 
events.  This difficulty was appropriately highlighted by an officer: “Memory issues 
(are) very difficult, because you’ve got to think they get to court and they’re in the 
witness box” (RO). Again, AOs also mentioned these for the same reason. Sometimes 
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also “historic because incest and … they’re drawn out or it’s been buried by the 
family, been dusted off, put over in a little box in the corner and no one talked about 
it.” (Investigator). “Sex workers can be problematic but that’s only because of pre-
conceived ideas that others have of them.” (RO). 
 
The gist of these narratives is illustrated further by these quotations: 
 
Some are fantastic and will just come in and tell you stuff, and others it’s like 
drawing teeth – pulling teeth. And just keeping appointments.  You ring them 
to ask them a question and you’ve got to chase them four times and others 
will be fantastic (IO). 
 
slipped into a girl’s drink at a nightclub or whatnot … snapshots.  It’s like the 
shutter of a camera opening and closing … very difficult to – because one, 
you don’t know whether she’s telling the truth or not because she’s leaving 
out all this stuff (RO). 
 
And it’s difficult because they can be difficult to deal with. They’ll start 
making a statement and then decide they don’t want to do the statement 
anymore and then they’ll come back a week later and say, “No, I want to do 
it again now,” and then they’ll go away and then they’ll come back again. It 
can be very difficult. It’s not sitting down normally just trying to get your 
investigation done. The person’s yes, no, yes, no. “Today I’m too sick. 
Tomorrow I can be good.” So they’re the sort that can be difficult and we get 
quite a number of those (RO). 
 
I know what will happen to them in the witness box in relation to 
(drug/alcohol use) (AO). 
 
If you say to somebody, “I want you go to court and stand in the witness box 
and give evidence on your own that’s not going to be backed up with 
anything,” that’s a big ask of someone who has been through what they’ve 
been through (AO). 
 
Well, if a victim doesn’t want to give evidence it’s going to be a bit hard to 
proceed then. And, and there are a lot of reasons why complaints are 
withdrawn.  We, we do get quite a bit of it (AO).   
 
But both investigators and ROs were reluctant to link the ease or difficulty of writing 
to whether or not these were also types of Brief that generally could or could not be 
recommended for authorisation. It is notable also that investigators and AOs/ROs 
generally emphasised that these were issues not of their making but of judges, juries, 
defence lawyers, the general public, and victims themselves. That is, although police 
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were cognizant of these as decision-making factors they saw them in relation to the 
perceived likelihood of a prosecution being successful at Court and, indeed, with a 
view to the impact of Court processes and unsuccessful prosecution upon victims. 
“It’s a bit sad for all those people who are so frightened that, you know, you may not 
have that punch or the rough sex… really sad, because that’s the way the courts look 
at it.” (RO). “The last thing you want is one on one.  Because then, why does the jury 
believe the victim any more than the offender?” (RO). “Sometimes I agonise over 
them. Because you think, now do I prosecute them, I’ve seen the results of failed 
prosecutions and you think, oh, why did I put that person through that?” (AO). 
Research evidence from strand one also supported this line of decision thinking by 
police (see s. 4.4). 
 
However, as one AO pointed out, the majority of sexual offence cases involved ‘word 
against word or oath against oath’ given the reality of delayed reporting and the 
general absence of physical evidence. For this officer it was frustrating to deal with an 
attitude among some police of avoiding recommendations to proceed where there was 
only the victim’s word against that of the alleged offender: 
 
Oath on oath is common in sex offences and oath against oath evidence is 
accepted in law so it shouldn’t be a barrier to prosecution or a consideration in 
police decision making... our job is not to assess what the prosecutor or jury 
will think or determine. Our job is to investigate a case and weigh up the facts 
and if it comes down to oath against oath then let the OPP decide... whether 
[oath against oath] is accepted will be determined by a jury and ought not to 
be in the remit of police... I see a lot of police who see it [word against word] 
as a fatal weakness in a case and therefore a basis for discontinuation of the 
investigation or not laying charges... but I’ve been doing these cases a long 
time and I’ve seen many oath against oath lead to convictions and I often have 
to drive this point home to the [detectives] I’m supervising or whose briefs 
they want non-authorised... (AO). 
 
Nonetheless, the over-riding theme in relation to Brief preparation was whether or not 
there was corroboration of the victim’s word, especially where there were perceived 
victim-related problems of particularization, consent, character, reliability of memory, 
and credibility and competency ‘in the box’. The outcome of this decision-making 
approach by police - where corroborative evidence is sought and victim’s word only 
evidence is avoided as the basis for prosecution - is to not challenge the courts and 
public to change because police tend to charge and prosecute mainly in stereotypical 
cases with ideal victims and so embed the problem further (Taylor & Gassner 2010). 
It is apparent that Victoria Police efforts consequent to the VLRC (2004) and 
Ombudsman (2006) recommendations still require robust and transparent change 
outcomes in respect to victim complaints that stand significantly on the victim’s word. 
It is also apparent that there is a genuine challenge in a number of these cases in these 
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terms – the question is whether Victoria Police as an organisation is rising to and 
meeting that challenge. 
 
 
Accused related factors. Reading of the case files showed accused related factors 
were also weighed in police non-authorisation decision-making. Three factors were 
induced in this regard: accused denial, accused credible and issue of consent unclear. 
The issue of unclear consent is construed as favourable to the accused since the 
judgement must be for either one or the other and it is clearly not favourable to the 
victim. 
 
Accused denial was cited by police in the following terms: no admissions (76), 
accused denied (13, 14, 33, 54, 61, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 77), accused made no 
admission (76), accused said victim consented (2, 57), accused gave contrary 
evidence (12), accused said victim initiated sexual act (56, 59, 64), accused said 
victim and he had a sexual relationship for several months (77), and accused said 
fellatio was normal in their sexual relationship (77). From Table 6.2, accused denial 
reasons were evidenced in 20 cases (53%). The accused credible factor was evident in 
a lesser number of ways: the accused had no similar prior convictions of a sexual 
nature (2), the accused appeared genuine (13, 56, 62, 66), the defendant gave a very 
consistent and convincing account (56), he was married and in same job for 35 years 
(74), and he stopped when the victim threatened to scream (77). The issue of consent 
unclear was noted in even less various terms: the accused could not reasonably know 
lack of consent (64), no indication of no consent (43, 66, 70), and the issue of consent 
was unclear (1, 12, 57, 65). Citation of reasons for the accused being credible was 
apparent in eight cases (21%) and unclear consent in seven cases (18%). One or more 
of the accused related reasons were evident in 25 (66%) of the examined cases of 
formal non-authorisation, and accused denial alone was the second most frequently 
relied upon rationale for non-authorisation (after the victim’s word only factor). 
Mention of accused-related factors was also made in the interviews and focus groups. 
One RO said that sometimes investigators believe the offender who is a fine, 
upstanding citizen in the community, wearing a business suit. An observation was 
made by investigators and ROs generally that juries - especially in rural areas - tended 
RECOMMENDATION: Notwithstanding the real challenges involved, Victoria 
Police policy should emphasise the need to seek, create and use every available 
option to encourage and support victims in their complaints, rather than allow them 
to remain ‘uncooperative’ or ‘poor’ witnesses, or to avoid ‘victim word’ only 
prosecutions. In making non-authorisation decisions police should take active and 
concerted steps to avoid victim related reasons for doing so and to particularly 
eschew finding reasons to blame victims. A robust quality monitoring program 
should be established specifically to reinforce this policy.  
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to believe alleged offenders who present as ‘normal’ people not drug addicts (IO 
focus groups and RO interviews 2011).  
 
Although some of these specific reasons appear very alike, there are highly nuanced 
meanings involved and, as reported earlier, often the same case saw police writing 
similar reasons as separate grounds in the non-authorisation argument. For instance, 
in case 77 the investigator cited one reason as the accused said fellatio was normal in 
their sexual relationship, while the recommending officer wrote that the accused 
denied and said that they had a sexual relationship for several months. That is, three 
reasons of similar but subtly different meanings were compiled in that case. This 
construction of argument is important as the decision-making appears more 
considered and facilitates more interpretations favourable to the accused (and 
unfavourable to the victim). More is said about this aspect of police decision-making 
in chapter nine. 
 
Consent and variability of police knowledge. In respect to the issue of consent, the 
1991 Crimes Act 1958 was amended to introduce a statutory definition of consent 
(s.36(a)) that emphasizes ‘free agreement’. Section 37(1)b also required a judge to 
direct the jury that a person is not to be regarded as having freely agreed to a sexual 
act just because she did not protest or physically resist or sustain physical injury, or 
that she agreed on previous occasions to a sexual act with the accused or another 
person. That is, inactivity or silence indicates lack of consent not the opposite. Yet the 
case file evidence showed a continuing reliance on this as a part of police reasoning 
against authorisation. In this respect, interviews and focus groups showed knowledge 
of legislation, policies and procedural rules was variable, ranging from one RO’s 
admission of not paying much attention to these through to a sound understanding and 
application. This finding resonates with earlier reported police views (s. 4.6.1) and 
supports the training needs identified in Chapter Nine. 
 
Other decision factors. Contradictive witness evidence was formally cited in terms of 
five specific reasons: no witness said any act occurred without the victim’s 
permission (65), inconsistent or conflicting witness statements (2, 12, 14, 57, 76, 77), 
witness statements contained allegations of an offence that the victim did not disclose 
(33), witnesses had doubts about the victim’s allegation (62, 64, 70), and a witness 
said the victim had similarly tried to initiate sex with him (64). In 11 of the cases 
(29%) contradictive witnesses were cited as a reason not to authorise a summons. 
 
A range of other reasons were also cited in favour of non-authorisation, including: the 
long-term relationship between victim and accused (1), sexual penetration was 
accidental (2), a judge would warn the jury of dangers of conviction (13), 
“consideration (of) Longman’s warning which relates to a jury being loathed to 
convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a victim” (57), accused was not rebuked by 
the mother for kissing his daughter (in a context of intra-familial sexual assault 
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allegations) (33), accused admitted tutoring victim (61), subsequent investigation and 
nature of allegation (63), ensuing court case would be extremely costly (65), most 
witnesses had returned overseas (65), force instructions relating to minor assaults 
(75), defendant suitable for diversion under S128A(1) of Magistrates Court Act (71), 
accused was not fully aware of his rights due to not being afforded an interpreter (67), 
both parties were known to each other and there was no breach of the peace (75), may 
fit criteria for civil action (75), victim aware can report in future (82), offender not 
identified (87), and victim’s daughter held power of attorney and withdrew complaint 
(88). 
 
Some of these specific reasons are quite vague, partly due to their short-hand or point-
form citation in a formal memorandum. Some could have been construed to fit the 
descriptive meaning of one or other of the above factors, however they were 
sufficiently cryptic within the context of the case to resist confident categorization. 
Some also suggest other factors at work exercising the minds of police decision-
makers. In particular there are suggestions of considerations of law – or possibly the 
‘success unlikely’ factor – and cost-savings. The presence of these other reasons in 13 
cases (34%) also reflects a considerable ideographic element in police non-
authorisation decisions. 
 
Historical reports. Although no longer a matter that is to be considered in Courts of 
law in Victoria - Crime (Sexual Offences) (Further Amendment) Act 2006 - historical 
sexual assault was cited either directly in those terms (87), or in terms of time delay 
(13, 65, 73, 74), or delay precluded test for drugs in a case alleging spiked drink rape 
(65). The fact that the sexual assault was reported after 72 hours - the defining 
criterion of ‘historical’ in Victoria - was cited as a reason for non-authorisation in four 
cases (11%). It was not always clear in their reasoning whether police were actually 
referring to the loss of medical/DNA evidence (e.g., due to washing clothes, bed 
sheets) rather than a ‘stale offence’ consideration (see also s. 7.5). Historical reports 
were seen as particularly problematic and challenging by police and OPP focus 
groups as well as RO/AO interviewees, because of a general lack of corroboration, 
victim memory/particularization problems, and differing points of proof/charges in 
relation to legislative changes over time. Similarly, strand one provided examples of 
how police often considered historical reports as a waste of police time and resources 
(s. 4.2) and beset by problems of victim capabilities to cope with the rigors of the 
criminal justice process (s. 4.4) and hence warranted the use of the ‘options talk’ to 
persuade victims against continuing with complaints (s. 4.5.1). 
 




Average number of factors per case. Table 6.2 shows that the above 13 factors were 
spread unevenly across the 38 cases, with a total of 163 factors found across all cases. 
The number of formal rationale factors for non-authorisation ranged from one to ten, 
with ten evident in one case, nine in three cases, eight in two cases, seven in one case, 
six in two cases, five in seven cases, four in ten cases, three in three cases, two in six 
cases, and only one in four cases. From this data non-authorisation most often 
occurred on the basis of several rationale factors, with 4.3 factors considered on 
average.  
 
‘Hard evidence’ policing. Altogether, the data shown in Table 6.2 provide further 
research evidence that police adopt a ‘hard evidence’ decision-making approach to 
sexual assault cases, albeit conversely. With the exception of contradictive witnesses, 
none of the factors/reasons induced from police formal non-authorisation reports were 
of a ‘hard evidence’ nature. Put another way, without ‘hard evidence’ non-
authorisation was by far the most frequent result of the police decision-making 
process. That process relied upon finding reasons that negated prosecution and those 
reasons predominantly concerned either disavowing the victim’s story or embracing 
that of the accused. As exemplified in the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the 
interview and focus group data support ‘hard evidence’ as the mainstay policing 
approach – also supported by the 2010 findings (s. 4.4) - albeit there was also 
commentary suggesting a trend towards greater risk-taking in the decision to proceed 
(see below s. 6.3). 
 
Two sets of decision-making. There is also a noticeably wide gap between the 
frequencies associated with victims’ complaint withdrawals and summonses not 
authorised by police. This gap is understandable in terms of the lesser need for 
victims to justify their decision not to pursue allegations. It suggests there are two sets 
of decision-making in non-authorisation: one is associated with victims and their 
interaction with police, and the other is in formal police decision-making. 
 
‘Options talk.’ Since ‘options talk’ by police can be an active ingredient in a victim’s 
withdrawal decision, the precise locus of decision-making – whether it is genuinely 
RECOMMENDATION: Steps should be taken to ensure all operational police 
are fully aware of the legalities concerning issues of consent, corroborative 
evidence, delays in reporting and other relevant legislation and their role in police 
decision-making.  
 
This recommendation is made in the light of the need - notwithstanding the sound 
knowledge of some police - to reinforce the legislative, policy and procedural 
knowledgebase of investigators and their supervisors and to monitor application of 
key requirements. 
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the victim’s decision or a police decision – is uncertain in situations where that is the 
outcome. The research literature supports victim withdrawal as a decidedly grey area 
of decision-making (Kelly et al., 2005; Lievore, 2005a; McLachlan, 2007; VCCAV 
2001). As one AO acknowledged in relation to whether investigators deliberately talk 
victims out of proceeding: “You can only go I think on what is before you and … you 
don’t know the process that took place beforehand. (But) sometimes they have. Other 
times it’s the relationship might have been, might have been restored”. As indicated 
by this AO, some of the complex motivation for victims withdrawing complaints of 
their own accord has been evidenced in the literature as due to influences arising from 
their relationship with the offender: e.g., fearing the offender who is an intimate 
partner, avoiding wider family disruptions, and needing to retain employment with the 
offender, among other motivators (cf, Heenan & Murray, 2006; Lievore, 2003). 
Again, these considerations pointing to the importance of options talk and its capacity 
for managing victims away from proceeding with complaints was amply 
demonstrated in strand one findings (s. 4.5). 
 
6.2.2.1 Non-formal non-authorisation decision-making 
 
Apart from the formal statements of why matters were not taken forward, documents 
were examined for reasons that were not formally stated in nine cases (19, 20, 25, 26, 
52, 80, 83, 84 and 85) in which there were no reports with formal reasons against 
authorisation, and all of which resulted in the victim withdrawing the complaint. That 
is, none involved an active formal decision by police. However, since police are able 
to prosecute matters despite a victim’s withdrawal of the complaint, there remains the 
question of why authorisation was not forthcoming. In lieu of formal statements and 
consistent with critical discourse theory, reasons were induced from other file 
materials through the de-layering procedure. This task of analysis was especially 
difficult in these cases due to documentation gaps additional to lack of a formal non-
authorisation report.  
 
Findings were consistent with those of formal non-authorisation decision-making, 
albeit only six factors and 20 reasons were inferred from the available file materials. 
In three cases (19, 25, 52) the role of the victim’s word only factor was apparent. For 
example, in case 19 police noted there was no surveillance footage showing that the 
victim had not consented to unprotected sexual intercourse. A lack of victim 
cooperation was also observed in one form of words or another by police in seven 
cases (19, 26, 52, 80, 83, 84, 85). For example, in case 83 the victim was said to be 
“extremely hostile to police” and refused to make a statement. Similarly, the victim 
was said to have refused court involvement in case 84. In case 52, it was observed 
that the victim was “unsure whether to go ahead” and later withdrew her complaint. In 
this case there was also an implication of the victim being blameworthy in a record of 
her saying that she was “too drunk to refuse (the alleged offender’s) advances”. Two 
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cases reflected a new factor of victim incapacitation, with ‘emotional strain’ 
mentioned in one file (20), and in another “she was stressed about it and just wanted 
to forget and put it behind her” (85). Historical sexual assault also appeared as a 
reason in terms of ‘staleness’ of offence (82). 
 
Other reasons included: victim going overseas to live (25), victim an overseas 
backpacker who returned home (case 84), accused an overseas backpacker who 
returned home (84), police withdrew the charge once the accused signed an agreement 
not to pursue financial compensation (26), and the victim’s family was against Court 
proceedings (80). In a case of rape (85) the accused was a stranger yet, after advising 
the victim to ‘think about it’, police allowed her to withdraw the complaint and took 
no further action. The reasoning behind this decision was especially opaque given that 
it appeared police did in fact believe her. Police checked video surveillance footage 
but did not note whether it could be used to identify him. 
 
Separate to these nine cases, the case files with formal non-authorisation reports were 
also examined for non-formally stated reasons in accord with the critical discourse 
approach. This examination added only 22 reasons and revealed no different reasons 
from those already found in the nine cases. The most significant result in this respect 
was finding the ‘victim incapacitation’ factor reflected in reasoning of four of the 
cases with formal non-authorisation reports. 
  
6.2.2.2 Non-authorisation reasoning not formally stated in other cases. 
 
In addition to the above, cases were not proceeded with beyond an initial complaint or 
investigation because they were categorized as ‘no offence disclosed’ or ‘unsolved’. 
None of these cases included a formal report by police citing the reasons for their 
non-authorisation, nor for their more precise outcome classification. (There were no 
cases found where police decided an outcome of a ‘false complaint/report’).  
 
Generally, these cases also suffered from the absence of key documentation on file 
and they reflected the factors found in other non-authorisation outcome 
classifications, albeit a lesser set, viz: victim’s word only (22, 23, 51, 86), victim a 
poor witness (23, 51, 86), uncooperative victim (22, 53), blameworthy victim (23, 
86), incapacitated victim (53), accused denial (51), contradictive witnesses (22, 23), 
and other, difficult to classify reasons (21, 24, 86). 
 
One finding highlighted in these cases was that outcomes classification were often 
moot if not inaccurate - as, indeed, it was for other classifications. The ‘no offence 
disclosed’ cases were arguably described more accurately as a complaint withdrawn 
by the victim. For example, in case 22, the summary report indicated that the victim 
refused a medical examination and wanted no further action. Although they were not 
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‘eye’ witnesses and possibly self-interested, nursing staff gave contradictive accounts, 
which appeared to be the basis for the ‘no offence disclosed’ outcome. The victim in 
case 51 was described as naive and she withdrew her complaint, with no witnesses 
and the accused claiming consent. In case 86, the victim was noted to be ‘quite 
intoxicated’, extremely vague about details and recollections, and she did not 
complain of injuries. She also withdrew her complaint. In Case 23 the summary report 
noted that police doubted there was any offence. Police clearly considered the victim 
blameworthy and a poor witness, having been alcohol and cannabis affected, giving 
an offence date that was shown to be incorrect, not being able to identify the 
boarding-house room where the offence allegedly occurred, and saying every male 
spoken to looked like the offender. A resident described the victim as a ‘drunk’ who 
was always around the premises. From this mix of possible reasons, police decided it 
was an unsolved case, yet it would arguably have been better determined as ‘no 
offence disclosed’. 
 
From the committed police efforts in cases 21 and 24, it is reasonable to infer that the 
only explanation for not pursuing those matters was the failure to locate the accused. 
The intellectually disabled victim in case 53 was not confident of identifying the 
accused and she was concerned about attending Court. Given police followed up the 
victim several times without success, its ‘unsolved’ status appeared to rest on the fact 
that she declined to make a formal statement. The ‘unsolved’ status of these cases was 
an apt outcome. 
 
 
6.2.2.3 Unusual argument cases 
 
Cases 13, 26, 54, 60, and 89 were especially unusual in argument, with none seeking 
or endorsing authorisation. It is worth discussing these cases in more detail to further 
illustrate non-authorisation police decision-making.  
 
In case 13, the investigator presented a balanced if ambivalent view, noting 
uncertainty as to who was telling the truth. By contrast, the recommending officer 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should develop and implement a clearly 
articulated classification system of mutually exclusive and comprehensive 
outcomes based on defined criteria and guided by extensive practice examples. 
This classification system should avoid the problem of one outcome being a reason 
for another outcome – e.g., ‘complaint withdrawn by the victim’ should not be a 
‘reason’ for ‘summons not authorised’. A comprehensive set of concrete and 
precise reasons for decision-making needs to be developed to underpin this 
classification system. 
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presented three points for and six against prosecution. The authorizing officer 
provided seven points against and only one for authorisation. Their arguments can be 
amalgamated as follows. Reasons for authorisation included: the victim complained at 
the earliest opportunity; a witness confirmed she was distressed at the time; and there 
was no obvious motive for a false report. Contraindications included: the victim 
reported an earlier indecent assault on herself which she later withdrew; the accused 
denied allegations and “appeared to be of good character”; no inappropriate behaviour 
by the accused was known to other welfare agency staff; there was no independent 
witness to the alleged assault; the “credibility of the complainant would be an issue” 
at court; it would be extremely difficult to obtain a conviction; there was no direct 
evidence; no medical evidence; no evidence of similar acts; and “the period of time 
reporting this matter effects the prosecution’s chances of success”. The case was not 
taken to Court. 
  
Although requesting non-authorisation, the investigator in case 54 formally cited 
reasons for and against authorisation, having found the victim credible and believed 
rape had occurred.  Also, the accused had been investigated previously for a similar 
modus operandi allegation. Against these factors, there were the “strong denials by 
accused’, a lack of independent witnesses and the victim’s withdrawal of the 
complaint. The recommending and authorizing officers only ticked the Brief-head 
boxes in the actual decision not to proceed.  
 
Similarly, case 60 was unusual in that it contained a formal memorandum of 
argument from the investigator that canvassed reasons for both authorisation and non-
authorisation. The reasons for authorisation were that the accused was unconvincing 
in interview; he admitted to forcing his finger into the victim’s vagina; the victim was 
found to be credible and competent; and a witness was willing to give evidence of 
physical injury to the victim. At one point the authorizing officer requested the 
investigator to re-interview the victim as to her drug history. Contra-indications to 
authorisation were cited as being that the victim had a drug history that needed “to be 
taken into account when assessing the credibility of the victim” and the accused 
admitted sexual intercourse but claimed it to be consensual. The victim subsequently 
‘disappeared’ and was not re-located for almost two years during which she had 
established a family. She then no longer wished to pursue the matter and a request for 
non-authorisation of the summons was the result.  
 
Case 89 also formally stated reasons for authorisation – although the result was non-
authorisation. The reasons included: VATE evidence of the victim and her daughter, 
evidence of first complaint, some physical corroborative evidence, and the refusal of 
the accused to give any reply to the allegations. Yet these reasons were 
countermanded by the victim’s mother’s fear of another suicide attempt by the victim, 
with the recommending officer concluding that the victim’s wellbeing took 
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precedence. There was no file evidence of the victim being consulted before the non-
authorisation decision was taken. 
 
Case 26 presented a peculiar situation regarding authorisation decision-making. There 
was a memorandum stating the victim had supplied sufficient information to establish 
a crime, and another stating the matter was to proceed unless the defendant provided a 
written undertaking not to seek a financial claim against Victoria Police if the charge 
was withdrawn. Neither memorandum was in the form of a formal authorisation 
argument. The victim withdrew her complaint once the accused had received a 
summons. However, police pursued the matter and the charge was withdrawn by the 
prosecution only after the defendant agreed in writing not to seek a financial claim 
against VicPol. Thus, his agreement not to do so became the reason for discontinuing 
with the case. This was the only examined case that was pursued against the wishes of 
the complainant. 
 
6.3 Coming to a decision 
 
Comparing authorisation and non-authorisation rationales revealed that the former 
were taken-for-granted and the latter framed usually within formal argument. Further, 
from the available file data, authorisation was based on an average of 2.9 factors 
comparative to 4.3 factors for formal non-authorisation. That is, non-authorisation 
was not only far more often formally argued but also with greater substantiation. The 
fashioning of formal argument and the greater rationale basis suggest that police were 
concerned to ensure non-authorisation argument was unimpeachable and more so 
compared to justifications for prosecution at Court. 
 
Notably, different factors were generally decisive in authorisation versus non-
authorisation. Witnesses were predominant in driving prosecution, with offender 
admissions being the second most frequent driver. While not the sole driver in any of 
the examined cases, victim credibility or victim vulnerability were also frequently 
apparent in authorisation, with one case reflecting both as the only reasons. That case 
was exceptional in terms of the victim’s compelling and detailed account of the crime. 
In this regard, of some note were the OPP focus group responses to the question: How 
important is victim credibility to a prosecution? “Really important.” “Essential.” 
“Without it, it's fatal.” OPP lawyers said this is because most of the charges are ‘word 
on word’. Victim credibility was found also in the 2010 strand one data to be 
important to police decision making (s. 4.4). 
 
It is also notable that the least frequent rationale factors – accused culpability, police 
at crime scene, and public, open space offending - remain potentially pivotal to the 
decision to prosecute in individual cases. Additionally, at some juncture, all of the 
authorised cases – including ‘sufficient evidence’ and lack of rationale cases in 
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particular - would have to receive attention to translate into cases displaying more 
detailed evidentiary arguments.   
 
By contrast, victim related drivers – especially negative ones - predominated in non-
authorisation followed by accused related rationales. Victim-blaming reasons were 
both directly cited and less directly stated in terms of poor witnesses and 
uncooperativeness, with non-authorisation relying at least partly on one of these 
factors in 27 of the examined cases (71%). The ‘victim’s word only’ factor was 
particularly frequent as it was evident in 50 specific reasons cited formally in 63% of 
cases. So, whether victims were blamed or not police decisions against authorisation 
saw them as a vital impediment. This non-supportive victim orientation in police non-
authorisation was further highlighted by the inverse tendency to accept accused 
denials, their assessed credibility and unclear consent as reasons for non-authorisation 
as well. With at least one accused related reason being evident in 25 cases (66%) and 
accused denial alone cited in 53% of cases, there is also the appearance of a pro-
accused orientation in non-authorisation decision-making. 
 
Notably, many of the various specific reasons that comprised victim-related factors 
reflected thematic decision-making issues reported in the literature, viz: the role of the 
victim/offender relationship, alcohol, drugs, mental health, cognitive impairment, 
moral judgements, risk-taking conduct, and the ‘physical harm rule’ in helping to 
decide whether or not the victim is a credible and reliable witness. It is also notable 
that the OPP focus group acknowledged alcohol/drug use and mental health as 
targeted by defence lawyers to question victims’ credibility or reliability of evidence; 
as well as acknowledging the importance of physical or DNA evidence to persuading 
a jury as to the truth of the victim’s complaint, with judges referring to these aspects 
despite no longer being able to give a Longman warning.  
 
Still, the remaining factors and reasons were clearly of some import to formal police 
decision-making against authorisation. Thus, contradictive witnesses were cited in 11 
cases (29%), historical sexual assault in four (11%) and a range of other not easily 
categorised reasons in 13 (34%). The listing of 16 specific reasons in this last respect 
shows they were diverse (cf. Heenan & Murray, 2006).  
 
Coming to a decision not to authorise prosecution also arose in 16 cases that lacked 
formal written argument, seven of which were classified ‘no offence disclosed’ or 
‘unsolved’. In these cases the same factors and reasons were apparent as in formally 
argued cases, though fewer in number, presumably due to the fewer examined cases. 
Some of these cases reflected an additional factor of ‘victim incapacitation’, which 
was also evident in the non-formal reasoning of cases with formal non-authorisation 
reports. 
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There were five case files reflecting atypical argument in police decision-making. 
Four of these involved arguments formally citing reasons for and against prosecution 
in memoranda requesting non-authorisation. The fifth carried no substantive formal 
argument, the victim withdrew her complaint, and police ceased prosecution only 
after the defendant agreed in writing not to pursue a financial claim against VicPol. 
Altogether these cases illustrate three points concerning how and why police made 
decisions. First, non-authorisation decision-making did not always proceed in an 
unbalanced, mono-argument fashion according to identifiable factors for one or the 
other decision outcome. There were cases in which formal argument was balanced 
rather than skewed in reasoning to support only a decision against proceeding. 
Secondly, while investigating, recommending and authorizing officers typically 
agreed, that was not always true. In that respect, disagreement could be among any 
one of the three police officers involved, and any one of them could support or resist 
non-authorisation. Thirdly, sometimes the decision against authorising or continuing a 
prosecution was determined by factors external to the evidence pertaining to the crime 
such as family members’ views and police budgetary concerns.  
 
Both authorisation and non-authorisation decision-making were prone to highly 
generalised reasoning that simply cited ‘sufficient’ or ‘insufficient’ evidence for 
authorisation or non-authorisation respectively. Both also reflected the earlier 
described ‘hard evidence’ approach suggestive of the uncertainty avoidance principle 
reported in the literature (s. 6.1; see also s. 4.4). By taking a more risk-taking 
approach, police could arguably achieve more in their efforts to produce results for 
sexual assault victims. 
 
There was mixed if not ambivalent support for the case file results from RO/AO 
interview and IO focus group findings in 2011. As noted earlier (s. 6.1), ‘hard 
evidence’ was emphasised in investigator focus groups and RO interviews in the 
terms illustrated in the case files. The 2010 data also supported this approach to 
decision making based on ‘hard evidence’ (s. 4.4). There was also mention of the 
desirability of competent, credible witnesses and victims, and no reason to doubt the 
veracity of the victim’s story. Other considerations were false accusations, credibility 
of the offender and the issue of consent. Still, AO/RO interviewees  said they were 
aware that many police felt that cases with hard evidence - either forensic or physical 
or other witnesses - were the strong ones, while those with victim word only or a 
victim with issues such as mental illness and cognitive impairment were very 
vulnerable to not proceeding because the victim was unable to particularise offences 
in the way the courts needed, involving issues of credibility and consent. ROs also 
stated that cases where it was victim’s word only were difficult but not impossible 
and there is now an emphasis on authorisation which sees increasingly ‘risky’ cases 
going forward. 
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In lieu of ‘hard evidence’, particularisation was emphasised as important by both 
investigators and ROs, especially for historical and word only complaints. In 
historical cases investigators and ROs said there is an effort to establish timeframes 
by reference to significant events such as social occasions. Thus, investigators 
emphasised trying to find anything that might corroborate the victim’s story, even if 
only indirectly supportive by establishing an agreement by the offender on certain 
facts such as the place, other people around at the time, events such as camping, items 
of clothing the offender was wearing etc. Similarly, if a recent case is based on the 
victim’s word only, then police seek anything that might shore up the victim’s 
credibility – e.g., she provides details around the offence such as hearing a train go by 
at 4am, which they can verify. “Now it’s not corroboration but if you can prove all 
those other events and so you’re able to say, well, she’s told you the truth about this, 
this, this and this, why would she lie about that?”  
 
Investigators said they use verified and accurate details in interviewing the accused, 
seeking to elicit a mistake or simple agreement on some points of evidence that are 
not necessarily pivotal, or unwitting verification within the context of the victim’s 
story, or even an admission from him. The more they can get the offender to support 
points of the victim’s story the better. If particularised, matters can be put to the 
offender and “it can add weight to what they’re saying historically if you get some 
sort of admission from the person you’re interviewing that items in the statement are 
true”. This is a strategy of building up a weight of evidence for the victim’s story even 
if it isn’t actually proof beyond reasonable doubt of the offence. The idea is to 
corroborate the surrounds or circumstances of the story if not the actual offence. 
 
Still, as noted earlier (ss. 6.1 and 6.2), ROs considered corroborating evidence highly 
preferable and pointed out police know that if there is no corroboration a jury will not 
convict. They also had misgivings about the commitment of some investigators, as 
further discussed below (s. 7.4).   
 
Coming to a decision for authorisation or non-authorisation thus seems bedevilled by 
pressures to go forward with ‘risky’ cases, now relying more on ‘particularisation’, 
yet still seeking ‘hard evidence’ or a pseudo-form of ‘near-hard evidence’ wherever 
possible and in whatever form it can be found. In short, police, especially ROs, are 
becoming it seems more inventive risk-takers but are ambivalent and uncertain in 
their new, still developing skills and, if ROs are correct in their assessment, at times 
investigators are not fully committed to the endeavours of their role. 
 
Finally, from a critical discourse viewpoint, it is apparent that the dominant police 
decision-making narrative has an inverted quality in relation to the victim and the 
victim’s word. The logic of authorisation reasoning is to find and display in the 
prosecution narrative references to corroborative evidence to support the victim’s 
word and thus to avoid uncertainty in the public forum of courts where the image and 
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reputation of police as criminal investigators and collectors of evidence might be 
challenged or impugned. The non-authorisation narrative also emphasizes avoiding 
uncertainty but by finding and displaying reasons why the victim cannot be believed 
or relied upon, hence justifying the decision outcome for purposes of internal formal 
accountability to superiors. Thus, the police narrative empowers and dis-empowers 
victims in the first and second instances, respectively. However, the position power of 
police is maintained in both instances, with the victim ultimately being powerless 
alone and needing the police as allies in their quest for justice (cf. Frohmann, 1991, 
1997, 1998). 
 
Notably, the police narrative is supported by that of the OPP - in terms of both the 
OPP lawyers’ focus group commentary on quality Briefs of evidence and the written 
OPP prosecutorial guidelines (ss. 7.1.2 and 7.5 provide the research evidence and 
detailed discussion in these regards). The significance of this support lies in the fact 
that although victims have a right of review from the OPP if they are unhappy with 
the police decision, it is possible that they will not find any solace in exercising their 
right due to the OPP guidelines serving as a shared normative base for decision-
making by police and OPP personnel. Thus the criminal justice system provides an 
appearance but not the reality of victim empowerment in the review process. 
Nonetheless, the police narrative is coming under the strain of increased risk-taking to 
satisfy new policy discourses such as evident in the VLRC (2004) AND Victoria 
Ombudsman (2006) reports arising from and informed by wider community 
expectations. Operational police are consequently experiencing dissonance between 
their traditional and developing ways of understanding and defining what they are 
doing and why they are doing it in relation to sexual assault Brief preparation. To that 
extent the criminal justice equation is changing in favour of empowering victims.  
 
6.4 Summary and recommendations 
 
Case file evidence showed that police decision-making was substantially more 
considered and concerned with formal justification in non-authorisation than in 
authorisation processes. Thus, authorisation involved fewer factors on average 
compared to non-authorisation. Further, none of the examined cases that were 
prosecuted or clearly intended for prosecution was formally authorised in a written 
report giving reasons, whereas non-authorisation decision-making was usually 
reduced to writing in a formal report that cited reasons. However, formal argument 
was lacking in a significant proportion of non-authorisation cases, including the 
examined ‘no offence disclosed’ and ‘unsolved’ cases. The merits of improving 
argumentation in Brief preparation are discussed at length in Chapter Eight. 
 
Non-authorisation most often involved the investigator identifying and citing reasons 
and supervising and authorising officers agreeing in a perfunctory ‘tick-the-box’ 
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fashion on the Brief-head. Authorisation was driven predominantly by witnesses with 
offender admissions also frequent, whilst in non-authorisation victim-related factors 
were dominant with accused denial/credibility also frequent. Victim credibility was 
the core prosecutorial criterion as affirmed also by OPP focus group lawyers because 
most cases are word on word. In deciding whether or not to prosecute a complaint, 
police commonly adopted a ‘hard evidence’, uncertainty avoidance approach. Both 
the ‘hard evidence’ approach and victim credibility in particular were also found in 
strand one research to be important to police decision making (s. 4.4). 
 
Two stages of decision-making were evident in authorisation: investigation and Brief 
preparation, followed by additional decision-making in interaction with prosecution 
officers. This was consistent with the OPP focus group finding that it was often 
necessary to return Briefs for police to undertake further work and with that of 
interviewed Sergeants that on occasion incomplete Briefs had to be forwarded to meet 
legal deadlines. In non-authorisation there appeared to be two sets of decision-
making: victims taking the formal decision to withdraw complaints after interaction 
with police involving ‘options talk’, and formal police decision-making not to 
proceed regardless of victims’ wishes. Arguably, these two sets are still two phases of 
the police decision-making process since police retain the right to prosecute matters 
despite a victim’s withdrawal, as often noted in the literature (e.g., Bryden & 
Lengnick, 1997; Frohmann, 1998; Lievore, 2004). The police role in decision-making 
is masked by the victim’s withdrawal decision, often only made subsequent to 
‘options talk’ anyway. 
 
Reflecting on issues canvassed in the literature and on legislative changes to address 
those provides a deeper understanding of the meaning and impact of police decision-
making rationales. Present findings reveal little change in the reasons for non-
authorisation in sexual assault policing over the past two decades pursuant to the 
VCCAV study (1991). Further, present research provides a window on victims’ 
explanations and opinions in relation to complaints withdrawn. This aspect was 
identified by the VCCAV study as potentially “extremely illuminating” (VCCAV, p. 
70). Present research also provides more detailed reasoning for non-authorisation, as 
well as broader rationale factors, and in relation to both ‘complaint withdrawn’ cases 
and ‘summons not authorised’ cases. The difficulty in the distinction between these 
two outcomes, however, is that it is generated from an unclear definition (see 
Appendix 12).  
 
Additionally, present evidence shows that police decision-making remains in 
significant measure opaque in the continuing use of vague ‘reasons’ such as 
‘sufficient/insufficient evidence’ and ‘success unlikely’, notwithstanding our 
understanding of what these might mean subsequent to research to date (e.g., 
VCCAV, 2006). To this extent, police decision-making is unaccountable to any 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 206 
external or even internal management control system designed to ensure that it is 
responsive to victim allegations. 
 
Current research is also consistent with the evidence in the literature that police 
decision-making entails the use of typifications such as ideal versus non-ideal victims 
and routinised, taken-for-granted thinking short-cuts (e.g., Frohmann 1991, 1998; Lea 
et al., 2003; Segrave & Wilson, 2011; Spears & Spohn, 1996). These thought tools are 
constructed out of case specifics in relation to any available ‘hard evidence’, and they 
take account of whether the victim and offender are strangers, acquaintances or 
intimates, as well as victims’ alcohol/drug use, psychiatric illness, cognitive 
impairment, perceived immorality, risk-taking behaviour, and absence of physical 
injuries, among other indicators of whether the victim is credible, reliable and 
genuine, and did not consent to the alleged sexual conduct. Present research found 
‘hard evidence’ – such as witnesses, medical evidence, visible victim harm, multiple 
victims, offender admissions, surveillance footage and other ‘objective’ items apart 
from the victim’s word only - was associated with authorisation. By contrast, factors 
such as victim’s word only evidence, victims as poor witnesses (e.g., emotional or 
memory issues), victim blameworthiness (e.g., alcohol use, sexual conduct), 
uncooperative victims, accused denial/credibility, and unclear issue of consent were 
associated with non-authorisation. These two sets of decision criteria constituted the 
means by which case specifics were organised into typifications leading to decision 
outcomes. They reflect key findings in the literature, especially in relation to non-
authorisation. Interestingly, present research evidence shows that factors and 
typifications associated with authorisation are not simple opposites of non-
authorisation decision-making. Instead, discourse analysis shows that the 
authorisation and non-authorisation narratives are inverted symbolically, the one 
emphasising corroboration of the victim’s word and the other emphasising why it 
cannot be believed, the one supportive of the victim’s complaint narrative and the 
other non-supportive. 
 
Further, the literature evidences that victims are reluctant to report in the first place 
often due to perceptions that sexual assault complaints to police will not receive a 
sympathetic hearing (Lievore, 2003; Taylor & Norma, 2011). The non-supportive 
victim narrative in non-authorisation decision-making found in analysis of the case 
file data serves to reinforce that message to those victims who had reported to 
Victoria Police in the study period (and anyone with whom they shared their reporting 
experience). There are clearly situations in which victims initiate and drive the non-
authorisation decision. However, even so, police retain the authority to proceed. 
Moreover, victim-driven decision-making is obfuscated by the role of police ‘options 
talk’ - itself a complex mixture of the need for victims to be made aware of the nature 
of the criminal justice process and the insertion of police attitudes that are unhelpful, 
if not contrary to effectively responding to sexual assault claims. 
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There are indications also that operational police are not always aware of the 
legislative and policy context of their decision-making. For instance, the continuing 
role of consent unclear and delayed reporting in non-authorisation suggest that these 
are inadequately understood as irrelevant factors (accepting the difficulty in 
interpreting the latter in some of the case files). This lack of knowledge was also 
evident in the police focus groups and interviews. 
 
Before concluding, a caveat is in order. The foregoing should not be taken to deny 
that many police do indeed work diligently and have the victim’s best interests in 
mind as they proceed through a complex decision-making process in respect to sexual 
assault complaints. As one example of this diligence and commitment to the victim 
one AO recounted how women who make a statement then don’t want to go to court, 
and make a NFPA statement instead, still allow police a ‘bank’ of crime intelligence 
that can later be used either to identify a modus operandi of a repeat rapist and/or to 
return to earlier victims to try and persuade them to later go to court as the rapes 
continue on and/or a later victim wants to pursue her matter. Thus he said: 
  
And it might be you go back to these women and say, “Look, I know you’ve 
done a no further police action statement, but it’s building up to a whole 
picture. We want to put it all together. This person is doing it to other 
people.” 
 
This same AO also recounted how his unit had unwittingly undertaken a VARE with 
a victim who had cerebral palsy and who therefore did not meet the VARE eligibility 
criteria. He was asked to withdraw the charge, refused to do so and a more senior 
officer subsequently did so. The AO put the view that it should have gone forward as 
a test case because VARE should be for best evidence and least trauma to the victim.  
 
Victoria Police as an organisation has made identifiable and commendable efforts to 
address recommendations made by the VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman 
(2006) concerning research into the reasons behind police authorisation and non-
authorisation of sexual assault complaints. The PJO research project is itself proof of 
this as far as its researchers were allowed access to the field. Still, those 
recommendations were intended to effect real and substantial change in policing 
responses to allegations of sexual assault. The evidence on police decision-making 
found in analysis of case file, interview and focus group data show that - despite the 
good efforts of many dedicated individual police officers - there is still have some 
way to go to satisfactorily meet these calls for improvement. Notably, a similar 
conclusion was reached by Heenan and Murray (2006). Although there are some 
beginning signs of victims becoming more empowered in the State of Victoria, they 
remain substantially dependent on police as the gatekeepers to the criminal justice 
system. 
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Following are the recommendations arising from data analysis and evidence presented 






RECOMMENDATION: Police should avoid using highly generalised reasoning 
to justify authorisation and instead cite the exact reasons in terms of evidentiary 
materials. (s. 6.2.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Authorisation decision-making should be based on 
explicit reasons stated in a formal report for that purpose. (s. 6.2.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring that all case files 
include reports of formal reasoning for the non-authorisation decision. (s. 6.2.2) 
RECOMMENDATION: Police should avoid using generalised reasoning to 
justify non-authorisation and instead cite the precise reasons in terms of 
evidentiary materials lacking in the cases concerned. (s. 6.2.2) 
RECOMMENDATION: Notwithstanding the real challenges involved, Victoria 
Police policy should emphasise the need to seek, create and use every available 
option to encourage and support victims in their complaints, rather than allow them 
to remain ‘uncooperative’ or ‘poor’ witnesses, or to avoid ‘victim word’ only 
prosecutions. In making non-authorisation decisions police should take active and 
concerted steps to avoid victim related reasons for doing so and to particularly 
eschew finding reasons to blame victims. A robust quality monitoring program 
should be established specifically to reinforce this policy. (s. 6.2.2) 











RECOMMENDATION: Steps should be taken to ensure all operational police 
are fully aware of the legalities concerning issues of consent, corroborative 
evidence, delays in reporting etc and their role in police decision-making. (s. 6.2.2) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should develop and implement a clearly 
articulated classification system of mutually exclusive and comprehensive 
outcomes based on defined criteria and guided by extensive practice examples. 
This classification system should avoid the problem of one outcome being a reason 
for another outcome – e.g., ‘complaint withdrawn by the victim’ should not be a 
‘reason’ for ‘summons not authorised’. A comprehensive set of concrete and 
precise reasons for decision-making needs to be developed to underpin this 
classification system. (s. 6.2.2.2) 
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7.0 Networked policing 
 
Police decision-making does not occur entirely in a vacuum, although that might 
sometimes seem so to some police as well as members of the broader community and 
victims/survivors. Within a ‘networked policing’ conceptual framework (Bayley & 
Shearing, 1996; Crawford, 2006; Loader, 2000; Loader &Walker, 2001;Shearing 
&Wood, 2000; Schedler, 2006;Wood & Bradley, 2009) public police are located as a 
central set of actors in a bounded system of relationships, and their effectiveness as 
decision-makers depends on understanding and working within that framework. 
“Public police services around the world have decided that in order to be effective, 
they must cater their services to local conditions and engage in active partnerships 
with community members” (Shearing & Wood, 2000, p. 460). Whilst retaining 
ultimate responsibility to ensure ethical and political accountability, with public 
police remaining in overall control (Schedler, 2006), public police services have 
sought to network community resources and knowledge in ways that shift attention 
from the past to the future (Shearing & Wood, 2000, p. 461), albeit not without 
challenges and constraints (e.g., Loader, 2000; Schedler, 2006; Wood & Bradley, 
2009). Recognition of this aspect was apparent in the VLRC recommendations, for 
example for police to: 
 
work collaboratively with CASAs to develop training packages that ensure 
police members understand the role of CASAs and can benefit from their 
experience of working directly with complainants (VLRC, 2004, p.  xlvii) 
 
The VLRC (2004) report also recommended the OPP develop a training program to  
address the needs of sexual assault complainants and build linkages with CASA and 
other relevant organisations, with a clear intent to enhance the viability and 
functioning of the network incorporating police (VLRC, 2004, p. l-liii). Similarly, the 
Ombudsmen Victoria expressed the view that there would be benefits in establishing 
a formal, ongoing structural arrangement among relevant agencies and departments 
concerned with sexual assault to develop and share advice and expertise.  
 
Any standing inter-agency body that is established should also develop 
formalized communication structures with regional liaison groups to 
ensure that local issues which arise and which have wider implications are 
addressed centrally (Ombudsman Victoria, 2006, p. 24). 
 
Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Services Inspectorate & Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary (HMCPSI & HMIC) report (2007) has also recognized and 
recommended the value of a concerted networking framework and gone further to 
declare: 
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Partnership working within the context of rape and sexual violence now needs 
to be taken forward on a more formalised and structured footing at a strategic 
level across police forces, CPS Areas and local authorities to ensure that 
services are co-ordinated and developed effectively. (HMCPSI & HMIC, 
2007, pp. 20-21). 
 
In Victoria, major actors within a ‘networked public policing’ framework focused on 
adult sexual assault complaints include not only victims of sexual assault and police, 
but also the Office of Public Prosecutions and Centres Against Sexual Assault most 
particularly, along with the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine (VIFM), 
government departments, hospitals (HCCUs), and a potentially wide range of 
welfare/support organisations including the Victim Support Agency, the Victorian 
Court Information and Welfare Network, and the Victims of Crime Assistance 
Tribunal (cf, Victoria Police, 2010).  
 
The Success Works (2011) report provided an overall positive view of recent 
developments in Victoria in terms of the arrangements of networked public policing. 
It noted that stakeholders suggested that CJS practitioners no longer lack a belief in 
what happened in sexual assault cases. A CASA worker was reported as referring to a 
police victim/survivor focus and regular consultation with police in a co-location 
environment (Success Works, 2011, p. 178). The majority of victims/survivors were 
reported to have “felt that the initial response (usually from a SOCAU member) was 
extremely caring, supportive and compassionate - and generally much better than 
expected” (Success Works, 2011, p. 30). 
  
In this chapter the focus is on the ways and extent to which police interacted in a 
timely fashion with other agencies in investigating sexual assault and ensuring 
appropriate support was provided to victims. First, there is an account of findings in 
relation to the role of the Victoria Office of Public Prosecutions. This is followed by 
findings on the police interface with Centres Against Sexual Assault and briefly in 
respect to other sexual assault victims’ support services. Then there is discussion of 
the organisational structure of sexual assault policing and limitations on the police 
authorisation decision in Victoria. A summary of the main findings and 
recommendations concludes the chapter. The results reported here are from analysis 
of data drawn from the research conducted in 2011 using the LEAP case files, the 
police interviews and focus groups, and the 0PP focus group. As well, there is 
triangulation of the research evidence garnered across the strands wherever 
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7.1 Interacting with the Office of Public Prosecutions 
 
In this section, attention is paid first to the police view of the OPP interface and then 
to the OPP lawyers’ view, with some interesting results. 
 
7.1.1 The police viewpoint  
 
The case files reflected Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP) involvement in 10 of the 
90 examined cases, including one not taken to Court (case 70) and nine that 
proceeded (cases four, seven, eight, 17, 38, 44, 49, 50 and 90) – see Appendix 13, 
Grid 1. In terms of original allegations and eventual charges, OPP involvement would 
have been expected in a total of 58 and 20 of the cases, respectively – see Appendix 
14, Grid 2. The reduction from 58 to 20 is accounted for by non-authorisation in 36 
cases and downgrading the original allegation to a lesser charge in two cases. Hence, 
64% of the adult sexual assault allegations were initially Superior Court matters, 66% 
of these were not prosecuted and OPP involvement was found in only half of those 
taken forward. 
 
In respect to Magistrates Court matters, there were initially allegations in 32 cases 
which were reduced by 17 non-authorisations, resulting in 17 cases taken forward 
with the addition of the two cases involving downgraded charges. That is, there was a 
50% reduction in the total eventual Magistrate Court allegations.  
 
Further, the OPP involvement indicated in the ten cases was not described in the files 
in any depth that allowed a confident understanding of the typical communications or 
issues raised between police and OPP lawyers. The one case with some detail could 
not be relied upon as representative, nor could addition of details from the other cases 
be expected to form a reliable view of OPP/police transactions. The following 
summarises the case file evidence in respect to the police/OPP interface. 
 
The most extensive interface found between the police and OPP lawyers was in case 
44. This involved a an ex-husband charged with three counts of rape, intentionally 
causing serious injury, conduct endangering life and false imprisonment relating to 
his former wife in an episode that ensued from his attempts to stop her from 
continuing with an Intervention Order. In this case, there was an exchange of emails 
between the informant and the OPP. The informant inquired about excusing police 
witnesses, advice of when the file would be allocated for committal as the informant 
was due to take leave, issues with respect to witnesses and forensic matters, and 
whether he should subpoena a witness who was refusing to give a statement. An OPP 
response indicated that they had no instructions as to ‘further committal mention’ 
because the informant didn’t show up and the OPP liaison officer for the case was on 
leave. The OPP also advised that the defence were waiting for vaginal swabs to be 
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tested, and there was no committal date because the barrister didn’t have advice about 
availability of witnesses. 
 
In case four, the investigator provided a highly negative character report on the 
accused to the OPP, but there was no other indication of involvement between the 
police and the OPP. In this case, the Sergeant was the investigator and self-authorised 
the charges. 
 
In case seven, an OPP letter to the investigator advised him that a Nolle Prosequi was 
entered with the agreement of the OPP Director subsequent to the victim’s withdrawal 
of complaint on grounds that her psychological welfare would suffer. Professor X and 
Dr Y gave evidence during pre-trial argument that cross-examining her regarding 
confidential material could be ‘extremely damaging’. The letter concluded with: 
“Many thanks for your assistance and hard work during the course of this matter”. 
 
In case 17, file indication of OPP involvement was limited to notification of the 
accused failing to appear at Court and the subsequent issue of an arrest warrant, as 
well as a later adjournment of the matter Sine Die. Cases 38 and 90 reflected a 
similarly limited indication of involvement. The files on cases eight, 49 and 50 also 
indicated OPP involvement but with no details at all. 
 
A significant point concerning OPP involvement is that, as gate-keepers, the police 
are positioned to determine whether or not an allegation progresses to become a 
charge and, initially at least, what type of charge eventuates. Brief preparation and 
authorisation cannot be understood in isolation from the first crucial step of 
investigation. In case one, for instance, the fact that there was no further processing of 
the matter after the investigation and decision by police not to authorise prosecution 
acted to siphon off the alleged rape from the criminal justice process. The OPP was 
not involved because there was no authorisation of the original allegation of rape. If it 
had been authorised the OPP would then have become relevant. This crucial point is 
illustrated by a total of 32 cases – one, two, 12, 14, 19, 20, 33, 36, 43, 52, 54, 56, 57, 
58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87 and 89. These 
cases exclude those designated ‘unsolved’ and ‘no offence disclosed’ which otherwise 
might have resulted in OPP involvement (cases 22, 23 and 86). This data set was 
adduced from Grids 1 and 2 contained in Appendices 13 and 14. 
 
Evidently, examination of the case files was not especially revealing about the 
interactions between the police and the OPP. This was possibly due to those 
interactions being conducted as verbal or email transactions with little if any ‘paper 
trail’. Alternatively, the database was deficient for this purpose owing to non-returns 
and sampling factors. In Magistrates Court matters, there were even fewer cases of 
detailed description of the interaction between informants and prosecutors. Thus, in 
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both higher and lower jurisdictions the case files did not provide adequate data to 
obtain a robust view of the interface between informants and prosecutors.  
 
Turning now to the interview and focus group evidence a different and more complex 
story was told of the interactions between police and OPP personnel. Investigators 
and their supervisors both spoke of routinely interacting with OPP personnel and with 
one OPP officer in particular.  
 
The importance of one OPP lawyer. From the investigators’ viewpoint, contact with 
the OPP was said to be very helpful as a rule, usually with one or two people there, 
mainly by email and telephone, both informally at early stages and more formally 
when the Brief goes to the OPP. OPP advice was generally rated excellent when 
given. One OPP person who has been with the OPP for a very long time was seen as 
especially helpful and there was a general reliance on this one individual. This raises 
the question of what happens when that person leaves. It also raises the question of 
whether a more formal arrangement of a protocol and regularly scheduled visits by 
OPP personnel to SOCIT teams (newly established ones especially) might be 
worthwhile in accelerating the contact network and knowledgebase of presently 
inexperienced investigators. One focus group said there was a need for an in-house 
prosecutor to advise them on Briefs and they would welcome a closer relationship 
with OPP lawyers. 
 
Variability in police perceptions of OPP utility. There was, however, variability in 
how the OPP expertise is utilised and how useful investigators consider the OPP, 
whose lawyers were recognized as also being very busy. One officer indicated that on 
recent advice from someone, he sent a statement to the OPP and received back the 
charges for each paragraph, which he found very helpful and saved a lot of time. Most 
indicated they frame the charges within a Brief then send it on, often with changes 
then being made by the OPP, which they found irksome. There appeared to be a 
consensus that leaving OPP contact late runs the risk of additional statements being 
requested close to Court times, whereas early contact can result in practical advice 
and ‘nipping in the bud’ problems, saving a lot of time and effort. One investigator 
said the relationship was ‘quite workable’ however the OPP was not contacted much 
due to the SOCIT unit being very busy with coverage of a large area. 
 
In short, investigators indicated generally good contact with the OPP, however with 
some variability in opinion on OPP usefulness, they are still becoming aware of who, 
how and when to contact someone there, contact is not always timely, and there is an 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police case files should provide a written 
record of the essentials of all interactions with the OPP to allow for accountability 
and provide sound data for training and management purposes. 
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over-reliance on a particular OPP officer whose departure unless addressed would 
create a serious ‘succession’ problem.  
 
A similar view of OPP contact was provided initially in interviews by ROs. At first, 
they advised that there is usually a very good working relationship and 
communication with OPP Specialist Sexual Offences Unit (SSOU) lawyers and 
solicitors, often with the same particular person, telephone and email mainly, also at 
Court, on circuit and with OPP lawyers invited to update them on new legislation at 
various venues. They often ring the OPP to check whether to authorise or not (i.e., 
likely success at Court) and usually get good, accurate advice. But the relationship is 
not always optimal, for instance with problems of changing OPP personnel. An 
example was given by a Sergeant from a rural locale of a lawyer arriving on circuit 
who was not familiar with a case, asking why charges were changed and blaming 
police, when this was done on the advice of an earlier OPP lawyer. 
 
In response to later interview questions on this aspect, contrary to the answer given 
earlier in the interviews, there was a much more mixed view of the OPP relationship, 
seen as being in need of repair by most ROs and found to be good by a couple. A 
common complaint was that the OPP change charges without consultation. One RO 
said the particularisation charts which used to be the OPP’s job “can add massive 
amounts of hours” to police workloads. Another commented that OPP prosecutors do 
not “fight hard enough” sometimes where a victim cannot recall exact dates of 
offending. Another RO mentioned high OPP prosecutor turnover, OPP case 
conferences could be more frequent and their prosecutors could be more personable 
with victims. A closer working relationship with OPP in Brief compilation was 
mentioned as desirable by one RO. One RO said that interaction with the OPP is 
becoming much more formalized, and “nobody wants to talk to you in case you quote 
them”. A rural locale RO said the OPP barristers on circuit are often not from the 
SSOU, they have unrealistic expectations of victims to whom they cause great stress, 
and there can be three or four solicitors involved in a case and they disagree at times. 
The OPP focus group confirmed the absence of SSOU lawyers on circuit and that 
these circuit lawyers in rural locales deal with a mix of cases and do not have 
specialist expertise. Notably, the Success Works (2011) report commented on this 
inadequacy and its recommendation nine stated: “That the Specialist Sexual Offences 
Unit at the OPP be extended to include full or part-time specialist prosecutors for the 
country courts” (Success Works, 2012, p. 220). 
 




AOs also reflected difficulties in the police/OPP interface. For example, one AO 
commented: 
 
The problem with the OPP is, they picked a Brief up probably two days 
before the court or the committal, and then they want the investigator to run 
around for – like a mad cow for two days. You know, they will look at it and 
go, “Well, by Thursday we need this done, we need this done, we need this 
done.” You know? And it’s frustrating for the member.  
 
This AO does not seek advice from the OPP because they say it is the AO’s decision 
anyway. Another AO commented that the OPP talks to the informant not the AO who 
authorised the Brief and an informant might not tell anyone else in the SOCIT unit, 
including the AO, about specific OPP requests that reflect some case law requirement 
that is unknown to the AO or the unit. That is, this AO said there is no systematic 
sharing of new knowledge and this also applies across SOCIT units, although a 
newsletter is being established that might help redress this deficit. The import of these 
AO comments is followed up in the next section. 
 
7.1.2 The OPP viewpoint 
 
For its part the OPP focus group raised a number of points they would like to see 
addressed in relation to their interactions with police. It is “very rare that you will get 
a police officer contacting you prior to you contacting them once we receive a file”. 
In a contradictory vein, however, OPP interviewees also said that many police do 
contact the OPP legal prosecution specialist prior to forwarding a file. “And even if 
they did ring us up at that stage, we would probably still refer them to (this specialist) 
anyway”. 
 
Inconsistent quality of Briefs and repercussions. OPP lawyers spoke of the 
inconsistent quality of Briefs which needed to be returned to police for further work 
against the clock of Court deadlines. They said that at times it meant they were doing 
the police investigation for them in terms of finding the work still required in a case 
and directing or advising police about it and waiting for return of the revised Brief. 
Thus, 
 
by the time it comes to us – you know, usually issues are flagged the moment 
we start reading say just the charge itself. You know, it might be a date that's 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should make representations to the OPP 
to have Specialist Sex Offences Unit lawyers more involved with country circuit 
sex offence cases. 
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not reflective on the statement. Whereas if they had sought that advice from 
the outset, we would be able to rectify everything, just the simple things like 
the dates and times and places, etcetera. 
 
As a result there are ‘knock-on’ effects leading to other difficulties. These include 
adjournments that indicate problems with cases to defence lawyers as well as 
mounting costs against tight budgets. “Whereas if you get a compelling Brief to start 
with, there can be more pressure on accused people to have a serious look at 
potentially resolving a matter”. If an informant is advised of the need to complete 
tasks, this is not always received well. 
 
And it can be quite – they can be quite hostile, and particularly when you 
say, "Well, all these things are missing now. We've got a court day in a 
week's time.  This all really needs to be done as a matter of urgency."  And 
then they become even more hostile, because not only are you asking them to 
do eight different things, but you're saying, "Can you do these eight different 
things before Wednesday?" 
 
What makes a good Brief. The OPP lawyers nominated a good Brief as including a 
‘particularisation of charges’ and ‘summary’. The particularization chart/evidence 
table should provide a clear account of the charges against the evidence by showing 
each charge in relation to the evidence supporting it, where it is contained in the 
statement, the exhibit numbers and charge numbers, and where that evidence is 
located in the Brief. This is especially important in complex cases involving multiple 
offences over time or multiple victims and offenders and different charges such as sex 
offence charges and other charges such as violence, theft, weapons etc. Further, “as 
you're compiling the evidence, and as you're gathering it, it's a lot easier … Once an 
informant gets a statement … they can add it to that chart and they can maintain it 
very easily.  Whereas having to go through it from the start … is just a huge burden”. 
 
Problems of particularisation and completion of summary of charges. But the OPP 
view is that police too often do not provide good particularization charts. In this 
respect, it was mentioned above (s. 7.1.1) that police saw the task of particularization 
charts as an onerous and time-consuming one that used to belong to the OPP. OPP 
lawyers saw police completion of the summary of charges as similarly problematic, 
with a need for police to clearly link each paragraph detailing events and acts to its 
relevant charge(s). A good summary was said to be comprehensive, with a short 
introduction, details of the accused, citation of the charges, what alleged offending 
supports the charges, and mention of the arresting interview. “So we need to know 
exactly what's being covered or what they perceive is being covered by the charge”. 
 
In short, a good Brief is highly organized, succinct and shows efficiently where to 
locate evidence for each charge in complex matters that sometimes involve a number 
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of complainants, multiple charges arising from a single event, and several events. If 
the Brief is not well organized with a particularization chart and summary it can lead 
to an OPP lawyer doing hours of work only to discover that the charges cannot be 
sustained by the evidence collected and having then to withdraw all the charges at or 
before committal proceedings. 
    
It is apparent that the problem is one of lack of uniformity of Brief preparation 
quality, not that all Briefs are poorly compiled from an OPP viewpoint. 
 
Some detectives are really, really good with the way they compile their 
Briefs and how they're able to support all the charges. Others you just – you 
look at it and think, "How the hell did this get authorised?" 
 
Inappropriate disclosure by police. OPP lawyers also cited a problem of 
inappropriate disclosure by police. This occurs on occasions when police obtain a 
victim’s permission to disclose matters to defence lawyers which can then be used to 
question the victim’s credibility. For instance, “a little red light should come up when 
they see sort of psychologists’ reports, psychiatrists’ reports, anything medical … any 
confidential information”. Defence can obtain that information under section 32C 
subpoena applications, “but they've got to go through a judge or a magistrate that 
actually assesses what can go in, what's able to be viewed and what's not.  It's not 
even for us to say that. It's a court order”. The OPP viewpoint was that police should 
hand over nothing to defence lawyers and simply advise them to contact the OPP. 
 
Supervision of police. Other specific concerns were voiced by the OPP focus group. 
Statements by victims and witnesses can sometimes be very short and need further 
work, which allows defence lawyers an opening to question the reliability of the 
evidence. Over-charging (‘hamburger with the lot’) by the police leads to problems of 
having to explain why charges are dropped, both to defence lawyers and to victims. 
OPP lawyers also thought that “some of the junior informants I've worked with, they 
don't seem to have much supervision” and, referring to police quality monitoring of 
Briefs and related checklists, “sometimes I'm not sure if they actually check it”. These 
comments presage discussion of the need for excellence of police leadership in 
Chapter Eight (see ss. 8.1.2 and 8.2 especially). 
 
Small details and police unavailability. Again, there are often problems with 
seemingly small details, for example: “one of the main things missing too, 
particularly from a summary in an historical matter, is dates of birth and ages at the 
time the offences occurred”. Further, “one of the common frustrations we face” is 
exemplified in a case where the informant went on leave without telling the OPP 
lawyer and without telling his Sergeant that a trial was due in two weeks with several 
outstanding tasks requiring completion. There are informants who the OPP “query 
whether they understand the gravity of the situation”, once a matter goes to trial they 
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seem to see the matter as being solely the OPP’s responsibility, explaining they 
cannot attend Court because they are on a training course, on a pistol course, or “‘I'm 
on a night shift.  Sorry, I can't make it.’” Others attend daily, are much more 
committed and know the whole case. Less experienced police informants tend to take 
as personal criticism an OPP decision not to proceed due to an assessed lack of 
evidence. Still, 
 
If there's a fatal flaw, though, and it's as a result of something the police did 
or did not do at a crucial time, most of the police that I've dealt with have 
said, "Look, I really treat this as a learning experience and I will not do the 
same thing in the future." 
 
Generally, police are cooperative, “especially if you articulate why you want a 
particular thing and you explain how it's going to assist the case”. 
 
OPP resources and timing problems. Again, part of the challenge for the police/OPP 
interface is a mutual lack of resources comparative to the demands of each of their 
jobs, as this quotation makes clear in being so reminiscent of descriptions from the 
police interviews and focus groups (see s. 8.3): 
 
And some of the things sound a bit nit-picky, but when you're a solicitor and 
you're in sex offences with these time constraints, and you're analysing 40 
Briefs and you're working on these sorts of matters and you're in and out of 
court, it's the little things that make such a big difference. 
 
This quotation is clarified in its import by the following remark:  
 
Just in terms of resourcing … the Melbourne County Court is the main trial 
court in Victoria.  In any given week they probably run between 50 or 60 per 
cent of their entire list is sex offence trials.  So that's 50 to 60 per cent every 
single week … whereas our unit here is probably 15 per cent at the OPP, in 
terms of the size in proportion to the rest. 
 
Interestingly, reminiscent of aspects of the police viewpoint, OPP focus group 
lawyers acknowledged routine clashes of court cases, where: 
 
many solicitors here have two or three matters running at any given time, and 
so the case that they have prepped and they have met the complainants for 
are not the ones that they're sitting in court for. That is one of the tragedies, I 
think, where we hold ourselves out as a specialist unit, and one of the aims of 
specialisation was to have continuity of personnel … (so there can be) three 
different solicitors from our office. I think it must be confusing and 
overwhelming to have that many people involved. 




Ironically, the OPP lawyer making this statement was speaking of victims being 
‘confused and overwhelmed’ but did not mention any similar impact on police. 
 
Communication difficulties. It is clear that both police and OPP lawyers rely very 
heavily on the one OPP legal prosecution specialist at the early stage of police 
seeking advice before sending a Brief to the OPP. It is also apparent that there are 
subsequent communication problems and need for police to do more work and for 
OPP lawyers to also work against the clock once the Brief is then returned to them. 
But it is unclear exactly what is happening in the process of communication between 
police and OPP lawyers and at what stage of their contact or upon what elements of 
advice there is a breakdown in communication. Yet the communication chain is 
evidently not working at an optimal level given the conflicting views that arose from 
the police focus groups and interviews on the one hand, and the OPP focus group on 
the other.  
 
This communication gap has resulted in lack of understanding and appreciation by 
each of the other’s work demands. There was an unhappy irony in that police and 
OPP lawyers spoke of the same constraints and pressures in their jobs in accounting 
for problematics: time constraints, limited resources, complex cases and the need to 
attend to higher priority tasks often without completing the one at hand – with police 
putting the lower priority task off until another day or passing an incomplete Brief on 
to the OPP, while an OPP lawyer passes a time-clash case to another lawyer. The 
police viewpoint in this regard is detailed below (s. 8.3). 
 
In their analysis of police and prosecutorial decision making in sexual offences Taylor 
and Gassner have made explicit: 
 
it is imperative that police and prosecutors from the Office of Public 
Prosecutions develop a shared understanding of the norms, rules and policies 
that direct and govern their decisions, whilst developing a collaborative 
partnership that enhances prosecution outcomes for complainants in sexual 
offence cases. Such an exploration would allow understanding of the socio-
legal construction of sexual violence in the context of police investigations 
and prosecutorial decision-making (2010, p. 247) 
  





7.1.3 Re-visioning the police/OPP interface 
 
Given the above research evidence, at this point it is worth considering a new way of 
approaching the Victoria Police and OPP relationship with a view to enhancing their 
combined response to sexual assault complaints. In this regard, there is strong 
evidence from overseas that there are more viable and effective models for achieving 
a much better CJS performance. 
 
Examples include the Thu Thuzela Care Model (TTC) in South Africa and the 
Merseyside Unity Model in the UK. Whilst there are differences in the compositions 
of the models in South Africa and UK, with the TTC model being more extensive and 
integrated, both involve police and prosecutors working collaboratively case by case. 
The Lead CI of the PJO project undertook research and site visits to both locales to 
examine the models and their workings in situ. Both parties are involved in the case 
development and case building, and evaluation of both models make explicit 
improved outcomes for victim welfare, stronger Brief preparation and greater success 
at the court level. That UK police and Crown Prosecutors have been able to develop 
and trial such a model with great success, with other UK police jurisdictions looking 
to replicate the model, augurs well for its replication in similar jurisdictions such as 
Australia. Both the TTC and Unity Model utilise screening and selection of police and 
prosecutors. This is more formalised in the TTC Model. However the Unity Model is 
very aware that selection of police to work in the Unity Team is paramount to its 
success.   
 
RECOMMENDATION: Serious consideration should be given to formalizing an 
arrangement of regular OPP visits to SOCITs, establishing clear contact guidelines 
and expectations, sharing regular newsletters of mutual interest matters, consulting 
with the OPP with an aim of reconciling currently divergent views, with open and 
ongoing communication on issues as they arise - including in respect to reliance on 
a single OPP legal prosecution specialist and other personnel instability/turnover 
issues. 
 
Implementing this recommendation would substantially bridge the existing 
communication gap between police and OPP personnel, provide a much needed 
mutual appreciation of both their workloads, and promote a much tighter if not 
seamless efficiency and effectiveness between these vital links in the CJS chain of 
improving responses to sexual assault complaints. 




7.2 Supporting victims: Centres Against Sexual Assault 
 
The following observations from the case files are generally consistent with the 
earlier reported views from CASA counsellors obtained from strand one research (see 
Chapter five). 
 
Inadequate Code compliance. Grid 2 (Appendix 14) shows that alleged victims were 
recorded in the VicPol case files as being in contact with a Centre Against Sexual 
Assault (CASA) in 26 (28.9%) of the 90 examined cases. This figure rose to 38.2% of 
the recent cases, given that police are only required to make CASA referrals in cases 
reported within 72 hours. In terms of cases authorised for prosecution CASA contact 
was recorded as occurring in eight (22.2%) of the 36 relevant cases. CASA contact 
was recorded in 18 (33.3%) of the remaining 54 cases. In cases of rape, attempted 
rape and incest allegations 21 (36.8%) of the 57 relevant cases saw a CASA referral, 
which suggests that the more serious the alleged sexual assault the slightly more 
likely that a CASA referral would occur. Even with the possibility that victims were 
not agreeable to a CASA referral in all instances, these data strongly indicate that 
police were not sufficiently compliant with the Victoria Police Code of Practice for 
the Investigation of Sexual Assault (paragraphs 6-10).  
 
Further, there were other signs of inadequate compliance with the Code. For instance, 
even where a CASA referral had occurred, it was sometimes unclear whether police 
recommended CASA to victims or third parties had done so, and on occasion it was 
clearly a third party. Again, when CASA referrals occurred these were not always 
timely. For example, in case nine, it took 5 ½ hours before the victim was 
accompanied by a CASA worker to hospital, despite police involvement within an 
hour of the commission of very serious offences of rape, assault with a weapon, 
threats to kill and false imprisonment. There was no obvious reason recorded on file 
to explain this delay. 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should examine the overseas practice 
and experience of unified police/prosecution models for improving the CJS 
response to complaints of sexual assault with a view to adopting a best practice 
model. 
 
Implementation of this recommendation will be consistent with adopting a best 
practice approach to sexual assault CJS responses which emphasise the innovation 
and continuous learning characteristic of Learning Organisations. More 
importantly, it will predictably result in the adoption of a best practice model for 
responding to sexual assault complaints and tangibly contribute to lower attrition 
rates. 




Compliance with the Code? Yet, in contrast to the case file evidence, the police 
interview and focus group data indicated that police routinely make CASA referrals in 
compliance with the Code and formal agreements with CASA. CASA is a priority if 
the assault is recent “because they still would have forensic evidence on them and 
their wellbeing, basically, still is number one” (investigator). However, one RO 
pointed out that in regional areas it is not possible to always comply with the two hour 
rule for getting victims to CASA due to long distances. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring there is a written 
record in case files of compliance with Code requirements concerning CASA 
referrals and problems in effecting compliance. These records should be collected 
together in regular memoranda reports and forwarded for advice to management 
and a state monitoring body (see further recommendation in s. 7.4). 
 
Implementing this recommendation will assist with quality monitoring of Briefs as 
well as identify problem areas for improvement efforts. 
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7.3 Supporting victims: interacting with other agencies 
 
There is also mixed evidence on police interaction with agencies other than CASA. 
Aside from the involvement of SOCAU officers, the case files reflected a strong 
reliance on only CASA and hospitals as support services for victims in the hours and 
days after reporting.  
 
A wide range of agency contacts and referrals? However, according to police 
Sergeants in interview, apart from the OPP and CASA, investigators are asked to 
contact a wide range of agencies in preparing sexual assault Briefs, including various 
counselling services, CityLink, VicRoads, local health centres among others. Victim 
support was emphasised as part of the police job and seen as important in its own 
right. The investigator focus groups confirmed this view. Their responses were in 
terms of both victim welfare/support and evidence gathering to establish 
corroboration of the victim’s story. Agencies were seen as being contacted where 
relevant to particulars of the case – e.g., a GP who might have seen the victim – and 
with CASA referrals for counselling and support. Again, a wide range of agencies 
were nominated, including the OPP, DHS, Centrelink, Department of Immigration, 
Eastlink, Victims of Crime, refuges, housing, mental health and Court assistance 
volunteers. 
 
Compliance with the Code? Furthermore, police interviews and focus groups 
indicated a generally strong awareness of and commitment to victim welfare in accord 
with the Code. This was especially pronounced in the RO interviews, with a greater 
tendency for investigators to link victim welfare to evidentiary concerns rather than 
for the victim’s sake per se. For instance, among the most time-consuming aspects in 
investigations and preparation of Briefs, ROs and investigators mentioned 
relationship building with victims. For example, “to ensure that they’re in the best 
possible condition that they can be in when they’re giving evidence, because that’s so 
often a credibility issue” (investigator); and “if you can prevent your witnesses or 
victims being attacked again in the witness box, that’s a good thing. So yeah, you take 
your time. You go through – a lot of time, our sexual assault victims are emotionally 
traumatised so it takes days” (RO).  
 
Explaining the mixed research evidence. One explanation for the mixed evidence is 
that provided by Segrave and Wilson (2011) who reported on police engagement with 
support agencies in relation to victims of crime generally. They found that “awareness 
of and relationships with support services for victims of crime vary across the state” 
(Segrave &Wilson, 2011, p. 71). This explanation is consistent with the CASA 
viewpoint reported in strand one findings (s. 5.5). Another explanation is that police 
do not record their agency contacts and purposes in the case files, due at least partly to 
the sorts of constraints that are canvassed below (s. 8.3).  





7.4 Organising the police response 
 
The organisational structure of police responses in Victoria is now examined in 
relation to the effectiveness of networked policing of sexual assault. Notably, the 
findings reported in this section are highly reminiscent of many drawn from the strand 
one research.  
 
Transitioning from SOCAU to SOCIT. During the period of the PJO research, the 
organisational model of police operations was transitioning from Sexual Offence and 
Child Abuse Units (SOCAUs) working together with Criminal Investigations Units 
(CIUs) to a new policing framework of Sexual Assault and Child Investigation Teams 
(SOCITs). SOCITs were often though not always co-located with other services in 
facilities which Victoria Police termed Multi-Disciplinary Centres (MDCs). SOCAUs 
had been charged mainly with taking statements from victims and ensuring they were 
appropriately referred to hospital and support services as a priority, whereas the 
Crime Investigation Units took responsibility for investigating complaints, making 
decisions on authorisation and processing prosecution Briefs. The structural transition 
saw SOCITs combining these police operational functions of investigation and victim 
support, as well as being co-located with other agencies such as the Centres Against 
Sexual Assault (CASAs), Department of Human Services (DHS) and the Victorian 
Institute of Forensic Medicine (VIFM). 
 
The new model was intended to streamline the functioning of networked policing, to 
increase referrals and enhance decision-making, to increase specialization of police 
and raise the quality of Briefs, and thus improve the police response to sexual assault 
and better meet victim/survivors’ needs. In theory, the SOCIT model and co-location 
of police with other professionals could be expected to enhance networked policing 
and hence the police response to sexual assault allegations, if for no other reason 
because of the much closer arrangement of police along with other interested 
RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring there is a written 
record in case files of all agency contacts and their purposes. These records should 
be collected together in regular memoranda reports and forwarded for advice to 
management and a state monitoring body (see recommendation in s. 8.4). 
 
Implementing this recommendation will assist with quality monitoring of Briefs, 
allow timely and ongoing circulation of relevant agencies for information of all 
SOCIT members, identify areas for improvement efforts, and help to manage 
efficient and effective resource allocations. 
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agencies. The synergies to be gained from co-location in terms of communication and 
mutual understanding would appear obvious. 
 
Hybrid structural arrangements. Yet, as just noted, not all SOCITs are co-located 
with other relevant agencies, and co-location by itself is not the same as multi-
disciplinary settings and does not unleash the synergies that derive from the shared 
vision and shared principles and values that are a feature of the genuine team-work 
environment of multi-disciplinary models. Notwithstanding this critical feature, 
Success Works (2011) suggested that the SOCIT ‘multi-disciplinary centres’ were 
operating in a team fashion on some levels. In this respect, however, a telling 
comment about the SOCIT relationship with CASA was that it is “an arrangement and 
not a partnership and we need a partnership” (IO focus group run by PJO researchers 
in 2011). This comment shows that some police clearly see gaps in Victoria’s 
networked policing framework and reflect on them, which was also clearly evidenced 
in strand one research results (s. 4.6). Additionally, in interviews rural RO’s were 
adamant that the SOCIT model was developed with a metropolitan focus and it was 
virtually impossible to replicate in rural areas because of differences in population, 
resourcing and geography. Notably, key elements of successful change in police 
organisations have been identified in the literature as taking account of the unique 
features of local settings along with effective consultation and partnering with local 
stakeholders (Bayley, 2005; Edwards,1999). One AO said the SOCIT model was 
trialled with very substantial resource inputs in areas where it would succeed with 
good reviews, then rolled out elsewhere with fewer resources, resulting in failure. He 
said “it’s already a hybrid that cannot be replicated across the state”.  
 
Even so, according to Segrave and Wilson (2011), although general duties police 
continue to see their role in relation to victims generally as mainly one of fighting 
crime not dealing with and supporting victims, specialist police units such as SOCIT 
are different. They contend that this is because specialist units are charged with 
specific Code responsibilities. Accordingly, these authors believe knowledge of and 
referral to sexual assault victim support services are quite satisfactory (Segrave & 
Wilson, 2011, pp. 64-72). Yet these authors also point out that “it is meaningless to 
talk in terms of one homogenous (sic!) view” and “the level of contact individual 
victims seek, the time and resources available, and the disposition of … individual 
officers” among other factors, all operate to determine the approach adopted by 
individual officers (Segrave & Wilson, 2011, p. 18).  
 
Evidence from the police interviews and focus groups promotes a somewhat more 
circumspect view of just how much police feel able and are willing to adopt a victim 
supportive stance to sexual assault victims as distinct from their obligations to fight 
crime and bring sex offenders to account. This is not to deny the above mentioned use 
of a wide variety of victim support agencies by investigators under the supervision of 
ROs, nor the commitment and compassion demonstrated by some ROs in particular. It 
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is rather to query whether utilization and referrals are optimal. That is, despite the 
interview and focus group evidence of appropriate agency contacts, there was also 
evidence of under-utilisation. 
 
Role conflict and tension. Moreover, where it occurred, less than optimal victim-
support also appeared to be confounded with the evidence-gathering role of 
investigators, such that neither role expectation was fulfilled adequately, each 
interweaving with and restraining the other (cf. s. 4.6). This was especially indicated 
in the RO interviews where a common complaint was that ROs regularly return Briefs 
for more work by the investigator before sending them on to the AO. Most often this 
was said to be due to investigators’ inexperience and sometimes to the complexity of 
sexual assault cases. This was seen as exacerbated by recruitment, training and 
development inadequacies (see Chapter Nine). But it was also said that on occasion it 
is because of lack of diligence, unprofessional attitudes, laziness, and not ‘working 
the evidence’. (Issues of recruitment in these and following regards are raised in s. 
9.2). This can be a matter of the investigator recommending against authorisation due 
to only the victim’s word evidence, with the view being that it will not succeed at 
Court. ROs said that investigators can miss obtaining relevant witness statements, 
including first complaint evidence, and they sometimes rely on admissions without 
thinking that these can be rescinded as ‘under duress’ once there is a defence lawyer 
on the scene. (This last observation suggests that IOs do not always employ best 
practice principles for interviewing suspects [Read, Martine, Powell, Kebbell, & 
Milne, 2009; Walsh & Bull, 2011] as taught in Victoria Police training courses). 
These observations were echoed by some AOs who directly supervised investigators 
and/or conducted investigations themselves. 
 
Judgemental attitudes, and lack of work ethic and professionalism of some police. 
ROs acknowledged a problem of some police being judgemental in their case 
summaries and how this affected their view of the case. Some were very personalized: 
examples included describing victims as ‘nuffys’ (where there is a cognitive 
impairment or mental illness); describing a victim as ‘vindictive’; and suggesting the 
accused was more credible or truthful because he told police he was innocent. 
Interviewees were also critical of police writing comments about the case generally 
suggesting the case was ‘weak’ or ‘not likely to succeed’ because this was their 
judgement and it may not be correct, especially as it is to be reviewed by a more 
senior officer but putting this on a case file means it is very likely to be read by a 
defence lawyer and thus becomes another problem in the case to be overcome. They 
also felt these comments suggested investigators might not rigorously investigate the 
sexual assault allegation.  
 
Typical comments in these respects included: “I sometimes question the work ethic of 
the new policemen … There’s no pride”. “(Investigators) are a bit lazy”. “I think it’s 
too easy to become a policeman.  You don’t wear it as a badge of honour any more”.  
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Similarly, “with the sex Briefs sometimes they just don’t want to do the leg work. 
Because they are difficult. You sometimes have to approach… you know, relatives or 
people that don’t want to know about it, don’t want to cooperate…”. “Because… 
because every bit of correspondence is attached to a Brief [and it] is subpoenable 
[and] I hate it when an informant puts comments like that at the front of a Brief … 
Word against word, no corroboration… unlikely to result in a successful prosecution”. 
“Sometimes investigators make comments that reflect a personal view on the victim 
or evidence – e.g., victim has been drinking, works in the sex industry”. Again, “one 
would assume and hope that everyone in that area is so committed in the interests of 
the victims.  If they’re not they shouldn’t be there.” 
 
One RO would not authorise a Brief where it involved victim’s word only, an 
offender without priors, and a minor offence such as “pinching a girl’s bum.”  
 
Because I’ve got to take into consideration:  is it worth tying up the court 
time for a matter of such a trivial nature?  Now, I know that some people 
would argue that it’s not trivial because she’s come and reported to the police 
and she’s obviously been offended and whatnot.  But it’s still – he’s not 
going to – sorry.  He’s not going to receive any penalty in court, in reality. 
 
However, the same RO would prosecute a rape even if it was only the victim’s word 
and regardless of whether the offender had priors. 
 
Variability among supervisors. A significant finding is highlighted here in terms of 
variability among supervisors and AOs in their decision-making. One AO pointed up 
this aspect in comments on changing a decision by another relieving Senior Sergeant 
or by ROs who were not normally under his line accountability due to leave 
arrangements. Both investigator focus groups mentioned the particular preference or 
style of the Sergeant and/or Senior Sergeant could impact return of Briefs for further 
work, which also indicates variability in supervision and standards in quality review. 
Variability among supervisors and specialist units was reported by police and CASA 
in strand one research as well (ss. 4.6.1 and 5.2). 
 
So the RO and AO interview evidence in particular indicated that investigators were 
mostly still learning, while some were unsuited to the job, and especially because it 
involved both victim-supportive and crime-fighting demands. ROs and AOs similarly 
at times reflected ‘human factor’ variability, a point that is taken up and discussed 
further in the next chapter (see s. 8.4). The import of these considerations is that the 
SOCIT model and co-location responses to address sexual assault allegations cannot 
be the sole answer to enhance reporting and eventually conviction rates. It is more 
essential that SOCITs are resourced adequately and most particularly with aptly suited 
individual police officers at all levels of responsibility. What Segrave and Wilson 
(2011) characterized as the “disposition of … individual police officers” is the critical 
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ingredient - not the nominal and structural changes - to meeting the dual role 
expectations of sexual assault policing in Victoria, particularly within a networked 
policing environment.  
 
From this data and the earlier cited lack of evidence on file of CASA/other agency 
contact it was apparent that – despite some contrary interview/focus group opinions 
(see ss. 7.2 and 7.3) - the existing arrangement of Victoria Police/CASA Liaison 
Committees (Victoria Police 2005) was not adequately performing the stated 
functions of identifying and resolving problems locally and monitoring and reporting 
on Code of Practice compliance. This finding was supported by research evidence 
from the CASA interviews conducted by PJO researchers in 2010 (see s. 5.5).  
 
 
7.5 Limiting the police authorisation decision 
 
There are obviously limits to police decision-making, including the factor of ‘victim 
incapacitation’ found in the case file analysis, which notably was found only in the 
‘complaint withdrawn by victim’ cases (see s. 6.2.2.1). For example, the death of her 
stepfather in case 78 could readily be inferred to have resulted in emotional turmoil 
that interfered with the victim’s capacity to pursue a complaint. Again, the expressed 
yearning by the victim in case 85 to ‘just go home’ could be interpreted to flag her 
basic need to rest from the night’s social activities as well as her ordeal which brought 
her to the police in the early morning hours, and/or it could be understood to reflect 
her particular way of addressing a deeper need to begin recovering from the rape. In 
such instances, police decision-making was limited by the external factor of victims 
who were unable to pursue their complaint due to the effects of the sexual assault and 
its circumstances.  
 
RECOMMENDATION: The current SOCIT model should be modified from the 
current variable, hybrid application that has developed across different locations, 
and expanded in concept and built upon in field design to develop fully functioning 
MDCs and unleash the partnership synergies of a ‘best practice’ networked 
policing framework. 
RECOMMENDATION: An umbrella monitoring body should be established at 
the State level whose members are drawn from representatives of the SOCITs,  
MDCs, CASAs and other relevant bodies. Individual members should have non-
renewable three year tenures to ensure freshness of commitment. This body should 
have co-ordinating, advisory and victims’ advocacy responsibilities. 
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Complaints withdrawn. In this respect an analysis was conducted of complaints 
withdrawn by victims, using data obtained from the total 481 case files made 
available to researchers. Some kind of impairment was identified in 27% of these 
cases especially psychological/psychiatric impairment, and drug/alcohol affected 
victims were also prominent (57%). These findings are consistent with the literature 
which shows that victims whose recollections of the assault are vague or imperfect for 
these among other reasons are more likely to have their claims questioned by police 
on grounds of credibility (e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, 1997; Clay-Warner & Burt, 2005; 
Frohmann, 1998; Heenan & Murray, 2006; HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007; Krahe et al., 
2009; Lea et al., 2003;Segrave & Wilson, 2011; Spears & Spohn, 1996; Stewart, 
1998;VCCAV, 1991). Police often feel constrained to do this in anticipation of the 
defence strategy to discredit the victim’s story. Thus, among the most important 
considerations in preparing sexual assault Briefs investigators recounted in focus 
groups was the need to be honest with victims about it not necessarily being the 
outcome they want once they attend court. Similarly, ROs cited the importance of not 
making promises to victims that they could not keep. The earlier quoted words of an 
AO bear repeating here as well (s. 6.2.2): “Sometimes I agonise over them. Because 
you think, now do I prosecute them, I’ve seen the results of failed prosecutions and 
you think, oh, why did I put that person through that?” As a result victims confronted 
by these issues and how they would be handled by the defence often withdraw their 
complaint rather than proceed, thus constraining the police decision-making process. 
However, as noted earlier (Chapter Six), in such cases police are still deciding not to 
pursue the matter against the ‘victim’s wishes’. 
 
OPP prosecutorial guidelines. Additionally, police decision-making is bounded by 
legislative and other criminal justice factors, including the impact of OPP interactions. 
For instance, a frequent comment in interviews and focus groups was how OPP 
personnel were determinant in whether or not a matter was progressed at court. This 
was despite the formal separation of the police decision to authorise or not from the 
advisory role of the OPP. In this respect, the OPP prosecutorial guidelines (Office of 
Public Prosecutions Victoria) are relied upon by both OPP personnel and the police, 
thus impacting the criminal justice decision-making process at two distinct points – if 
the police do not heed them then the OPP still has the opportunity to do so. The 
significance of these guidelines is that they act as a severe brake upon police 
authorisation decision-making in a number of respects (see also ss 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). 
 
A brief examination of these guidelines is instructive in this regard. Notably these 
policy guidelines were issued on 14 February 2008, sometime after the VLRC (2004) 
and Ombudsman Victoria (2006) reports, and subsequent to the bulk of the case file 
data-collection period for the present research. Thus, they continue to impact sexual 
assault decision-making. These require prosecutors not to institute or continue a 
prosecution unless there is admissible, substantial and reliable evidence that a 
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criminal offence known to the law has been committed by the alleged offender, or if 
there is no reasonable prospect of a conviction; and to take into account:  
 
• the availability, competence and credibility of witnesses and their likely 
impression on the arbiter of fact 
• any physical or mental disability or ability to communicate that is likely to 
affect a witness’ credibility 
• the public interest as determined by, inter alia, the youth, age, intelligence, 
physical health or special infirmity of the alleged offender; the staleness of the 
alleged offence; availability and efficacy of any alternatives to prosecution; 
the victim’s attitude to the prosecution; and the likely length and expense of a 
trial 
• close scrutiny of DNA evidence to ensure it is clearly reliable and highly 
probative 
 
A total of 21 items are listed for determining the public interest, most of which are 
amenable to negating a prosecution as much as or more than encouraging it. In a 
separate clause apart from that pertaining to trial length and expenses, the prosecutor 
is charged to consider the finite availability of resources. Also separately listed are 
requirements concerning prosecution of cognitively impaired persons and involuntary 
psychiatric inpatients. Special considerations apply to prosecution of cognitively 
impaired persons, which are stated to include persons with intellectual disabilities, 
personality disorders, acquired brain injury, neurological disorders, or forms of 
mental illness, and “whether a prosecution would be likely to be harmful to the 
offender or be inappropriate”. Regarding involuntary psychiatric inpatients, issues 
raised against prosecution include incapacity to form intent, a gesture of protest 
against confinement, and the potential consequent making of orders that result only in 
retaining the person in psychiatric detention (i.e., implied redundancy of effort and 
costs). 
 
In short the guidelines are a diverse collection of rationales that can be employed by 
police in the first instance and prosecutors in the second to thwart pursuit of a victim’s 
claim of sexual assault and, hence, to justify not responding to such claims. More than 
that, the guidelines require this diverse collection of rationales to be heeded – they are 
a real and substantial deterrent to police decision-making that might favour 
appropriate responses and they serve to cement any individual attitudes of police that 
are unreceptive of victims’ claims. Furthermore, as a reflection of government policy, 
the OPP guidelines serve as notice that the State “encourages a cultural context which 
both encourages and reinforces the public construction of … violence” against certain 
groups in society who are thus “‘deserving’ victims of violence” (Richardson & May, 
1999, p. 327). 
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In terms of police non-authorisation decision-making discussed earlier from 
inspection of the case files (S. 6.2.2) these guidelines clearly serve to underpin the 
bulk of rationales, viz. those associated with: insufficient evidence and success 
unlikely; the five victim related factors including victim credibility; historical 
reporting; and withdrawal of complaints by victims. Moreover, a number of specific 
and other reasons raised formally against authorisation can be traced in their roots to 
the OPP guidelines: e.g., the offender was a psychiatric inpatient whose treating 
psychiatrist counselled against prosecution as that would damage the offender’s 
therapeutic recovery (14); anticipated court costs (65); and force instructions relating 
to minor assaults (75). The guidelines are a concrete manifestation of existing norms, 
rules and policies shared by police and OPP prosecutors that direct and govern their 
decision-making.  
 
Against these prescriptions the prosecutor must also consider the prevalence of the 
offence, whether it is of considerable public concern, and the need to maintain public 
confidence in institutions such as the Parliament and the courts, all of which criteria 
would seem to urge a robust commitment to pursuing sexual assault claims. 
 
‘Hard evidence’. Yet a considered view of the guidelines is that they are weighed 
against positive police and prosecutorial responses to allegations of sexual assault. 
The overall effect of these guidelines is to reinforce and culturally embed the ‘hard 
evidence’, uncertainty avoidance policing approach exemplified from the research 
data and discussed earlier (Chapter Six and s. 3.3), and thus to work against 
implementation of the VLRC (2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006) 
recommendations designed to improve the response of the criminal justice system to 
sexual assault. 
 
Shifting the attrition point. Furthermore, from the Success Works (2011) report, the 
police data indicated the rate of attrition – measured by complaints withdrawn by 
victims - increased between 2005/06 and 2008/09 and then decreased substantially in 
2009/10, while the court data indicated an increase during 2009/10 in cases where the 
prosecution was withdrawn. This suggests there could be a shift of the attrition event 
from the policing to the prosecutorial decision point. 
 
Achieving VicPol’s commitment to building victims’ capacities. Hence, to achieve 
VicPol’s commitment to building victims' capacities to report - thus implementing the 
recommendations of the VLRC (2004) and Ombudsman Victoria (2006) - requires 
more than changes in VicPol organisational structure and attitudes of some individual 
police officers. There is also a need to engage the OPP and courts (including the 
Magistrates Court) in social action change as well to assist VicPol’s commitment to 
increasing the reporting and conviction rates in relation to sexual assault (cf 
Frohmann, 1998). For that matter, the OPP and the courts are likewise constrained by 
legislation and the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. In this respect, some 
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of the difficulties imposed on achieving just outcomes for victims of sexual assault 
can be removed only through legislative change, as detailed elsewhere by Taylor 
(2004) and Taylor and Gassner (2010). 
 
 
7.6 Summary and recommendations 
 
The evidence from the case files, police interviews and focus groups, and the OPP 
focus group indicates that some important elements of networked policing were not 
happening at a level consistent with best practice.  
 
Interaction with the OPP was reported by RO interviewees particularly in mixed 
terms, indicating that more formal arrangements and more frequent contact, including 
a schedule of training/liaison meetings, would prove worthwhile. The OPP focus 
group commentary was similarly mixed in its evaluation of police Briefs. There was 
strong evidence of a clear communication gap between police and the OPP, 
highlighted by a striking similarity of their views as to the constraints, complexity and 
pressures of their respective workloads, without an equal awareness of such by either 
party.  
 
The case file evidence indicated poor implementation of the Code guidelines on 
CASA referrals whereas police interview and focus group data suggested a strong 
commitment and practice in accord with policy directions. There is also conflicting 
data on interactions with agencies other than CASA and hospitals, with largely 
neglect of a broader range of victim supports shown in the case files despite police in 
interviews and focus groups citing appropriate use of various agencies to develop 
evidence as well as to support victims. Questions were raised by operational police 
about the effectiveness and viability of the SOCIT model. 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake efforts to alter the OPP 
guidelines to more victim-friendly criteria in regard to sexual assault matters. 
These efforts should involve consulting with the OPP to make appropriate joint 
representations to the Minister and Parliament on behalf of sexual assault victims 
supported by the abundance of research literature evidence on the special problems 
of non-reporting, late reporting and attrition of sexual assault crimes from the 
criminal justice system. In undertaking these efforts Victoria Police should also 
consult and work together with other significant players in the policing network. 
 
Implementing this recommendation will tangibly demonstrate and reinforce the 
strength of VicPol’s SARS and SOCIT commitments. 
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Police interviews and focus groups indicated that prosecution efforts are constrained 
by victims’ incapacitation, their need to be informed as to the court process and their 
withdrawal of complaints, as well as by resource deficiencies. ROs and AOs in 
interviews also acknowledged that constraints took the form of attitudinal blocks on 
the part of some SOCIT members. Investigators were also acknowledged as 
inexperienced both by themselves and by their superiors, especially given the 
complexity of sexual assault cases, regarding which there was a very strong consensus 
across the various groups. OPP prosecutorial guidelines and legislative requirements 
of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof also served to constrain 
prosecution and police decision-making. 
 
The OPP focus group cited a number of issues they would like to see addressed in 
terms of their interactions with police: inconsistent quality of Briefs against deadlines 
for review, consequent adjournments, poor particularization and summary of charges, 
short statements, inappropriate disclosure, and adverse impacts on victim credibility 
due to subsequent defence tactics. OPP lawyers also considered that police approach 
their commitments differently, some seriously committed and willing to learn, 
whereas others seem uninterested, unwilling to learn and/or appear personally 
offended if told there are flaws in the Brief or that charges must be withdrawn.  
 
The OPP legal prosecution specialist was acknowledged by police interviewees and 
focus groups as well as OPP focus group lawyers as invaluable in provision of advice 
to police. This person has been working with police in this capacity for many years. 
He no doubt will be very badly missed once he retires or otherwise leaves, which 
therefore raises a potentially critical ‘succession issue’. 
 
A best practice networked policing framework would involve a much tighter co-
operative partnership between police and other significant parties (Schedler, 2006) 
than that shown in the PJO research evidence, but without resulting in either “newer 
and more capacious modes of control” by the state (Crawford, 2006, p. 471) or the 
erosion of the state’s legitimate authority in public policing (Loader & Walker, 2001). 
Despite their shared normative basis for decision-making, the police and OPP are 
significantly at odds in their communications and they do not enjoy a tightly knit 
collaborative relationship that enhances prosecution outcomes for sexual assault 
victims/survivors. In this respect, the Unity Model in Manchester/Liverpool provides 
an alternative where police and prosecutors work together from the outset of a case in 
sex offence matters. To date, reviews of this model and its results are very 
encouraging and it is being examined by other police jurisdictions.  
 
Police decision-making remains limited by not only the OPP guidelines but also the 
broader legal framework of the courts, juries and existing legislation. CASA and other 
community players remain limited in their capacities to influence the police decision-
making process and to help SOCITs to improve responses to sexual assault victims. 
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Networked public policing has a considerable challenge in these respects as well as 
others described in the previous and next chapters. 
 
The research evidence showed that the networked public policing arrangement in 
Victoria does not reflect the democratic, best practice model envisaged and promoted 
in the literature. Shearing and Wood (2000) described their arrangements in South 
Africa and Argentina in terms of a community forum of all the partners together 
establishing goals, strategies and implementation arrangements. This model does not 
currently exist in Victoria, where the SOCIT apparatus is basically one of co-location 
of police with other services for victims. It is not a fully functioning community 
partnership (Crawford, 2006). The current SOCIT/MDC model in Victoria is a step in 
the right direction, but there remains some way to go both in structural and normative 
process terms. Further developing this model to align more with best practice will 
result in more tangible improvements in the police response to sexual assault victims. 
 
The following recommendations are pursuant to the data analysis and evidence 
presented in this chapter. 
 









RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police case files should provide a written 
record of the essentials of all interactions with the OPP to allow for accountability 
and provide sound data for training and management purposes. (s. 7.1.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should make representations to the OPP 
to have Specialist Sex Offences Unit lawyers more involved with country circuit 
sex offence cases. (s. 7.1.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Serious consideration should be given to formalizing an 
arrangement of regular OPP visits to SOCITs, establishing clear contact guidelines 
and expectations, sharing regular newsletters of mutual interest matters, consulting 
with the OPP with an aim of reconciling currently divergent views, with open and 
ongoing communication on issues as they arise - including in respect to reliance on 
a single OPP legal prosecution specialist and other personnel instability/turnover 
issues. (s.7.1.2) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should examine the overseas practice 
and experience of unified police/prosecution models for improving the CJS 
response to complaints of sexual assault with a view to adopting a best practice 
model. (s. 7.1.3) 
RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring there is a written 
record in case files of compliance with Code requirements concerning CASA 
referrals and problems in effecting compliance. These records should be collected 
together in regular memoranda reports and forwarded for advice to management 
and a state monitoring body (see further recommendation in s. 8.4). (s. 7.2) 
RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to ensuring there is a written 
record in case files of all agency contacts and their purposes. These records should 
be collected together in regular memoranda reports and forwarded for advice to 
management and a state monitoring body (see recommendation in s. 8.4). (s. 7.3) 







   
RECOMMENDATION: The current SOCIT model should be modified from the 
current variable, hybrid application that has developed across different locations, 
and expanded in concept and built upon in field design to develop fully functioning 
MDCs and unleash the partnership synergies of a ‘best practice’ networked 
policing framework. (s. 7.4) 
RECOMMENDATION: An umbrella monitoring body should be established at 
the State level whose members are drawn from representatives of the SOCITs, 
MDCs, CASAs and other relevant bodies. Individual members should have non-
renewable three year tenures to ensure freshness of commitment. This body should 
have co-ordinating, advisory and victims’ advocacy responsibilities. (s. 7.4) 
RECOMMENDATION: Victoria Police should undertake efforts to alter the OPP 
guidelines to more victim-friendly criteria in regard to sexual assault matters. 
These efforts should involve consulting with the OPP to make appropriate joint 
representations to the Minister and Parliament on behalf of sexual assault victims 
supported by the abundance of research literature evidence on the special problems 
of non-reporting, late reporting and attrition of sexual assault crimes from the 
criminal justice system. In undertaking these efforts Victoria Police should also 
consult and work together with other significant players in the policing network. (s. 
7.5) 
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8.0 Managing the police response - improving the 
preparation of Briefs  
 
An understanding of the reasons why complaints are authorised or not authorised and 
taking steps to enhance police decision-making in those regards is necessary but it is 
not sufficient to ensure police respond appropriately to sexual assault claims and the 
needs of victim/survivors. Best practice networked policing is also necessary but not 
sufficient for that purpose. It is also necessary to understand the management of Brief 
preparation and take any steps indicated to improve management systems and 
processes.  
 
In these respects, the VLRC Final Report (2004, p. 129) recommendation 19 states 
that Victoria Police “should review their Brief authorisation process with the aim of 
developing a model that is consistent, transparent and accountable”.  
Recommendation 21 states that “a monitoring process should be established to allow 
evaluation of the authorisation process on a regular basis, so that necessary 
amendments can be made”. The Office of the Victoria Ombudsman (2006) has made 
similar recommendations. Its recommendation 22 states in part that “the conduct of 
investigators should be regularly monitored for compliance with the code. Persistent 
breaches should be subject to sanctions”. Recommendation 27 states in part that 
Victoria Police should “develop a range of measures to reduce the number of 
complaints withdrawn including automatically reviewing cases where a complainant 
withdraws a report of sexual assault”. Recommendation 28 states that Victoria Police 
should “consider whether, in some circumstances, a more independent review of a 
decision not to authorise a Brief for prosecution should apply in sexual assault cases. 
The use of panels, either independent or internal to Victoria Police, could be 
considered for such review”. 
 
Further, recent overseas experience suggests a similar improvement approach to the 
policing and prosecution of sexual assault complaints by adults. For example, in 
relation to policing and prosecution of rape cases, the HMCPSI & HMIC (2007) 
report observed: 
 
There were cases identified, however, where lines of enquiry had not been 
fully explored and where further enquiries might have resulted in sufficient 
evidence to prosecute. In addition, file quality was found to be variable, with 
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As a result, there was a: 
 
need to ensure that debriefs, involving the police and prosecutors, of both 
successful and unsuccessful cases take place in order to learn from experience, 
build up expertise and develop high-quality case decision making and 
handling (HMCPSI & HMIC, p. 160). 
 
A PJO project literature review (Spiranovic, 2011) was conducted covering change 
management efforts by police organisations in Australia (e.g., AGD [NSW], 2005; 
DPP [ACT] and the AFP 2005; Heath 2007; Queensland CMC, 2003, 2008; Success 
Works, 2011) within the context of the literature on organisational change and culture 
(e.g., Chan 1996, 1999; Dunford, 1992; Narayanan 2005; Paoline, 2003; Prenzler, 
1997; Robbins & Barnwell, 2002). It was concluded that current Australian initiatives 
in police reform concerning sexual assault have neglected the complexities of 
organisational change management and these reforms risk being fixed at the policy 
and rhetoric stage of implementation instead of becoming institutionalized in changed 
practices at the level of individual police officers. As Woodhouse (2006) argues, to 
effect change management in any large and complex organisation (such as Victoria 
Police) requires first and foremost best practice leadership; and best practice 
leadership does not impose new visions (Wood & Bradley, 2009) but rather 
exemplifies desired change and inspires others to follow.  
 
However, best practice leadership is neither easy nor necessarily well received in 
police organisations. Densten (1999) conducted a survey of 480 senior police officers 
in a large Australian police force. Respondents reported that their superiors managed 
by exception, that is by attending to problems as they arose and otherwise allowing 
their subordinates free rein to do their jobs. That is, their superiors did not provide 
leadership that inspired them to work beyond expectations and did not provide 
exemplary behaviours to follow. Densten also found that the surveyed police officers 
were happy with this style. In the leadership literature this form of leadership is 
widely acknowledged to be the least effective style (e.g., Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 
1993; Bennis, 1997; Calás & Smircich, 1997; Fagiano, 1997; Fleming, 2001; Hunt, 
1999; Mumford, Zaccaro, Connelly, & Marks 2000).  
 
Other research work provides a more complete picture of police leadership. Dobby, 
Anscombe and Tuffin (2004) conducted a postal survey of over 2000 police officers, 
and interviewed 150 police officers across all ranks in England and Wales. Most 
officers wanted leaders who ‘walked the talk’, made them feel proud of their work, 
personally demonstrated high professional standards and who possessed high levels of 
professional technical skills. These are among the hallmarks of the most effective 
forms of leadership (e.g., Bass & Avolio, 1993; Mumford et al., 2000). Dobby et al. 
(2004) also found that all respondents had experienced negative leaders who were 
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lazy, moody and unethical and who significantly impacted the quality of police 
services as a result. 
 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2008) utilized a web-based 
questionnaire, field work and focus group in its thematic inspection of police 
supervision across a representative group of basic command units (local police service 
area delivery units) in England and Wales. This study found an extensive deficiency 
in capability and confidence among sergeants to do their job, widespread basic skills 
gap and variations in the quality of supervision by them, and inadequate training 
provisions (HMIC, 2008). It confirmed that “leadership qualities and technical skills” 
were most important to sergeants performing their supervisory and managerial roles 
(HMIC, 2008, p. 5). 
  
The available literature on police leadership stresses the critical role of leadership of 
police supervisors and managers in determining the quality of police services. In 
particular, police have been enjoined to embrace positive symbolic leadership (Punch, 
1994) and conspicuously ethical leadership (Goldsmith, 2001) as the primary means 
of managing professional and effective policing activities. Punch (1994) emphasised a 
need for positive role modelling by superiors, with personal integrity and moral 
leadership demonstrated from the top as well as cooperation with external agencies in 
ensuring police accountability. Goldsmith (2001) similarly stressed that senior police 
must lead by example, with public display & courage, sending a consistent message 
of expectations. He further argued that along with and integral to conspicuous 
leadership, police must build trust with the wider community and senior police must 
accept “responsibility for poor performance, taking firm action against police 
personnel who have performed poorly … encouraging and supporting … 
whistleblowers” Goldsmith (2005, p. 459). Murray (2002) argued that police 
leadership was now necessarily more about a democratic rather than militaristic style, 
moving from a purely rules-driven to a values-driven stance, relying on persuading 
and inspiring, consistently displaying integrity and honesty. The essentials of such 
leadership thought promoted by these authors are reminiscent of the most widely 
acclaimed leadership behaviours and skills in the literature, with an emphasis on 
providing transformational leadership, inspiration, a defined and achievable vision, 
desirable role modelling, and energizing followers to pursue policy dictated 
organisational goals (e.g., Bass & Avolio, 1993; Mumford et al., 2000). Such 
leadership is consistent with the notion of an enabling bureaucracy as distinct from a 
coercive one (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
 
Where such leadership is not displayed the conditions are established for poor police 
service if not corruption in one form or another (Newburn, 1999), along with 
associated cultural supports that are difficult though not impossible to change (Chan, 
1996, 1999). Thus, as Woodhouse (2006) points out, it is futile to rely solely on 
written policies, codes and inspections to ensure compliance with police 
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organisational standards and requirements. Although like most of the police 
leadership literature his commentary is in the context of controlling police corruption, 
it is equally applicable to managing the police response to sexual assault allegations. 
He too points to conspicuously ethical leadership as the critical ingredient, along with 
a range of monitoring and control devices. Whilst managing the police response to 
sexual assault allegations and the needs of victims/survivors also depends on robust 
monitoring and control systems, it is appropriate leadership that most matters, and 
that leadership is not of the ‘fix the broken wheel’ kind but rather of the ‘lead from 
the front’ kind. 
 
Managing the police response to sexual assault allegations is inextricably linked to the 
decision-making process discussed in chapter seven where those decisions are 
fundamentally decisions of leadership not just management. In this regard, the work 
of Frohmann (1998) is instructive about the ways that prosecutors utilize the 
knowledge and resources of their asymmetrical power relationship with sexual assault 
complainants to persuade or pressure them to withdraw complaints – cf, Lievore’s 
(2005a) observation of the asymmetrical power relationship between 
victims/survivors and criminal justice agents. In her study Frohmann identified three 
strategies prosecutors use to manage victims’ complaints: displays of concern, 
specifying downstream possibilities, and paradigm shifting. She argued that 
prosecutors display or withhold concern for victims’ physical safety and 
psychological health thereby encouraging their cooperation in whatever decision the 
prosecutors had in mind. Prosecutors also use their insider knowledge of the legal 
system and past cases to show that they can assess and predict the likelihood of court-
room success as well as the consequences for victims of pursuing complaints. In this 
respect, they have a “‘downstream’ concern with convictability” and are “constantly 
‘in dialogue with’ anticipated defense arguments and anticipated judge and juror 
responses to case testimony” which produce premature closure of the victim’s claim 
of sexual assault (Frohmann, 1991, p. 224). If favourably disposed, prosecutors 
typically try to dispel victims’ fears and if not they highlight difficulties and 
humiliating aspects of continuing on. Thirdly, they translate the victim’s lived 
personal experience of sexual assault into the language and definitions of the legal 
system, deciding whether or not a ‘crime’ was committed and if so what kind, as well 
as the ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’ that can be adduced in law. The complainant is put 
accordingly into the position of re-conceptualising the lived experience of sexual 
assault. In implementing these strategies, the prosecutor has control in the relationship 
to determine and define the victim’s situation whereas the victim is very largely 
powerless. Frohmann’s (1991, 1998) analysis applies equally to the encounter 
between victims and police investigators. Thus, in the context of Victoria, the 
processes of interviewing victims with the intent of obtaining particularization and 
utilizing resultant evidentiary materials or lack thereof in Brief preparation documents 
are paramount to IOs’ abilities to define and control the victim’s experience in the 
written decision-making record.  




This chapter itemizes and discusses areas of potential improvement of police 
decision-making in relation to sexual assault allegations by adults, where those 
improvements can be effected through best practice leadership that pays attention to 
how SOCIT police can re-orient their relationship with sexual assault victims to 
effectively empower them. This is achieved in regard to first documentation practices, 
then secondly argumentation. A subsequent section deals with improving field 
conditions for police in pursuing their duties. Before concluding, attention is paid to 
potential for improving quality control systems. Data are drawn for analysis from the 
research conducted in 2011 in relation to the LEAP case files, police interviews and 
focus groups, as well as the OPP focus group. Where applicable there is also 
reference to triangulation of the research data and findings across the strands. 
  
8.1 Improving documentation  
 
In this section there is comment first on the methodologically conservative approach 
taken concerning case file documents, followed by substantive findings. 
  
8.1.1 Methodological conservatism  
 
The case files were characterised by a general absence of documentation, partly due 
to documents having been destroyed for various reasons. Wherever this limitation was 
recorded on file it was not counted in the analysis of documentation practice. 
Instances of documents being destroyed, however, do raise a question of why this 
occurs and consequent impact upon accountability capacity, whether internal to 
VicPol or an external body. Notably, it was not always obvious from reading a case 
file whether documentation was missing as what is required in cases varies greatly 
according to the circumstances of the offences, and those are not always clearly 
indicative of what is necessary as evidence – for instance the need for medical or 
forensic reports can be moot. 
 
Where it was uncertain whether a document was actually missing it was not counted 
in the analysis. Also, where there was a file indication of police having no control 
over some aspect of documentation, analysis did not count the missing documents 
concerned. For example, in case 58, where the victim reportedly ran off refusing both 
completion of a statement and a statement of no complaint, these were not counted in 
the analysis. Similarly, there is no count of the missing victim statement in case 83 
where the victim was ‘extremely hostile’ and refused to commit her verbal complaint 
to writing and made no withdrawal statement. However, in case 57 the missing record 
of interview was explained by the fact that the “accused statement can’t be transcribed 
because his speech is too unclear—he is a ‘mutterer’”. This was judged as not being 
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valid since it amounts to ignoring an effectively ‘no comment interview’, which was 
routinely documented by police. It could be expected that police would persist despite 
the difficulty, and many other interviews were documented despite their individual 
challenges. That is, the analysis was concerned only with police documentation 
practice that indicated needs for ongoing targeted quality monitoring and/or training 
improvements. 
 
Lack of documentation might also be explained partly by a reluctance of members to 
be involved in the research project for a variety of reasons, promoting a relaxed 
approach to returning copies of file materials in their possession. It is also partly 
explained by the practice of authorising officers first listening to audio-tapes of an 
accused interview before taking a decision where the investigator’s recommendation 
is against prosecution. If the decision is non-authorisation in such instances, the 
practice has been then not to obtain a typed hard copy of the interview.  
 
In the following analysis, ‘no formal (non)-authorisation details’ means there was no 
formal report detailing the (non-)authorisation rationale signed off by either an 
authorizing officer or a recommending officer. ‘Missing signatures and/or dates’ refer 
to documents other than a formal authorisation report, such as victim, witness and 
informant statements, and accused record of interview. ‘Poorly completed documents’ 
refers to aspects other than missing signatures and/or dates which are counted 
separately. 
 
Poorly completed documents entailed a variety of aspects which bear further 
explanation with a few examples. In case 13, for example, the record of interview 
comprised 3 ½ pages of handwritten notes that were a difficult to follow, staccato 
account. As well, the recommending officer gave one date for the alleged offence, but 
the Brief-Head stated a date nine months earlier. The case 17 file was especially 
poorly organized, with many file management issues and incomplete information 
including the mixing together of the two victims’ case details and the missing accused 
interview. Such aspects might well have rendered prosecution hazardous unless the 
explanation was that the research project did not receive all of the actual file contents 
and in an orderly fashion that those might have been presented in the original file, 
given that copies only were made available for research purposes. Again, for example, 
the file in case 18 not only held no suspect interview but also gave no record of the 
plea. 
 
8.1.2 Documenting authorisation and non-authorisation decisions 
 
The following deals first with documentation improvement potentials in authorisation 
and then in non-authorisation cases. Documentation improvement potentials in other 
cases are discussed subsequently. There is then comment on triangulation evidence. 




Absence of formal authorisation reports. The most significant finding in 
authorisation cases was the absence of a formal report detailing the authorisation 
rationale and signed off by an authorizing or recommending officer, as discussed 
earlier (Chapter Six). 
 
Missing supportive documents. In 16 cases (44.4%) there were one or more missing 
supportive documents, with no written record of accused interview in ten cases 
(27.8%); no informant’s statement in four (11.1%); missing witness statement in three 
(8.3%); no victim statement in two (5.6%); a missing medical report in one; and other 
missing documents in eight (22.2%).  
 
Other  important elements of improvement potential. The files reflected missing 
signatures and/or dates in ten (27.8%); poorly completed documents in nine (25%); 
and inexplicable delays in obtaining a witness statement in six (16.7%). More 
generally, there were four or more areas of potential improvement in 10 cases 
(27.8%), and at least three areas in 15 (41.7%). There were a total of 89 potential 
documentation quality aspects of improvement discovered across all the files, or an 
average of 2.5 per file. Putting aside the lack of an authorisation report with formal 
sign off, there was still a total of 53 other potential improvement aspects or 1.5 per 
file. 
 
Non-authorisation cases. In respect to non-authorisation, there were nine cases 
(19.2%) where there was no formal report. Some 36 (76.6%) of the cases were 
missing at least one important supportive document, including missing interview 
records in 26 (55.3%) of the 47 cases. Additionally, across the files there were a total 
of 22 other missing documents. Further, seven (14.9%) of the case files held poorly 
completed documents and four of those - 8.5% of the 47 cases - had missing 
signatures and/or dates. More broadly, there were four or more areas of potential 
improvement in two (4.3%) of the cases, and at least three areas in 10 (21.3%). There 
was a total of 69 potential documentation quality improvement aspects found across 
all the files, or an average of 1.5 per file. Aside from the lack of a formal non-
authorisation report, there were a total of 60 other potential improvement aspects or 
1.3 per file. 
 
Other cases. In cases classified as ‘no offence disclosed’ and ‘unsolved’ there was a 
lack of a formal non-authorisation report with details in all cases, absence of a victim 
statement in six of the seven cases, a missing witness statement in three, and several 
missing documents in two of the three ‘no offence disclosed’ cases. Cases that were 
classified ‘unsolved’ or ‘no offence disclosed’ therefore also displayed documentation 
improvement potential. 
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Triangulated research evidence. RO interviewees mentioned documentation 
difficulties in terms of missing witness statements, incomplete victim statements and 
other “holes in investigations, lines of inquiry that haven’t been done, forms that 
haven’t been put on”. They explained these problems in terms of the complexity of 
sexual assault investigations and the inexperience of many investigators. So, “as 
investigators have become more experienced the quality of Briefs has improved 
measurably”. Investigators in the focus groups agreed with these observations saying 
that it was not uncommon to have to correct errors or follow-up further statements or 
expand existing ones, obtain medical records, provide additional or replacement 
charges, or attend to exhibits or other matters. This was seen as due to the Brief being 
a big document that meant investigators can miss something. They also agreed that 
extra work lessened with experience. As noted previously (s. 7.1.2) the OPP focus 
group also cited problems of missing documents in Briefs forwarded for prosecution 
to the SSOU. These included missing “photographs; record of interview that's been 
transcribed; charges; statements; (and) a correct summary”.  
 
Analysis of the tri-angulated data indicated that the case file findings on 
documentation improvement potential were reflected in the interview and focus group 
results, including the external evaluative comments from OPP lawyers. This suggests 
that there remains room for improvement, a finding that should not be surprising 
given that major changes typically take time to ‘bed down’ in complex organisational 
environments. Nonetheless, considerable room for improvement is apparent and 
acknowledged by police interviewees and focus groups. Whilst quality control and 
monitoring systems require review, this area represents a challenge for the leadership 
of ROs and AOs in particular – see s. 7.1.2 in this respect – but also for more senior 
police, all of whom need to actively strive to adopt the transformational styles of 
positive symbolism and conspicuous ethics that has been recognized and promoted as 




8.2 Improving argumentation 
 
In the following analysis case file examples are given of argumentation elements that 
could be addressed to improve decision-making and Brief preparation. These are not 
RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to reinforcing the importance 
of ensuring there is accurate and comprehensive documentation on case files 
irrespective of whether authorisation or non-authorisation is being sought and 
before forwarding to senior police officers and prosecutors. This mission should be 
a priority of leadership at operational and executive levels of VicPol, as well as 
calling for a review of quality control mechanisms. 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 246 
exhaustive of file materials and they are also tri-angulated to interview and focus 
group data. The potential for improvement is examined in terms of clarity of 
argument, cohesive Brief preparation, attention to details, relevance of materials, 
providing a true and accurate account of victim and witness statements, and according 
value to the victim’s story. 
 
These are crucial elements of the police narrative that help define and determine in 
the written record available to defence lawyers how and why police have arrived at 
their decision to go forward. As or more significantly, these are crucial elements of 
rationales for not going forward that reside in the police account that does not receive 
public exposure. In both instances, but particularly the latter, these elements underpin 
and reveal in the written police narrative implicit strategies of managing displays of 
concern, specifying downstream possibilities of convictability and shifting paradigms 
(Frohmann, 1991, 1998). They also suggest needs for improved quality control 
systems, and for best practice front-line leadership styles rather than management-by-
exception (as described above). (In respect to front-line leadership, however, see 
section 8.3 for other possible explanatory factors of improvement potential needs). 
 
8.2.1 Developing and writing clear authorisation argument 
 
A significant area of potential improvement is in the provision of clearly enunciated, 
formally written authorisation argument. As noted in the preceding section and in 
Chapter Six on authorisation reasoning, there was a lack of any written discussion at 
all, leaving out of the record any clear decision-making process that could provide a 
window on just how and why it was decided to prosecute a case. For example in case 
32, the file indication for authorisation was limited to two brief notes: “Brief for 
checking (date) 2003” and “authorised (one month later) 2003.” In case 45, although 
the IO and RO penned formal memoranda those were brief and gave no substantive 
reasons, indicating only that the offences were self-explanatory. The AO only ticked 
the box on the Brief-head in agreement. The only written record of decision-making 
in case 35 was the informant’s hand-writing in the summary sheet: “authorise please, 
Detective Senior Sergeant issue process ASAP”. In case 55, although a five year 
record of intra-familial sexual abuse by a father with his daughter from age 13 to 18 
years, and showing a County Court conviction, reading of the three inch thick file 
revealed no indication of the authorisation decision-making process. 
 
Axiomatic progress of authorisation cases. Such instances reflect an assumption that 
the reasons the case is progressing are axiomatic within the file and thus highlight a 
casual or informal style of case record keeping (cf Frohmann, 1998); as well as a 
management-by-exception style of leadership on the part of frontline SOCIT ROs and 
AOs (cf Densten, 1999). As reported earlier (s. 7.1.2), both record keeping in relation 
to Briefs and supervision of Brief preparation were aspects raised by the OPP focus 
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group as well. (In relation to management-by-exception frontline leadership, see 
section 8.3 for other possible explanatory factors for this and other aspects of 
potential improvement mentioned in the following discussions). 
 
Audit trail benefits. A key objective of quality control measures should be to achieve 
formal written argument in all sexual assault cases, including those that are authorised 
and regardless of whether authorisation is ipso facto the result of arrest and charge, or 
intent to summons. Proactive leadership by ROs and AOs would greatly facilitate this 
objective. Taking this approach would help to provide an empirical audit trail of 
police decision-making for future scrutiny, allowing for greater insights for police 
themselves about police practice, and allowing police to address or rebut criticisms of 
how they arrive at decisions both for and against prosecution. It could be expected to 
produce better scrutiny of authorisation cases, earlier preparation, higher quality 
Briefs sent to the OPP, and strengthened prosecution at Court. 
 
Absence of quality monitoring. As discussed further below (ss. 8.3 and 8.4), the 
absence of quality monitoring was noted by RO interviewees as something that can 
happen because Briefs are expedited to the OPP due to heavy workloads and tight 
timelines. The OPP focus group clearly regarded this as a significant problem (s. 
7.1.2). The following discussion further supports an overall observation of needing to 
address leadership capabilities and quality monitoring/review procedures in relation to 
preparation of sexual assault Briefs with a view to ensuring that IOs do not fall into 
the strategy traps identified by Frohmann (1991, 1998) as discussed above. 
 
8.2.2 Achieving cohesion and unity in the police Brief: redressing 
fragmentation 
 
The case files thus also often reflected two kinds of fragmentation: where not all of 
the relevant police contributed to what written record there was of the decision 
reasoning; and where details relating to an offence were spread across several 
documents or in a general disorder of file documents. Fragmentation of this latter kind 
was additional to the aspect of missing or poorly completed documents discussed 
above (s. 8.1.2). 
 
Loss of quality review. In cases where not all of the relevant police provided a written 
input to the argument, there was the risk of inadequate quality review. For example, in 
case 12 the RO provided only a Brief-head support for non-authorisation without any 
stated reasons. Neither the RO nor AO presented reasons for non-authorisation in 
cases 36 and 54, again making only Brief-head tick-the-boxes. The RO in case 74 and 
the AO in cases 43, 71, 77, respectively ticked the box only. In case 63, the 
investigator’s reasons had to be inferred from hand-written notes, whilst the RO’s and 
AO’s support for non-authorisation were vague generalisations. These features of the 
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police written narrative illustrate a management-by-exception style rather than best 
practice transformational leadership behaviours canvassed in the literature (e.g., Bass, 
1985; Bass & Avolio, 1993; Fleming, 2001; Hunt, 1999; Mumford et al., 2000).  
 
Loss of information for quality review. Aside from the loss of relevant supervisory 
monitoring of case files, the quality of Brief preparation and decision-making can be 
impacted by important details being scattered across different file documents, thus 
resulting in information not being clearly and readily available for consideration by 
supervisors and managers. Fragmentation of details across different documents in the 
case file can be illustrated with reference to several cases. For example, in case three, 
there was a significant piece of information in the third victim’s statement that was 
not included in the police summary, viz: at one point she had gotten back into the 
driver’s seat and the accused had tried to push his way into the driver’s seat and her 
into the passenger’s seat. This information is compelling in terms of suggesting that 
the accused was seeking to force entry into the victim’s vehicle potentially signalling 
abduction, yet it was omitted from the Brief due to being part of a general 
fragmentation of items of information across several data sources in the case file. 
Thus the written record showed the whole of story evidence of the alleged offence 
was not written into the account that would be prominently seen by the IO’s 
supervisors, and the IO thus exercised power - consciously or through error - in the 
police decision-making process whilst not appearing to do so (Lukes, 2005). It is also 
reminiscent of what has been described in the literature as a strategy of withholding 
concern for the victim to achieve a desired decision (Frohmann, 1998), again whether 
or not that was intentional. 
 
Case 13 showed separate details of the alleged offence spread across the summary 
report, the Brief of evidence and the summary of charges, as well as the victim 
statement. The point here is that some of these details were located in some of these 
documents but not in others. Among other examples, the formal report did not contain 
reference to the victim’s claim that the alleged offender had placed his hand on her 
left thigh above the knee, although that item was mentioned in the summary of 
charges. So the RO and AO were not presented with a file that could be examined 
easily for the argument in support of non-authorisation. In case 15, despite a lengthy 
summary of offences and an obvious investigative commitment to prosecution, the 
Brief suffered a number of defects. Different details of the alleged offence were 
spread across the summary report, the charge and summons, and rough handwritten 
notes, as well as the victim’s statement. Untidiness of this sort promotes missing the 
best presentation of a victim’s complaint and again shows lack of concern 
(consciously or unconsciously) and lack of appropriate oversight reflective of 
management-by-exception leadership.  
 
Fragmentation was arguably a strong reason for the dismissal of charges in case 11, 
which involved an alleged sexual assault by a taxi driver on a passenger inside the 
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taxi. In this case there was a police prosecutor narrative in the form of a great deal of 
handwritten notes on statements regarding details to be probed (presumably at the 
Magistrates Court hearing). This scribbling was not clearly connected to other 
elements of the Brief, and it suggested poor preparation that could not auger well for a 
disciplined and focused case for the sexual assault victim. In this case, given the 
matter was presented for prosecution, it is quite possible that the poor preparation was 
due to work overload factors which are discussed below (s. 8.3). However, the police 
narrative subsequently justified the dismissal in terms of poor witnesses, problems 
with photographs inside the taxi and defence counsel confusion tactics. Yet the 
justification failed to adequately explain these difficulties, especially since evidence 
had been gathered showing the taxi driver turning off the surveillance camera 
moments before the alleged sexual assault. Best practice leadership would have 
conceded rather than concealed the problems in this case with a view to 
demonstrating a strong ethical commitment to learn from past errors to avoid future 
repetitions. 
 
Case 26 was presented in an especially confused file of many documents in no 
particular order and for two distinct purposes: first to cover the possibility of having 
to present a case to the Court, but second to cover the administrative requirements of 
not proceeding with a case. This case was notable for its lack of a clear investigator’s 
commentary. Notably also, this was the only case of the total 90 available for research 
where the police pursued prosecution against the victim’s wishes (see s. 6.2.2.3). The 
file included a memorandum that there was sufficient information to establish a crime, 
and another stating that the matter was to proceed unless the defendant provided a 
written undertaking not to seek a financial claim against Victoria Police if the charge 
was withdrawn. There was nothing on the file that indicated the intention of the 
defendant if the matter were to proceed. A reasonable interpretation is that this Brief 
was focused more on ensuring the accused did not seek financial recompense from the 
police than on encouraging the victim to pursue the matter. Leadership in this instance 
clearly did not reflect positive symbolism (Punch, 1994) or conspicuous ethics 
(Goldsmith, 2001, 2005), but rather emphasised needs of expediency for budget 
purposes.  
 
The foregoing illustrate two forms of fragmentation, first, how one or two of the 
investigating, recommending or authorising officers - especially one of the latter two 
– often did not contribute formally to the written decision-making record even where 
that was on file to some extent. Secondly, leaving offence details spread across 
documents in the case files - in both authorised and non-authorised prosecutions – 
promoted loss of data to argumentation. In this second regard, the disarray in files was 
not simply a matter of photocopying materials and hurriedly putting those together for 
the researchers. That is, the fragmentation referred to here was not just a matter of 
poor order of documents, although that was also very often problematic, and possibly 
due at least in part to the research request activity being an additional task for busy 
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police officers (see s. 8.1.1). Rather, as indicated in the above examples, the 
fragmentation identified here refers mainly to important items of information (e.g., 
pieces of evidence, elements of a crime) being dispersed across important documents 
in the file (the documents themselves being in disarray also, or not in disarray, 
depending on the file). For instance, an item might be mentioned in the Brief report 
but not in the summons, or in the charge but not in the summary; and one or more 
items might be missed from one or more relevant documents. 
 
Triangulated research evidence of fragmentation and its implications. Furthermore, 
this finding on fragmentation was supported by the OPP focus group whose members 
also remarked on both of these aspects (see s. 7.1.2): wondering whether sometimes 
senior police actually supervised Brief preparation – a leadership question - and 
referring to the need to clearly track evidence in what are often complex Brief 
documents. For example, as one OPP lawyer put it: “(police) need to set everything 
out from the outset as opposed to us getting the Brief and actually trying to locate 
things ourselves”. The IO focus groups also raised questions about variable 
supervision and quality review, noting that the particular preference or style of the 
Sergeant and/or Senior Sergeant impacted return of Briefs for further work. Such 
questions again suggest improvement potential in SOCIT front-line leadership. By 
giving examples of these sorts of fragmentation, a defined and comprehensive quality 
assurance system – reinforced through proactive, positive leadership rather than 
management-by-exception - can be expected to enhance the Brief authorisation 
process and achieve both additional authorisations and greater success at Court. 
 
Nature, mechanisms and decision-making impacts of fragmentation. The nature, 
mechanisms and decision-making impacts of fragmentation are exemplified and 
discussed more comprehensively in the following sub-sections. Taken altogether, 
these devices result in a tendency towards mono-directional argument and decisions 
that do not fully take account of the elements of a sexual assault allegation. Regarding 
authorisation decision-making the result can be unnecessary problems at court; whilst 
in respect to non-authorisation decision-making there is a risk of victim/survivors and 
complaints of sexual assault not receiving the consideration they deserve.  
 
8.2.3 Ensuring inclusion, consistency and agreement of details 
 
Essential elements in a comprehensive, robust argument are the inclusion of all details 
in a rigorously reviewed fashion, keeping these consistent and avoiding 
contradictions. The following examples demonstrate this did not always occur. 
 
Omission of important details. In case one, the interview transcript showed the 
accused wondered whether he was indeed a rapist, yet that important point was not 
mentioned in the formal non-authorisation argument and its inclusion could have been 
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expected to result in authorisation. Similarly, the investigator in case 43 failed to 
formally take account of the accused admitting: “I cannot justify or give a reason for 
it”. Again, in case 59, the accused denied that the victim had ever visited his house, 
and police found evidence that this was a lie. Yet, this information (which suggests 
credibility issues for the accused) was not raised in the formal police commentary. In 
case 72 the investigator failed to mention in the police rationale medical evidence of 
the victim having leg bruising and shoulder soreness.  
 
“Lack of corroborating evidence” was cited as one reason for not authorizing a 
prosecution in case 68, despite the victim’s neighbour finding her distressed outside 
her house and partly unclothed after the alleged assault, and had seen the taxi parked 
at her house. The neighbour’s evidence was omitted from the formal reasoning - 
although there was an oblique reference to ‘circumstantial evidence’ favouring the 
victim’s complaint. It was also noted that there was “bruising on the victim’s left 
upper arm and hip”. Yet police also made vain efforts to follow-up the victim’s initial 
unsigned, hand-written complaint, among other signs of police concern that there was 
indeed something amiss in relation to the accused taxi driver. In case 34, supportive 
statements by three witnesses were ignored in the decision not to proceed. 
 
Whilst prior convictions cannot be entered into Court deliberations of guilt, being 
restricted to sentence hearings, these are of some import to police decision-making as 
to whether a prosecution is worthwhile in the first instance. In case 57, the non-
authorisation argument took no account of the fact that the accused had seven pages 
of prior convictions, including “aggravated assault of a female’ and failed to 
acknowledge that it was only the offender’s claim that there had been prior sexual 
activity. Case 64 also saw a failure to make explicit in the rationale against 
authorisation the accused’s history of violent crimes that may well have served as a 
brake upon the victim’s active resistance to her victimization. The investigator also 
omitted from the formal request for non-authorisation the victim’s stated resistance to 
the accused’s attempts to put his penis into her mouth.  
 
Inconsistencies. Aside from omissions, case file documents contained inconsistencies 
such as in case one, where the accused was noted in Brief-head tick-the-boxes to be of 
good demeanour and cooperative, yet he was abusive and insulting. Case nine 
reflected no visible victim injuries in an incident report the day after the alleged 
offences, yet other documentation and the summary of evidence indicated a bite on 
the left side of her neck. In case 14 the AO noted one reason for not going to Court 
was the alleged victim’s failure to disclose “any sexual matters until a number of 
years later”, yet the report to police was made five days after the alleged offence. 
Case 49 was listed as historical with a report date two weeks after the event, yet 
police arrested the accused at the scene on the day of the alleged rape and the victim’s 
statement was initially taken the following day. One summary report in case 25 
indicated a somewhat bland incident where the victim was seated in a vehicle with a 
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male known to her when he forcefully tried to kiss her. Another case record summary 
report gave greater details suggesting a more aggressive attack upon the victim by the 
accused noting that he locked the car doors, she cried, he grabbed hold of her shirt 
and released the car seat lever making the seat fall backwards. In this second report 
the actual accused behaviour and indication of intent are somewhat more serious than 
suggested in the summary report.  
 
Contradictions. Clear contradictions in the police argument also appeared on 
occasion. In case 43, the investigator did “not believe that the victim is sufficiently 
disabled for her not to understand the nature of the acts performed”, yet also 
considered she would be a poor witness unable to “articulate what offences if any 
have been committed against her by the defendant if she was to give testimonial 
evidence before a court” on the basis of her level of cognitive impairment. 
Contradiction in case 60 took this form in the IO’s commentary: 
 
Prior to vaginal penile sex (the accused) has admitted that he forced his finger 
into the victim’s vagina while she was holding her legs closed. This in itself 




(The accused) admitted during the taped interview that he had been involved 
in intercourse with (the victim) but that it was consensual. It is therefore a 
matter of consent. 
 
Clearly in the first quotation there is an admission of digital-vaginal rape, which is 
followed by an acceptance of the accused’s claim of consensual intercourse. Although 
it might have been consensual vaginal intercourse subsequently – a moot matter under 
the circumstances - that would not have exonerated the accused on the count of digital 
rape. 
 
In case 22, the investigator indicated in the summary report that the victim was unable 
to consent because of her state of mind. Yet the SOCAU reporting member told the 
victim’s boyfriend who argued the case should go ahead that only she could make a 
decision to do so and to consent to medical examination.  
 
Another contradiction in police argument was apparent in comparing and contrasting 
the materials of cases 14 and 16. In case 14 police elected not to interview the accused 
on the grounds of her psychiatric condition supported by her treating psychiatrist’s 
opinion, yet the alleged victim was also a psychiatric patient in the same facility. By 
contrast, police in case 16 elected not to take the victim’s statement due to his 
intellectual impairment, yet the accused was also an intellectually impaired person in 
the same Art class. These cases raise a policy question of consistent standards 
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applicable in such instances of both accused and victims suffering like disabilities, or 
more generally how to approach situations involving complex issues of ‘mens rea’ or 
‘actus rea’. 
 
OPP focus group observations. The OPP focus group also mentioned some of these 
sorts of details difficulties, referring to ‘loopholes’ and ‘bits and pieces missing’ that 
defence lawyers can raise: for example, “it might be a date that's not reflective on the 
statement … just the simple things like the dates and times and places, etcetera.” 
Further, by the time the Brief reaches the OPP, “if there are huge discrepancies or 
things that need to be changed or followed up on, we really don't have the time to do 
that properly.” 
 
Such instances of omission, inconsistency and contradiction in the detail of the 
written record again very likely impact on the success of cases and/or charges laid and 
will likely be identified by the OPP or seized upon by defence lawyers to the 
detriment of victims as well as reflecting poorly on police practice and investigation. 
Moreover, these instances served to define the sexual assault complaint as not 
involving the necessary legal elements of a crime, thus not translating the 
complainant’s lived experience to one that would further trigger the criminal justice 
process. The complainant’s sexual assault experience was ‘lost’ in the paradigm shift 
of the victim’s narrative into the legal forms required for courts (Frohmann, 1998). 
 
Omissions, inconsistencies and contradictions are integral to the fragmentation of 
details and elements of an allegation of sexual assault and these contributed 
significantly to the general mono-directional nature of argumentation and decision-
making that characterised the case file documents relating to Brief preparation. 
 
8.2.4 Ensuring relevance of argumentation materials 
 
Extraneous inclusions also crept into police argument in the case files, similarly 
obfuscating the paradigm shift of legal re-interpretation. For instance, in case 57, it 
was an irrelevant fact that the “victim has never made any secret of the fact … that 
she likes (the accused)”, an observation by the investigator as part of the reasoning 
against authorisation. In case one, there was mention in non-authorisation discussion 
of the complainant having instigated the meeting with the accused and her long-term 
relationship with him. There was no evidence in case two of the victim’s prior anal 
sex in the case file, which was cited as a non-authorisation reason and which was 
irrelevant to whether she had been anally raped as alleged anyway. The IO and RO in 
case 43 listed as a reason against authorisation that the victim had sex with another 
male (not at the same time as the accused). Among the reasons the IO gave for 
requesting non-authorisation in case 75 was that the victim and accused knew each 
other and “no breach of the peace” occurred. In case 33, the RO observed: “in fact the 
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kissing has been occurring in front of the child’s mother without the defendant even 
being rebuked”. This comment was made in the context of a series of allegations of 
intra-familial sexual abuse of the daughter as part of the decision-making that saw the 
case not taken to Court. 
 
Again, one OPP lawyer remarked: 
 
(Y)ou can really examine the Brief the first time you get it if everything is in 
order and everything is – all the relevant information is there.  Whereas sort 
of you go through a Brief and you think, “Well, that's missing and that's not 
right, and I have to chase that up."   
 
Instances of irrelevancies and everything not ‘being in order or right’ muddy the 
translation of the victim’s complaint into legalese. Best practice frontline leadership 
oversight - given appropriate resourcing and support from higher echelon leadership - 
would minimise or eliminate such strategy errors. 
 
8.2.5 Authenticating the victim’s story: the problem of re-framing    
 
In the examined VicPol case files formal accounts also included re-framing victim 
and witness statements to reflect a typically uni-focal argument for non-authorisation, 
which often involved omissions or inconsistencies. The result was to question aspects 
of the victim’s story given in her/his statement, thereby casting doubt on either the 
victim’s credibility or the strength of the case to proceed further. These 
inconsistencies created a shift in the victim’s storying of their victimisation and were 
oversighted by more senior officers, vested with the authority and leadership to ensure 
sound, quality Briefs.  
 
For example, in case two the investigator’s account represented the mother as 
contradicting her daughter (the victim), yet no such contradiction was evident in the 
mother’s statement. The mother clearly admitted that she was angry because the 
accused was married and she never gave her daughter a chance to say anything when 
her daughter telephoned her in the evening to talk about the alleged offence during the 
day. Further, reported inconsistencies in the victim’s statement were not found there, 
yet those inconsistencies were said to “make prosecution extremely difficult”, 
reflecting Frohmann’s (1991, 1998) strategy focus on ‘specifying downstream 
possibilities’ of convictability to the detriment of the victim’s story. A similar 
example was found in case 59, where the investigator observed that other witnesses 
gave versions inconsistent with the victim regarding alleged injuries, concluding that 
the victim would not present as a credible witness. Yet this refers to the victim’s 
teenage son saying her neck injuries were love bites, whereas a friend of the victim 
confirmed to police that they were more than that (i.e., proper bites). Again in case 
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77, the victim said she told her 13 year old son that the accused had tried to force her 
to have sex. The investigator reported the victim’s son as simply saying that his 
mother had said the accused had grabbed her, whereas the son’s statement clearly 
indicated ‘adult stuff’. The son’s statement was re-interpreted by the investigator to 
suggest generalised ‘grabbing’ rather than an actual sexual assault. In case 56, one 
reason for not prosecuting the matter was that the victim “wilfully engaged in sexual 
activity”. Yet this reason ignored the victim’s expressed fear of the accused as the 
cause of her cooperation, thus reframing her view and participation, and helping to 
define the events as not constituting an offence. The term ‘wilfully’ suggests a 
judgement of blame on the victim’s part. 
 
Similarly, in case 35 the investigator’s account made a subtle yet significant alteration 
compared to the victim’s statement, stating: 
 
the defendant has walked at a fast pace past the victim indecently assaulting 
her by placing his hand on her right breast and left buttock squeezing it.  
 
This description of the assault did not reflect the victim’s testimony that the suspect 
not only grabbed her in this way (with both hands, not one hand), but thereby 
attempted to physically pull her backwards toward the ground (potentially on her 
back). The victim’s statement did not indicate the offence took place so fleetingly and 
it suggested a more serious intent than indicated by the investigator. 
 
Re-framing was exemplified also in case 31, where the IO referred to inconsistencies 
but failed to clearly delineate them, and they were not apparent in the file. The IO also 
failed to mention that aside from some witnesses not clearly supporting the victim’s 
story, other witness testimonies were indeed supportive. Further, the IO’s 
memorandum report noted that the victim did not try to escape, yet the victim’s 
statement clearly included a claim that she tried initially to escape but was subdued by 
her attacker. In case 38, the mother’s account was re-framed as one of ignoring her 
daughter’s disclosure, when she actually took a number of steps against the accused, 
including threatening to “put a knife through his guts if he did it (masturbation) again 
in front of my daughter”. This sort of corroborative evidence - if not re-framed - 
would have been crucial to the development of a pattern of sexual misconduct that 
included in this case alleged indecent assault of a then 16 year old girl. 
 
In the foregoing instances, the legal paradigm shift was biased against taking the 
matter forward. As a result the complainant’s story was not authenticated in terms of 
the lived experience of sexual assault nor in terms of a faithful translation of its ‘truth 
claim’ into the legal language acceptable by courts. Re-framing subverted both the 
victims’ narratives and the rules that apply to criminal justice narration, including the 
policy and procedural criteria of VicPol’s Codes. 
 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 256 
The IO’s ability to set the agenda. The problem of re-framing was also 
acknowledged in interviews. As one AO put it: “Well in a sense you have a look, you 
can only go on what’s on the Brief of evidence”. That is, ROs and AOs depend on IOs 
providing full and accurate details – there are limits to their capacity to manage Brief 
preparation because IOs can omit or re-frame evidence. It is the IO who goes into the 
field, collects evidence and writes the Brief. The Brief is the equivalent of an agenda 
for decision-making and it is a primary vehicle used by ROs and AOs to recommend 
and decide for or against authorisation. Again, the words of the AO are enlightening 
in speaking about a first complaint: “Sometimes it gets missed yeah … Or, or gets 
misdiagnosed perhaps”. If the IO ‘misdiagnoses’ or omits a piece of evidence, then it 
is not fully and accurately interpreted in its true evidentiary value. In this respect, the 
IO plays a powerful role in setting the initial agenda for decision-making and thus 
controlling what is seen by the RO/AO (Lukes, 2005). The IO is the prime gate-
keeper who gives initial effect to the paradigm shift from the complainant’s lived 
experience to a legal story of ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’. Re-framing in these ways also 
operates as a fragmentation device that contributes to mono-directional argument and 
decision-making. This circumstance reflects a capability gap that is not addressed due 
at least partly to a management-by-exception style rather than best practice leadership 
on the part of some ROs and AOs in quality review. However, the IO was not the only 
gate-keeper whose input in non-authorisation was decisive in this biased, uni-focal 
fashion, as illustrated in the following section.  
 
8.2.6 Valuing the victim’s story 
 
Closely related to ensuring the victim’s authentic story is understood and told in 
police Briefs there is a need to appreciate that story from the victim’s viewpoint, and 
to find and state all the reasons for taking forward a case. However, as already 
evidenced in many of the foregoing examples, there were instances of imbalance in 
argument, with reasons for prosecution ignored or de-emphasised in favour of reasons 
against prosecution, resulting in tendencies to devalue the victim’s viewpoint. In the 
following discussion largely additional examples from the case files are used to 
highlight a tendency to uni-focal, non-authorisation argument that devalued the 
victim’s story. Many of these examples also reflect a variety of often small ways in 
which fragmentation contributes to skewing the decision-making process towards 
non-authorisation. Once again, these examples collectively suggest the employment 
of what Frohmann (1991, 1998) calls strategies of ‘manipulating displays of concern’, 
‘paradigm shifting’ and ‘specifying downstream possibilities of convictability’, as 
well as of the leadership literature defines as management-by-exception rather than 
best practice front-line leadership styles (see the literature reviewed at the start of this 
chapter). 
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In case 54, for example, the IO noted three reasons against proceeding as strong 
denials by the accused, lack of independent witnesses, and the victim’s withdrawal of 
her complaint. (Note that there was no reason stated on file for her decision to 
withdraw her complaint). Yet there were two cogent reasons also stated for why the 
prosecution should proceed. The IO found the victim to be credible and believed the 
rape had occurred. Furthermore, the accused had a past allegation of a similar nature 
and modus operandi. The latter, although mentioned by the IO, received no 
accounting by either the RO or AO in the decision not to proceed, which was made in 
Brief-head tick-the-boxes without stated reasons. Notably, the IO requested that the 
case be filed in the serious crime cabinet, reinforcing a view that a crime was 
committed by the alleged offender. In Frohmann’s (1991, 1998) terms, this case 
suggests the RO and AO withheld a display of concern for the victim due to 
considering the downstream possibility of conviction being low. This ‘withholding of 
concern’ does not mean that police in this case (or others cited here) were deliberately 
unconcerned with a victim’s story, but rather that from a victim’s viewpoint concern 
was not actively or adequately displayed to a point that valued the victim’s story.  
 
In case 13, the AO’s written record ignored several points for and noted seven against 
authorisation, despite a balance of argument from the IO and RO. Again, in case 88, 
the non-authorisation decision was despite an eye-witness to the alleged indecent 
assault of the victim who was an elderly resident of a nursing home. This decision 
was apparently taken in the light of the victim’s daughter (as the holder of her 
mother’s power of attorney) withdrawing the complaint. The decision not to proceed 
was also against the obvious wish of the IO in this case and no explanation was 
recorded by the RO or AO. 
 
In case 33, there were four witnesses available for the prosecution argument as well as 
computer forensic evidence of telephone records of disclosure by the victim to a 
friend about her grand-father’s incestuous conduct. Yet this case was not prosecuted 
because, the file record indicated, the victim’s VATE statement did not clearly 
disclose a crime, witness statements alleged offences not disclosed in the VATE 
statement, the accused made no admissions, and the mother failed to rebuke the 
accused for kissing the grand-daughter. Aside from not valuing the reasons for 
prosecution, these negating reasons strongly suggest a lack of concern for the victim’s 
disadvantage on both counts of the grand-father being a patriarchal authority figure as 
well as her own impairment which essentially made her a vulnerable victim and 
witness.  
 
The IO in case 59 observed that the victim remained in the situation, even dressing 
and going to work the following morning. These observations devalued her clearly 
stated fear of the alleged offender, who had reportedly stalked, brutalized and raped 
her over a period of months. There was also no allowance for other possible 
motivations in remaining in the situation, such as not having a compassionate 
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employer and needing every day’s pay, among many other reasons why she might do 
so. Again, in this case the IO’s written record demonstrates a lack of understanding 
regarding the post sexual assault behaviour of victims or indeed seeking to understand 
from the victim’s perspective, why she behaved as she did in this situation. Again, in 
Frohmann’s (1991, 1998) terms, this translates to withholding of a display of concern 
for the victim in contrast to actively seeking to understand and support her story.  
 
Devaluation of the victim’s story also emerged in case 67, where the RO commented: 
 
The victim didn’t report the matter but it was reported by her daughter which, 
although the victim was cooperative, it may be she just didn’t like what the 
accused had done. 
 
Although it is slightly vague as to which woman “didn’t like” the alleged offending 
behaviour, the point here is that the RO devalued the victim’s situation by not giving 
due consideration to her vulnerability as a 57 year old resident of the same supported 
living community as the accused who, on the face of the complaint, had forced his 
way into her home attempting to kiss her and grope her breast. The victim stated to 
police that, as a result, she no longer felt able to go outside her house and had taken to 
always shutting the curtains. Further, the wording “it may be she just didn’t like what 
the accused had done” is a surprising comment here given that the alleged behaviour 
if proven constitutes an assault in current Victorian law. That wording alone suggests 
a ‘withholding of concern’ in this case. Notably, moreover, there was a RO file 
observation: “In future if there presents any doubt as to the need of an interpreter 
please obtain services of same.”  The IO also wrote that “her vagueness about certain 
aspects of what happened may harm her credibility in a court proceeding”, which 
suggests taking account of ‘downstream possibility of conviction’ being low. Non-
authorisation was nevertheless the decision, again reflecting a lack of understanding 
about the psychological impact of sexual assault and victim behaviour post assault, 
involving a victim with a significant degree of vulnerability.  
 
Balanced argument was found to be present only in the non-authorisation requests of 
cases 13, 54, 60 and 89, and even then not from all police parties, as detailed in 
previous discussion (s. 6.2.2.3). The just cited case examples do not exhaust case file 
data found in relation to de-valuing the victim’s story in seeking or deciding non-
authorisation. Like the instances cited of re-framing, this data also reflected a 
paradigm shifting inclination to uni-focal non-authorisation argument that was often 
evident in IOs’ formal reports and at times in the formal contributions by ROs and 
AOs. 
 
As with authentication, valuing the victim’s story requires proactive leadership from 
ROs and AOs, with daily demonstration of the ethics that are so strongly embedded in 
VicPol’s Codes, so that investigators - as well as some ROs and AOs – become 
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routinely attuned to first and foremost looking for all of the reasons for progressing 
sexual assault complaints, rather than engaging in their de-valuation and/or finding 
reasons that are believed to make progression difficult. Only then will it be possible to 
rectify mono-directional, non-authorisation argument. 
 
  
Aside from the foregoing analysis and discussion, however, part of the explanation 
for the strong trend to mono-directional argument against authorisation can be 
ascribed to the field conditions of investigating and preparing Briefs on sexual assault 
complaints to which discussion now turns. 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to developing a set of 
quality assurance criteria to be administered by ROs and AOs in reviewing Briefs. 
These criteria can be informed by although not limited to the foregoing elements of 
argumentation. 
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8.3 Improving field conditions 
 
Investigators in the focus groups cited a range of difficulties in the field that often 
constrained preparation of high quality Briefs for adult sexual assault allegations in 
particular (see also s. 4.6 that reflects a continuing view in these respects). 
 
Insufficient time, resources and training. There is never enough time: this was seen 
as the main stressor. Insufficient vehicles and investigator numbers were mentioned 
as severe constraints, as well as being suddenly called for another ‘decent job’ to help 
the rostered crew (cf, HMIC report, 2008). Forensic, DNA procedures and courts are 
all backlogged and country investigators said they sometimes give up calling for 
Crime Scene Services. Even the administrative tasks are very time-consuming (eg 
photocopying, updating Interpose). Interpose was described as extremely time-
consuming, with additional recent requirements around creating events for every 
different aspect of an investigation (each victim, witness, crime scene) and then tasks 
(things to do) for every event. There is a need to do an Interpose course but no time to 
do it anyway and many police interviewed across the project were frustrated by lack 
of training opportunities and the inadequacy of the training that was offered. Interpose 
is not updated regularly or completely, due to inadequate training and 
computer/progamme skills, as well as other job demands, adding another pressure on 
the investigators. Unmet training needs of specialist sexual assault police, including 
ROs and AOs as well as investigators, can be a significant underpinning of the above 
discussed areas of improvement potential in both documentation and argumentation. 
Notably, training needs of specialist police were also identified by victim/survivors, 
CASA counsellors and police interviewees in the strand one research (ss. 3.5; 5.2, 5.5 
and 5.6; and 4.6.1 respectively). 
 
Examples of Investigators’ own words help understanding the challenges. 
 
I’ve got a case at the moment where I have CCTV footage from lots of 
different locations and so that’s with our forensics department and they’re 
putting that all together on one disc to make it easier to view it and in 
sequence, and it’s been with them for two months, and I spoke to them 
yesterday and they haven’t even touched the file yet, and I’ve got the OPP 
saying that it needs to be served within 28 days and I’ve now got two weeks, 
and they’ve just said that there’s no way that they’ll be able to get that done 
within those timeframes (Investigator). 
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I just had a Brief that I served recently and it hadn’t been complete at that 
point in time but it had to be served, and there were outstanding statements 
and reports.  DNA reports needed to come back. And I didn’t feel quite 
comfortable kind of serving that because I knew that it wasn’t really as high 
quality as what it should have been, and I’ve had to keep going back and 
serving additional paperwork. You know, the page numbers are all out of 
whack now and it’s just got really messy (Investigator). 
 
I know it’s only minor, but even just the – what you have to do to put up a 
hand-up.  I mean, you’ve got to have four copies and then go to a 
photocopier and copy them all these times, paginate it. Every time I do it I 
think there’s got to be a better way than this.  The amount of time – you 
almost have to set an afternoon shift aside to go into a room by yourself 
(Investigator). 
 
So that’s very difficult for me – very large – getting my head around these 
Briefs: very thick, involved investigations. And it’s very – and we’re very 
short on the floor at the moment, very low on staff. So the workload is just … 
you’re just snowed under (Investigator). 
 
Facilities. Facilities were also mentioned as an obstacle to appropriate and effective 
policing of sexual assault complaints, especially in respect to the special needs that 
have to be addressed concerning statements from victims and witnesses. The 
following example was given about a SOCIT office that was supposedly designed to 
be victim focused and victim friendly: 
 
the interview room is next to the street so you can hear street noises when 
you're recording and when a victim comes in they have to walk past the 
interview room so there's not privacy for any victims.  It's all open space so 
you're speaking to a victim with just a 3x3 board separating you and the next 
open desk area so everyone can hear and see the victim and...they’re telling 
you things and you can see they are worried about talking to you or 
frightened or whatever or unsure and the whole bloody office can hear it and 
at the next desk they’re taking phone calls and walking in and out and....I just 
don’t think it creates the environment victims deserve and we deserve as 
police to work in (AO).  
 
Overwhelming workloads, frustration, fatalism and morale. While recently 
transitioned, inexperienced investigators were said to be the most pressured, all the 
investigators agreed that sexual assault investigations and Brief preparations are 
extremely demanding and they constantly feel ‘under the pump’. The problems of 
time and backlogs were indicated as widespread and endemic. Commentaries 
reflected a common feeling of being overwhelmed by the workload in terms of 
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quantity and complexity of the cases, learning how to do the Briefs and doing a 
quality job, along with administrative requirements (paperwork/Interpose/LEAP), 
while being inadequately trained, short-staffed and under-resourced, with Command 
not appreciating the difficulties and demands of sexual assault investigations and 
Brief preparations. There was a dominant expression of fatalism mixed with 
frustration, which does not augur well for morale. “More people is (sic!) the only 
solution. It’s state wide. More people. It’s flogging a dead horse, but that’s the only 
way” (Investigator). Police from strand one interviews in 2010 also talked about the 
excessive work load and being overwhelmed and for some issues of workload and job 
pressures led to using the options talk to basically screen out cases police determined 
as weak (see s. 4.5). 
 
A similar refrain of deep frustration and feeling unsupported by Command was 
expressed by ROs (and police from 2010 strand one interviews as reported in s. 
4.6.1). They commonly cited the problem of resources and vehicles, including 
insufficient numbers of investigators. One recounted a time of being left alone on the 
roadside without a car with all the exhibits due to a higher priority call for a child 
assault. They also cited Court timeframes, forensics delays, working very long hours 
(sometimes more than 14 hours a day according to one RO), Interpose, and time-
consuming statement taking. One RO said that sometimes heavy workloads and tight 
timelines result in a Brief going directly to the OPP without first being reviewed by 
senior police officers. ROs also expressed fears for even worse officer workloads now 
the SOCIT ‘piloting’ is over. On the question of costs as a constraint, there was 
divided opinion among ROs and AOs, some saying it is not a factor and others saying 
it is a clear determinant. 
  
Priority of child assaults (non-sexual). Also of particular note was the point made by 
one RO concerning child assaults (not sexual) which take precedence over adult 
sexual assaults, and they “cover a huge area with probably thousands of schools”.  
 
Again, the viewpoint of ROs and AOs can be illustrated in their own words, closely 
matching that of investigators. 
 
You have always not enough members to do the job. That’s a simple fact of 
life. You just can’t allocate all the time you need properly to do the job. I 
mean we don’t have - we’ve got two cars between 18 people (RO). 
 
No. No we’re never properly resourced. That, that’s the problem (AO). 
 
If you get that one child assault, that can be your day gone. The whole day 
for the two of you. And you’re the only crew on, so if another (adult sexual) 
assault comes in, it sits until tomorrow (RO who is also constrained to 
undertake investigations). 




I’d hate to see the pressure taken off us so much the justice slows right down 
… I do like to see these things brought before the court quickly (RO). 
 
If we get a victim, we’ve got to normally take that victim to hospital for a 
forensic medical. Now, that - that is normally at least one member who’s got 
to go with that person and normally there’s one car.  It’s all very well to say, 
well, you drive them and leave them there and all that but the reality is, for 
you to do it properly, you take that person to hospital. You stay with that 
person which means you normally need a car. Well, that leaves you with one 
car for every other job and every other court case and every other inquiry a 
statement has got to be taken … for everything else and it can’t work (RO). 
 
Forensic evidence and our services are just taking far too long” (DNA, blood, 
sperms) (RO city). 
 
Forensic exhibits examined in a timely manner that don’t push out 
investigation lines which they always do (RO rural). 
 
Even when, when Briefs are submitted you know, there are dates that you 
have to remember over the last fifty years (AO referring to the complexity of 
legislative changes). 
   
These (victim) statements can go for five, six, seven pages which means it 
can be about three hours. Now, distance is a huge issue.  Police stations are a 
huge issue because nothing electronically works outside big, big areas (RO in 
rural area). 
 
Rural locales. This last quotation highlights a problem that is particularly severe in 
rural areas, where there are so many ‘black spots’, they have to take witnesses back to 
a police station hours away to access PCs, print off the statements and have them 
signed. Other difficulties for police in rural areas were canvassed earlier in this report 
(ss. 4.2 and 4.6), many of which are not readily susceptible to resolution aside from 
recognition and support from Command, including visits from senior officers 
expressly to state and show that support. Notably, although those rural difficulties 
apply for all serving officers they are accentuated in relation to SOCIT members due 
to the especial demands and complexities that generally characterise sexual assault as 
described in detail shortly.  
 
The Ombudsman (2006, p. 34) noted difficulties in relation to rural areas of evidence 
gathering, availability of female medical officers, and victims undergoing a medical 
examination within 72 hours of the assault. Police interview and focus group data 
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clearly showed these to be continuing problems and in both rural and city areas, albeit 
more pronounced in regional areas. 
 
Lack of resources/facilities and high workloads were commonly agreed by IOs, ROs 
and AOs - as well as strand one police interviewees (see ss. 4.5 and 4.6) - to impact 
negatively on the level of service provision, a refrain reminiscent of experience in 
other jurisdictions, for example the SOIT approach by London Metropolitan Police 
(Jamel et al., 2008) and in Western Australia (CDJSC, 2008). 
 
Unique demands of sexual assault policing. Additionally, IOs, ROs and AOs all 
spoke of the unique demands of sexual assault policing comparative to most other 
crimes. There is a definitive emotional component in terms of the crime being 
especially intimate and personal to the victim, with a stigma that very often attaches 
or is seen to attach to both victim and offender. This stigmatization effect concerning 
both victims and offenders was noted by the VLRC (2004) as well. Again, strand one 
police interviews in 2010 similarly recognised stigma and shame for victims to be 
significant issues (see Chapter Four). Partly as a result of the intimacy of the crime 
and partly due to the need for particularisation, victim and witness statements can take 
many hours to complete and often require a victim to have a break, sometimes even of 
some days or weeks. They need time to feel emotionally stable enough, to gain 
confidence in being able to tell their story to a stranger and to collect their thoughts 
before returning to complete statements. Such statements can also particularly strain 
investigators in similar ways, including in being able to remain emotionally in tune 
with victims to facilitate their telling and yet sufficiently objective to ensure legal 
evidentiary requirements are met in statement taking. There is also a need on 
occasions to take second and third statements due for example to new evidence found 
at a crime scene. The need to often interview victims several times has been noted in 
the research literature (e.g., Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Lord & Rassel, 2000).  
 
Here are more examples of officers’ own words describing the uniqueness of this 
form of policing:  
 
A monetary value can be put on property crime, but not on the emotional 
trauma of a sexual assault victim (IO). 
 
It is much more personal. It is more difficult for the victim than having 
something stolen from them (IO). 
 
Sexual assault victims are vulnerable, often self-blaming. “why didn’t I do 
xyz?  Why didn’t I stop this? I shouldn’t have drank (sic) so much …” (RO). 
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It’s more so with sexual offences because it can cover a long period of time.  
Like an armed robbery will be over within 10, 15 minutes. Because your 
victim’s gone to the party at 6 o’clock at night sober as a judge and she’s 
interacted with so many people, got a little bit pissed and got a bit more 
drunk and she catches the cab home to this guy’s house and this guy’s 
actually friends with so-and-so and then she wakes up in the morning, Joe 
Bloggs is beside her.  He’s got his pants off.  My pants are off. So you’re 
talking like a 12 hour period and you’ve got to cover all that (RO). 
 
They mean a lot, I suppose, to the victim. And to the offender, who has 
obviously been accused. It’s not – you know, without downgrading any 
crime, you know, house burglary – okay, it’s important to the victim, but it’s 
probably not, you know, as you know, sexual offences are quite a heinous 
crime. And I suppose, similar to a serious assault. And you go, probably, not 
much less than a murder. Again, without downgrading murder, you haven’t 
got a – we haven’t got a victim. You know. So you’re not justifying 
everything to the victim. Whereas a sexual assault, you’ve really got to be 
careful about how you do it, and make sure that you’ve done it the right way. 
I find there’s a lot of pressure in relation to authorisation and non-
authorisation, basically for that reason. Because you’ve got a victim. And 
you do have to justify it to the victim. (AO, explaining a core difficulty in 
making non-authorisation decisions and his need to take time in doing so). 
 
A habit we have in this office is, when you’re taking a statement, bring it up 
with someone else to double check and to read, so that just gives you – 
because if you’re in a room with someone for six hours where they’re telling 
their whole life story you do become focused on that and that person and 
(you can) lose some objectivity. So, you have to come back to the objectivity 
outside and say, “Okay. What are the legal implications here?” or “What else 
do we need legally?” (AO). 
 
Coping mechanisms. How do police cope under the pressures illustrated in these 
quotations? It was strongly agreed across interviewees and focus groups that support 
and guidance within SOCIT is very good, on a team basis, with investigators, ROs 
and AOs in each unit supporting each other, and usually with strong support and 
guidance from other unit ROs and AOs. 
 
The role of Command. There was also a strong consensus that Command and other 
VicPol units neither understand SOCIT work nor provide genuine and adequate 
support to the SOCITs. In this regard, it is apparent from the strong thematic 
emphasis of the foregoing interview and focus group commentaries that VicPol’s 
senior and executive groups also need to examine their leadership styles and 
credentials in relation to demonstrating robust, continuing and tangible resource 
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support for SOCITs in their work. This means positive symbolic and conspicuously 
ethical leadership (Goldsmith, 2001, 2005; Murray, 2002; Punch, 1994) needs not 
only to be the subject of rhetoric but also exemplified in real and concrete terms by 
upper echelon management as well as and as a foundation for that of front-line 
SOCIT supervisors and managers. As the HMIC report (2008) found, high quality 
front-line leadership and supervision requires: 
 
tangible presence of support mechanisms at the service delivery level. These 
support mechanisms range from the organisational and managerial to the 
moral and emotional. All of these mechanisms need to be underpinned by 
adequate infrastructure in terms of the provision of sufficient equipment and 
people to enable effective delivery (p. 8). 
 
 
8.4 Improving quality control systems 
 
From the foregoing it is also apparent that quality control of police decision-making is 
subject to areas of improvement, including the preparation of formal reports in 
relation to authorisation as well as non-authorisation. Further, the absence of tightly 
defined and implemented quality control in visible terms was often apparent even in 
the written record that was actually on case files. The RO/AO interviewees also 
testified that although quality control measures are already in place and functioning 
they do not always work as well should be hoped. The OPP focus group also 
exemplified quality control problems in Briefs reaching the SSOU. Some of the 
explanation for quality control dysfunctioning is clearly resource-related in relation to 
the demands of sexual assault policing and tight timelines, as well as transition 
teething of inexperienced police, especially investigators but also ROs/AOs. 
 
Local cultures and leadership. However, that is not the whole explanation. ROs/AOs 
also indicated that there is a real reluctance to interfere with the decision-making of 
other ROs/AOs, for example when relieving an officer on sick or recreation leave, 
even when that was necessary to ensure a quality investigation and Brief preparation. 
ROs/AOs said there is a cultural expectation that each SOCIT OIC or RO is left to 
his/her own bailiwick so to speak. If a relieving RO/AO queries another’s decision-
making or directions to an investigator, it brings the response in one AO’s words:  
“Well, he doesn’t know what he’s on about, so don’t tell us how to suck eggs at our 
unit”. This AO offered two suggestions for improving current quality monitoring 
arrangements. A review process could involve OPP feedback to the informant and the 
RECOMMENDATION: Serious and urgent consideration should be given to 
enhancing the resource allocations for SOCITs. 
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AO, and/or non-authorised Briefs could be sent off for review to another region. Still, 
he paused: “I’m worried about how effective a review process on non-auths 
[authorisation] would really, really be”. Case study two drawn from strand one 
research illustrates how such local cultures can result in unnecessary lack of crime 
intelligence, and subsequently untoward outcomes for victims, local SOCIT units and 
Victoria Police generally (s. 4.5.2). 
 
The value of team leadership. This is a problem of team leadership being recognised 
as not only valid but necessary to the smooth functioning of a contemporary mega-
organisation such as Victoria Police. Unless it is culturally accepted that any relieving 
RO/AO has the authority to require compliance, there will remain an unacceptable 
hiatus in the framework of SOCIT functioning and accountability. In consequence, it 
may well result in SOCITs that are adrift on their own sea of parochial decision-
making in relation to adult sexual assault, a circumstance that will inevitably produce 
problems internally and in the legal domain. This is an issue that must be addressed 
by VicPol’s corporate management in terms of the best practice leadership discussed 
earlier. 
 
Another AO recounted a case where he became aware that a SOCIT had not 
appropriately investigated a sexual assault complaint and he took it upon himself to 
make further inquiries. After obtaining admissions from the accused he placed the 
matter before the responsible SOCIT AO who initially resisted follow-up but whose 
investigators then interviewed the young cognitively impaired victim concerned. 
However, they returned to say the victim would not cooperate, whereupon the 
initiating AO then saw the mother who told how her son was frightened that he was in 
trouble due to the aggressive questioning by the investigators and that is why he did 
not cooperate. The responsible AO nevertheless refused to follow-up further. This 
kind of instance reflects the earlier evidenced comments by ROs/AOs (s. 7.4) that 
some investigators and ROs – in this case apparently the responsible AO as well – do 
not have the aptitude and personal commitment required in sexual assault policing. 
This episode suggests a problem of leadership at some SOCITs where conspicuously 
ethical leadership is lacking. 
 
Culture of under-reporting. Another AO spoke of a ‘culture of under-reporting’ and 
‘probably pissing jobs off at the front end’ in one location with which he was familiar. 
This was said to be not so much a matter of discouraging complainants from reporting 
as not encouraging them, with a “level of indifference to their report”, a subtle form 
of the strategy of displaying or not displaying concern (Frohmann, 1998). He linked 
this to a ‘rationing’ of time by police in view of heavy workloads – see also sections 
4.5 and 8.3 - and attending to complaints that had the greatest perceived likelihood of 
‘positive outcomes’, again reminiscent of Frohmann’s (1991, 1998) strategic 
specifying downstream possibilities of convictability. This AO went on to point out 
that any review of decision-making “really should ensure that the case file is 
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reviewed, along with the Brief, because as I said, the Brief is a selective collection of 
the material from the case file”. As discussed earlier, the IO is the primary gate-
keeper who goes into the field and collects evidence, then translates the victim’s story 
into legalese not always to the victim’s benefit as argued by Frohmann (1991, 1998).  
 
Geographic and policy factors. The following comment from an AO points to yet 
another difficulty in quality monitoring that is due not to personal indispositions, but 
to geographic and policy factors. 
 
The other thing is there are some areas where these units will, because of 
their isolation or whatever, will report to people who, by policy, can 
authorise these Briefs, but won’t necessarily have the background or 
knowledge that some of the people that are putting the Briefs together will … 
there needs to be some real policy change, because the policy is 
determinative on rank and position, as opposed to being qualified at courses, 
or having the relative experience to do it. 
 
Once again, aside from training implications, there is a challenge of best practice 
corporate leadership intimated in these words. 
 
Variability among SOCITs. Such instances also point to variability among SOCITs in 
appropriately and effectively responding to sexual assault claims, a matter that was 
evidenced in strand one findings as noted previously (s. 4.6.1). On occasion this kind 
of variability has led to situations resulting in tensions and disagreements that 
highlight heterogeneity across SOCITs in terms of best practice principles and expert 
knowledge around sexual victimization and victim response.  
 
Reflections in other jurisdictions. Nor are these occurrences peculiar to Victoria. 
Such variability has been found in other jurisdictions, for example: “Since police 
force area was found to be a significant predictor of victim withdrawal, the 
implication is that some forces are more successful than others at reducing the 
likelihood of a victim withdrawing, once controlling for other factors” (Feist et al., 
2007, p. iv). As with other contemporary complex mega-organisations (e.g., Dunford, 
1992; Robbins & Barnwell, 2002), police culture has been argued to be diverse rather 
than monolithic, such that units develop subcultures that do not necessarily support 
the core values and beliefs of the dominant culture and organisational vision (e.g., 
Chan, 1996, 1999; Narayanan, 2005; Paoline, 2003;Prenzler, 1997). In respect to 
Victoria Police, this illustrates a pressing need for corporate management to do more 
than rely on the rhetoric and structural reforms embodied in the SOCIT arrangements, 
and to show a willingness to lead by establishing a quality review and control process 
that addresses local SOCIT culture and the human side of the equation of adult sexual 
assault policing. Thus, Victoria Police has an opportunity to provide leadership in 
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these as well as other regards in the difficult and demanding area of responding to 
sexual assault complaints. 
 
 
8.5 Summary and recommendations  
 
Continuous improvement is widely recognized in contemporary management practice 
as essential to the success of modern complex organisations in meeting the needs and 
objectives of their key stakeholders. In the present context, VicPol’s key stakeholders 
include victims of sexual assault, interest groups such as CASA, the OPP, the 
judiciary, the criminological research fraternity and the wider public. To meet the 
needs of its stakeholders, VicPol as a Learning Organisation must continue taking 
steps to make the sorts of improvement indicated from analysis of data from the case 
files, the interviews and focus groups presented in the foregoing discussion. By doing 
so, VicPol can show it is an enabling rather than a coercive organisation in relation to 
sexual assault victims and their complaints (Adler & Borys, 1996). The aim should be 
to prevent this sort of comment from arising: “Some of the Briefs we get are just 
unbelievable” (OPP focus group). 
 
A close examination of the VicPol case files suggests a number of aspects of case 
management improvement in relation to documentation, argumentation and the field 
conditions of operational policing of sexual assault. These are summarized as follows. 
 
A comparison and contrast of authorisation and non-authorisation document practices 
in the present case file research revealed a number of potential improvements. 
Whereas both would benefit from greater attention to formal written argument, that 
would be more beneficial in authorisation cases where none of the examined files 
carried formally signed off reports. Both would also benefit from a greater focus on 
support documents, with more than half of non-authorisation and slightly less than a 
quarter of authorisation case files showing an absence of these. Also, greater inclusion 
of written accused interview records, especially in non-authorisation cases, would 
enhance comprehension in those regards. Again, case management could be expected 
to improve with greater attention to quality completion of documents, and more so in 
authorisation cases because of the higher frequency of poor completion and greater 
frequency of a high number of potential improvement areas in those cases, and the 
fact that they are susceptible to the greater rigors of Court room scrutiny. 
RECOMMENDATION: Vicpol should review its quality control systems and 
related policies in relation to sexual assault Briefs and authority delegations with a 
view to removing inept SOCIT members (including ROs/AOs where identified) 
and establishing and maintaining best practice standards of transparent and 
accountable written authorisation and non-authorisation argument.  




Furthermore, documentation practice in ‘unsolved’ and ‘no offence disclosed’ cases is 
open to improvement, especially regarding inclusion of formal argumentation and 
statements by victims and witnesses, as well as the need to include many documents 
observed as missing in the latter type of case. Such improvements could be expected 
to either lead to more authorisations or more robustly justify a decision not to proceed 
in the latter instance.  
 
The research evidence also illustrated a number of features in the construction of 
Brief argument that call for attention in management quality control of the Brief 
authorisation process. Analysis of data from case files, interviews and focus groups 
showed greater attention can be profitably paid to developing clear, formal arguments 
in Brief preparation; to seeking cohesion and unity of effort by all police involved as 
well as in terms of how evidence items are located in the case file; and to ensuring all 
evidentiary details are included, kept consistent and non-contradictory. Further, 
extraneous inclusions are anathema to sound policing arguments, and those 
particularly can be picked out in quality monitoring if found there. The same holds for 
re-framing statements of victims and witnesses – for instance by referring to non-
existent inconsistencies in those statements. That can result in unjust argument against 
authorisation and can lead to difficulties at Court if a case is taken forward. Benefits 
in terms of just outcomes for victims would also be enhanced through more 
considered attention to authenticating and positively valuing victim’s stories. 
Legitimate testing of victim credibility needs to be carefully weighed against doing 
the job of defence lawyers and second-guessing Courts or juror decision making. 
Paying attention to these criteria would contribute much stronger, evidence-based 
decision-making. 
 
An overarching consideration was a tendency to put a one-sided view by one or more 
of the investigating, recommending and authorising officers that presumed the 
outcome and - where put by investigators - that dis-enfranchised senior police officers 
charged with quality review. This is perhaps particularly problematic in respect to 
non-authorisation argument, since the result is a tendency to ignore reasons for 
prosecution, whereas in authorisation argument it could be expected that police seek 
to put the argument for prosecution and leave the contrary argument to defence 
lawyers – albeit necessary to anticipate and counter that contrary argument. 
  
Nonetheless, it is argued here that cases need to be treated on a level footing 
regardless of whether contemplating authorisation or non-authorisation. There is 
otherwise an unwarranted presumption that investigators, recommending and 
authorising officers will be in agreement. This means that cogent, clear, written 
formal argument needs to occur in not only non-authorisation but also authorisation 
cases and regardless of whether the trigger is arrest and charge or intent to summons. 
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The point of drawing attention to elements of police Briefs that can be improved is to 
enhance documentation and argumentation skills, which would lead to more 
authorisations, efficiencies in interactions with prosecutors, greater Court success and 
victim satisfaction, and an enhanced public image for VicPol as a modern police 
organisation. In turn, these benefits would promote investigative confidence, pride in 
Brief preparation, and an accumulating sense of doing a good job in sexual assault 
policing and Court presentations by informants and prosecutors. As skill development 
increases, a self-reinforcing loop is established that leads to increasing skill 
development, a positive sense of professionalism, and promulgation of just outcomes 
for victims. Hence, the foregoing analysis and suggestions are of value to training of 
police in sexual assault policing, to current VicPol initiatives such as the SOCIT 
project, and to VicPol’s ongoing commitment to enhancement of justice outcomes for 
sexual assault victims. It is likely that VicPol is already aware of at least some of 
these areas and taking steps to improve sexual assault policing as a result. Current 
findings provide additional support for those efforts. 
 
Notably, these improvement suggestions are consistent with recent sexual assault law 
reform recommendations to Victoria Police made by the VLRC (2004) and the 
Victoria Ombudsman (2006) outlined above. They are also consistent with the 
HMCPSI & HMIC (2007) and Spiranovic (2011) analyses which alert us to the need 
for concrete changes in operational policing practice as well as organisational 
structure and management level changes that reflect new policy imperatives. Such 
practice change is only possible to the extent that police organisations are able to 
understand and implement the sorts of improvement potential that have been found in 
the present study. Ultimately, it is the ‘nitty-gritty’ of everyday operational policing 
and Brief authorisation processes that must be improved if real and lasting changes 
are to occur in the sexual assault area. 
 
In addition, it has been argued above that managing the police response to adult 
sexual assault is first and foremost a question of best practice leadership, both at the 
front-line of daily SOCIT operations and at higher echelon supports. In this regard, it 
is apparent from the tri-angulated data and analyses that there is a need for tangibly 
showing positive symbolic and conspicuously ethical leadership as described in the 
literature on police leadership. It has also been argued that the strategies identified by 
Frohmann (1991, 1998) have relevance to the construction of Briefs and along with 
the case examples of criteria for improvement these would provide sound focal guides 
in demonstrating contemporary best practice leadership behaviours.  
 
Of course, it could be questioned whether study results continue to apply to present 
policing of sexual assault in Victoria. Given that organisational reform on the ground 
always lags behind the implementation program, and given the pervasiveness of these 
findings across the examined case files plus the strong triangulated data support from 
very recent interviews and focus groups, these findings are clearly reflective of 
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current practice. Furthermore, given strand one work by PJO researchers in 2010, it is 
apparent that there is a persistence of some of the central findings here over time. 
 
It is acknowledged that the interview and focus group data strongly indicate that there 
are considerable resourcing difficulties that hamstring SOCIT operations, which also 
reflect leadership judgements in terms of budget allocations, those being the 
responsibility of executive level police leaders. These budget factors reinforce a 
morale problem within SOCITs which is intertwined with cultural, leadership and 
quality control system issues at the operational level. 
 
Notably, both this chapter and chapter one of this report highlight police views 
indicating that resourcing constraints and attitudinal factors can militate against the 
interests of victims as police begin to screen reports or discourage victim reporting 
based on their opinions about the likelihood of successful conviction or factors 
pertaining to the victim and context of the offence. This subjective evaluation of 
victims or projection of how the case might play out in a legal setting diminishes both 
the victim and the judicial process. As Taylor and Gassner (2010) made clear, this 
reasoning has the dual effect of not just impacting on victim confidence to report but 
means that the legal system and indeed the wider community, in the form of jurors, 
are not challenged to hear and determine cases that fall outside stereotypical cases of 
rape. In relation to these points they argue: 
 
In this way, intentionally or not, police and prosecutors are pre-empting 
potential juror attitudes. The appalling conviction rates for sexual offences 
both here and in international jurisdictions (Fitzgerald, 2006; Kelly & Lovett, 
2009; OCJR, 2006; VLRC, 2003, 2004) make challenging these attitudes 
more difficult and yet more urgent. The awareness that negative public 
attitudes about sexual violence may affect successful prosecution compounds 
the problem of police and prosecutorial decision-making. The problem 
becomes circular as one domain of professional decision-making may be 
later influenced or reinforced by the public domain. Moreover, it means there 
is a very real danger that the ‘types’ of sex offence cases that proceed to 
court are those that most closely conform to dominant myths and stereotypes 
of ‘real’ victims and ‘real’ rape/sexual assault. Thus, intentionally or 
unintentionally, the criminal justice response reinforces and perpetuates 
myths and stereotypes, making cultural and legal reform more difficult and 
impermeable to challenge (Taylor, 2004a). (Taylor & Gassner, 2010, p. 248) 
 
Finally, unless it is thought that documentation and argumentation difficulties were 
universal among the case files and OPP focus group commentary, there is this remark 
on particularization in a quality Brief from one OPP lawyer:  
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Stemming from that, I guess the good detectives refer it to particular pages in 
the hand-up Brief.  And so you will get, for example, an alleged act, and then 
it will refer to exhibit numbers or the page numbers of the Brief, and that is 
fantastic.  Right from the outset you know where to go to refer to it, as 
opposed to, you know, starting from basically scratch.  
 
Similarly, one RO said in relation to what makes a best practice Brief: 
 
Large number of written statements to support the charges. A summary of 
charges that document, that tells the story – that’s detailed but not verbose, 
succinct, it’s cross-referenced to the charges, it’s footnoted to the exhibits 
and a witness list. It’s very readable. It’s user friendly for the OPP when they 
pick it up at a court, when they first get it and they go, yes, no worries …  
But it’s easy to navigate your way around the Brief, it’s easily read, it’s well 
presented. All the statements are in uniform format, like all the witness 
paragraphs – all the paragraphs are numbered, the same font is used, just 
little things. Just so it just looks nice and … professional, and you might get 
some defence barrister that might go, ‘Gee, it looks quite professional,’ while 
I’m calling to get a plea [of guilty, from the defence] and it’s not looking like 
a dog’s breakfast. Yeah, nice and neat and solid. 
 
While there are challenges to be met and skills to be learned there are also knowledge 
and skills already available in VicPol SOCITs to address many of them. In the 
following chapter the nature and extent of organisational learning is examined in 
relation to future recruiting, training and developing of police officers for the job of 
sexual assault investigation and Brief preparation in Victoria. 
 
Recommendations issuing from this chapter’s data analysis and findings are as 
follows. 
 







RECOMMENDATION: Attention should be paid to reinforcing the importance 
of ensuring there is accurate and comprehensive documentation on case files 
irrespective of whether authorisation or non-authorisation is being sought and 
before forwarding to senior police officers and prosecutors. This mission should be 
a priority of leadership at operational and executive levels of VicPol, as well as 
calling for a review of quality control mechanisms. (s. 8.1.2) 
RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to developing a set of 
quality assurance criteria to be administered by ROs and AOs in reviewing Briefs. 
These criteria can be informed by although not limited to the foregoing elements of 
argumentation. (s. 8.2.6) 
RECOMMENDATION: Serious and urgent consideration should be given to 
enhancing the resource allocations for SOCITs. (s. 8.3) 
RECOMMENDATION: Vicpol should review its quality control systems and 
related policies in relation to sexual assault Briefs and authority delegations with a 
view to removing inept SOCIT members (including ROs/AOs where identified) 
and establishing and maintaining best practice standards of transparent and 
accountable written authorisation and non-authorisation argument. (s. 8.4) 
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9.0 Recruiting, training and developing police officers 
 
VLRC (2004) findings and recommendations emphasised knowledge and skills 
acquisitions by generalist police, CIU members as well as SOCAU (now SOCIT) 
officers, in relation to a range of special needs victims, including the CALD, NESB, 
indigenous, mental illness, and cognitively impaired groups, as well as “issues 
surrounding drug or alcohol facilitated sexual assault” (108), “attitudes about the truth 
and falsity of complaints” (111), and “preconceptions about ‘real’ rape victims” 
(122). The VLRC (2004) report also included a number of recommendations that 
went to the complementary need for OPP and other prosecution lawyers, as well as 
members of the judiciary, to have specialist training and development in sexual 
assault, including, for example, in relation to cognitively impaired victims. 
 
The VLRC (2004) identified police training and development needs to include 
response and communications skills (recommendation 11); reasons why victims 
discontinue complaints (recommendation 13); diversity of victim’s needs and barriers 
to reporting (recommendation 14); police training collaboration with CASA, NESB 
and indigenous communities (recommendation 15); and identifying and 
communicating with cognitively impaired people (recommendations 151 and 153). 
 
In particular, the VLRC recommendation 12 stated that sexual assault training for 
members of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (SOCA) Units and Criminal 
Investigation Units (CIU) should address the social context of sexual offences, 
including the characteristics of most offences, offenders and victims; the short-term 
and long-term impact of sexual assault on victim/survivors; and the barriers that 
victims often face in reporting offences. 
 
Notably, the VLRC findings and recommendations addressed key issues and findings 
in the literature on sexual assault already covered in previous chapters of this report. 
Two years later, the Ombudsman reported: “Victoria Police advised that it currently 
provides employees responsible for responding to or investigating reports of sexual 
assault with specialist training” (Office of Victoria Ombudsman, 2006, p. 30). Yet 
another five years on, Spiranovic (2011) concluded that while change management 
efforts by police organisations in New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian 
Capital Territory in relation to sexual assault have been progressive – recognising the 
need for training, specialised units and/or one-stop shops as well as victim liaison 
officers – those efforts have not addressed adequately the attrition issues 
characterising sexual assault complaints. For example, she argued that training 
content is still deficient - eg sensitivity training is lacking in regard to victims – and 
 
the recent initiatives in Australia have not paid a sufficient amount of attention 
to issues relating to procedures around reporting and interviewing nor has 
there been any discussion of the need to change recruitment procedures to 
recruit officers with the desired skill set (Spiranovic, 2011, p. 25). 
 
In Western Australia similar training issues have been noted in relation to sexual 
assault policing, including in areas of enhanced training for general duties police 
officers and detectives, a need for specialized training regarding people with an 
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intellectual or decision-making impairment, and interviewing skills generally 
(Community Development and Justice Standing Committee, 2008).  
 
Little is mentioned in the Success Works (2011) report on police training in relation 
to sexual assault. Aboriginal legal service advocates said that Victoria Police 
members in SOCAUs and SOCITs require additional cultural awareness training, and 
there is an oblique suggestion that this held true for CALD communities more 
generally (Success Work, 2011, p.188). Additionally, “there is a clear need for the 
police, prosecutors and others in the criminal justice system to receive training in 
relation to the differences between cognitive impairment and others forms of 
disability” (Success Works, 2011, p. 190). 
 
Discussion now turns to reviewing the small body of research on police sexual assault 
response training programs and even fewer evaluations as distinct from descriptive 
studies of such programs (Kinney, Bruns, Bradley, Dantzler, & Weist, 2007; 
Lonsway, Welch & Fitzgerald, 2001). Kinney et al. (2007) found that literature on the 
prevalence and effectiveness of sexual assault training for law enforcement officers 
was scarce. Similarly, despite a wide search by PJO researchers for more recent 
relevant academic research, few studies have been found to address the topic in the 
last decade. The little available recent research examining police education and 
training in adult sexual assault has been conducted mostly in the United States, 
including North Carolina (Lord & Rassel, 2000), Illinois (Lonsway et at.,  2001), 
Boston (Stevens, 2006) and Maryland (Kinney et al., 2007). Epstein and Langenbahn 
(1994) analysed four jurisdictions in the USA, Denver, Seattle, Philadelphia, and St 
Paul. Jamel et al. (2008) conducted an investigation of the specialist police service 
provided to male rape survivors and related training in the United Kingdom. The 
current PJO review found no research literature into the education and training of 
Australian police on adult sexual assault. 
  
In an early study of sexual assault training McKinnon (1982) found training structures 
were inconsistent and inadequate in the 27 most populous United States cities. 
Campbell (1995) found that 41% of law enforcement officers in her study noted their 
opinions on date rape were positively impacted by departmental training; and officers 
who saw their training as helpful held more favourable attitudes toward women, 
which predicted less victim-blaming date rape perceptions. 
   
In their ground-breaking study of what made for success in the investigation and 
prosecution of sexual assault, Epstein and Langenbahn (1994) interviewed not only 
sex crime investigators but also a number of key agents responding to sexual assault, 
including prosecutors, judges, physicians, social workers, program directors, legal 
advisors and advocates, and sexual and mental health professionals. These researchers 
documented a description of subjects to be taught to sexual assault investigators, 
including interviewing techniques for victims and suspects, collection of physical 
evidence unique to rape cases, and coordination with rape crisis centres, medical 
personnel, and prosecutors. 
 
Epstein and Langenbahn (1994) found that collaboration in education and training in 
adult sexual assault between police and key agencies such as victim support services, 
hospitals and other criminal justice agencies like prosecutors, can improve services to 
victim/survivors of sexual violence and present opportunities for agencies to discover 
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common agendas. Presentations from key agencies were said to "supplement training 
in investigative skills, allow for investigators to learn firsthand the needs and 
contributions of each component of the criminal justice and victim assistance 
communities” (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994, p. 54). They also found that the police 
departments in their study deemed most effective in responding to reports of adult 
sexual assault were ones in which new sexual offence investigators were assigned to 
work with an experienced sexual assault investigator. Further, they argued that 
training must be provided to police who first receive sexual assault complaints as well 
as investigators. Finally, Epstein and Langenbahn (1994) identified effective police 
practices as including a need to first employ specific criteria for selection of 
investigators of sexual assault complaints. Among these selection criteria were 
evidence of capabilities to be sensitive to victims and to understand the short-term and 
long-term impacts of sexual assault on them. 
    
Lord and Rassel (2000) conducted site visits and follow-up telephone interviews with 
law enforcement investigators in 34 police departments across nine counties in North 
Carolina to ascertain the use of procedures based on Epstein and Langenbahn’s 
(1994) work. They found that training of patrol officers – those likely to receive initial 
sexual assault complaints – was provided in only nine of the 34 departments. Most 
investigators wanted training that would help them glean information from sexual 
assault victims. Only two departments used criteria to assign sexual assault 
investigations, and none employed criteria specifically to select sexual assault 
investigators. They also found that a number of departments used team teaching 
which included rape crisis volunteers teaching about victim trauma and victim 
services.  
 
Lonsway et al. (2001) reported that previous evaluations of police training programs 
in sexual assault primarily used subjective appraisals by instructors and self-reflection 
of participants to determine the impact of programs. They noted particularly that: 
 
Such programs often specifically address the individual’s personal attitudinal 
orientation toward the topic of rape. This focus on personal attitudes is 
emphasised because it is seen as representing the primary block to effective 
police response (Lonsway et al., 2001, p. 697, italics added).  
 
These authors found no previous research that used experimentation methods to 
assess the impact of different program elements on police training outcome measures. 
To address this gap, they designed two separate experiments. One study employed a 
control group of trainees undergoing a baseline “typical training protocol” and two 
other trainee groups attending an experimental program. They found that trainees in 
the experimental program were more likely than those in the baseline curriculum to 
allow the victim control over the interview; to address a range of victims’ needs and 
concerns; to provide the victim with empathy and reassurance in a variety of ways; 
and to avoid asking about victim use of alcohol. They also found no change in any of 
the trainees’ level of endorsement of cultural rape myths. They suggested that 
behavioural change might not require cognitive or attitudinal change or that 
behavioural change precedes if not determines attitudinal change, both of which are 
long-standing explanations in the literature (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Wicker, 1969). 
Alternatively, they suggested, the absence of change in rape myth acceptance might 
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have been due to social desirability effects producing low rape myth acceptance in the 
first instance. 
 
In a subsequent study they made a number of design alterations to strengthen their 
research, including a blind procedure and a greatly expanded sample allowing more 
statistical power to detect group differences (Lonsway et al., 2001). Further, 
observations were recorded at varying stages and conditions of training, allowing 
measurement of the impact of individual program elements – e.g., number of 
simulated interviews - and of improvements in trainee performance throughout the 
training. Due to police training program changes there was no measure of attitudinal 
change. Like the first study, study two results supported the use of behavioural 
training and assessment techniques, with two simulated interviews producing superior 
performance over only one. However, factual knowledge scores were also found to 
deteriorate within weeks of class-room instruction. 
 
Lonsway et al. (2001) concluded that police training in sexual assault investigation 
should include development of soft skills required for sexual assault interviews and 
that specialised training was effective in improving behavioural performance. They 
particularly encouraged use of behavioural simulations – i.e., application learning - to 
improve investigative interview skills. They also stressed program design should 
ensure that learning activities are realistic, relevant and “anchored to a particular task 
or problem”; that trainees have time and feedback for meaningful reflection; and that 
behavioural simulations occur at the end of training when trainees have integrated 
instructional materials. 
 
The Lonsway et al. (2001) studies were the most sophisticated discovered in this 
literature review. They employed a range of well developed measures – including the 
45-item Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance (IRMA) Scale – as well as audio-taped role-
plays, thematic coding, pilot-testing of new scales and statistical inferential tests (e.g., 
Exploratory Factor Analysis). However, there was no follow-up of any continuing 
retention and utilization of behavioural or attitudinal outcomes after trainees had 
became investigators. That is, there were no medium or long-term post-training 
measures of these outcomes, for example by way of focus groups or individual 
interviews of police in the field. 
    
Stevens (2006) surveyed 319 Boston police officers, then conducted individual 
interviews with eight officers who had completed Boston’s five day Sexual Assault 
Investigators Certification Course. Topics included the three stages of victimisation 
experiences (immediate crisis, normalisation or outward adjustment, and healing); the 
victim recovery process; and discussion of cultural issues. The last included speakers 
from a panel of female sexual assault survivors from Latino, Vietnamese, African-
American and Caucasian women who explain how cultural attitudes influence the 
reporting of sexual assault. A convicted sex offender instructed police students about 
lifestyles, attacks and issues of rehabilitation.  
 
Stevens (2006) found that training and supervisory style influenced first-responders’ 
investigation of sexual assault complaints. Importantly, he highlighted a difference 
between providing comprehensive formal training in sexual assault to police and the 
residual value of training in the work place, with respondents from his study reporting 
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that “once out of training, our training officers tell us to forget everything we’ve 
learned and listen up.” (Stevens, 2006, p. 142).  
 
However, there was no detailed description of the methodology employed by Stevens 
(2006). Particular, while he provided interview excerpts, he did not explain the 
method or cite the questions. Also, his data-collection and analysis were narrowly 
focused on trainee opinions. So, for instance, supervisors of trained staff were not 
involved as participants in follow-up of graduates’ application of learning or other 
issues such as aptitude and suitability for sexual assault policing. This is an interesting 
omission in this study since it is apparent Stevens (2006) considered supervisors 
themselves were problematic in not providing support and encouragement of trainees 
once they graduated to the field of actual policing of sexual assault. Thus, he refers to 
"training can influence officer behaviour less frequently than expected if supervisors 
and command fail to have in place policies including an enforcement process that 
supports training topics" (Stevens, 2001, p. 127). 
 
The HMCPSI & HMIC (2007) report that followed that of the HMCPSI & HMIC 
(2002) in the UK five years earlier summarized the situation concerning police 
specially trained in relation to sexual offences: 
 
While local training provision was generally described as very good, and in 
some cases excellent, standards were not always consistent. There were also 
gaps in the provision of refresher training, with two forces providing no input 
other than initial training, as well as an absence of training for supervisors. 
This reinforces the need for nationally accredited training (HMCPSI & 
HMIC, 2007, p.  56). 
 
The HMCPSI & HMIC (2007) report also emphasised that sexual assault training was 
necessary but still lacking in respect to police who first respond to sexual assault 
complaints, a point noted in US jurisdictions by Epstein and Langenbahn (1994) more 
than a decade earlier. Further, first responders lacked expertise in sexual assault crime 
scene procedures and evidence-gathering/preservation. Notably, the report did not 
entail evaluation research into sexual assault training for Specially Trained Officers 
(STOs), whose role did not include investigation and preparation of Briefs. Even so, 
the report noted that STOs’ interviewing skills appeared to be in need of attention, 
with STOs being reluctant to explore inconsistencies and ambiguities in victim 
statements for fear of discouraging victims. “This requires sensitivity, care and skill 
and re-emphasises the need for effective STO selection, training and performance 
monitoring” (HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007, p.  65). 
 
Jamel et al. (2008) used a predominantly qualitative design in their evaluation of 
Sexual Offences Investigative Technique officers’ (London Metropolitan Police) 
response to male survivors of rape. Semi-structured questionnaire responses of 19 
SOIT investigators were compared with similar questionnaire responses by male 
(n=20) and female (n=56) victim/survivors of sexual violence, using content analysis 
of thematically coded responses following the open and axial coding procedures 
originally laid down by Glaser & Strauss (1967). They also undertook a limited 
quantitative analysis. Notably, they had a very poor questionnaire response rate from 
a total of 300 officers.  
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Training was identified as a theme in interviews with investigators of adult sexual 
assault. In particular, “training for SOIT and STO officers regarding male rape 
survivors needs to be more comprehensive” (Jamel et al., 2008, p. 501). They argued 
that that training needs to heighten officers’ awareness of male victims’ physiological 
and psychological impacts, gender identity and sexual orientation, and “inherent 
complexities associated with masculinity which underlie questions such as how could 
they ‘let’ that happen to them” (Jamel et al., 2008, p. 501). Significantly, they also 
found that despite training, STOs were still said by survivors to be “judgemental, 
confrontational and unprofessional when dealing with both male and female rape 
survivors” (Jamel et al., 2008, p. 502). They found that rape myths remained a 
pervasive problem and affected the likelihood of rape cases being taken seriously, 
findings consistent with those of Lonsway et al. (2001). 
 
Jamel et al. (2008) agreed with Lonsway et al. (2001) that training did not change 
attitudes, arguing that - despite police in the UK completing specialist training in 
sexual assault investigation - underlying attitudes and values can remain unchanged 
and filter implicitly through non-verbal behaviour or more directly through verbal 
behaviour of police attending sexual assault victims. Underlying attitudes supportive 
of rape myths and stereotypes of sexual violence can impact adversely victim/survivor 
care as well as cooperation with police and quality of evidence. Jamel et al. (2008) 
proposed future research on sexual assault training should examine single loop 
learning where information is understood superficially compared to double loop 
learning where sexual assault investigative training aims to achieve understanding at a 
fundamental level and thus evoke changes in values and attitudes where necessary. 
  
Kinney et al. (2007) undertook a study of the sexual assault response training required 
by the Maryland Police Training and Correctional Commission for all entrance-level 
police training programs run by 20 police academies across the State. The mandated 
basic training had seven objectives: 
 
(1) identify the basic psychological response of victims of sexual offenses; 
(2) identify techniques officers can use to defuse the crisis stress symptoms 
of victims of sexual offenses; (3) identify the duties of a police officer when 
intervening in an interpersonal conflict involving sexual offenses; (4) 
presented with a practical exercise, identify and satisfactorily handle those 
tasks delegated to a field officer responding to crimes; (5) describe the 
resources available to the officer and/or victim for the crime of rape and 
sexual offenses; (6) explain the role the polygraph may play in the 
investigation of sexual offenses; and (7) describe the resources available to 
the officer and/or victim for the crime of sexual abuse of children (Kinney et 
al., 2007, p. 84-85). 
 
There was an additional three-yearly training requirement requiring officers to have a 
score of 70% or higher to pass. Albeit the seven objectives provide some assurance of 
a robust program across the 20 Academies, neither the basic or three-yearly training 
courses was described or evaluated in their article. 
 
Kinney et al. (2007) reported results of a state-wide, cross-sectional survey of 301 
Maryland law enforcement officers. They examined survey responses of officers who 
received additional training above a mandated minimum (46.6% of respondents) in 
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comparison with those who received no additional training. They found statistically 
significant differences favouring additional training in respect to being better prepared 
and feeling comfortable when presented with a sexual assault case; satisfactory 
interactions with the court system; greater victim cooperation in investigations; higher 
percentage of cases investigated; higher percentage of cases prosecuted; and needing 
further, high quality training. The vast majority of both groups wanted additional 
formal training, including refresher training.  
 
These authors suggested further research is necessary to evaluate current and 
developing training in sexual assault for police, and to determine the ideal 
components, optimum conditions and intensity of such training (Kinney et al., 2007). 
They also suggested further research should be conducted in individual precincts, the 
equivalent in Victoria being the SOCIT units. They noted a current lack of 
longitudinal studies looking at course curricula, as well as a lack of experimental and 
control group comparative research. A basic limitation of their research was the 
reliance on self-reports from trainees alone. 
 
Quantitative methods dominate research on police education and training in adult 
sexual assault. Quantitative methods used in previous research included questionnaire 
surveys of patrol officers and police recruits (Kinney et al., 2007; Lonsway et al., 
2001; Stevens, 2006) and interviews with sexual assault investigators (Lord & Rassel 
2000). In two mixed method research designs reported here, quantitative data were 
sourced through survey questionnaires, while the qualitative aspects of each study 
were distinctly different with one utilising role player observation (Lonsway et al., 
2001) and the other in-depth interviews (Stevens, 2006).  
 
Previous research analysing police education and training in adult sexual assault has 
utilised patrol officers (Stevens, 2006) and police recruit participants (Lonsway et al., 
2001). Investigators of sexual assault have participated in some studies of this kind 
(Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Jamel et al., 2008; Lord & Rassel, 2000; Stevens, 
2006). The PJO literature review discovered no studies that used supervisors of police 
trained to investigate adult sexual assault as research participants. 
 
As noted in the introduction of this report, early research work found that personal 
attitudes such as belief in stereotypes, victim blaming and rape myths influenced an 
individual’s effectiveness in investigating sexual assaults. Lonsway et al. (2001) and 
Jamel et al. (2008) have more recently made similar findings in their research work on 
police sexual assault training. Furthermore, this recent work shows that whilst training 
programs need to address attitudes, attitudinal change is either not achieved or 
attitudes regress due to the contrary influence of post-training placement in 
operational units. That is, training courses by themselves appear on the current 
research evidence to be ineffectual in the medium to long-term because newly 
operational police are rapidly assimilated into local police unit cultures, including 
those of specialist sexual assault units.  
 
Although the participants, settings, and methods used in previous research differ, the 
most documented finding offered to date on police education and training in adult 
sexual assault is a description of what specialised sexual assault training does or 
should contain. The key syllabus topics identified by researchers include investigative 
interviewing with suspected sex offenders; interviewing vulnerable witnesses and 
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victim/survivors; collection of physical evidence; liaison with key agencies including 
medical, prosecution and victim support services; and components aimed at changing 
antithetical police beliefs, attitudes and behaviours in a ‘double-loop’, fundamental 
fashion if and when necessary, as well as recognizing and celebrating best police 
practice skills. In this last respect, however, judicious attention needs also to be given 
to robust recruitment and selection procedures to ensure only genuinely committed, 
compassionate and aptly motivated police are trainees in the first instance.  
 
Depth of expertise and width of external input have been noted by researchers as a 
vital tool to be exercised in educating police in adult sexual assault investigation. For 
instance, Jamel et al. (2008, p. 491), referring to the HMCPSI & HMIC (2002) report, 
argued that predominant features of good practice in sexual assault investigative 
training included “an absence of superficiality, a depth of expertise and the width of 
external input throughout the syllabus”. Kinney et al. (2007, p. 94) agreed, quoting 
one respondent’s words: "‘Training should be updated every year and taught by 
someone who has skills and knowledge in the field. Not by a tape or a lay person!’". 
Refresher training was emphasised as necessary to continuing professional 
development of police involved in sexual assault investigations. Similarly a number 
of police departments in North Carolina have developed a team teaching approach to 
sexual assault where rape crisis centres provide training to police on the trauma 
experienced by rape victims and services provided by rape crisis centres, while police 
teach rape crisis volunteers about the role of law enforcement (Lord & Rassel, 2000). 
Mentor training of new investigators in the field has been noted as worthwhile 
(Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994). 
 
The main gaps and issues identified in the existing research on sexual assault training 
of police can be summarised as follows. Limited research has been conducted on 
training for specialist sexual assault investigators and what research has been 
undertaken has tended to be unsophisticated and too often simply descriptive. 
Research has been dominated by quantitative methods. There has been a strong 
tendency for studies to rely on a single perspective, usually that of general duties 
police, trainees and investigators. There are consequently particular needs for 
qualitative work and robust evaluative studies. In these regards, longitudinal, 
experimental and control group studies are necessary, along with involvement of 
supervisors and more senior police officers. The absence of Australian research is a 
special problem for Australia’s sexual assault policing fraternity given that cultural 
and other differences even in like jurisdictions are significant enough to forbid strong, 
evidence-based conclusions for an Australian context. 
 
Key training course issues that require further research efforts include police attitudes, 
values and stereotype beliefs that hinder sexual assault policing effectiveness and the 
loss of related educational input once police trainees graduate to operational duties. 
Course design should incorporate ‘double loop’ learning components for this purpose. 
This level of research effort would require post-training evaluation research access to 
operational units charged with sexual assault policing - such as the SOCITs in 
Victoria - to determine if, how and why vital training loss occurs and what can be 
done about it. 
 
More generally, there is still a need for further evaluation studies of what constitutes 
the optimal or best standard components of training, what should be taught in the 
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curricula, how it should be taught, and how to best measure training outputs and 
outcomes. To date the dearth of studies do not provide sufficiently sound evidence-
based knowledge in these basic respects. It is apparent, however, that best practice 
training program models are likely to incorporate a strong component of external 
interest group trainers within a team-based teaching and learning framework. It is also 
apparent that the ‘soft’ skills of communication, compassion and sensitivity to sexual 
assault victims’ needs, awareness of rape myths and so on are vital to training and to 
long-term outcomes for effective sexual assault policing. Further, mentoring in the 
field, refresher training, and ongoing, regular professional development are all 
indicated from the available research to be necessary elements of a best practice 
regime. Finally, there remains the need to ensure robust criteria-based recruitment and 
selection procedures precede training provision to ensure that the scarce training 
dollar is used effectively and efficiently. This last point is a critical first ingredient for 
successful and effective policing of sexual violence, and its absence renders the other 
criteria largely futile given the evidence that changing basic attitudes through training 
programs is at best extremely difficult. 
 
This chapter focuses on recruitment, training and development of police officers in 
Victoria for responding to, investigating and preparing Briefs on sexual assault, 
including supervision and management aspects.  
 
9.1 Training police for SOCIT work in Victoria 
 
Current research data and findings on training police for sexual assault work in 
Victoria is approached first by a brief discussion of sexual assault training available 
for probationary constables. This account is followed by examining the main Victoria 
Police SOCIT/VARE sexual assault training course from the viewpoints of trainees, 
training providers and non-participant researcher observations. Next, there is a report 
on what was found in the strand two case files, interviews and focus groups in relation 
to sexual assault police officers’ training and their knowledge, skills and aptitudes 
(KSA), thus providing a robust triangulation of research findings. Additionally, 
findings from the 2010 focus groups conducted by strand one researchers provide 
some longitudinal depth in analysis. 
 
9.1.1 Victoria Police sexual assault training for probationary constables 
 
Victoria Police are to be commended for developing a specialised SOCIT/VARE 
course focused on sexual offences over a four week duration. This is clearly an 
excellent step in the right direction in terms of giving consideration to a syllabus that 
seeks to arm police with sound knowledge of sexual violence in order to build 
competency in police praxis at every level of their initial response and investigation of 
sexual offences. The following analysis and assessment of the training is undertaken 
with the hope of contributing to the continued evolution development.   
 
Minimal probationary constable training on sexual assault topics. Apart from the 
SOCIT/VARE course, about six months after they leave the Academy probationary 
constables are provided with a week of Level 8 training, two hours of which focus on 
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adult sexual assault topics. This is the only training provision that addresses the best 
practice criterion in the literature for more widely ensuring police officers who 
interact with sexual assault victims are educated on the complex issues involved in 
this area of policing (e.g., Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007; 
Lord & Rassel, 2000). Observation of this course by a PJO researcher on one 
occasion showed that the trainer provided a succinct, well informed overview of key 
issues in sexual assault. However, the trainer for the adult sexual offence aspects of 
Level 8 training was not involved in the final assessment or examination of responses. 
Further, in response to the trainer’s question about the percentage of false reports in 
sexual assault complaints, the probationary constables indicated a range from 35% to 
92%. Three of the probationary constables also reported to the researcher having been 
the most senior member working on a divisional van, with much less experienced 
members, who had also not received any specialised sexual assault training. 
 
This is clearly an insufficient training input given the complexity of sexual assault 
policing and given that general duties officers in Victoria are often the first police to 
whom sexual assault victims report or whom they meet initially at crime scenes. A 
2010 PJO focus group also made this point of general duties officers often being the 
initial police contact with sexual assault victims. Although the problem of non-
specialist police involvement with sexual assault victims will reduce with time as the 
SOCIT model becomes more publicly known, there will always be some non-SOCIT 
police involvement due to happenstance of victims arriving at the front desk of police 
stations or generalist police being first responders at sexual assault crime scenes.  
 
 
9.1.2 The Victoria Police SOCIT/VARE sexual assault training course  
 
The following analysis draws from research undertaken on a four week block SOCIT 
training course provided to Specialist Sexual Assault Investigators in Victoria from 
August 2009 to November 2011. Over that period the course was provided six times 
and a total of 120 trainees who were predominantly SOCIT investigators completed 
the course. An outline of the training program is provided in Appendix 16. Course 
evaluation was undertaken using four data-collection methods: non-participant 
observation; an in-depth interview of course designers and trainers; an online 
questionnaire completed by SOCIT course trainees, comprised of investigators and 
more senior police officers; and review of trainees’ feedback sheets provided during 
and after the course (see Appendix 15). Collected data were subjected to both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. This methodological framework addressed 
deficits canvassed in the literature to date - as discussed above - by taking a multi-
method, triangulated approach, with quantitative and qualitative components, and 
seeking views from not only trainees but also course providers. 
 
Background demographic data on participants in the training course evaluation. 
Background demographic data on participants in the four data sources are as follows. 
RECOMMENDATION: More substantial provision should be made by VicPol 
for providing sexual assault education to generalist police officers. 
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In respect to the survey, 39 respondents (89%) worked in locations investigating 
sexual offences, such as a SOCIT, SOCAU or CIU, with only one respondent 
working at a uniform station, one from the Sexual Crimes Squad, and three from other 
departments. Twenty-eight respondents (64%) worked in the metropolitan area and 16 
(36%) were located in regional Victoria. Thirty-four (77%) were Senior Constables or 
Detective Senior Constables, the main target group for the SOCIT course. Equally 
important were the 10 (23%) participants ranked Sergeant or above, who had the 
capacity to contribute to the study as both a student and supervisor, although no 
specific questions were asked relating to their opinions of the course from a 
supervisory perspective. The total policing experience respondents reported was 
considerable, with 21 (49%) reporting more than 20 years of service with Victoria 
Police, and a further 17 (40%) between 10 and 20 years police service. In terms of 
sexual assault investigation experience, eleven respondents (25%) provided no details 
19 (58%) had less than 2 years work experience in the field, while six (18%) had 
more than 10 years. SOCIT trainees who stated less than two years experience in the 
investigation of sexual offences reported an average of 17 years overall policing 
experience. Hence, a lack of experience in dealing with sexual assault was not linked 
with a lack of policing experience. 
 
Non-participant research observations. Non-participant observations were made on 
the SOCIT course provided from the 16th July until 13th August 2010. This course was 
attended by 20 Victoria Police members, 13 (65%) were male and seven (35%) 
female. Thirteen (65%) were from metropolitan locations, and seven (35%) worked in 
rural areas. Of the 20 trainees observed, all but two occupied positions within a 
SOCIT, SOCAU or CIU, with responsibility for sexual assault investigations. 
 
9.1.2.1 Findings and evaluation on SOCIT/VARE training 
 
SOCIT/VARE course trainees were asked for their opinions on course strengths as 
well as general comments. 
 
Overwhelmingly positive SOCIT/VARE course trainee feedback. They were happy 
overall with the course design despite limited resources and despite their criticisms 
outlined shortly. Overwhelmingly positive trainee responses to the course were 
provided through both feedback forms and the online questionnaire. The 
questionnaire responses indicated that all the surveyed trainees agreed that a specialist 
sexual assault course was necessary and 37 (84%) said refresher training would be 
valuable. Some 32 respondents (73%) rated the SOCIT/VARE course as excellent in 
relevance to their work-role and another 11 (25%) rated it as good in this respect, with 
one rating it as neutral. A total of 16 survey respondents (36%) were satisfied and 27 
(61%) were extremely satisfied with the course, (with one nil response). From course 
feedback sheets both course content and delivery were very well regarded by trainees, 
who were especially enthusiastic in their praise of the training team members as well 
as a few of the external presenters. The following quotations are typical of trainee 
opinions: 
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I regard this course as the best course I have participated in 20 years. I value 
the techniques taught and (I am) genuinely excited about using same, I think 
I am better prepared to attend to victim needs and take a broader approach to 
offenders (feedback sheet comment). 
 
My interview skills have improved out of sight and I am more empathetic 
towards victims now, particularly ones who seem to keep placing themselves 
in compromising situations as I have a better understanding of why this 
happens. I also judge victims less on the way they react to situations (survey 
response). 
 
Ability to 'teach' in an adult environment was excellent. At no time did I feel 
undervalued, a failure, incompetent etc which has been the case in previous 
courses (feedback sheet comment). 
 
(I) have been able to better understand inconsistencies in victims’ accounts 
and point out the effects of trauma on memory to colleagues and prosecutors 
(survey response). 
 
Other feedback comments included: “(T)he course far exceeded my expectations”; 
“one of the best courses I have done”;  “enjoyable, extremely worthwhile”; “best 
course that I have done for a long time”; “definitely worthwhile course”; “I’ve 
thoroughly enjoyed it”; “great course, well done”; “fantastic course”; “great course”; 
“fantastic, thoroughly enjoyed it”; and “well run, well prepared, positive learning 
environment”, among other similar compliments. All of these comments came from 
different trainees, indicating the strong consensus of positive opinion from the trainee 
viewpoint. Notably, many of the trainees were especially impressed with the main 
trainer, although other training team members also received their share of accolades. 
It is also notable that trainees were especially impressed with the PJO project head 
who was one of the external speakers, providing typical comments such as “edge of 
seat”, “pin drop stuff”, “fantastic”, “inspirational”, “empowering” among many other 
similar reactions. Trainees said other presenters were generally professional, very 
knowledgeable and competent. Both VicPol trainers and external presenters were seen 
as passionate and committed to their teaching. 
 
Trainee comments on weaknesses and potential improvements of the course. 
Trainees were asked to provide feedback also on weaknesses and potential 
improvements. Instances of the main comments in these respects include the 
following. Some outside presenters were considered below par, did not recognise their 
audience was composed of detectives and thus failed to tailor their delivery 
appropriately. (In this respect, RO interviewees also expressed a similar view that 
VicPol used trainers who had much theoretical knowledge of their particular 
discipline but little understanding of how it actually applied to police work and 
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practice). Location and room layout were not considered optimal by many trainees, 
with more Academy based sessions and fewer external venues considered necessary. 
Some of the role-playing was “way too ridiculous for the target audience” and some 
of the content could have been better structured to the session time available. Also, 
some of the outside sessions were seen as irrelevant and a Gay and Lesbian Liaison 
Office speaker was mentioned as unnecessary in view of audience work experience. 
VARE training was most often mentioned by trainees as deficient in terms of practice 
and equipment. Lectures/theory were said to be better placed as morning sessions 
with practice sessions in the afternoon, and more practice sessions were seen as 
valuable. 
 
Caveats to trainee feedback. Many of these and other perceived course weaknesses 
can be readily addressed by course staff. However, any changes to content and 
presenter specifics should bear in mind that trainees did not all agree on these 
specifics and trainees are not the ‘font of all wisdom’ as to what is indeed valuable – a 
point that is highlighted by their views on false reporting discussed shortly. Also, 
obviously, there can be real practical constraints that trainees are unaware of to 
making changes. For example, SOCIT Course trainers cannot usually specify who 
should represent an agency as an outside speaker or what they present, commenting 
that “we get outside presenters that we don't have a lot of control over their method or 
style of presentation” (in-depth interview, 2011). 
 
Further, some trainee perceived course weaknesses require a commitment from 
VicPol in resourcing and policy direction. Primary among these was that the four 
weeks block was seen as too long and demanded too much of trainees to put into 
practice all in one grasp. There was mixed opinion among the survey respondents on 
this aspect, some saying the course should be reduced to three weeks, others wanting 
different content that would still justify the four week course, and most being happy 
with the current duration and content. Also trainees perceived venue, equipment and 
practice session improvements that would require policy and/or resource decisions. 
Since these aspects were quite varied in their specifics they are not detailed here, but 
left to the training team to follow-up.  
 
Trainers’ views. Trainers stated that they would prefer to deliver the course over a 
longer period and within a training/work experience model that allowed work place 
experiences to be brought back to the classroom in between sessions, rather than 
having a four week block. Some trainees agreed, for example: “(I) would have 
preferred it to be broken up into two week groups so you can return to your work 
group and practice it and then move on to the next phase” (survey respondent). 
Interestingly, four survey respondents considered the course could be shortened to 
three weeks by deleting irrelevant or already known materials. 
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Under-resourcing of the SOCIT course. The SOCIT course was under-resourced in 
terms of facilities, equipment and people. This was confirmed by trainers, trainees and 
observations by the researcher. “There are some practical issues … the academy is too 
full and I can't get rooms when I want them and our students can't live at the 
academy” (SOCIT trainer). The course also did not have a clear and coherent 
structure which was evidenced from the lack of a course outline and framework for 
assessment/qualification and the disjointed provision of course documents. One 
survey respondent, for example, referred to the course being “all over the shop”. The 
SOCIT training team worked hard and ‘made do’ to deliver what they could within 
the resource constraints. Trainers advised at interview that trainees were now 
provided a hard copy folder containing a majority of course materials at the 
commencement of the course.  
 
AQF problematics. Still, while VicPol is a Registered Training Provider (RTO) 
accredited under the Australian Quality Framework (AQF), trainers do not apply any 
AQF principles to this course. The course structure and how assessment/qualification 
was attained was sent in a few emails with some attachments. Notes were handed out 
randomly in class, or some before, all of which was muddled and hard to follow or 
collate by the PJO researcher. 
 
CALD and Indigenous groups. In respect to course content (see Appendix 16), 
notwithstanding trainees’ glowing opinions there was relatively little attention 
devoted to CALD and Indigenous groups despite the VLRC’s (2004) 
recommendation. When asked about this, a trainer said “instead of giving them 
knowledge about CALD we're giving them skills about how to get that knowledge 
when they need it, because that's what we think will be more helpful.” Regarding 
indigenous communities, trainers said there are “a unique set of circumstances” in 
each area of the State that requires “engaging in certain ways” with each group or 
community and that cannot be dealt with adequately within a generic four-week 
training course. 
 
SOCIT training on best practice interviewing. SOCIT training did, however, address 
issues relating to best practice police response in terms of interviewing victims with a 
cognitive impairment. Trainees were coached and assessed with a battery of tools by 
external, qualified Speech Pathologists for competency in this regard. Assessors 
employed an assessment tool and assessed a trainee’s achieved level of competency in 
relevant interpersonal and interviewing skills, and strategies for overcoming 
communication breakdowns. If the required competency level was not met a trainee 
would be provided with further learning opportunity.     
 
SOCIT training on false reports. On the first day of each SOCIT training course, 
part of the introductory session (approximately 20 minutes) was dedicated to the 
topic of false reporting by complainants. During this session trainees were asked for 
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their beliefs as to the amount of false reports of sexual assault made to police. The 
researcher’s observation of this session showed that at least one third of the trainees 
believed more than 20% of reports of sexual assault are false. Trainers discussed the 
topic and revealed that research has found that only 2–5 % of reports are false. 
Trainers explained during the in-depth interview that several core attitudes are 
worked on throughout the course focused on trainees coming to accept that sexual 
assault is a specialized field of policing; that it involves complex cases “with its own 
special challenges that are fairly unique”; that it requires them to understand “what is 
a good result and for whom”; and for them to identify with and “work actively to 
increase the status of these particular types of investigations”. 
 
Adverse trainee views on false reports subsequent to training inputs. Importantly, 
findings about police attitudes on false reporting were identified from the non-
participant observation of training sessions and from the on-line questionnaire returns, 
the latter of which post-dated the six courses conducted within the research period, 
including the course observed by the researcher (see also s. 4.6). In this respect, the 
on-line questionnaire - administered after the course, on the return of SOCIT trainees 
to their work place - asked: “In your experience, and from what you have learned 
from colleagues, what percentage of reports of sexual assault made to police do you 
believe are false?” Some 30 (68%) SOCIT trainees answered the question with an 
actual figure. Twelve trainees responded that 5% or less of sexual assault complaints 
are false; nine said 10% of complaints were false; two said 20%; and seven 25% or 
more, with one of those respondents indicating that 80% of complaints were false and 
three of those saying 50% were false. Of the remaining 14 trainees, seven were non-
committal; five said few, very few or very, very few; one said “too many”; and 
another a “high proportion”. Several responded also with comments, variously 
referring to attention-seeking and cries for help; exaggerations rather than deliberate 
lies; mistaken beliefs; blatant lies; and hidden agendas and motivated by “financial 
gain, spite or revenge”. For example: 
 
80%. And I justify this as 80% of victims don’t tell us all the facts. Some 
blatantly lie and others bend the truth. 
 
At my level as a senior investigator - more than half the reports/cases (my) 
crew investigates turn out to be false reports! 
 
This office has had 2 this year... that would equate to less than 1%. I think it 
is important to understand that sometimes people report what they believe 
may be a sexual assault which, after investigation, shows that no offence 
occurred. We do have quite a few of these... but it doesn't mean they are false 
reports! The only way to determine what has occurred is to properly 
investigate the event/incident reported to police. 
  
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 290 
While many were of this last view, the above figures clearly indicate that a significant 
percentage of trainees did not absorb or did not accept the research literature findings 
and continued to hold false and highly prejudicial beliefs that adversely impact at the 
outset their likely approach to sexual assault victims. This was despite the fact that the 
course was generally extremely well received by trainees and despite the eulogistic 
commentary on the content and delivery of the session by the PJO project head. This 
result strongly indicates that the SOCIT training course is ineffectual in one of its key 
learning and skill goals, if not the most critical of the goals to be expected from 
course outputs. Further, this is even before the extra regressive impact of ‘on-the-job’ 
counter-learning established in the research corpus as often following trainees’ 
adaptation to the sexual assault policing workplace culture. This finding is consistent 
with the literature that training to date has had a negligible if any positive effect on 
attitudes (Lonsway et al., 2001; Stevens, 2006). It is also consistent with the strand 
one findings in relation to views expressed by victims (ss. 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) and CASA 
counsellors (s. 5.2 and 5.5). 
 
Need for a ‘double loop learning’ model of training. In this respect particularly 
therefore, while trainees saw the course as extremely valuable, it is apparent that there 
is a need to re-think the SOCIT/VARE course, and the VicPol trainers’ thoughts on 
re-designing it to allow for a work experience return to the training environment is a 
sound alternative model. Such a model would incorporate double loop learning as 
suggested by Jamel et al. (2008) and it would provide for an opportunity to challenge 
anew on-the-job counter learning and to consolidate the evidence-based learning from 
the SOCIT/VARE training sessions. Part of that learning renewal and reinforcement 
of sound practice would come from fellow trainees who had absorbed and 
successfully put into practice initial training benefits. Peer learning of this sort is a 
well-known powerful tool in successful training programs and equally powerful as a 
tool for poor learning if allowed to exist in the workplace for any length of time (cf. 
Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994). That peer learning would be enhanced greatly if 
officers were screened initially to select only those with aptitude to work in this area 
and avoid those with poor baseline attitudes from the beginning. 
 
Need for a comprehensive evaluation framework. Finally, it is apparent that the 
existing trainee feedback sheets are a valuable means of assessing course activities 
along with training team observations, however this is not undertaken within a 
systematic framework grounded in the training and development literature. A more 
comprehensive, best practice evaluation framework could be installed through 
judicious reading of the training and development literature.  
 
Neglected value of the Crime Investigative Guidelines – Sexual Crimes. It is also 
notable that the Victoria Police (2010) Crime Investigative Guidelines – Sexual 
Crimes v 1.1, aside from being an informative and valuable document of much of best 
practice sexual assault policing, also provides part of a sound basis for assessing 
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SOCIT/VARE training effectiveness and trainee evaluation – e.g., with reference to 
principles underpinning investigations (Victoria Police, 2010, pp. 19-20); 
consideration and care of the victim (pp. 30-36); principles of sexual assault 
investigations (pp. 67-68); options talk that engages victims rather than having a 
detrimental impact on the investigation (pp. 78-80); interviewing of victims (pp. 87-
88); and interviewing suspects (pp. 88-90). The guidelines were the subject of one 80 
minute session in the SOCIT course, however trainees were not provided a copy of 
the document, and they were advised to access it from the VicPol Intranet. The 
guidelines were not examined in any detail, nor referenced and utilized systematically 
throughout the course. 
  
Neglect of the ‘options talk’. Options talk was also not a focused topic, but rather the 
subject of a few passing comments, thus leaving trainees to develop their individual 
understanding of its policy meaning and application. It is recalled that strand one 
findings included police utilising the options talk in ways that actively discouraged 
some victims to suit police in terms of maximising limited resources, or police using 
it in ways they thought benevolent to prevent reporting from victims they felt were 
either not up to the process or for whom the courts or jurors would not favour (s. 4.5). 
All of the other Guideline materials were incorporated into the syllabus, providing the 
basis for majority of the course, albeit not being clearly referenced as such. Thus it 
would be quite easy to explicitly acknowledge and utilize the Guidelines as a learning 
and assessment framework grounded within the Training and Development literature. 
 
Utility of the Sexual Assault Code of Practice. As well, the relevant materials of the 
Sexual Assault Code of Practice (Victoria Police, 2005) can be fruitfully conjoined 
with the investigative guidelines to reinforce to trainees the intents of Victoria Police 
policy and need for compliance with the same in everyday sexual assault 
investigations. Yet the Code was also provided to trainees only as an attachment with 
one of the pre-course emails, and it was barely mentioned in the course, nor compared 
or discussed in conjunction with the guidelines. Minimal attention was given to these 
documents, thus diluting their otherwise considerable authority and significance. 
Several other documents were also provided to trainees, but not referred to during the 
course at all, including the Human Rights Charter Act 2006, Charter of Human Rights 
Booklet, Victims Charter Act 2006 and the Victims Charter Fact Sheet. These 
documents could be also be conjoined with the investigative guidelines to reinforce 
how investigators have an individual responsibility in relation to sexual offences.  
  




Re-design of the SOCIT  training program should build on current strengths and 
points of excellence. Notwithstanding this recommendation, it was apparent as 
indicated previously that the SOCIT course as it stands was extremely well received 
in terms of its instructors and existing content, and recognition of that fact should not 
be lost. The following quotation from one trainee feedback sheet sums up much of the 
trainee viewpoint: 
 
(T)he most rewarding course I've attended with VicPol (including DTS). 
Made me want to get a socit position asap and do the role and the position 
justice and pride. Made me want to challenge bad habits and bad attitudes, 
without feeling like ive[sic] been preached to. Has made me reflect on 
previous ‘jobs' and wish I could start again. TB, MB and PT are an asset to 
VicPol and the course. ALWAYS approachable and willing to be challenged 
by naturally cynical police members. Very, very memorable and credible and 
knowlegable [sic] presenters. Overall, content was very relevant, informative 
and sometimes entertaining. The review at the end a great way to tie the 
course/critiques together. 
 
Re-design should therefore build on the existing strengths of the course and not 
‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’. A key strength of the SOCIT course has been 
the involvement of external teachers and experts, a best practice element found and 
recommended in the literature (e.g., Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Jamel et al., 2008; 
HMCPSI & HMIC, 2002; Lord & Rassel, 2000; Stevens, 2006). The knowledge and 
expertise of up to 18 outside presenters were utilized on each course. These included 
presenters from cognitively impaired volunteers; CASA; victims/survivors; Speech 
Pathologists; VIFM; a Psychiatrist; M.I.N.D Guest Speaker (mental health); Specialist 
Sex Offences Unit (OPP); County Court; Witness Assistance Service and Policy & 
Special Hearings. Presenters were also drawn from within VicPol, including from a 
local police station; Cultural Diversity/MLO; Gay Lesbian Liaison Officer (GLLO); 
the Mental Health Strategy Unit; Sexual Crimes Squad; a legislation specialist; and 
the Police Psychology Unit. Clearly, this represents a sound range of external and 
internal presenters which is a strong feature of the course. In future course design, the 
RECOMMENDATION: The Victoria Police sexual assault training course 
should be re-designed and upgraded to enable challenging of SOCIT unit 
placement antithetical re-learning and poor practices; to consolidate initial learning 
through trainee reports of positive practice effects; and to facilitate construction 
and implementation of an even more robust system for evaluating the course and 
trainees’ learning accomplishments with reference to the Victoria Police (2010) 
Crime Investigative Guidelines – Sexual Crimes v 1.1 and the Sexual Assault Code 
of Practice (Victoria Police 2005). Re-design should take advantage of the benefits 
of a module-based framework in course delivery and evaluation.  
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aim should be to seek the return of those not commented upon as ‘poor’ presenters 
and, if feasible, not invite back the others.  
  
Additionally, as shown in the next section, mentor training of new investigators is 
common in the field, albeit not formally structured and over-sighted as part of an 
ongoing professional development program. This is another best practice element 
identified in the literature (e.g., Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994), although it can become 
a ‘double-edged’ sword of inculcating poor local cultural attitudes and practices if not 
subject to quality control monitoring from non-local SOCIT personnel (cf, HMCPSI 
& HMIC, 2002; Stevens, 2006). 
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9.1.3 Other perspectives on Victoria police sexual assault training and 
knowledge, skills and aptitudes  
 
The 2011 LEAP case file research evidence revealed a potential for documentation 
and argumentation improvements in authorisation and non-authorisation decision-
making. The SOCIT/VARE training course should include components accordingly, 
although those would need to be sensitively addressed so as not to provoke a ‘don’t 
teach us how to suck eggs’ reaction from trainees, a response that was elicited from a 
number of trainees by a few presenters. 
 
Uni-focal argument. The case file data showed that uni-focal argument in particular 
needs redress through examples in training to significantly strengthen Brief 
preparation, whether for or against prosecution. The criteria in these regards 
developed and discussed in Chapter Eight allow for the opportunity to learn from the 
past so as to continuously improve for the future. It is important to include in any 
Brief preparation ‘best practice’ model not only ‘good’ examples but also ‘bad’ 
examples, not only ‘what to do’ but also ‘what not to do’, and in relation to both 
authorisation and non-authorisation arguments. Positive case examples have dynamics 
and characteristics that do not necessarily coincide with those of poorly executed 
Brief preparations. It is also important to ensure that training covers a wide range of 
practical and up-to-date case illustrations. In this respect, an AO said that both 
successful and unsuccessful trial matters should be drawn to the attention of SOCITs 
to ensure understanding of Court outcomes as these change over time, and these could 
also be profitably fed into SOCIT/VARE training.  
 
SOCIT trainers’ views. Notably, at the in-depth interview, SOCIT trainers did not 
support refresher training, stating: 
 
We're developing a continual improvement strategy.  We haven't got it 
signed off yet.  Refresher training is not really the way to go, because it's – 
the attrition of the skill is too – you can't train that many people that often 
without forcing too much of a drain on both this office, but also on 
operational members.  So we're looking at embedding it into a learning 
culture (SOCIT trainer 1). 
 
But it's in development.  Certainly – we've talked about refresher training for 
a long time, and what we've talked about, I think, is – as (other trainer) said, 
"refresher training" is probably the wrong term.  It's a way – it's a system of 
maintaining.  It's a system of developing those people to do it in the 
workplace.  It's hard enough to get people out for four weeks. Then to then 
say to them twice a year, for example, you have to come back for two or 
three days or – or for more refreshing training. (SOCIT trainer 2). 




Similar to the strand one finding from police interviews in 2010 that police mentioned 
wanting in-service training as part of their ongoing training in this area (s. 4.6.1), 
SOCIT course trainers spoke about what they would like to see in an ideal world: 
 
We would go out and do interventions in their office. I don't know that it 
would be training, but it would be interventions in the office. And there 
would be – I mean, if it was an ideal world we would have a feedback 
assessment loop as well… but generally, in general terms, there's either a 
lack of time or a lack of expertise or a lack of knowledge to be able to do that 
within workplaces” (SOCIT trainer). 
 
Organisational costs and alternative training models. Implicit in these comments is 
a question of organisational costs not only in direct budget terms but also in terms of 
organizing ‘that many people’ out of local SOCITs on a frequent basis. Yet the view 
seems to be uninformed as to how regular and in what ways refresher training could 
be provided, appearing, for example, to see this as a once or even twice yearly input 
of two or three days at a central venue. An alternative refresher training model might 
involve fewer yearly days ‘out of the field’, along with use of training videos, self-
motivated learning, scenario and other trainee educational assignments, and internet 
and intranet facilities. 
 
Culture and the Learning Organisation. The notion of ‘embedding it in culture’ does 
not sit well with the research evidence that culture itself, including at the local SOCIT 
unit level, remains a challenge of some proportions. Leaving the ‘refresher’ input as a 
cultural change effort could be doomed from the start. Again, the idea of ‘embedding 
it in learning culture’ misunderstands the concept of a Learning Organisation, which 
does not refer to technical training inputs but rather to a widely spread attitude of 
mind and organisational mechanisms for encouraging and ensuring organisational 
members are prepared and willing to learn new ways of doing jobs, thinking 
creatively and critically about their existing work routines and, indeed, actively 
seeking out new ways of learning. 
 
Refresher training and excellence of the existing ‘brand’. In the literature, refresher 
courses were identified as an essential element of sexual assault training for 
investigators (HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007; Kinney et al., 2007), and this should also be 
included as part of the SOCIT/VARE training framework, although not necessarily 
conducted at the Academy as suggested in the foregoing paragraphs. Given the 
overwhelmingly positive trainee feedback on SOCIT/VARE trainers it would be well 
to build upon their existing excellent ‘brand’ rather than use a separate team and 
training regime. It would also be useful to have SOCIT/VARE trainers exposed to 
alternative training models other than simply central classroom venues etc. 
 





Training needs identified by police interviewees. The case file findings were 
supported through triangulation regarding results from strand two interviews and 
focus groups conducted in late 2011. The interviewed investigators reported that they 
were neither experienced nor trained, except for DTS and sexual assault experience as 
a detective, ranging from three to 22 years. (Notably, this point was made by the 2010 
SOCAU and SOCIT focus groups conducted in strand one - that is, earlier trained 
specialists saw themselves as inadequately trained, so refresher and top-up training 
are necessary for experienced specialists who have not benefited from the later, 
enhanced SOCIT course – see s. 4.6.1). On the job, asking questions, and getting a 
copy of someone’s Brief were mentioned as the main means of learning. Some said 
they were due to undertake SOCIT training in early 2012. Mention was also made of 
an OPP package on how to do sexual assault Briefs, along with occasional OPP 
training sessions. Both these were seen as valuable, but work demands and being new 
to SOCIT prevented investigators taking full advantage of them. 
 
Specific training needs identified by ROs and AOs. ROs said there is specific 
training required in sexual assault matters, including cultural issues, and “you’ve 
probably got to be a little bit more in touch emotionally”. They also said they had no 
training in sexual assault Brief supervision and considered this would be worthwhile. 
AOs likewise typically reported in interview that they received no training specific to 
sexual assault Brief authorisation, however have seen the need for that as they have 
accumulated experience in the job, and any Brief preparation or supervision training 
was ‘old’ and no longer offered. They would value training although some saw 
problems with not enough time and thought that it would be best left as telephone 
feedback from the OPP relating to each Brief and outcomes after trials. Additional 
training is necessary for those ROs and AOs who have not been sufficiently or at all 
trained in the specific sexual assault area. Again, the literature has shown additional 
training - separate from refresher training - to be a key element of a comprehensive 
and effective training regime in the area of sexual assault policing (Kinney et al., 
2007; Lonsway et al., 2001). 
   
A specific example of this sort of training need was given by one AO who said a 
training regime for sexual assault Brief authorisation needs to take account of some 
victims being quite competent in their statement of complaint yet incompetent at trial 
when faced with cross-examination, whereas the opposite holds true for other victims. 
This point of not being able to easily rely on a victim’s presentation at the time of 
complaint/statement to predict later performance at trial was made by several police 
RECOMMENDATION: VicPol trainers should be provided with advice from 
experts in the field of training and development in how to alter VicPol’s current 
training framework to optimize refresher training. 
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interviewees. Again, this links with strand one findings on how options talk was given 
by police to victims they felt presented poorly even before taking a statement 
consequent to subjective judgements about victim stamina and worthiness and thus 
screening out cases or outright discouraging victims from reporting (s. 4.5). 
 
However, there was no focus on the preparation of Briefs of evidence, or any other 
written documents at the SOCIT Course. A legitimate argument here was that these 
items were excluded as already being covered in Detective Training School. Yet it is 
apparent from AO and RO comments that specialized Brief preparation is required for 
sexual matters and as such, specialized training in preparing, supervising and 
authorizing the same would be advantageous. Further, the manual entry of data into 
VicPol systems (e.g., Interpose) is not included in SOCIT training. This aspect might 
be covered in a generalist training course, however all police interviewees and focus 
groups were also adamant that Interpose and computer skills training were especially 
inadequate, resulting in real problems doing this aspect of the work, which need 
redress in specific training.  
 
Tapping the thoughts and experience of specialist police. There are likely to be 
many small ‘gems of wisdom’ such as the above in the minds of experienced sexual 
assault police officers at all levels that could be tapped further than currently done for 
both basic and later training purposes. These could be picked up in a training audit 
and training needs analysis for future courses, which would be appropriately 
undertaken at this juncture now that the SOCIT model has been completely rolled out 
across the State. 
 
A problem in data-collection in these regards was the VicPol restriction of researchers 
to interviewing only police officers who had not already undertaken ‘whole-of-story’ 
training (s. 2.4). However, evaluation of the SOCIT/VARE sexual assault training 
course demonstrated continuing attitudinal deficits on the part of graduates. Also, 
ROs and AOs mentioned that investigators were inadequately trained for the job of 
sexual assault policing; and the OPP focus group referred to informants not being 
trained, for example in relation to inappropriate disclosure of information to defence 
lawyers. These sources thus further confirmed the currency of continuing training 
deficits or, at least, that training was not being carried over into workplace practice. 
Furthermore, training needs of specialist police were also identified in these and/or 
other respects by victim/survivors, CASA counsellors and police themselves in the 
strand one research (ss. 3.5; 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6; and 4.6.1 respectively), demonstrating 
their persistence over recent years. 
 




Specific elements of specialist sexual assault policing that need inclusion  in 
training. As discussed earlier (s. 8.3), the emotional aspect of the policing of sexual 
assault was mentioned by investigators, ROs and AOs as a distinctive element, which 
does not characterise most other crimes. That is, the intensity and nature of sexual 
assault victims’ emotional suffering is unique. There is also an emotional drain on 
investigators. Sexual assaults were commonly said to be especially different in being 
so personal and intimate, having a life-long impact upon victims, involving a need for 
victim and witness statements that are often lengthy and complicated, and being 
‘fought hard’ by defendants due to their likely imprisonment and the stigma of the 
crime itself. Other features peculiar to sexual assault investigations were also 
emphasised by interviewees and focus groups – e.g., absence of a monetary value 
placed on the offending; heightened sense of police accountability to survivors; 
complex victim reactions; lengthy duration of offence episodes; and a requirement for 
objectivity and balance in highly emotionally charged situations that differs from that 
in other investigations (see s. 8.3). There is a need for specialist training in this area as 
a result that focuses upon these elements in particular.  
 
The current SOCIT/VARE course is underpinned by the ‘whole story’ approach 
which uses distinct elements of this crime type to re-define how police are trained to 
look at, investigate and present findings specifically for sexual offences. That is, the 
training has significant elements dedicated to the specialization of this crime type, 
such as sex offender theory and specialist offender interview techniques. Yet it is 
evident that the uniqueness of sexual offending from the victim’s viewpoint is lost on 
many trainees given the above discussed continuing attitudinal barriers and training 
inadequacies observed by ROs, AOs and OPP lawyers, as well as strand one findings 
(see ss. 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.4.4 and 4.5). 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION: A Training Audit and Training Needs Analysis (TNA) - 
complete with learning objectives and evaluation criteria - should be undertaken to 
identify the refresher and additional sexual assault learning requirements of 
existing SOCIT police at all levels. As part of a TNA, the bank of existing practice 
wisdom of experienced officers should be tapped and taken into the design of 
future training courses.  
RECOMMENDATION: Accreditation of the SOCIT course should be conducted 
bi-annually by a panel constituted of a representative of the SOCIT training team 
and members drawn from a state-wide network monitoring body (see s. 7.4). 
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Critical elements of a sexual assault police training program. On the basis of the 
case file, interview and focus group findings, as well as strand one research results, 
critical elements of training for sexual assault policing can be itemized as follows: 
 Comparative uniqueness of sexual assault policing and Brief preparation 
o Emotional aspects 
o Victim impacts, including stigma and life-long effects 
o Offence features such as lengthy duration 
o Police impacts, including heightened sense of accountability, need for 
balance between caring for victim and investigation objectivity 
 Statement taking 
 Interviewing offenders in a way that gains their cooperation and does not 
make them defensive 
 Brief preparation, supervision and authorisation skills 
 Case studies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ examples of Briefs  
 ‘Whole-of-story’ training 
 Legislation and case law, including historical amendments etc 
 Need to consider each victim and complaint on its own merits as well as to 
frame it within known parameters of past ‘successes’ at Court 
 Assessing victims’ competencies and capabilities in Court room performance 
and evidence giving under cross-examination 
 Sensitivity and reflexivity, self-awareness in respect to police officers’ 
personal values and attitudes 
 Research literature 
o Attrition rates 
o Factors associated with non-authorisation 
o The role of rape myths, typifications and taken-for-granted beliefs  
o Delayed reporting, reasons why victims are reluctant to report 
o Cultural aspects of sexual assault complaints and barriers to reporting 
o Strategies for encouraging and supporting victims to continue with 
complaints 
 VARE training 
 Interpose and computer skills 
 Familiarity and partnering with CASA and other network players and local 
victim support agencies 
 
Although some of these elements overlap with other areas of policing, they are 
distinctive in form and/or process. These elements are presented in Table 9.1 
identifying the current status of each in terms of SOCIT/VARE training. 
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Table 9.1: Critical Training Elements, SOCIT Status and Action/Comment. 
 
Critical Training Element SOCIT 
Status 
Action / Comment 
Comparative uniqueness of sexual assault policing 
and Brief preparation 
Missing Include session and assessment on 
Brief preparation for sexual offences 
including LEAP and case management 
Emotional aspects Included Explained well in Victimology 
Victim impacts Improve CASA & victim speakers to continue 
Provide resources to Investigators to 
provide to victims/survivors – e.g.: 
Surviving the Legal System by Prof. 
S. Caroline Taylor 
Offence features such as lengthy duration Included Covered 
Police impacts  Included Covered 
Statement taking Improve Whole-of-story approach suggested as 
way of getting victims to tell their 
story and interviewing vulnerable 
witnesses, lengthy, but no actual 
training on how to take statement  
Interviewing offenders in a way that gains their 
cooperation  
Included Suspect Rapport Building & Planning 
session 
Brief preparation, supervision and authorisation 
skills 
Missing Not discussed specific to sexual 
offences 
Case studies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ examples of Briefs  Missing Include real examples 
‘Whole-of-story’ training Included Well received by trainees 
Legislation and case law, including historical 
amendments etc 
Improve Include practical exercises 
Need to consider each victim and complaint on its 
own merits as well as to frame it within known 
parameters of past ‘successes’ at Court 
Improve OPP visit included discussion around 
progression through CJS, however 
give real case examples 
Assessing victims’ competencies and capabilities in 
Court room performance and evidence giving under 
cross-examination 
Improve Competency to give evidence 
discussed regarding only child and 
cognitively impaired victims  
Sensitivity and reflexivity, self-awareness in respect 




This is not always translated into 
attitudinal change 
Research literature Improve Provide relevant reading list and 
access to materials to trainees 
Attrition rates Improve Not a point of focus 
Factors associated with non-authorisation Improve Not a point of focus 
The role of rape myths, typifications and taken-for-
granted beliefs  
Improve Attitudes remain unchanged or poorly 
towards victims 
Delayed reporting, reasons why victims are 
reluctant to report 
Included Covered well in Victimology 
Cultural aspects of sexual assault complaints and 
barriers to reporting 
Improve Only one generic session by 
Multicultural Liaison – inadequate 
Strategies for encouraging and supporting victims to 
continue with complaints 
Improve As above, give tools to police to give 
to victims eg: C Taylor Book - 
Surviving the Legal System 
VARE training Improve High demand for more practice with 
VARE Equipment - facilities 
inadequate 
Interpose and computer skills Missing Include with practical exercises 
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Familiarity and partnering with CASA and other 




Presented well – continue – add detail 
and provide local resource directories 
to trainees relevant to their particular 
SOCITs. Also, CALD and Indigenous 
groups neglected 
 
9.2 Recruiting into SOCIT units and developing police for the future 
A comprehensive training and development framework entails not only base training 
to adequately equip sexual assault investigators prior to entry to the field, but also 
robust recruitment procedures with defined selection criteria prior to base training 
(Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007; Lord & Rassel, 2000), and 
ongoing professional development in terms of additional and refresher training after 
entry to the field (HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007; Kinney et al., 2007; Lonsway et al., 
2001). The following section deals with the front-end and back-end of a best practice 
sexual assault policing investigation and Brief preparation regime in relation to 
Victoria. 
 
9.2.1 Recruiting into SOCIT units 
 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that the field conditions of investigation and 
preparation of sexual assault Briefs were at least partly responsible for mono-
directional police decision-making, including particularly in formal non-authorisation 
argument (s. 8.3). However, it was apparent from RO and AO interviews that this was 
not the sole explanation.  
 
Problematic recruitment of specialist sexual assault police. From these interviews, 
there is strong evidence that recruitment of investigators in particular has been 
problematic, as indicated in earlier discussion (ss. 7.4 and 8.4). For instance, one AO 
recounted: “I know a few who've gone to it (SOCIT) and I wouldn't trust them with a 
victim or a Brief because of their attitudes or simply that they do sloppy work.” 
Further, a number of ROs and AOs indicated that too often investigators have been 
‘press-ganged’ into SOCIT units. It was put that VicPol personnel implementing 
SOCIT “tell us that we now need (a certain number of) detectives from CIU to go to it 
and if they don't volunteer they'll just point the finger at who goes” (AO). 
Consequently, it was said that investigators are taken into SOCIT who do not have the 
appropriate motivation, attitudes or commitment to do the onerous and specific kind 
of work involved in sexual assault policing. The OPP focus group referred similarly 
to informants who are not really interested and who “have an attitude that once it gets 
to trial it's our responsibility”. That is, some are not genuinely committed to this form 
of specialist policing, and some even have antithetical values in relation to women 
and sexuality issues. A related recruiting problem identified was the employment of 
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part-time police officers in a work-role that demands a full-time (and often over-time) 
commitment. For example:  
 
(W)e've got part time people here, most of them are women because they've 
got kids and that and that's fine but this job now doesn’t suit that. It probably 
did when it was SOCA and it was victim centred and taking statements but 
now they’re supposed to handle the victim and all the statements and handle 
the offender and do the investigation and that includes field investigation and 
the forensics and all that and we've got women here working part time saying 
'well I can't do that, I have to leave at 2.30 to pick up my kids' or a victim 
comes in at 2pm and they won't handle them because they want to get out of 
here in half an hour or you need investigation matters done and they can’t 
follow through because they only work (so many) days a week so it either 
doesn't get done and so it gets stuffed up or we have to take it from the part 
timers. It doesn't work. The whole idea is focus and consistency and it 
doesn’t happen (AO). 
 
This view was supported by the Success Works (2011) finding that several part-time 
SOCAU members (all women) were concerned about becoming SOCIT detectives, 
with a need to manage the workload (including court appearances and follow-up 
detective work) within a part-time work allocation; and a number of SOCAU 
members indicated they were much more interested in the victim/survivor-focused 
work and not at all interested in being a detective. Some of the officers interviewed in 
the Success Works (2011) research also mentioned the potential difficulty of not 
being able to reconcile the inherent role conflict between being ‘impartial’ and 
analytical in dealing with the evidence and their ability to show that they believed the 
victim/survivor. This was also a matter mentioned by police interviewees in strand 
one (s. 4.6). 
 
Furthermore, from the AO interviews there is evidence that ROs recruited to perform 
the complex and demanding duties of overseeing sexual assault investigations and 
Brief preparations are not always suitable for the role. The aptitude and skills of some 
senior police officers in this work-role have also been called into question. 
 
As canvassed earlier, appropriate recruitment policies and procedures have been 
discussed in the literature as an essential first step to effective policing of sexual 
assault (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007; Lord & Rassel, 
2000). The PJO research evidence clearly shows this crucial first step is too often 
circumvented in current SOCIT recruitment practice. Aside from creating morale 
problems, this results in poor sexual assault investigations and contributes to 
antithetical local SOCIT cultures. In turn, SOCIT/VARE training, the Crime 
Investigative Guidelines – Sexual Crimes v 1.1 (Victoria Police, 2010) and the Sexual 
Assault Code of Practice (Victoria Police, 2005) are ‘white-anted’ and left without the 
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force and authority that is their due and that is expected by the general public. 
Eventually, the repercussions of poor recruitment are played out in the open courts of 
public opinion and emerge as major police image problems in the media and public 
arena. In this respect, it has been noted that driving organisational change in policing 
(as elsewhere) requires appropriate changes to incentive systems and procedures 
relating to reward and promotions as well performance review (e.g., Chappell, 2009; 
Ikerd, 2010). To help redress this situation it is necessary to employ contemporary 
management performance and remuneration principles, for example those relating to 
strategic human resource management, including 360º appraisal systems linked to 
organisational goals and objectives such as a defined percentage reduction in attrition 






RECOMMENDATION: The SOCIT recruitment process should be overhauled 
and brought up to best practice standards, including defined and robust selection 
criteria that ensure only aptly motivated police officers are taken into SOCIT 
teams. 
RECOMMENDATION: SOCIT graduates should receive an annually renewable 
appraisal-linked certificate of SOCIT detective practice status along with a 
premium remuneration package attached to that annual status. 
RECOMMENDATION: VicPol should develop and implement a 360° 
performance appraisal system for SOCIT police that includes feedback from sexual 
assault complainants as well as from peers and immediate superiors. This system 
should produce annual appraisals that contribute to whether or not individual 
officers remain SOCIT members. Consistently under-performing officers should 
be transferred out of SOCIT and lose their premium remuneration benefits in the 
train of departure. 
RECOMMENDATION: Appropriately de-identified appraisals and related 
statistics should be made available to a state-wide network monitoring body for 
review and advice (see ss. 7.4 & 9.1.2). 
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9.2.2 Developing SOCIT police for the future 
 
(E)ducation and training is going to be really important, I think, with the 
people that can authorise Briefs. Interesting enough, there are 12 senior 
sergeants, now, around the state, that will be in charge of these (SOCIT) 
units, and I think that they need to be – at least do a two day refresher every 
year on this, and more of a chance for them to get together to be able to 
discuss some of the issues around these Briefs (AO interviewee). 
 
Update and refresher training needs. As this AO points out, there is a continuing 
need for specialist sexual assault police to be updated and share in developments as 
well as to recapture ‘forgotten knowledge’. Although AOs are highlighted in his view, 
ongoing development opportunities need to be systematically entrenched in VicPol 
organisational and budget arrangements. A number of the SOCIT/VARE trainees also 
mentioned that regular refresher training was necessary, a point that has also been 
raised as a best practice benchmark in the literature (e.g., HMCPSI & HMIC, 2007; 
Kinney et al., 2007). Strand one SOCAU and SOCIT focus groups in 2010 similarly 
offered these comments:  
 
Like I want to do a VATE refresher I haven’t done one since 2001.  There is 
no refresher (SOCAU group participant). 
 
The training is probably a little like the Victoria police across the board very 
light on for people who are in it. They actually need more staff, they need to 
be taken a bit more seriously and getting the SOCA’s through with refresher 
courses (SOCAU group participant in another location). 
 
Although there has been progress since these views were expressed in 2010, they 
show an enduring need for updated and refresher training especially for early trained 
sexual assault specialist police and even more recently trained investigators still see 
needs in these respects. 
 
The need for specific Interpose training. The Interpose computer management 
program presented as a major difficulty for investigators who commonly cited lack of 
training in that and other respects as one of the most severe obstacles to timely, 
quality Brief preparation. The following quotation from one investigator captures 
their commonly expressed frustration and ambivalence in regard to Interpose. 
 
Now what they’re doing is they want us to create events and tasks so an 
event for every entity, so for every witness or for crime scenes, an event for 
witnesses, an event for victims, and for every different entity of an 
investigation you create an event and for every different event your tasks, the 
things that you need to do … You’d never leave the office. I’ve probably got 
50 outstanding tasks that are all unassigned because I don’t even know how 
to assign them to myself, but they’re there … I think I need to do an 
Interpose course.  All good and well and no time for that.  So Interpose has 
the potential to be absolutely brilliant and save a lot of time, but most of us 
don’t have the ability (Investigator). 




Utilising the field knowledge of existing specialist police. As noted earlier (s. 7.1.2), 
the OPP focus group made it clear that there was a lack of uniform quality of Briefs, 
not that this was a universal difficulty. That is, some of the knowledge and skills are 
already embedded in VicPol’s SOCIT units and the police who have the expertise 
could be identified, then, along with appropriate OPP input, co-opted into a training 
and development program across the state’s SOCITs. 
 
It is also clear that ROs and AOs differ in their style of supervision and approach to 
reviewing Briefs as noted earlier (ss. 7.4 and 8.4). For example, one AO described 
reviewing from the back to the front of the Brief – looking first at the offender’s 
interview, secondly at witness statements, then other corroborative evidence and only 
finally at the victim’s statement. This procedure was designed to see whether the case 
could be carried forward without relying on the victim’s word only and hence 
expediting the decision-making process as well as early discovery of the strength of 
the case. Another AO described the procedure as front to back, starting with the 
victim’s statement, making notes then examining the rest of the Brief to tick off the 
noted items, then checking other statements (e.g., witnesses, first complaint), and 
finally looking at the offender’s interview. This procedure was designed to provide a 
checklist of questions to be put to investigators for follow-up. The question arises as 
to whether such differences in supervision style and reviewing procedures matter and 
if so how and what to do about them, and if not whether it would be worth 
establishing ways of cross-fertilising them to other police and SOCIT units.  
 
Ensuring uniformity of ‘best’ practice. The ROs and AOs agreed that they do not 
interfere with each other’s decisions, as discussed earlier (s. 8.4). Yet there arises, as 
one AO pointed out, an issue potentially of comparative performance of different 
SOCITs and areas. Thus: 
 
But, you know, if you had an area, for example, that was having a 20 per cent 
Brief authorisation rate, compared to another area that had a 60 per cent, or 
the State average was 50 per cent, I would be wanting to look at that area 
with the 20 per cent, okay, and some area – for probing in, just to find out 
what is that that’s there. The other thing is, too, is perhaps a review process 
for non-authorised Briefs. 
 
Aside from reviews of the kind mentioned by this AO, which essentially call for non-
authorised Briefs to be sent away from a SOCIT for another opinion to a central 
VicPol vetting unit team or between regions, there is an option of establishing an 
ongoing development program for all SOCIT police aimed at updating and sharing 




RECOMMENDATION: In accord with the earlier TNA recommendation, a 
robust regime of refresher and additional training should be implemented to meet 
ongoing KSA needs of sexual assault police at all levels. 
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9.3 Summary and recommendations 
 
Two decades ago, the now retired Partner Investigator of the PJO Project, David 
Bradley, delivered a paper at the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association 
of Criminal Justice Educators, held at Manly in New South Wales, 7-9 July 1992. It 
concerned the need for police to address the problem, as he identified it, of 
‘unreflective policing’, to engage in university level research and education in the 
same fashion as other occupations, such as social work, medicine, teaching, the law, 
military, and so on. He concluded with a vision of police academies as separate 
facilities having disappeared into the tertiary education landscape. Whilst this has not 
transpired, police organisations, including Victoria Police, have opened their doors to 
external researchers such as the PJO researchers, accepting greater scrutiny from 
without, and increasingly expect their police officers to have a broader, more self-
critical higher education frame of mind that arms them for their complex and 
challenging daily duties in a world of rapid and expansive ongoing change. 
 
Yet in Victoria at present the evidence from the PJO research queries how far this 
higher education process has penetrated the minds and hearts of serving police 
officers charged with addressing the calls from the VLRC (2004) and Victoria 
Ombudsman (2006) to improve policing responses to the claims of sexual assault 
victims. 
 
There is no doubt that many have done so, and that is especially true of ROs who 
supervise investigators, at least as far as the interview evidence is a reliable indicator 
of their frame of mind and commitment. They have been persuasive that they support 
sexual assault victims, ensure appropriate implementation of the Code of Practice and, 
most recently, have taken up the challenge of recommending authorisation in cases 
that only a short time ago would have been assessed in terms of ‘insufficient 
evidence’ and ‘success unlikely’ because only the victim’s word was available and 
the victim for one reason or another was assessed as a poor witness or uncooperative, 
if not blameworthy. From the evidence given by RO/AOs, OPP lawyers and that 
arising from the survey of SOCIT/VARE graduates, however, it is apparent that much 
still needs to be done in terms of instilling a broader and deeper understanding of the 
plight of sexual assault victims into the minds and hearts of investigators in particular, 
but also at least some SOCIT managers as well. Nor is the difficulty of attitudinal 
change sited only at the operational level, as testified in the RO/AO interviews, and 
even interactions with more senior police officers (see s. 7.4).  
 
Clearly, the strong consensus of positive trainee opinion indicated in the feedback 
sheets and survey responses augers well for the training team and the perceived value 
of the existing course to trainees. However, whilst the SOCIT/VARE program is ‘fine 
as far as it goes’, it has not managed to make the quantum of attitudinal and 
behavioural shifts necessary for real and lasting positive change at the level of 
everyday operational sexual assault policing. Data across the research strands lend 
support to attitudinal factors that drive decision making among some police working 
in sexual offence units. By themselves these attitudes are problematic, however it was 
clear also that resourcing issues also drove decision-making and when complemented 
with poor or questionable attitudes, some police were apt to draw on attitudes about 
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victims to make decisions in cases where they viewed resources as an issue. This is a 
difficult educational challenge that arguably requires additional input to that currently 
delivered by the SOCIT/VARE course. Moreover the present recruitment process is 
flawed and there is a need for a comprehensive, ongoing professional development 
program that generally updates SOCIT police and particularly those whose specialist 
training occurred long ago. 
 
What this problematic means is that organisational change at the levels of policy, 
procedure and structure – with the transitioning from a SOCAU to a SOCIT model - 
are by themselves a hollow vehicle to achieve the objective of lowering the sexual 
assault attrition rate. Unless such structural and name changes are accompanied by a 
deep and lasting commitment – a change of heart and mind - from VicPol personnel 
especially at the investigating level, but also with some higher echelon personnel, 
then there will remain restraints on the efforts of supervisors and middle managers. 
Gaps in implementation and compliance with formal rules and protocols and actual 
policing practices have been identified in the research literature (Bradley, Walker & 
Wilkie, 1986; Chappell, 2009; Eade & Shepherd, 2000; Edwards, 1999). Resistance 
to change is a well known phenomenon in the organisational and management fields. 
Victoria Police is not exempt from such resistance. Its basic challenge lies there. 
Further, police traditionally distrust intellectuals and so “change must be championed 
within the organisation rather than the product of academic research alone" 
(McLachlan, 2007, p. 181). If it is to champion the needs of sexual assault victims 
Victoria Police must do more than provide robust and comprehensive guideline 
documents, and do more than champion its own image and undertake public relations 
exercises. It must be prepared to acknowledge not only the problem of sexual assault, 
but also the problem of a continuing less than optimal policing response, despite 
SOCIT and other progressive changes. In order to effect such fundamental change, it 
must upgrade its training regime to world’s best practice, with a TNA-based program 
and evaluation system, along with robust recruitment procedures and ongoing 
professional development, and utilisation of contemporary management principles 
and practices. As discussed in Chapter Eight, it must also provide transformational 
rather than management-by-exception leadership at all levels.  
 
This said, it is also necessary to recognise and value the existing SOCIT/VARE 
specialist sexual assault course, its trainers and, by-and-large, its external presenters. 
The course at present provides a very sound foundation for further development into a 
world class training and development program, notwithstanding the limited available 
research evaluation evidence of specialist sexual assault police training courses. In 
further development of the existing course, Victoria Police should bear in mind that 
the requisite additional resources would have significant pay-offs in terms of 
victim/survivors’ quality of life, positive impacts on the attrition rate of sexual assault 
complaints from the criminal justice system, and the dollar bottom-line of the 
Victorian economy that will accrue as a result of improved police responses.  
 
To re-iterate, Victoria Police rightly deserve congratulations for developing and 
resourcing this course, taking an excellent step forward to provide a syllabus and 
learning arrangements that build knowledge and competencies of police responding to 
sexual offence complaints. The next step is to build it into a truly word’s best practice 
framework. 
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The following recommendations are made as a result of the data analysis and 









RECOMMENDATION: More substantial provision should be made by VicPol 
for providing sexual assault education to generalist police officers. (s. 9.1.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: The Victoria Police sexual assault training course 
should be re-designed and upgraded to enable challenging of SOCIT unit 
placement antithetical re-learning and poor practices; to consolidate initial learning 
through trainee reports of positive practice effects; and to facilitate construction 
and implementation of an even more robust system for evaluating the course and 
trainees’ learning accomplishments with reference to the Victoria Police (2010) 
Crime Investigative Guidelines – Sexual Crimes v 1.1 and the Sexual Assault Code 
of Practice (Victoria Police 2005). Re-design should take advantage of the benefits 
of a module-based framework in course delivery and evaluation. (See later 
recommendations in this chapter) (s. 9.1.2.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Trainers should be provided with advice from experts in 
the field of training and development in how to alter VicPol’s current training 
framework to optimize refresher training. (s. 9.1.3) 
RECOMMENDATION: A Training Audit and Training Needs Analysis (TNA) - 
complete with learning objectives and evaluation criteria - should be undertaken to 
identify the refresher and additional sexual assault learning requirements of 
existing SOCIT police at all levels. As part of a TNA, the ‘well’ of existing 
practice wisdom of experienced officers should be tapped and taken into the design 
of future training courses. (s. 9.1.3) 
RECOMMENDATION: An upgraded specialist SOCIT training course should 
take greater explicit account of the distinctive nature of sexual assault policing viz-
a-viz other forms of criminal investigation. (s. 9.1.3) 
RECOMMENDATION: Accreditation of the SOCIT course should be conducted 
bi-annually by a panel constituted of a representative of the SOCIT training team 
and members drawn from a state-wide network monitoring body (see s. 7.4). (s. 
9.1.3) 








RECOMMENDATION: The SOCIT recruitment process should be overhauled 
and brought up to best practice standards, including defined and robust selection 
criteria that ensure only aptly motivated police officers are taken into SOCIT 
teams. (s. 9.2.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: SOCIT graduates should receive an annually renewable 
appraisal-linked certificate of SOCIT detective practice status along with a 
premium remuneration package attached to that annual status. (s. 9.2.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: VicPol should develop and implement a 360° 
performance appraisal system for SOCIT police that includes feedback from sexual 
assault complainants as well as from peers and immediate superiors. This system 
should produce annual appraisals that contribute to whether or not individual 
officers remain SOCIT members. Consistently under-performing officers should 
be transferred out of SOCIT and lose their premium remuneration benefits in the 
train of departure. (s. 9.2.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: Appropriately de-identified appraisals and related 
statistics should be made available to a state-wide network monitoring body for 
review and advice (see ss. 7.4 & 9.1.2). (s. 9.2.1) 
RECOMMENDATION: In accord with the earlier TNA recommendation, a 
robust regime of refresher and additional training should be implemented to meet 
ongoing KSA needs of sexual assault police at all levels. (s. 9.2.2) 
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10.0 Conclusion: policing just outcomes for the future 
 
Sexual assault appears to be a never-ending societal story, reflected in the following 
comment from current research: 
 
(B)ut just the amount of sexual offending that occurs in society is 
unbelievable, and not many people actually understand, or no one would 
really understand unless they actually dealt with it or they work within the 
section, or, you know, they're police – even police members, unless they 
work within a SOCA team or - a SOCA team, just would not understand the 
gravity or the depth of the sexual offending that occurs in society (OPP focus 
group lawyer). 
 
To put an end to that story Victoria Police has made a number of significant changes 
in the organisational framework of policing sexual assault subsequent to VLRC 
(2004) and Victoria Ombudsman (2006) recommendations. The Sexual Assault 
Reform Strategy has been implemented in large measure and there has now been a 
transition from SOCAUs to SOCITs, along with a commendable SOCIT/VARE 
specialized sexual assault training course. Other developments have included new 
legislation and the Victims Charter; and subsequently the Victoria Police policy and 
procedure framework is clearly very robust and pertinent in details as to what is 
expected of operational police in dealing with sexual assault complaints, as 
encapsulated in the Code of Practice for the Investigation of Sexual Assault and 
Crime Investigative Guidelines version 1.1 – Sexual Crimes. There have also been 
strong and continuing efforts to consult and work with external agencies such as 
CASA and the OPP’s Specialist Sexual Offences Unit. All of these efforts have been 
laudable and there is no doubt of the genuine commitment of very many police 
officers, including trainers as well as SOCIT investigators and their immediate 
superiors. 
 
Nonetheless - unsurprisingly given the size, complexity and some of the cultural 
traditions of the Victoria police organisation - there remain quite significant 
challenges in the policing of sexual assault in Victoria. To pretend that this is not so 
would not only deny the complexity of contemporary society and the research 
evidence relating to similar jurisdictions elsewhere, but also would contradict the 
weight of evidence gathered in the PJO project following on from earlier research in 
relation to Victoria Police. 
 
Summarily, those challenges include a need for police to recognise and consider the 
complexities of reporting and non-reporting behaviour in their responses to sexual 
assault victims and claims of sexual assault. For example, police could be better 
attuned to the range of barriers to reporting as well as victims’ altruistic ‘symbolic 
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protest’ and the sense of responsibility and self-sacrificing motivators of reporting. 
Whereas police on the present evidence generally have a reasonable grasp of barriers, 
they have more limited perceptions of motivators. The PJO strand one evidence 
shows that victim experiences of police in the reporting process have a defining 
influence on whether or not they will continue with their complaints. Some police 
were seen by victims to respond positively and even to an excellent degree at times. 
Yet there were also other police who profoundly influenced victims in a negative 
fashion, not only deterring further pursuit of justice but leaving them with sometimes 
devastating feelings of betrayal and hopelessness. These effects, tragically, also have 
had the effect at times of leaving already vulnerable victims helplessly prone to 
continuing patterns of sexual assault. 
 
Notably, strand one victim/survivor proffered three recommendations to enhance 
sexual assault reporting: the establishment of an independent advocate to work 
directly with victims quite apart from SOCIT police or CASA counsellors; provision 
of readily available information in public places for victims who need advice; and 
inputs to the Victoria Police training courses and community education programs that 
dispel rape myths and other misinformed views about sexual assault. This last 
recommendation clearly questions the efficacy of the generally very sound Victoria 
Police SOCIT/VARE specialist sexual assault course. 
 
From the police interviews in 2010, moreover, there were two general streams of 
police thought and consequent reporting responses. One involved recognition by a 
number of specialist sexual assault police of the difficulties faced by victim/survivors 
in reporting, including for instance the role of family deterrents, along with associated 
compassion and supportive responses that enabled victims to continue with the rigors 
of reporting. These police officers also tended to be frank in speaking of other 
specialist police who did not share their level of understanding and victim enabling 
strategies. The other stream of police thought and decision-making tended to be 
victim-unfriendly if not victim-blaming, showed a lack of appreciation of victim 
reporting behaviour and engaged the ‘options talk’ as a device to dissuade victims 
from pursuing their claims of sexual assault. Police in this second respect were 
forthright, furthermore, in their beliefs about false reporting and limited police 
resources that justified their use of the options talk in this fashion, thus putting aside 
clear policy and procedural directives.  
 
CASA counsellors who were interviewed by strand one researchers made similar 
observations about this negative approach of police. CASA counsellors generally 
enjoyed good relations with police, however those relations turned on whether or not 
local SOCIT culture and leadership were amenable to regular and genuine partnership 
interactions. The CASA view also stressed the need for training of specialist police 
particularly around attitudes and values, noting that as necessary to obviate 
stereotyped beliefs about certain types of offences and or victims. 




In addition to strand one research findings, strands two and three often echoed many 
of the same themes over time. Thus, in terms of the 2011 case file research, it was 
found also necessary to address the reasoning processes behind police decision-
making both for authorizing and not authorizing Briefs of evidence in sexual assault 
cases. To attain best practice that reasoning would be overhauled in terms of clear 
criteria for decisions; all case files would obey some uniform structure and contain 
formal reports in authorisation as well as non-authorisation cases; all three police 
officers typically involved would provide a written account of his/her decision input; 
and all case files would be complete in documentation, ‘reader-friendly’ and 
rationally organized, not a motley collection of documents and evidentiary materials. 
Further, only relevant evidentiary factors would be used as a basis for decision-
making and that would not only be the situation but clearly appear to be the situation. 
There would be no imbalance in argument, which would be comprehensive and an 
accurate reflection of file materials, and especially no omission of reasons evidenced 
for prosecution. That is, argumentation would be clear, cohesive and unified; 
appropriately detailed in terms of relevant evidence; optimise the authentication and 
value of the victim’s story; and duly allow for Brief (non-)authorisation to be the 
prerogative of senior police officers. It would strenuously avoid providing defence 
lawyers with adversarial materials. Very few case files reflected these best practice 
criteria to a substantial extent. Investigators in particular need to learn and 
demonstrate the art of argument, and not be satisfied with only the practical collection 
and presentation of evidence. Research evidence from 2011 individual interviews of 
ROs and AOs as well as the OPP focus group confirmed these best practice needs as a 
current management goal of considerable importance. This suggests also a significant 
need for an updated and rigorous SOCIT quality control system. 
 
There was also strong evidence of an accumulating morale problem afflicting SOCIT 
personnel, which had already emerged in the 2010 interviews, with the great majority 
of interviewees describing in detail a highly demanding work environment that is 
under-resourced and unappreciated by other elements of Victoria Police including 
Command. Frustration in this respect was especially highlighted by ROs and AOs. 
 
They don't want to hear from the cops actually doing the work that it isn't 
working because it interrupts their good news story for the press (AO). 
 
The lack of adequate resources combined with unmet training needs – e.g., Interpose, 
Brief authorisation practice and supervision – were responsible partly for the 
evidenced deficiencies in doing the job at best practice levels. However, another 
source of these deficiencies was evidenced in terms of some officers whose attitudes 
and commitment were questionable and at times said by ROs and AOs to be very poor 
indeed. That source of deficiency was said to include some senior officers at SOCIT 
as well as higher levels. There is a related need for best practice leadership to be 
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shown at SOCIT level in terms of conspicuously ethical and positive symbolic styles 
as well as adoption of a team leadership ethos, and for these styles to be exemplified 
and championed at executive level if SOCIT is to be successful in the medium and 
longer terms. The PJO research found that more needs to be done regarding Victoria 
Police organisational culture and individual police attitudes and beliefs if benefits of 
recent changes are to be realized in an ongoing and indisputable fashion. Yet another 
source of sub-optimal job performance is embedded in the legislative environment 
that constrains police in putting forward Briefs of evidence for prosecution of sexual 
assault. This source is exemplified in the OPP guidelines which require serious and 
urgent review to facilitate appropriate and effective police responsiveness to sexual 
assault victims and their complaints. 
 
Although there are recognizable police networking improvements already in place 
these still require fine-tuning and more expansive structuring to achieve optimal 
synergies that accrue from tighter coordination and cooperation among police and 
other interested community parties in addressing sexual assault. Multi-Disciplinary 
Centres as defined by Victoria Police are yet to be placed firmly on the ground in 
Victoria - albeit there is evidence of this occurring to some extent (Success Works, 
2011) - as distinct from co-location facilities. This is not to deny or demean in any 
way the professionalism and commitment of the various practitioners in these 
facilities, but rather highlights potential for enhancement of their work. These 
facilities are a step in the right direction and can be relatively easily converted into 
MDCs through correctly devised protocols and agreements, including dove-tailing of 
work roles and expectations. An essential component however remains the need to 
develop a more robust state-wide monitoring body that receives regular, appropriately 
de-identified information on the policing of sexual assault throughout the State. This 
body could also serve to lobby State Legislators with a view to remedying external 
constraints on the policing of sexual assault and the prosecution of sexual offenders in 
the Courts. If its charter were marginally widened it could also help to educate the 
judiciary and wider public, serving as a strong ally of Victoria Police in its ongoing 
SARS efforts. 
 
Interestingly, both police and OPP lawyers expressed ambivalence towards each 
other, saying that the other is doing a good job and yet not doing a good job, tending 
to blame yet praise the other, and each citing very similar working conditions with a 
great deal of complex and demanding tasks, tight timelines, insufficient and 
sometimes inappropriate personnel, and inability to maintain continuity or 
commitment to a case as a result. This circumstance represents a particular need to be 
addressed in terms of strengthening the communication and educational ties between 
these two key criminal justice agencies that must work together efficiently and 
effectively if there is to be a resolution of sexual assault as a societal problem. 
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In regard to Victoria Police SOCIT/VARE training, the general excellence of current 
course delivery, trainers and external presenters ought not to obfuscate the need to 
address not only the gap in learning-to-practice concerning attitudinal blocks – raised 
also in the strand one research – but also refresher and additional training 
requirements. To ensure these are accurate and up-to-date a properly designed and 
executed Training Needs Analysis along with expert advice on structural and learning 
framework innovations as well as a robust, evidence-based training evaluation 
program are all necessary and timely in view of the recent SOCIT transition. In 
developing the course further, particular attention needs to be paid to adequately 
resourcing and developing not only the core existing course but also its necessary 
supplements of ongoing professional and refresher training for specialist sexual 
assault police, as well as training inputs to generalist police as first responders to 
sexual assault complaints. Particular attention is also required to employ the full range 
of contemporary evaluation tools, including inbuilt external evaluation, formative and 
summative procedures, regular on-the-job training needs assessments, as well as 
longitudinal evaluations of retained learning practice of members of SOCIT and 
generalist policing units across the state.  
 
Sexual assault is now widely recognized as a societal scourge of immense proportions 
that reaches into and profoundly affects the health, welfare and economic prosperity 
of a nation in a variety of ways. It is not just another nasty crime. It ranks at least as 
the equal of such more popularly advertised crimes as organized crime, illicit drugs, 
terrorism and cyber-crime. Accordingly it requires the very best of police efforts and 
those only of officers capable and committed to its discovery, investigation and 
prosecution in the Courts. Hence, the flawed current Victoria Police recruitment effort 
needs to be replaced with a best practice procedure that recognizes the significance of 
sexual assault as a crime that undermines the foundations of a free and egalitarian 
society. 
 
A 360º performance appraisal system embedded in a dedicated specialist career 
framework is needed to accompany this best practice recruitment procedure. This is 
necessary to ensure SOCIT members are both appropriately rewarded for a peculiarly 
demanding job and that they do not use it as a mere stepping-stone on the way to 
other, more lucrative or ‘glossy’ job assignments. Exiting from that career either 
willingly or by reason of being found wanting in skill or aptitude should carry a loss 
of dedicated extra remuneration benefits or promotional basis. That is, sexual assault 
policing needs to be warranted as a highly desirable and sought after specialist service 
with its own career paths.  
 
It remains to be seen whether Victoria Police is not only willing to accept credit due 
to its reform efforts to date, but also equally willing to acknowledge and make further 
diligent efforts to address the need for continuing reforms in accord with the findings 
and recommendations of present research evidence, which have been rigorously 
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developed within a multi-pronged, robust research design. A sign of Victoria Police 
commitment to ongoing work will be the promulgation of this report and its findings, 
along with a strong public commitment to make those necessary further changes to 
policing sexual assault in Victoria. This represents a critical opportunity for Victoria 
Police to continue moving forward and to establish itself as a genuinely progressive 
State agency committed to not only improving responses to sexual assault allegations 
but also to unambiguously contributing to reductions in the unacceptably high 
attrition rates that characterize this crime, thus sending a clear message to sexual 
predators that their crimes are not tolerated in Victoria.  
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Appendix one: On-line questionnaire for victims/survivors, strand one, 
(administered in 2010) 
 
The online survey tool was designed to be an innovative and unique data collection 
tool. Designed by the lead researcher in conjunction with her staff and a survey 
consultant, the survey was trialled with survivors in 2008 in a private workshop and 
again trialled online in the latter part of 2009. The survey was not badged with the 
Victoria Police insignia as it was felt it might hinder respondents whose trust we were 
seeking and to their credit, members of Victoria Police we were communicating with 
at the time understood this and supported the decision.   
 
The online survey went live in December 2009 remaining open until the end of May 
2010. The survey website invited respondents to self-select participation in the 
survey. Media response to the online survey was tepid which proved somewhat 
frustrating for researchers. A lack of media interest in sexual violence issues is not 
surprising. We did not have the level of support from the Victoria Police Media Unit 
we had originally sought so gaining media support was at times difficult to sustain. 
Nonetheless we did secure two interviews with ABC radio Victoria in prime listening 
spots and secured small news items coverage. Attempts to secure media coverage in 
free newspapers such as MX – provided to Melbourne public transport travellers - 
were not successful and the reasons given reminded us of the difficulty of having 
media support public awareness of sexual violence in the community and the rights of 
victims to come forward. 
 
Posters advertising the survey as well as hard copies of the survey with SSAE were 
sent to all police stations/locales that had a SOCA or SOCIT unit attached to them 
with a request from police that the posters be prominently displayed in the foyer and 
SOCA/SOCIT units and surveys available for victims seeking any form of police 
contact with regard to sexual violence. 
 
(NOTE: For the sake of brevity and clarity, formatting changes have been made to the 
following copy of the questionnaire in converting it from an on-line instrument to a 
word document). 





This survey is part of an Australian Research Council Large Linkage grant between Edith 
Cowan University and Victoria Police. 
 
Edith Cowan University and Victoria Police 
 
Adult Sexual Assault Project 
"Policing Just Outcomes - Survey" 
 
Welcome to this Survey 
This survey should take between 10 and 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Who should complete this survey? 
Women and Men in Victoria, 18 years of age and over, who at any time in their life have experienced 
sexual assault and either have or have not reported it to police in Victoria. 
 
What is the purpose of this survey? 
By completing the survey you will help Victoria Police better understand the experiences of sexual 
assault victims and identify where police can improve their response and investigation of sexual 
offences. 
 
Can I be identified by filling out this survey? 
No. The information will not and cannot be used to identify individuals. 
 
Can I see the final Report? 
Your survey will be one of many that contribute to a pool of information. 
Collected data will be made available in an aggregated form only and no individual data will be able to 
be identified. Updates and results of the survey will be published on the project website: 
www.policingjustoutcomes.org 
 
Can I change my mind about the survey? 
You can choose to withdraw from the survey at any time whilst completing the survey. Once you have 
submitted the survey you have given consent. If you feel you need to speak to someone about any 
issues that arise for you in filling out this survey you may contact: The Centre Against Sexual 
Assault 24 Hour Crisis Line on ph. 1800 806 292 Or Lifeline on ph. 13 11 14 
 
This survey has been approved by; 
Edith Cowan University, Human Research Ethics Committee. 
The following survey is divided into sections. Each box with a shaded heading is a new section. Please 
read the section headings carefully. There may be whole sections that you do not need to complete. 
Please mark the check box that best represents your response. 
COPYRIGHT © 2008 EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY 
To complete the survey, 
Please tick the box that you feel is the most appropriate response. 
Please feel free to comment in any of the boxes that allow for additional information. 
Your completion of the questionnaire will indicate your consent to be included in our study 
 
Please do not include any information that may identify you. 
 
Section 1: About You 
1 What is your gender/sex?  Male  Female 
2 Is English your first language?  Yes  No 
 
3 Are you from a non English speaking background? (were you, or one or both of your parents born in a non 
English speaking country) 
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 Yes  No 
4 Are you of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent?  Yes  No 
 
5 What is the post code or town/suburb where you currently live? 
 
6 What is your age now? Years 
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Section 2: About the assault(s) and police 
7. Were there multiple incidents of sexual assault? Yes (omit Q 9) No 
 
8. How old were you at the time of the first assault? years 
 
9. How old were you when the last sexual assault occurred? years 
 
10. What is the gender of the offender(s) who assaulted you? Male  Female  Both male 
& female 
 
11. Following your sexual assault, before deciding whether to contact police, what was your 
perception of, or attitude toward police? (Please circle) 
 
Very negative Negative Neutral Positive Very positive 
 
12. Was/were the offender/s related to you? 
Yes. (tick as many as apply) No. (go to next question) 
Spouse or partner Current Previous 
Mother Father Step-Parent Grandparent Step-Grandparent Uncle Aunt 
Brother Sister Step brother/sister Cousin Other (please specify) 
 
13. Was/were the offender/s unrelated to you? 
 Yes. Tick as many as apply 
Boyfriend-------------------- current previous Girlfriend--------------------- current 
previous 
Family Friend Neighbour Teacher Sports Coach Minister of Religion or Priest 
Health Professional Carer Client Employer Work Colleague Stranger 
Other (please specify) 
 
14. Over what period of time did the sexual assaults occur? Tick one only. 
it was a single incident 
 
Or over a period of 
1-6 Days 1-3 Weeks 1 month 2-3 months 4 months - 1 year 2-5 years  
6-10 years More than ten years 
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15. At the time of completing this survey, have you made a report or spoken to police about your 
experience of sexual assault? 
Yes (got to Q 17) No (Go to Q 16) 
 
16. If you did not report to police, who, (if anyone) did you tell? (tick as many as 
apply) 
 I did not tell anyone 
 
I told one or more of the following 
G.P./Doctor Priest/Minister Friend  Family Member  Counsellor/Therapist 
Work Colleague  Other (please specify) 
 
17. Where did the assault/s occur? 
(Tick as many as apply) 
My home Someone else’s home Offender’s home Vehicle  
Professional Setting e.g. Doctor’s surgery, dentist, etc. Outdoor location Work Place 
Orphanage Foster Home Hotel/Motel Hospital Boarding School School 
Public transport Night Club Other (please specify) 
COPYRIGHT © 2009 EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY 
Section 3: Reporting/speaking to police 
 
If you have made no contact with police please go to Question 47 now. 
 
Please note: If you have made more than one report or spoken to police more than once about sexual 
assault, please answer focussing on your most recent contact with police. 
 
18. In what year did you contact the police about this assault? If you are unable to remember exact year, 
please give an approximate year. 
 
19. How did you contact police? (tick one only) 
Telephone In Person Someone contacted police on my behalf  
Other (Please Specify) 
 
20. Following your experience of sexual assault, how much time had passed before you told police 
about it? (choose 1 only) 
Within 72 hours (3 days) 4- 7 days 8 days - 1 month 2 – 3 months  
4 months – 1 year 2 – 5 years 6 – 10 years More than 10 years 
 
21. a) Did someone support you to make contact with police?  
Yes (go to 21b) No (go to 22) 
 
b)If yes, was this person 
Family member Friend Professional e.g. Doctor, Counsellor 
Work Colleague Other (please specify) 
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c) If someone did assist you, would you have made a report without this other person supporting 
you? (please circle) 
 
Highly unlikely Not likely Unsure Likely Highly Likely 
 
22. What was name of the town or suburb where you contacted police or made a report? 
 
23. Were you offered the choice to speak with a police officer of the same gender/sex as you? 
 No  Unsure  Yes 
 
24. Were you offered the choice to speak with an officer in a specialist sexual assault unit? 
 No  Unsure  Yes 
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Section 4: How Police Responded 
 
This section asks you about how you feel police responded to the report you made. You may have 
had contact with several different police members, but the following questions are asking you to rate 
your experience of the police response overall. (please circle your response) 
 
25. I felt supported by the police (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
6. I felt the police listened to what I said (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
27. I felt the police believed what I said (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
28. I felt the police treated me with respect (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
29. I felt speaking with police was a good decision (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
30. During my talk with police I felt I could make decisions about what I wanted to do next 
(circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
31. Police showed concern about my safety (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
32. Police talked to me in a way that was easy to understand (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
33. Police explained to me my choices about going further with my report(circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
34. Did you feel that police thought your report was false? No Unsure  Yes 
 
35. Did police explain the consequences for making a false report? No Unsure  Yes 
 
36. Did police give you information about other support services you could contact? 
No Unsure  Yes 
 
What was the outcome of your initial contact with police? 




37. I got some information on the Criminal Justice System, referrals or both 
No Unsure  Yes 
 
38. I made a formal typed or recorded statement to police about the sexual offence 
No Unsure  Yes 
 
39. I made a formal report but requested that no further action be taken 
No Unsure  Yes 
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Section 5: Police Investigation 
 
This section asks about your experience of police who further investigated your report after you 
made a formal statement 
 
40. How often did the police contact you after you had made a statement? (choose 1 only) 
At least once per week Fortnightly Monthly 3 monthly 6 monthly Never 
 
 41. Police contact with me was helpful (please circle) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
42. Police contact with me helped me feel confident to continue with my 
report (circle 1 only) 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
 
43. Were charges laid by police? 
A Yes (please go to box A below) 
B No (please go to box B below) 
C Unsure (please go to box C below) 
D Still waiting for outcome (please go to box D below) 
 
A If yes, from the time you made your police statement how long did it take before charges were laid? 
 
Please give your best estimate of the time. 
 
days weeks months years 
 
B If no, how long did it take before police notified you that charges would not be laid? 
 
Please give your best estimate of the time. 
 
days weeks months years 
 
Did they explain why? 
No Unsure  Yes 
 
C If unsure, how long is it since you last heard from the police? 
Please give your best estimate of the time. 
 
days weeks months years 
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D If still waiting, how much time has passed since you made your statement? 
Please give your best estimate of the time. 
 
days weeks months years 
 
44. Did you at any time withdraw your report/statement? 
No  Unsure  Yes 
 
If Yes, did the reason have to do with…… 
Police (please explain) other (please explain) 
 
45. Since the assault(s), and any related contact you have had with police, what is your 
perception of, or attitude to police now?(circle 1 only) 
 
Very negative Negative Neutral Positive Very positive 
 
46. If there has been a change in your perception of or feelings toward police (Question11) to your 
final perception (Question 45), please comment on the reason for this change. 
Reason for change: 
 
Section 6: Reporting the assault(s) 
 
Please complete this section whether or not you have made a report to police 
 
This section asks about things that prevented you from reporting the assault(s) to police, or made it 
difficult to do so. 
 
47. Please tick as many of the following that you have experienced as a result of being sexually 
assaulted. 
 
a) Feelings of … 
Guilt Shame Embarrassment Fear Anger Shock and disbelief 
Other (please describe) 
 
b)Fear of … 
The offender(s) Family members Community  Being publicly identified Police 
Being labelled/stigmatized Family break down Others finding out Not being believed 
Bringing shame to my family My children finding out Other (please specifiy) 
 
c) Fear of Losing… 
My job Family support Friends My connection to my Community  
My Home/Place where I live Support Custody of my children Other (please describe) 
 
d) I experienced intimidation or threats…. 
By offender By others 
 
e) I experienced concern …. 
 For my safety  For safety of others  For the safety of pets 
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 For the safety of my property  Other (please specify) 
 
f) I experienced a lack of confidence in … 
Police The legal system 
 
g) I experienced a lack of support from … 
Family Friends Professionals (e.g. Doctor, Counsellor, etc.) Community 
Work/Work Colleagues  Employer  Police Other (please describe) 
 
48. If you chose not to report to police please indicate reasons why. 
I was unsure if what happened to me was a crime 
I had a concern that reporting would not lead to conviction 
I wanted to deal with it myself 
 I did not feel that reporting it would make me feel any better 
I had a concern about the community standing (reputation/power) of the offender 
 I had concerns about my current or previous occupation 
 I had concerns about language barrier (not confident making a report in English) 
other (please describe) 
 
49. Do you regret the decision you made about reporting or not reporting to police? 




50. Please feel free to use the space below to write any further comments. Please feel free to use the other 
side of this page to write further comment 
 
Thank you for completing this survey, we appreciate the time you have taken to do so. 
This survey will help inform/improve police responses to sexual crime. 
If you feel the need to talk to someone about any issues that arise for you in filling out 
this survey, you may contact: 
The Centre Against Sexual Assault 24 hour Crisis Line on 




Lifeline on ph. 13 11 14 
 
If you feel you would like to make a report to police, please contact your local 
police station. 
 
Other services you can contact for support or assistance are located on the website. 
www.policingjustoutcomes.org.au 




An Invitation to be further involved in this 
important research. 
 
As part of this important research we are conducting individual interviews and focus groups 
with victim/survivors of sexual assault. 
 
These interviews and focus groups will be more in depth than a survey allows and will further 
inform us of the issues that face victim/survivors when reporting to police. 
 
If you wish to be part of further research and are willing to be contacted for focus groups and 
face to face or phone interviews please include your contact details in the section below and 
return to us in the provided reply paid envelope. 
 
Please DO NOT send this form in with your survey. Send your contact details in the second 










Please indicate below whether you have reported to police in Victoria 
 
 I HAVE reported to Police 
 I HAVE NOT reported to police 
 
I hereby give permission for researchers on The Policing Just Outcomes project to contact me 




N.B. A random sample of participants will be chosen for individual interviews 
Thank you, once again, for you contribution to this most important research. 
The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may  have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify  that the link points to the correct file and location. 
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Appendix two: Interview schedule for victims/survivors who reported to 
police, strand one, (2010 interviews) 
 
The interview is open and semi-structured and invites open narrative from the 
participant so these questions are around key themes with some directional questions 
to elicit further discussion and reflection.  Some themes and questions apply 
specifically to those who have reported, some to those who have not, and some to all 
participants and will be asked according to participants’ response to the initial 
questions. 
 





Were police the first people you spoke to about your experience of sexual assault or 
were you encouraged by someone else to speak with police?  
 
Was the police response what you expected?   
 
Key Question: Can you tell me about any concerns or fears about anything you might 




How did you deal with/overcome these concerns/fears? 
 
Did others help you to overcome these barriers or fears? 
 
Did you discuss these concerns/barriers with police and if so, did they offer any 
assistance or advice? 
 
After you made a report to police did you continue to experience any of the 
difficulties you have spoken about? 
 
Can you reflect on how these barriers/concerns/ fears affected you personally.  
 
Key Question: Can you tell me about the police investigation after you made a 




Did police ever make you feel disbelieved or make you feel uncomfortable in their 
reporting or investigation?  
 
Did police maintain frequent contact with you?  
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What, if any, aspects of the police response did you find helpful, useful, or 
encouraging?  
 
What, if any, aspects of the police response made you lose confidence, doubt yourself, 
make you feel angry or upset etc. or withdraw your complaint? 
 
If a survivor withdrew a complaint after making a report they will be asked to discuss 
the reasons for choosing to discontinue with a report. 
 
If no to reporting … 
Have you considered the possibility of reporting the assault/s against you to the 
police?  What things did you take into consideration when you were considering 
about a report to police?  
 
Key Questions across themes: 
 
Can you tell me about your reasons for choosing not to make a report to police at this 
time? 
 
At the time of the offence, is there anything that would have helped you make a 
report? 
 
Can you tell me how strongly these factors affected you when you were considering 
whether or not to report the crime to police? 
 
Do you believe that if certain situations changed, you would feel able to make a report 




Support structures the survivor had at the time – and whether they inhibited or 
facilitated reporting 
 
Did the survivor encounter specific fears of or threats of loss of support from family, 
friends or work colleagues should they report to police? 
 
Feelings of shame; embarrassment; confusion and fear about the process 
 
Fears about retribution by offender or others 
 
Demographic location – did a rural environment create additional fears and 
difficulties for reporting (e.g., lack of anonymity; lack of access to support services; 
offender having high profile in the community; fear of community or offender 
retribution) 
 
Lack of confidence in the police. 
 
Fear of not being believed. 
 
Language barrier was overwhelming. 




Fearful that the context of the assault may cause disbelief or shame and 
embarrassment for the survivor 
 
Pressure by others connected to the survivor’s cultural, social or religious affiliation. 
 
Fear of losing job, home location and custody of children. 
 
Fear that the survivor’s background e.g., Occupation or prior or current medical 
treatment may be a barrier to reporting to police. 
 
Fear of negative reactions or views from others – family, friends, work colleagues, 
community, police and the court system 
 
Fear of being blamed for the assaults 
 
Feelings of intense trauma and other health issues that made it hard to deal with the 
prospect of reporting to police. 
 
Dissuaded by others not to report (identify others – e.g., other survivors, 
professionals, work colleagues, friends, family, police. 
  




Finally, can you tell me about your feelings of reporting/not reporting? 
 
Do you believe it has been the right decision for you? 
   
Has not reporting helped you to recover from the assault or has not reporting made 
you feel angry or regretful about not reporting. If so, what is it that makes you feel 
upset or angry about not reporting?   
 
In order to make it easier for survivors to report sexual offences and have those 
reports proceed to court, what things do you think police, legal system and society 
could do to help you or other survivors overcome barriers and fears about reporting?  
 
Prompts  
What can police do? 
(If you reported) can you give me examples of what police did to make it less 
daunting? 
(If you reported) can you give examples of anything police did that may have made it 
more difficult for you?  
(If you reported) do you believe that you received a consistency in response between 
SOCA and the Criminal Investigation Unit?  




Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 344 
From your experience, what would be your advice to fellow victim/survivors in   
regards as to whether to report or not report the offence to police? 
 




Appendix three: Focus group questions for victims/survivors, strand 
one, (2010 focus groups) 
 
1. We want to start off with a question to break the ice and make everyone feel more at 
ease.  Going around the group, could you please each tell us one thing that you like to 
do to relax at the end of the day?  This is not compulsory and you can just pass if you 
like.  You can introduce yourself if you wish, or not. 
 
2. Thinking specifically about rape or sexual assault, from your experience and in your 
opinion what do you think could make it hard for someone to tell someone else, be it 
family, friends, medical practitioners, police or other people that they have been 
sexually assaulted? 
 
3. Did you consider or would you have considered going to an emergency department to 
seek help?  
 
4. If not what would have stopped you seeking help there? 
 
5. From your experience, and in your opinion what aspects or barriers do you think   
make it difficult for victim/survivors to report a sexual offence to police?   
 
6. We know from research that the vast majority of victim/survivors are sexually       
abused by someone known to them. Do you think that victims who know the offender   
have more difficulty being believed and more difficulty reporting to police?  
(Invite comments) 
 
7.  Is there anyone here today who chose not to report the crime to police? 
  (Invite comments about reasons for decisions). 
 
8.  Is there anyone here today who went ahead and reported to police?   
(Invite comments about reasons for decisions) 
 
9. What was the Police Handling Like In 
a. The initial report? 
b. Where the police good/bad about keeping you up to date about the 
investigation if it proceeded? 
c. At any stage during the process did you think about withdrawing? Did you 
withdraw? Why did you withdraw? 
d. Were the police good/bad in supporting you IF it went to trial? 
 
10. Do you believe that victims receive the same treatment and response between SOCA 
police who take the initial statement from you and the Detective who may then be 
assigned to your case?  (Invite comment and stories) 
 
11. What specific actions might police take that could help a victim/survivor in                 
reporting a sexual assault? 
 
 
12. From your experience and in your opinion do you believe that the police response to a 
victim/survivor can make their trauma worse and make healing more difficult? 
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13. Based on your experience of reporting, or from your knowledge of other survivors 
who have reported to police, would you have confidence to report a sexual offence in the 
future? 
 
14.  If a friend, relative or acquaintance told you they had been a victim of sexual assault, 
would you advise them to report the crime to police?  
 (Invite reasons for and against) 
  
15. If you were asked to give your opinion about the good things about SOCA and what 
police could do to improve their response to victims of sexual crimes that would: 
 
a) Improve victims’ confidence to report sexual offences to police in the first                
instance 
b) Enable victim/survivors to feel confident and informed about the investigation   
process 





From your experience, what would be your advice to fellow victim/survivors in   











Close of focus group session. 
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Appendix four: Focus group questions for SOCAU/SOCIT police, 
strand one, (2010 focus groups) 
 
Please bear in mind that what we are talking about today is your experiences of 
working with victim/survivors of rape or sexual assault.  It is important that the 
identity of victim/survivors and identifying details of cases be kept anonymous to 
protect victim/survivors and other police. 
 
Researcher to introduce a short ‘ice-breaker’ activity for the group.  
 
Key Question: POLICE SERVICE AND TRAINING:  
 
1. Going around the room what is the range of years experience with Victoria Police? 
Experience within SOCA Unit and/or SOCIT? 
 




Training in the academy,  
Specialist SOCIT course which commenced in 2009 
Detective training,  
In-service-sexual assault training or other courses. 
Has training been ongoing and involved in-service training opportunities? 
 
3. In your opinion and from your experience do you believe the training you have 
received to date has been satisfactory to enable you to deal with victim/survivors of 
sexual assault in your role? 
 
4. In your opinion and from your experience are there any areas of training/education 
you believe would be beneficial for you in terms of enhancing your knowledge and 
practice in the area of sexual assault and working with victims?  
 
5. In your opinion and from your experience what are the strengths of SOCA 
Units/SOCIT in responding to adults reporting sexual assault? 
 
Prompts 
Attending to the welfare of the victim.  
Obtaining a statement from a victim/witness for evidentiary purposes. 
Completing and submitting the relevant reports. 
Interviewing offenders for minor sexual and physical assaults after consultation and in 
liaison with the relevant Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU).  
SOCIT conducting full investigation 
 
6. In your opinion and from your experience are there any areas of SOCA 
Units/SOCIT you feel could be improved or changed to enhance the work of the unit? 
 
Prompts 





Liaison between different Agencies 
Internal support structures 
Resources and Infrastructure 
Processes in dealing with and communicating with victim/survivors 
 
7. Do you believe the current (2005) Code of Practice for the Investigation of Sexual 
Assault is adequate as a guide for police practice and a guide for advising victims of 
police responsibilities and expectations with regards to reporting? 
 
8. In your opinion and from your experience, do you believe that the work of 
SOCA/SOCIT Police is regarded as valuable and as important as other police criminal 
investigation work and practice? 
 
Key Question: BARRIERS TO REPORTING 
 
9. Thinking specifically about sexual assault, from your experience and in your 
opinion what do you think might make it hard for someone to tell police they have 
been sexually assaulted? 
 




Language barrier, issues of confidence in police and/or the criminal justice system, 
being believed, history of abuse, ethnicity, religion, victim’s personal background/life 
history 
 
11. Do you believe that any of these barriers impact on a victim/survivors decision 
making in terms of whether or not they will report a sexual assault to police? If so 
which ones do you believe have a greater impact? 
 
Key Questions: REPORTING 
 
12. From your experience can you tell me about any examples of what 
SOCAU/SOCIT police have done to help a victim to continue with a report or to 
alleviate any emotional distress or issues they had at the time?   
 
13. Does SOCAU/SOCIT have any strategies to assist particular victim/survivors with 
the process of reporting? 
 
Prompt 
Victims from a non-English speaking background 
Victim with a disability 
An elderly victim with dementia,  
A victim who is fearful of reporting or continuing with a report?  
 
Key Questions:  ATTRITION RATES OF REPORTED OFFENCES: 
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Sexual assault reports have the highest attrition rate of all other reported crimes.  A 
significant number of reported assaults exit the police system prior to a completed 
investigation.   
 
14. In your opinion and from your experience, how common is it for victims to 
withdraw their complaint or the victim requests no further action?  
 
15. What do you believe to be the main reasons for this action? 
 
16. To what extent, if any, do you believe police contribute to complaints being 




17. Heenan and Murray’s report (2006) (commissioned by Victoria Police) suggested 
police ‘attitudes’ to victims played a significant role in victims withdrawing a 
complain (p13).  Are you aware of cases where this has occurred? 
 
18. What do you believe are the reasons police might close a case on the grounds of 




Heenan & Murray study identified this at p (.20-21). 
 
Key Questions: POLICE INVESTIGATION 
 
At most SOCA Units once a statement has been made to SOCA it is forwarded to 
CIU detectives for investigation. 
 
19. In your opinion do you think detectives handling sexual offence cases should have 
specialist training similar to SOCA Unit police? 
 
20. In your opinion and from your experience are there any differences in attitudes 






21. In your opinion and from your experience do you believe that sexual offence 
reports and subsequent investigations should all be handled within a specialist SOCA 
Unit, rather than investigations being handled in many instances by general CIU 
detectives?  
 
Please comment on your reasons for and against this? 
 
For those who are now SOCIT do they believe the new model will alleviate such 
problems and improve the quality of investigations? 
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Research shows an inability to make a report to police makes recovery for the victim 
survivors difficult. 
  
22. On reflection do SOCAU/SOCIT officers feel an inability to make a report to 
police has implications for victim/survivors recovery? If so what do you think some 
of the issues are? 
 
23. From your experience and in your view, in what ways do you think reporting 






Thank you for your time and input. 
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Appendix five: Focus group questions for CASA counsellors, strand 
one, (2010) 
 
Please bear in mind that what we are talking about today is your experiences of 
working with victim/survivors of rape or sexual assault.  It is important that the 
identity of victim/survivors and identifying details of cases be kept anonymous to 
protect victim/survivors and other police.  
 
Researcher to introduce a short ‘ice-breaker’ activity for the group. 
 
Key Question: BARRIERS 
 
1. Thinking specifically about sexual assault, from your experience and in your 
opinion what do you think might make it hard for someone to tell police they have 
been sexually assaulted? 
 
2. Do you think there are any specific issues that make it more difficult for 




E.g., Victim or offender constellation; victim or offender characteristics, context of 
the assault, age of victim or offender, cultural or religious background etc Any one 
thing, or any combination – a particular combination? 
 
 Key Question: SERVICE PROVISION: 
 
3. From your experience, at the time of contacting your service: 
 
4. What percentages of victim /survivors have reported the assault to police? 
 
5. What percentages have not reported the assault to police? 
 
It is a requirement that police (within 72hrs) contact your service immediately when a 
victim reports a recent assault. 
 
6. From your experience, is this practice adhered to by police, and does the practice 
assist with victim support and recovery? 
 
7. From your experience, when you meet with victims who have made a recent report 
to police, are the victims confident to continue with making a report? 
 
8. What, if any, fears or concerns do they discuss with you about reporting, and do 
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It is a requirement that when a victim reports an historical sexual assault to 
police (assaults that occurred more than 72 hours ago) police advise the victim of 
your service. 
 
9. From your experience do police provide this advice to victims? 
 
10. As part of your counsellor/advocate role have you ever assisted a victim to contact 
police and/or to make a report to police? 
 
11. As a counsellor/advocate, are you confident in the police response to victims both 
at the initial report stage and across the investigation stage?  
 
12. From your experience and perspective, does your particular CASA service have a 
good working relationship with police in your area? 
 
13. Does your service meet with police to discuss cases, reports, other issues 
connected with victim reporting and SOCA/SOCIT responses? 
 
14. What are the strengths and positives of this relationship? 
 
15. What areas, if any, could be improved to benefit the services you provide to 
victims? 
 
Key Questions: REPORTING 
 
Recent studies show that complaints withdrawn by victims after an initial report are of 
concern.  
 
16. From your experience with victims, what are some of the reasons and factors that 
make a victim withdrawn a complaint? 
  
17. What affect has this had on the victim? 
 
Recent studies also show that many reported assaults to police result in police taking 




Heenan and Murray’s report (2006) (commissioned by Victoria Police) suggested 
police ‘attitudes’ to victims played a significant role in victims withdrawing a 
complain (p13).  Are you aware of cases where this has occurred? 
 
 
18. From your experience working with victims, are you aware of any instances 
where victims have been advised that police are not taking their case any further and 




Heenan & Murray study identified this at p (.20-21). 




19. What affect has this had on the victim? 
 
20. Are you aware of any cases where a victim has been accused of making a false 
report? 
 
21. What affect has this had on the victim? 
 
Under-reporting of sexual assaults is of major concern. Many factors are said to 
influence underreporting.  
 
22. From your experience as a counsellor/advocate for survivors what are some of the 
factors you are aware of that affect reporting? 
 
23. Some Victims report a lack of confidence in police as a reason for not reporting.  
In your opinion and from your experience how significant is this factor? 
 
24. What do you believe police can do to improve victim confidence in reporting?  
 
25. From your experience can you tell me about any examples of what police have 
done to help a victim to continue with a report or to alleviate any emotional distress or 
issues they had at the time?   
 
26. Do the police you have worked with have any strategies to assist particular 
victim/survivors with the process of reporting? 
 
Prompt 
Victims from a non-English speaking background, victim with a disability or an 
elderly victim with dementia, and so on 
 
27. If a victim says that because of circumstances particular to her or him there is no 
way they would ever report a sexual assault to police do you think this can impact 
their recovery and healing? 
 
28. From your experience and in your view, in what ways do you think reporting can 
be made easier for victim/survivors? 
 
Prompts 
What can police do? What do they do that they shouldn’t do? 
Can you give me examples of what you know police have done to make it less 
difficult? What about things that made it more difficult? 
Do you have any experiences where police could have handled a case better and you 
felt police may have made it more difficult for the victim?  
Do you believe that victims receive consistency in response between, say, SOCA and 
the Criminal Investigation Unit?  
What might others do? And who? 
 
Key Question: FEEDBACK 
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29. If you were asked to give your opinion about the strengths of what SOCA/SOCIT  
police do and advise on any areas that need improving with regards to increasing 




Increasing the confidence of sexual assault victims in the police management of 
sexual assault cases? 
 
Minimising the trauma for victim/survivors during reporting to police, investigation 
and court attendances?  
 
30. What Was The Police Handling Like in: 
 
a. The initial report? 
b. Where the police good/bad about keeping them up to date about the investigation if 
it proceeded? 
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Appendix six: Data collection and analysis in relation to the VicPol 
case files (strand two) 
 
This appendix is provided to show the extent of rigor applied to examining the case 
files and to warrant the robustness, reliability and authenticity of data collection, data 
analysis and findings. Other research standards also evident include accuracy, 
precision and fineness of granulation. This Appendix concerns the case file 
methodological underpinnings of the text chapters, numbers six, seven and eight as 
well as partially that of chapter nine. 
 
What are the VicPol adult sexual assault case files? 
 
It is important to explain what is meant here by the phrase “VicPol adult sexual 
assault case files” (hereafter termed case files) and to distinguish that data set from 
what is called “LEAP”. LEAP refers to an electronic database and management 
system maintained by VicPol which is utilised on a daily basis for operational and 
other purposes and which allows VicPol accredited personnel to access information in 
a timely fashion across Victoria. The case files are not an electronic database. These 
are normally a paper-based collection of a variety of documents provided for the 
researchers according to a set of search criteria for purposes of the current research. 
These do not represent the entirety of the information available on LEAP in relation 
to any ‘case’ – understood to refer to a particular set of allegations made by a 
complainant/s against a particular accused/s at a certain point in time. Rather the case 
files included paper form printouts from various LEAP electronic files relating to the 
case, these commonly being called summary reports or sub-incident and progress 
reports. As well, the case files potentially included a series of other paper documents 
such as described below. Additionally, the case files included on occasion 
photographs and computer discs. The case files examined by the researchers were 
held in manila and spring-back folders in boxes stored at VicPol Headquarters 
specifically and only for the purposes of the ARC Linkage Major Grants Project. The 
researchers did not have access to the LEAP daily operational electronic database and 
hence had no recourse to ongoing investigations or Court outcomes for the cases 
examined except insofar as in the latter instance the Court outcome had occurred, had 
been recorded and had been included in the paper based case files provided to the 
researchers.  
 
Data collection sources and categories 
 
The collection of data from the case files was an intensive and time-consuming 
process. It usually involved close reading several documents within each case file to 
discover, de-construct and re-construct relevant narratives. The most common 
documents included (see Appendix 11 for a detailed listing): 
 
 Summary report at the front ranging from a paragraph to almost two pages and 
usually a page of dense material 
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 Victim statement(s) – usually at least a page of type-written material and often 
more  
 Witness statements (ranging from one or two to many more) – usually a fairly 
brief paragraph or two, but sometimes a page or more 
 Accused interview transcript(s) – varying from a ‘no comment’ three or so 
pages to seventy or more pages of searching question/answer interrogative  
 summary of charges – often a short paragraph that adds to other accounts of 
the offence(s) 
 usually some other significant document such as a report from a 
psychologist/psychiatrist, medical or forensic report, or an internal police 
memo/letter/report, or a variety of police incident reports, or a combination of 
some of these – see further detail below 
 
As another way of indicating the size of the task of data collection, these 
parameters might serve: 
  
 in case eight there were 70+ pages of documentation from a high profile 
professional body which had taken action against the alleged offender for 
breaching professional ethics 
 in another case there were 25 pages of handwritten victim’s statement and 163 
pages of typed accused interview notes 
 another file contained the summary report followed by a Brief of evidence 
heading page that entailed 165 pages of documents  
 in many cases documents were held in manila folders that measured several 
centimetres thick 
 case 43 held a total of 77 pages of typed accused interview transcript and 85 
pages of typed interview transcript 
 in a number of cases documents were held in spring-back folders 
 
There was thus a very large quantity and variety of significant data sources within the 
case files. As a rough average some 20 data sources were found in a case file, 
although that number was highly variable, sometimes many more and sometimes only 
one, two or three.  
  
The most commonly occurring narratives and their containing documents were the 
following: 
 
 police narrative(s) – as contained in 
o The LEAP summary report 
o Other LEAP reports: e.g., Incident Field report, Incident report & case 
progress, LEAP Identifiers report, Sub-incident report, Intelligence 
report and others 
o Internal police reports/letters/memos/patrol duty return/running 
sheets/diary/log/notes 
o Informant’s statement 
o Summary of charges/charge and summons 
o Criminal history sheet 
o Brief-head 
o List of material in hand-up Brief 
o Witness list 
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o Exhibit list 
o Actual exhibits 
o Other court documentation (applications for court orders, affidavits 
etc) 
o Brief authorisation: any specific report from investigating officers, 
recommending officers and authorising officers outlining authorisation 
decision and reasons – these were usually in the form of 
memoranda/letterhead documents 
 
 victim narrative(s) 
o Victim statement(s) on alleged offence 
o Victim statement of withdrawal of complaint 
o Victim impact statement for Court consideration 
 
 witness narrative(s) – Witness statements on alleged offence(s) and related 
particulars  
 
 accused narrative(s) – Transcription of audio record of interview of accused 
by the investigating officer along with any corroborating officers’ 
contributions 
 
 other narratives – as contained in 
o Other reports/letters (e.g., OPP, CASA, Psychiatric) 
o Forensic reports 
o Medical reports 
 
The extensive nature of data collection 
 
There were an even much greater number of data categories and items. The following 
provides an abridged account of the sorts of data that were available for collection. 
(See Appendix seven for the data frame tool for collecting this data). All of the 
documents in each file were listed by exact title. Particular attention was paid to any 
interaction with the Office of Public Prosecution and whether there was a report at the 
front of the file pertaining to the Brief authorisation decision and reasons for making 
it. The various police units involved in the case were identified, as well as any other 
organisations involved, with the latter potentially shedding light on ‘networked 
policing’. The time of the report of the alleged offence to police was noted to 
determine whether it was recent or historical. Notes were made on the age, gender and 
number of police, victims and accused. Other characteristics of the victims and 
accused were also examined, such as whether they had interpreter needs or 
disabilities, and whether or not they were related in some way or strangers to each 
other. The context of the alleged crime was examined in terms of the type of location 
(e.g., home, street, public venue); time of day/night/week; the presence of alcohol or 
illicit drugs; and the duration, type and any particular features of offending (eg social 
descriptors). 
 
Attention was paid to the evidence gathering techniques and practices employed by 
the police in each case. Examination of the investigating officer’s commentary 
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included noting any recommendations concerning authorisation of prosecution; as 
well as any comments on victim(s), witness(es) and accused as to their character, 
credibility and other matters; and any other features of the investigating police 
narrative. Data were also scrutinised as to investigators’ knowledge of police 
protocols and practice concerning sexual assault victims, and for any indication of 
difficulties they confronted in their policing. 
 
The narratives of the police, victims and accused were particularly scrutinised for 
indications of their nature, consistencies and disparities. This involved making 
detailed notes as well as verbatim quotations from each narrative where those were 
especially insightful, emblematic or otherwise significant to the story being told. 
 
The files were examined specifically in relation to the Brief authorisation/non-
authorisation decision rationale and practice of the police in each case. In this respect, 
aside from the investigator, the focus was on recommending and authorising 
officer(s), and their interactions with each other, with the investigator, and with Office 
of Public Prosecution personnel. Data were scrutinised for signs of consultation; 
directions and feedback; shared norms, rules and policies; and time or other resource 
constraints. 
 
The management of each file was also examined for any distinctive features. This 
meant noting whether the file was updated appropriately, whether there was adequate 
and relevant documentation and whether extant documentation was completed at 
quality levels. In addition, if there was a court hearing, the file was examined for any 
indication of whether the case was closed, whether there was a record of 
conviction/sentence/other outcome, and whether there was an indication of a still 
pending matter. 
 
It should be noted that this comprehensive data collection exercise did not result in 
sufficient detailed data in many instances to warrant analysis beyond a certain point 
and consequently the text of the report does not reflect all of the data items described 
in the foregoing paragraphs. Once it was realised that particular items were too 
deficient in data the collected data in those respects were removed from the data 
frames (see next two sections).  
  
Case file data collection and analysis 
 
The main case file data collection was conducted over the period of 8 December 2010 
to 28 February 2011, with initial analysis and progress report-writing continuing 
through to 25 March 2011. Tracking details were kept on each of the case files – see 
‘authenticity, validation and reliability’ below - to permit returning to re-read already 
examined files to check facts if questions arose later and to check observations and 
insights revealed in later examined files against the data collected from earlier files. 
Thus, research was a highly iterative process, which is characteristic of this form of 
qualitative case study. Iterative research means that – unlike purely quantitative 
research and especially the sort that is concerned with hypothesis testing - data 
collection and analysis are not distinct stages, but rather interrelated. Data were 
analysed even in the earliest collections; collection continued even quite late in the 
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initial analysis; and there was continual cycling back and forth from the collecting and 
analysing of data, and from one level of analysis to another. Analysis of data collected 
from the case files involved intensive, painstakingly detailed scrutiny at both the 
intra-case and cross-case levels. Albeit not temporally separate, four durations of data 
collection and analysis could be distinguished in this initial period of present case file 
research. 
 
First, the case files were examined and data were summarily transcribed in 
handwritten notes. This involved the extensive collection of data as described above. 
Data were collected from source documents in order of their inclusion in each file 
(see Appendix 11 for a listing of the most common documents found in the examined 
case files). That is, data were collected as each document was read from the case file, 
moving from the front to the back of the file. The intent was to allow the cases to 
‘speak for themselves’, without overly pre-determining what was considered 
important for collection. Thus, although the data frame instrument shown in Appendix 
seven was devised to ensure gathering of certain categories of data, it was not rigidly 
imposed upon the collection effort, but rather used as a guide and check in a close 
reading of the files. This meant that the data were not simply forced into preconceived 
categories. Data analysis also commenced in this phase with the making of conceptual 
notes at relevant points in the page margin and in brackets of the body of the data text. 
 
Secondly, the transcribed data from each of the case files were then re-organised as 
the handwritten notes were typed up in the data frame format (Appendix seven) as PC 
word documents. The data frame served the purposes of allowing a second duration of 
analysis at the individual case level, thus making sense of the mass of data and casting 
it into a more communicable form. The emphasis was on analysis of the data in each 
case – that is, intra-case analysis was the focus (see below).  However, it also 
facilitated an early comparison and contrast of data across the cases – that is, for later 
cross-case analysis (see below). The handwritten notes were destroyed as the data 
frames were developed and secured with back-ups and as confidence in completion of 
this task was achieved, thus providing for confidentiality and security of the data 
concerning all relevant parties (including both the victims and the police members 
who provided the case data). 
 
Thirdly, case vignettes were written and grid analyses were undertaken (see below). 
The case vignettes were summaries of a number of cases that were of particular value 
in illustrating and substantiating findings. Grid analysis enabled the data to be more 
systematically interrogated to discover themes, issues and patterns across the cases 
and thus to build cross-case patterns. This duration of analysis occurred across the 
case files, rather than being confined largely to the individual cases. At this point – as 
discussed in chapter two - the broad technique of analysis was that of pattern-
matching and the following specific tactics of meaning generation were employed: 
counting; clustering; subsuming particulars into the general; comparison and contrast; 
and factoring (Miles & Huberman, 1994). New insights emerged, conceptual 
discoveries were made and intra-case issues, themes and patterns were re-formulated 
in this duration. 
 
The final duration of analysis occurred in writing-up the previously analysed data and 
findings in the first research progress report. The iterative nature of this form of 
qualitative research was demonstrated again at this point. Even though some 
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considerable work had already been completed in analysis, report writing led to re-
formulating and refining earlier insights and findings. 
 
A second period of analysis occurred over the period of 28 March to 30 June 2011 
during which the earlier analyses were re-visited, with amendments and additional 
analysis to provide for a more polished and comprehensive account to be included in 
the final report. At this stage, there was no further case file data collection. During 
this second period a series of frequency tabulations augmented the earlier largely 
qualitative and descriptive account. This second analytical endeavour was even more 
robust and rigorous, providing a very finely grained understanding of the data, with 
more detailed substantiation of the earlier results as well as adding new findings.  
 
Data frames and intra-case analysis 
 
The uploading of transcribed raw data into data frames and analyses within cases 
occurred over the period of 9 December 2010 to 14 April 2011. The procedure here 
was to first upload the data into the frames within the following seven broad 
categories: the Victoria Police organisational context; characteristics of victims’ 
characteristics of accused; the context of the alleged crime; evidence and 
documentation; the investigating officer’s commentary; Brief authorisation/non-
authorisation decision rationale and practice; and interaction between authoriser and 
the Office of Public Prosecutions (see Appendix seven). An eight category was 
related to linkages with data collection in the other strands of the larger Policing Just 
Outcomes project.  
 
For each case an initial analysis was conducted after the entry of the data into the 
various categories. This analysis was concerned first with how police approached 
victims and the accused in terms of indications of empathy, the nature of language 
adopted, and the presence of any myths or popular images within the police discourse. 
The police narrative was de-constructed to examine the extent to which processing of 
the case demonstrated evidence-based argument. Data were scrutinised for evidence 
of any perspectives informing the Brief authorisation process and for any shared 
understanding of norms, rules and policies among police and OPP personnel. Any 
evidence of collaborative partnerships was also sought at this point. 
 
At this point, the case materials were systematically and critically re-examined for 
emerging themes, issues and patterns both within the case at hand and, to some extent, 
across the cases so far examined. This reflected the iterative nature of data collection 
and analysis. Analysis focused on whether there were indications of a systematic 
framework or paradigm governing the progress of sexual assault cases to OPP 
prosecution and, if so, what was its nature and operating principles. Data were 
examined for ‘taken-for-granted’ signifiers; recurring stories and their methods of 
construction; the nature of the language in any of those stories; whether victim and 
accused stories were evident, diluted or suppressed; and whether any master or 
thematic narratives were to be found in the case files.  
 
This involved the process of de-layering which applied to all aspects and discoveries 
of data analysis. Whenever the researcher discerned an issue, theme, pattern or other 
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insight, it was critically interrogated by searching and re-searching not only the 
documents in each case file as it was under scrutiny, but also reconsidering, 
comparing and contrasting its materials with those of other already examined cases 
whose data had been entered into the data frames (see below, ‘cross-case analysis’). 
De-layering did not involve an exhaustive re-examination of all the data collected or 
every case analysed previously, but rather meant a selective returning to cases and 
data that came to mind in whatever respect prompted by the analysis item of the 
moment. Nonetheless, it was an intensive and time-consuming process. De-layering 
was central to the reading of file documents within an Action Research/Critical 
Discourse/Case Study framework (see the methodology chapter for additional 




After establishing the data-frames and conducting an initial sweep of the cases for a 
general cataloguing of issues, themes and potential patterns, selected cases were 
written up in vignette form. Case vignettes were also written up during grid analysis 
and report writing as the need arose. Cases were chosen for this purpose according to 
their cogency in illustrating an issue, theme, pattern insight, or some other finding. 
Case vignettes captured the essentials of the case along with key observations, 
quotations and references to other cases for any particulars of interest. Particulars of 
interest were for both similarities and dissimilarities relating to, for example, type of 
offence situation; victim and accused characteristics; investigative aspects; and 
authorisation decisions, reasons and outcomes. Excerpts from these case vignettes 
were utilized in the text chapters, numbers five, six and seven.  
 
Data grids and cross-case analysis 
 
Another phase of data analysis involved transferring selected data from the data 
frames and vignettes into grids that allowed comparison and contrast of the data 
according to established issues, themes and patterns discovered in the earlier phases. 
In addition, a key intent of this analysis was to discover any issues, themes and 
patterns that had not so far emerged through the earlier durations of analysis. 
 
Rosalind Hurworth (2000) further developed a grid framework based on Miles and 
Huberman (1994) style grids that is very useful to conducting analyses of qualitative 
data. Such grids are usable with transcripts from any qualitative data sources, 
including the focus group, interview and documentary modes of the current research. 
A grid analytical framework provides for a systematic display of material that can be 
noted, descriptively coded and classified into issues and themes etc. It is also possible 
to highlight particularly interesting or insightful comments and to include verbatim 
quotations, thus enriching reports with the voices of subjects themselves. Due to the 
number of cases and size of the raw data load, verbatim quotations could not be 
included in this level of the case study analysis and, instead, those were transcribed 
directly into the report analysis mode as appropriate to demonstrate and warrant 
findings. 
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The Grid Analysis Method is described briefly in the methodology chapter, however 
its application in strand two involved a variation of the usual way in which this 
method is employed in analysis. In the case file research, codes rather than raw data 
items (such as quotations) were entered into the cells for analytical comparison and 
contrast across the cases, with consequent pattern-matching. This was an innovative 
use of the grid method and it permitted the collapsing and analysis of a great deal of 
data within a relatively small visual space. Although it was an exhaustive and time-
consuming process there was no easy short-cut and it provided a rich and robust set of 
findings. Appendices 13 and 14 illustrate the use of GAM in relation to strand two 
case file research.  
 
Report-writing and analysis 
 
The final phase of analysis occurred during the writing of the initial draft research 
report. Even at this stage there was an iterative return not only to the grids and case 
vignettes but also to the data-frames and raw data storage. Further, this stage was also 
a multi-phase endeavour since each progress report and draft, including the final 
report and its drafts, were utilised in ongoing analysis. 
 
Authorisation and non-authorisation analysis procedure  
 
The following outlines the specific procedure employed (within the foregoing 
described framework) in analysis of the reasons behind police authorisation and non-
authorisation decision-making as discussed in Chapter Six. This provides for 
transparency of analysis and facilitates understanding of the results.  
 
Notably, the reasons extracted from the case files were initially taken literally as they 
appeared in the case files, so they were often highly specific, varied and numerous. 
This is shown to some degree in the listings that are provided along with the analysis 
tables in the text. However, for analysis purposes it was necessary to cluster many 
specific reasons into fewer, manageable data items, and some generalised reasons 
were already stated in the original narratives. In this process, particular reasons were 
subsumed where necessary into more general categories to form rationale factors. The 
generalised factors were then utilized for tabulation and counting purposes. 
 
Additionally, reasons often overlapped in meaning in a case and they were counted 
separately only when they appeared as separate reasons in a particular argument. For 
instance ‘insufficient evidence’ can mean ‘success unlikely’; and ‘absence of seminal 
stain on underpants’ might be subsumed under ‘lack of corroborating evidence’. If the 
same reason was stated by different police in a case, it was counted once only. If 
different reasons were stated by the same or different police in the one case narrative, 
they were counted distinctly. The same procedure was adopted in relation to other 
parties in a case and in regard to non-formal reasoning. 
 
De-layering was not an easy process as it had to be carefully considered as to whether 
factors for or against prosecution could be reasonably inferred to exist in what were 
often complex evidentiary proceedings. For instance, in case 68 the investigator 
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noted: “I am weary (sic!) of unleashing a flood of complaints against taxi drivers that 
are not connected to this investigation”. This note could have been inferred as a 
reason leading to the eventual non-authorisation. However, it was not determined as a 
valid inference in the circumstances since the police had vainly followed-up the 
victim to sign a statement after she had initially made a hand-written complaint.  
 
Again, de-layering took account not only of the police narrative but also of narratives 
from the victim, accused and witnesses. Thus, non-formal reasoning necessarily was 
inferred by the analyst as being what police would or should have taken into account 
from the other parties as well as their own officers. This is tantamount to ‘putting 
words into the mouths’ of the police concerned, yet there was no alternative given the 
absence of formal authorisation argument – see the text of Chapter Six - as well as the 
role of the interpretive method in de-layering to discover reasons in file documents 
other than formal argument memoranda. 
 
Authenticity, validation, and reliability 
 
In qualitative research of the kind pursued in the case study aspect of the PJO project, 
a widely recognised key requirement of authenticity and validation processes is the 
construction of a chain-of-evidence. A well constructed chain-of-evidence allows any 
duly authorised, ethically credentialed party to re-trace precisely how the researchers 
did their work from initial raw data collection through analysis to the final report. In 
investigation of the case files, care was taken to develop a strong chain-of-evidence 
by ensuring that reported findings and their supporting data could be traced back to 
their exact sources.  
 
The strand two case study chain-of-evidence was started by assigning a unique case 
number to each case file, within which all the materials comprising the case related to 
a specific sub-incident (subinc) number used by VicPol for operational purposes. This 
was a necessary first step given the large number of cases and hence the futility of 
identifying each case by means of a descriptive title. Each case was also identified in 
terms of its source region and the box in which it was housed within the storage room 
at the VicPol premises. Each box was identified by region number and box number so 
that every case could have been re-located at will by examining the case listing where 
details were recorded (if the chain-of-evidence procedure had been maintained). 
 
The following short excerpt from the tracking tool constructed for this purpose shows 
the nature of this part of the chain-of-evidence procedure:  
 
C SUBINC  R B 
1 xyz 5 1 
2 xyz 5 1 
3 xyz 5 1 
4 xyz 5 1 
 
(Note: xyz is shown instead of actual subinc numbers to protect the identities of police officers and 
their organisational units in the first instance as per the just noted ethical issues). 
 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 364 
This simply says that case one had a specific subinc number and it came from region 
five and it was stored in box one of that region’s collection of boxes. Every box was 
correspondingly labelled by its region and box number so, for example, case one 
could have been relocated by finding the box inscribed as R5, B1, then locating 
within that box the folder identified by the specific subinc number. The folder 
contained all of the materials provided to the researchers in relation to the victim(s) 
and offender(s) concerned in the investigation identified by the subinc number. (The 
collation of materials was actually sometimes more complicated than this suggests, 
however this covers the essentials of the bulk of the case files).  
 
In addition to this physical relocation procedure, wherever a specific case was 
referenced in any analysis or part of a report, its case number was also cited so that 
the particular analysis or report commentary relying upon that case for supportive 
data could have been traced back to the actual raw data source. Any duly accredited 
person who wished to check the veracity of a quotation from a particular case, for 
example, would have had a means for re-tracing that quotation to its exact source and 
thus satisfying him/herself that the researcher did not make an error. 
 
The durability of this chain of evidence depended upon VicPol continuing to maintain 
a secure and locatable storage facility for the case files once they were no longer 
required for present research purposes. It had been envisaged to negotiate with VicPol 
an arrangement whereby anyone who wished to examine the case files would require 
clearance from both the Victoria Police and Edith Cowan Research Ethics 
Committees. However, this chain-of-evidence and research access arrangement 
became redundant due to confidentiality and anonymity concerns (see Chapter Two of 
the text). Nonetheless, it is described to demonstrate the rigor and robustness of the 
data-collection/analysis and to warrant the authenticity of the research and its 
findings.  
 
The present effort was directed to achieving two of the key criteria of qualitative case 
research, viz: authenticity and reliability. Authenticity refers to the capacity of the 
research findings to reflect the truth of the cases in their individual and collective 
expressions of social reality. Reliability refers to its capacity to enable others to repeat 
the research so as to verify, extend, modify or correct its truth claims. Both of these 
criteria were fulfilled in the foregoing now voided procedure.  
 
Additionally, authenticity, validity and reliability of strand two case research claims 
were strengthened through the use of researcher triangulation and key informants 
(police). Researcher triangulation refers to two or more researchers examining the 
same data set independent of each other. In strand two research, two researchers 
collected and analysed data from the case files in this fashion, each taking 
responsibility for different sets of case files. Each researcher collected and initially 
analysed data from their respective case files, concluding their analyses at the intra-
case and cross-case levels before sharing the results. This procedure ensured that they 
brought to bear different viewpoints and arrived at separate understandings of the 
cases, providing for a later cross-fertilisation and checking of their respective 
analyses. This in turn enriched the findings by corroborating emerging issues, themes 
and patterns as well as embellishing, querying and adding others. 
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The key informant method employed here involved the researchers taking advantage 
of the in-house experience and expertise of a number of police officers regarding both 
operational matters as well as ongoing VicPol initiatives such as the SOCIT Project 
Brief. These officers provided invaluable advice to the external researchers helping to 
avoid errors and misunderstandings due to lack of ‘insider’ knowledge of the complex 
VicPol mega-organisation. They also assisted greatly in planning and implementation 
of the research plan. On occasions they were also a source of rich data which 
complemented and supplemented that obtained from other sources such as the IO, RO 
and AO interviews/focus groups. 
 
Finally, the strength of truth claims of strand two research findings was further 
warranted by triangulation across the case file, interview and focus group data 
collection and analysis, as discussed in several chapters of the text. 
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Appendix seven: Data frame collection instrument for Strand two 
VicPol case file research 
 
Strand two Case No. XYZ – data collected (DATE) 
 
Tracking details: sample no. xyz (subinc xyz) Box Rx(y)  
 
Summary report at front: yes/no – Printed (date); Dated (date) 
 
Report at front of file outlining authorisation decision and reasons: yes/no 
 
Time of report to police – recent/ historical 
recent – within 72 hours 
historical – note lag time in days, weeks, months, years 
 
OPP involvement – yes/no 
 
Networked policing – yes/no 
 
Allegation(s)/Charge(s) - xyz 
 
Outcome(s) 
authorised/not authorised – IO/RO/AO 
intent to summons/summons 
warrant of apprehension/arrest 
465 warrant of search & seizure 
court mention/committal date 
bail/remanded in custody 





VICPOL ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
VicPol Organisational Units 
Region 
SOCAU/SOCIT – yes/no 
CIU – yes/no 
SCS – yes/no – no action 
Uniform police station – yes/no 
other 
 
VicPol Personnel/location/gender/number involved 
Inf/IO – e.g., DSC CIU (Location), m/f 
Corroborator – D/SC (Location), m/f 
RO – e.g., DSgt (Location), m/f 
AO – e.g., DSSgt CIU (Location), m/f 
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Prosecutor – e.g., DSC (Location), m/f 
Number of police involved 
 





recent migrant/refugee  
English second language – lack of fluency 
occupation 
residential suburb 
disability (physical, mental illness, intellectual, elderly, other) 
incomplete or missing victim information  
other notable features 
 





recent migrant/refugee  
English second language – lack of fluency 
occupation 
residential suburb 
disability (physical, mental illness, intellectual, elderly, other) 
relationship to victim (family member – identify precise relationship(s); partner; in 
loco parentis (e.g., foster care, family group home, child protection worker); carer 
(e.g., home care, nursing home); other trust position (e.g., school teacher, scout 
leader, religious leader, doctor); stranger 
number of accused 
incomplete or missing suspect information 
other notable features 
 
CONTEXT OF ALLEGED CRIME 
 
From summary report 
 








entertainment venue (e.g., night club) 
other public venue 
Time of day/night/week 
Alcohol, illicit drugs, other drugs 
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Number of charges/allegations 
Type of alleged offence 
main one - e.g., rape (cite the legal category) 
add any social descriptors – e.g., rape in marriage, predatory 
role of technology – use of internet to ‘groom’ and/or ‘trap’ victims  









EVIDENCE & DOCUMENTATION 
 
Evidence gathering techniques and practices employed – E.G., interview with 
accused (audio taped); statements from victim and witnesses; surveillance tape 
footage. 
 
informed accused of rights 
in presence of accused unsealed 3 audio cassette tapes and inserted in recording unit 
corroborator present at accused’s interview  
checked master tape for voices 
gave accused copy of typed interview 
 








Court documentation (summons, court orders, affidavits etc) 
 
Internal police reports/letters/memos/patrol duty return/diary/log/notes 
 




Medical examination performed? 
 
Physical injuries – nature and severity 
 
Trauma – nature and severity 
 
Victim’s statement of interview, VATE/VARE (consent form) 
 









Summary of charges 
 
Incomplete or missing evidence/crime information 
 
 
INVESTIGATING OFFICER’S COMMENTARY 
 
From summary report, Incident Field report, Incident report & case progress, 
LEAP Identifiers report, Sub-incident report, Intelligence report, Internal police 




authorisation – reasons 
non-authorisation - reasons 
 
Strength of evidence - comments by IO 
strength of evidence indicators 
 
Victim comments by IO 
character (type) 
credibility 
threats or hindrances – accused/family/other 
how identified, how recorded by police  
indication of victim being kept informed of progress of case 
  
Witness comments by IO 
character (type) 
credibility 
how identified, how recorded by police 
 
Accused comments by IO 
indication of empathy/excuse/prejudice 
how identified – stranger or known? how recorded by police 
 
Other Police Narrative features 
omissions 
extraneous inclusions  
indicators of personal values and beliefs 
nature of language 
use of metaphor, analogy, non-evidence based argument and discussion 
framed in terms of assault or (consenting) sexual behaviour? 
lexical bias? victim given voice? accused given voice? passive voice? 
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VicPol procedures and protocol for sexual assault victims - indications of level of 
knowledge and application 
 
Interactions with other agencies – e.g., CASA – ‘networked’ policing or lack 
 
Police difficulties confronted - comments by IO 
initial police response – e.g., time lag issue 
gathering evidence 
using technology 
framing a persuasive case 
time or other resource constraints – are there especially frequent or important 
constraints? 
indications of consultation/support/guidance given to IO and from whom – nature 
and quality 
 
BRIEF AUTHORISATION/NON-AUTHORISATION DECISION 




Authorisation – reasons 
Non-authorisation – reasons 
Interaction with IO? 
consultations prior to authorisation/non-authorisation decision – written, 
telephone, face-to-face meetings 
Directions and feedback given to IO 
nature and quality 
further investigation required 
absence of directions or feedback for follow-up 
Nature of relationship – e.g., immediate superior, ad hoc/systematic 
Norms, rules and policies governing their interaction indications? 
Time or other resource constraints – are there especially frequent or important 
constraints? 
Indications of consultation/support/guidance given to RO 
from whom 




Authorisation – reasons 
Non-authorisation – reasons 
Interaction with RO/IO? 
consultations prior to authorisation/non-authorisation decision – written, 
telephone, face-to-face meetings 
Directions and feedback given to RO/IO 
nature and quality 
further investigation required 
absence of directions or feedback for follow-up 
Nature of relationship – e.g., immediate superior, ad hoc/systematic 
Norms, rules and policies governing their interaction indications? 
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Time or other resource constraints – are there especially frequent or important 
constraints? 
Indications of consultation/support/guidance given to AO 
from whom 
nature and quality 
 
IO, RO & AO agreed or disagreed? 
 
INTERACTION BETWEEN AUTHORISER AND OPP 
 
Authorisation supported – reasons 
Non-authorisation supported – reasons 
Interaction with IO/RO/AO? 
consultations prior to authorisation/non-authorisation decision – written, 
telephone, face-to-face meetings 
Directions and feedback given to IO 
nature and quality 
further investigation required 
absence of directions or feedback for follow-up 
Norms, rules and policies governing their interaction indications? 
Time or other resource constraints – are there especially frequent or important 
constraints? 
Indications of consultation/support/guidance given to/by OPP officer 
from whom 
nature and quality 
 
 
LINKAGES TO OTHER DATA COLLECTION 
 
strand 1 
interview categories – e.g., indications of ‘physical harm rule’, ‘protest reporting’, 
‘protection reporting’, socio-cultural barriers, family or community interference, ‘the 
talk’ 
individual interview questions 




individual interview questions 
focus group questions 
survey questions 
 
INITIAL ANALYSIS OF CONVERSATIONS, NARRATIVE DISCOURSE 
 
Approach to victim - indications 
empathic 
non-empathic 
neutral, dispassionate, logical 
emotive language 
myth(s), popular images – e.g., menstrual taboo 








neutral, dispassionate, logical 




‘second guessing’ jury or court deliberations 
ie, presence or lack of teleological element in determination of ‘a strong case’ 
 




Emerging issues – e.g., differences between processed v. unprocessed files? 
authorised v. non-authorised files? 
 
Perspective(s) informing the Brief authorisation process –  
IO and RO – nature 
RO and AO – nature 
Police and OPP - nature 
 
Shared understanding of norms, rules and policies or lack of it governing 
interaction between 
IO and RO – nature:  
RO and AO – nature:  
Police and OPP – nature:  
 
Evidence of collaborative partnerships along the chain of processing Briefs that 
enhances prosecution outcomes for victims of sexual assault? 
 
Socio-legal paradigm governing the progress of sexual assault cases to OPP 
prosecution and, if so, what is its nature and operating principles? 
Recognisable ‘taken-for-granted’ signifiers, symbols and emblems shared across 
IOs, ROs, AOs and OPP? 
Recurring stories of sexual assault cases that are ‘worthy’ v. ‘unworthy’ of CJS time 
and resources? 
Methods of construction (detection and determination) of those stories? 
are there particular or favoured ones?– e.g., external/internal attributions (Coates & 
Wade, 2004) 
Nature of the language in those stories – e.g., violent or erotic terms? (Bavelas & 
Coates, 2001) 
Narrative 
typical or ‘master’ narrative? or  
number of thematic narratives? or 
widely varying according to the particulars of cases? 
Victim’s story evident, diluted or suppressed? (Cotterill, 2004) 
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Accused’s story evident, diluted or suppressed? (Cotterill, 2004) 
 





incomplete – i.e., missing documents  
poorly completed 
E.G., undated 
E.G., absence of signatures 
 
if court hearing, is the case ‘closed’? 
record of conviction/sentence 
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Appendix eight: Interview schedule for Investigating Officers’ focus 
groups in 2011 (strands two and three) 
 
Introductory comments:  
 
Thanks to everyone for attending today. Introduce yourself. 
Explain briefly the ARC project and VicPol’s SOCIT project. 
Introductions all around. 
16 general questions, about 50 minutes, will need to move fairly quickly, and at the 
end there will be time for any additional thoughts that are important to note for the 
research. 
 
Ensure the focus is on adult sexual assault not other crimes (remind them every so 
often) 
 
In your opinion and from your experience (say this at regular intervals)  
 







Norms               Rules               Policies                Perspectives or viewpoints 
 







If any, probe for what sorts and their relative importance 
Importance of corroborating evidence 
Have you ever prepared a Brief based only on the victim’s word? 
Successful? 
 









Who have you contacted, and why? 
What norms, rules, policies and perspectives guide your investigation and preparation 
of Briefs of adult sexual assault? (Allow 10 minutes) 
 




Do you contact any agencies or services outside of VicPol when investigating sexual 
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Probe for whether routine or unusual with respect to whatever agencies are nominated 
CASA, OPP – explore these particularly 
If any, what are problems and solutions here? 
 







Probe for who supports 
Quality of feedback 
Brief checking guide on intranet – is it adequate? 
Value of a checklist and its content (SOCIT Project) – would it be different? 
Do you contact the OPP either formally or through informal networks? 
If not have you thought of doing it? 
Do you get advice from colleagues who have contacts? 
Is this encouraged or accepted as practice? 
Are you confident doing this?  
 








What would a ‘best practice’ Brief look like? 
Probe for how important is victim credibility 
Would you like to see more collaboration between police and prosecutors at an earlier 
stage to ensure quality of Briefs? 
 






Probe for whether a lot of time is spent on record keeping and file management 
Also probe for verbal discussions with the recommending officer and the authorising 
officer 
 






What consultation, support, and guidance do you have in investigating allegations and 




 In your opinion and from your experience what are the most important considerations 





Are there any aspects that take up the most time when you are investigating cases and 




Do you experience any constraints or pressures in preparing these sorts of Briefs? 








Probe for knowledge, resources, time, expectations 
Is there any ranking of factors as to their importance? 
 







Probe for what if any sorts of knowledge need to be provided 
Legal knowledge and its importance 
 







If any what? 
Probe for the reasons – e.g., cognitive impairment, mental health issues, character of 
victims 
Have you ever recommended this sort and if so why? 
What about victims in special needs groups (if not already mentioned)? – name them. 
Any special needs victims especially difficult? 
Any victims that are especially easy? Why?  
 







Apart from your assessment of false reports 
 







Probe for specific differences and their relative importance 
 
Key Question 12: 
 
 
Are there types of Brief that generally cannot be recommended for authorisation? 




Are there differences between adult sexual assault Briefs and Briefs for crimes 




What most works and most doesn’t work in the current system for preparing Briefs 
(Allow 5 minutes) 
 
 
In your opinion and from your experience are there any kinds of adult sexual assault 
cases that make the most difficult Briefs to write? EASIEST? (Allow 5 minutes) 
   
 
What experience have you had in preparing sexual assault Briefs? What training have 















Suggestions for improvement  
 







Has it been necessary and if not why not? 
Have you ever disagreed strongly with the recommending/authorising officer? 
How has this been handled by you? By the RO/AO? 
From your experience and knowledge what can happen in these situations? 
Do you wait until s/he goes on leave and present the Brief to another RO/AO? 
How often are Briefs returned to you for more work? 
Has the prosecutor/OPP asked for more work done? (REPEAT THE PROMPTS) 
 







Probe how this has changed, for better or worse?   
 







What do you see as problems in this respect? 
Is it related to any pattern in Briefs being taken up by prosecutors? 
Is there any connection to the way prosecutors handle Briefs at Court? 
Is it because cases are being taken to court that do not fit narrow stereotypes of sexual 
assault victims and thus challenge courts and jurors to hear these cases? 
 
Key Question 16: 
 
 
Have any of your Briefs ever been returned for more work? What kind of extra work 
have you done? (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
 
Do you have any other thoughts about the Brief authorisation process concerning 



















THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND INFORMATION 
 
YOUR CONTRIBUTION IS MUCH APPRECIATED 
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Appendix nine: Interview schedule for Recommending Officers in 2011 
(strands two and three) 
 
Introductory comments:  
 
Thanks for agreeing to be interviewed. Introduce yourself. 
Explain briefly the ARC project and VicPol’s SOCIT project. 
17 general questions, about 50 minutes, will need to move fairly quickly, and at the 
end there will be time for any additional thoughts that are important to note for the 
research. 
 
Ensure the focus is on adult sexual assault not other crimes (remind them every so 
often) 
 
In your opinion and from your experience (say this at regular intervals)  
 








Norms                      Rules                    Policies                  Perspectives or viewpoints 
 







If any, probe for what sorts and their relative importance 
Importance of corroborating evidence 
Have you ever seen a Brief based only on the victim’s word and asking for 
authorisation? 
Did you support it for prosecution? If so, why? If not why not? 
Was it successful at Court if it went there? 
Was it Magistrates or County Court? Both? 
 







Who has been contacted, and why? 
What norms, rules, policies and perspectives guide you in 
supervising preparation of Briefs of adult sexual assault and making 
recommendations? (Allow 10 minutes) 
 
Are there any kinds of evidence that are essential to include in a 
Brief? (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
 
Do you ask the investigator to contact any agencies or services 
outside of VicPol when supervising sexual assault Briefs? Do you 
experience any problems in this regard? (Allow 5 minutes) 
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Probe for whether routine or unusual with respect to whatever agencies are nominated 
CASA, OPP – explore these particularly 
If any, what are problems and solutions here? 
 







Probe for who supports 
Quality of feedback 
Brief checking guide on intranet – is it adequate? 
Value of a checklist and its content (SOCIT Project) – would it be different? 
Do you contact the OPP either formally or through informal networks? 
If not, have you thought of doing it? 
Do you get advice from colleagues who have contacts? 
Is this encouraged or accepted as practice? 
Are you confident doing this? 
 







What would a ‘best practice’ Brief look like? 
Probe for how important is victim credibility 
 








Probe for whether a lot of time is spent on record keeping and file management 
Also probe for verbal discussions with the investigator and the authorising officer 
 







Probe for knowledge, resources, time, expectations 
What consultation, support, and guidance do you have in 





 In your opinion and from your experience what are the most 
important considerations in preparing sexual assault Briefs? 




Are there any aspects that take up the most time when you are 
supervising investigations and preparation of Briefs on adult sexual 




 Do you experience any constraints or pressures in supervising 
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Is there any ranking of factors as to their importance? 
 







Probe for what if any sorts of knowledge need to be provided 
Legal knowledge and its importance 
 








If any what? 
Probe for the reasons – e.g., cognitive impairment, mental health issues, character of 
victims 
Have you ever recommended this sort and if so why? 
What about victims in special needs groups (if not already mentioned)? – name them. 
Any special needs victims especially difficult?  
Any victims that are especially easy? Why?  
 








Apart from your assessment of false reports 
 







Probe for specific differences and their relative importance 
 
Key Question 12: 
 
 
What experience have you had in supervising sexual assault Briefs? 
What training have you had in this respect? (Allow 5 minutes) 
          




Are there types of Brief that generally cannot be recommended 
for authorisation? Types of Brief that generally can be 




Are there differences between adult sexual assault Briefs and 




What most works and most doesn’t work in the current system for 
preparing and supervising Briefs (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
 
In your opinion and from your experience are there any kinds of 
adult sexual assault cases that make the most difficult Briefs to 
assess and supervise? EASIEST? (Allow 5 minutes) 











Suggestions for improvement  
 









Has it been necessary and if not why not? 
Have you ever disagreed strongly with the authorising officer when a Brief has been 
put up? 
How has this been handled by you? By the AO? 
From your experience and knowledge what can happen in these situations? 
Do you wait until s/he goes on leave and present the Brief to another AO? 
How often have you had to return Briefs to members for amendment or additional 
investigation? 
 






How often have you returned Briefs to members for amendment or additional 
investigation? 
What extra work have you asked the investigator to undertake? 
 







Probe how this has changed, for better or worse?   
 
Key Question 16: 
 
 
Have any of your supervised Briefs ever been returned by the 
authorising officer for more work? What kinds of extra work have you 
had to ask the investigator/member to do?  (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
 
Have you returned Briefs for more work before you have sent 




Have you changed the way you supervise preparation of sexual 




Why do you think sex offences continue to have lower conviction rates? 











What do you see as problems in this respect? 
Is it related to any pattern in Briefs being taken up by prosecutors? 
Is there any connection to the way prosecutors handle Briefs at Court? 
Is it because cases are being taken to court that do not fit narrow stereotypes of sexual 
assault victims and thus challenge courts and jurors to hear these cases? 
 






THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND INFORMATION 
 
YOUR CONTRIBUTION IS MUCH APPRECIATED 
 
Do you have any other thoughts about the Brief authorisation 
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Appendix 10: Interview schedule for Authorizing Officers in 2011 
(strands two and three) 
 
NOTE: While this set of interviews sought to cross-relate data to that obtained from ROs and 
the IO focus groups, a greater emphasis was placed on allowing AOs maximum room for 
providing their views in a largely unstructured, free-flowing fashion. 
 
Introduction: Researcher introduced herself and explained PJO and SOCIT projects etc  
 
1. Describe your understanding of the Brief authorisation process as it operates in the 
station/unit?  And what is your role in it? 
 
2. What types of information do you consider important to include in the Brief of 
evidence? And what to exclude and why? 
 
3. What works in the current process/structure? What is in need of improvement? 
 
4. Do you think that the process of handing up Briefs to the OPP works well? 
 
5. Do you think that what the OPP are looking for works with the kind of evidence that 
the police can collect? 
 
6. What are the strengths and weaknesses in the coordination between the police and the 
OPP? How can this be improved from the police perspective? 
 
7. There has been a lot of discussion surrounding the attrition rate for sexual assault.  
What sort of role do you think the Brief plays in this? 
 
8. What are the specific problems for you as a police officer, responding to sexual 
assault in a place like [insert geographical area]? 
 
9. Are there specific problems in the Brief authorisation process when it’s a sexual 
assault as opposed to other offences e.g. Property offences.  Why is this? 
 
10. What do you think needs to happen differently in regards to the investigation and 
prosecution of sexual assault? 
 
11. What sort of evidence do you want to see in the Brief before it’s authorised for 
prosecution? 
a) What’s your understanding of corroboration? 
b) What is your understanding of credibility and reliability of witnesses and 
documents? 
 
12. What do you think of the way sexual assault offences are defined by law?  And what 
effect does this have on the job you do? 
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Appendix 11: Most common documents found in the LEAP case files 
(strand two) 
 
Case file data collection and analysis typically involved close reading of several, often 
complex documents. The following lists the most commonly found documents on file.   
 
Summary report 
Incident Field report 
Incident report & case progress 





Exhibit list – e.g., photographs 
Court documentation (summons, court orders, affidavits etc) 
Schedule 8 Application for a DNA sample 
Warrant – Search, Apprehension, Arrest 
Internal police reports/letters/memos 
Patrol duty return/log/notes/diary 
Investigator’s formal memorandum requesting (non-)authorisation 
Recommending Officer’s formal memorandum requesting (non)authorisation 
Authorising Officer’s formal memorandum of (non-)authorisation 
Other reports/letters (eg OPP, CASA, Psychiatric) 
Forensic report (VIFM) 
Medical examination report 
Victim statement(s) 
VATE (consent form) 
Witness statement(s) 
Accused’s record of interview 
Audio tape of accused interview 
Informant’s statement 
Summary of charges 
Evidence Movement Record 
Criminal history sheet (accused/offender, victim) 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 386 
Appendix 12: VicPol Outcome Categories and the LEAP electronic 
database (strand two) 
Case file data collection and analysis required familiarisation with VicPol outcome 
categories and an understanding of what is meant by the LEAP system. The LEAP 
database is utilized to record, track and make available to authorised persons what is 
happening in relation to any criminal investigation. It records matters according to what is 
termed an incident or sub-incident. An incident refers to a specific event or series of 
events, which can involve more than one accused person and/or more than one victim.  A 
sub-incident sits within the framework of the incident and refers to specific 
allegations/charges relating to the incident. Each allegation/charge is assigned to a sub-
incident number. This allows recording and tracking of each and its investigative status. 
There are three categories of Investigative Status:  
• "A" Active The investigation is ongoing and further avenues of inquiry are to 
be followed. This can refer to an overall investigation or to one or more of its 
elements – that is, one or more accused persons and/or one or more 
allegations/charges 
• "P" Pending The investigation has been taken as far as possible at a given 
point in time and all avenues of investigation have been exhausted with no 
final result. This includes investigations where the offender has been identified 
and a "whereabouts desired" has been recorded on LEAP.  
• "C" Complete The investigation of the entire incident has been completed 
and each sub-incident has been cleared by one of the following:  
o OFPR = all offenders have been processed by way of 
charge and bail  
o ITS = Intent To Summons = all offenders have been 
processed by way of an application to summons 
o NOD = no offence has been disclosed. This includes 
cases of a proven false report/complaint. 
o CPWD = complaint withdrawn by complainant 
o SNA = Brief submitted but Summons not authorised  
o OTHER = Offender deceased, underage, mentally ill, 
etc.   
An ITS matter will be either authorised or not authorised. If authorised, the matter 
proceeds to court. If not authorised, the matter does not proceed to court. Broadly, the 
reasons for not authorising are coded in the LEAP system as one of the following: 
underage; deceased; no identity known; insufficient evidence; complaint withdrawn; 
exonerated; mental impairment; caution issued; PIN issued; and processed via another 
sub incident. A PIN is a Penalty Infringement Notice which means an on-the-spot fine. 
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Appendix 13:  
Grid 1 - Case status: (non-)authorisation, formal report, Office of 
Public Prosecutions involvement, and known final outcome (strand 
two) 
 
This grid summarises the status of LEAP file cases in terms of authorisation or non-
authorisation, with or without formal reasons stated; a formal report or not; Office of 
Public Prosecutions (OPP) involvement; and known final outcome. The complexity of 
coding captures the diversity of data in the case files. Line spaces are inserted 





C – Case number 
 
Authorisation status 
 A – authorised 
 ? – assumed, because it was processed ‘as if’ it had been authorised 
 NA – not authorised 
 R – reasons formally stated 
 NR – no reasons formally stated 
 B – Brief-head indication of authorisation/non-authorisation, no reasons 
evident 
 OL – authorisation/non-authorisation indicated in other location in the file, no 
reasons evident 
 OL* - OL + some reasons evident 
 
Formal report at front of file outlining authorisation details 
 Y – yes  
 N – no 
 
Office of Public Prosecutions 
 OPP – indicated 
 
Outcome: 
 OPC – offender processed/charged 
 PO – prosecution outcome 
 CPWD – complaint withdrawn by victim 
 SNA – summons not authorised 
 NOD – no offence disclosed 
 U – unsolved 
 CWP – charge withdrawn by prosecution 
 
 
C Authorisation status Formal 
Report/ OPP 
Outcome 
5 A B N PO - Court – conviction 
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6 A B N PO - Court – conviction 
7 A B N/OPP PO - Nolle Prosequi - CPWD  
8 A B  N/OPP PO - Court – no result on file 
9 A B N  PO - Court – no result on file 
10 A B N PO - Court – conviction 
40 A B N PO 
44 A B N/OPP  PO - Court – no result 
45 A B Y1 OPC 
48 A B N OPC  
49 A B N/OPP PO - CC – acquitted 
50 A B N/OPP PO - CC – 5y7m  
90 A B N/OPP PO 
    
11 A B OL N PO - Dismissed + VicPol costs 
    
42 A OL N PO - Conviction 
    
3 A? NR N OPC 
4 A? NR N/OPP OPC - Court – no result on file 
15 A? NR N OPC - Court – no result on file 
16 A? NR N OPC - Court – no result on file 
17 A? NR N/OPP OPC - Court – warrant issued 
18 A? NR N OPC - Court – no result on file 
27 A? NR N OPC  
28 A? NR N PO - CCrt – 6/5y min 
29 A? NR N PO - Court – no result on file 
30 A? NR N PO - Court – adj w’out convic 
31 A? NR N PO - Court – not guilty all counts 
32 A? NR N PO - Court – 2 yrs imp/18mth susp 
34 A? NR N OPC 
35 A? NR  N PO 
37 A? NR N PO - Court – 3 months imp + CBO 
38 A? NR N/OPP PO  
39 A? NR N PO 
41 A? NR N PO - Court – conviction  
46 A? NR N OPC 
47 A? NR N OPC 
55 A? NR N PO - CC conviction 
    
1 NA R Y SNA 
2 NA R Y SNA 
12 NA R Y  SNA 
13 NA R Y SNA 
14 NA R Y SNA 
33 NA R Y SNA 
36 NA R B Y  SNA 
43 NA R B Y SNA – OPC2 – Court – no result on file 
56 NA R Y  SNA 
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57 NA R Y  SNA 
58 NA R Y  SNA 
59 NA R Y  SNA 
60 NA R Y  SNA 
61 NA R Y  SNA 
62 NA R Y  SNA 
63 NA R Y  SNA 
64 NA R Y  SNA 
65 NA R Y  SNA  
66 NA R Y  SNA 
67 NA R Y  SNA 
68 NA R Y  SNA 
69 NA R Y  SNA 
70 NA R Y/OPP  SNA 
71 NA R B Y  SNA 
72 NA R Y SNA 
73 NA R Y SNA 
74 NA R B Y  SNA  
75 NA R Y  SNA  
76 NA R  Y SNA 
77 NA R B Y  CPWD  
78 NA R Y  CPWD  
79 NA R Y  CPWD  
81 NA R Y  CPWD  
82 NA R Y  CPWD  
87 NA R Y  CPWD  
88 NA R Y CPWD  
89 NA R Y  SNA 
    
54 NA B OL* N  CPWD 
    
25 NA OL* N CPWD 
    
19 NA NR N CPWD  
20 NA NR N CPWD  
26 NA NR N CPWD3 - Court – CWP 
52 NA NR N  CPWD  
80 NA NR N  CPWD  
83 NA NR N  CPWD 
84 NA NR N  CPWD  
85 NA NR N  CPWD  
    
21 U N Unsolved 
23 U  N  Unsolved  
24 U  N Unsolved 
53 U N Unsolved 
51 NOD N NOD - CPWD  
22 NOD  N NOD - CPWD 
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86 NOD N NOD - CPWD 
    
NOTES: 1. In case 45 a formal report was included on file without any reasons; 2. Case 43 was in fact 
prosecuted at least to a committal hearing, having been formally not authorised beforehand, without 
clarification on file; 3. Case 26 was especially unusual, the charge being withdrawn by the prosecution 
at Court after the complaint had already been withdrawn earlier by the victim.  
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Appendix 14:  
Grid 2 - Case status: original main allegation, main charge that 
eventuated, type of case and networked policing (strand two) 
 
This grid summarises the status of LEAP file cases in terms of original main 
allegation, main charge that eventuated, type of case and networked policing.  
 
C – Case number 
 
 Allegation (main, original): 
o R = rape 
o AR = attempted rape 
o IA = indecent/sexual assault 
o IN = incest 
 Charge (main): 
o R = rape 
o AR = attempted rape 
o IA = indecent/sexual assault 
o IN = incest 
 Not authorised = NA 
 Type of case: 
o DR = domestic rape 
o GR = gang rape 
o SR = stranger rape 
o SA = stranger attempted rape 
o AR = acquaintance rape (includes friends and known others) 
o AA = acquaintance attempted rape 
o IN = incest 
o SI = stranger indecent assault 
o AI = Acquaintance indecent assault (includes friends and known 
others) 
o UR/UI = unknown due to lack of detail on file  










1 R NA AR yes 
2 R NA AR no 
3 IA IA SI no 
4 R R AR no 
5 IA  IA AI no 
6 IA IA SI no 
7 R R AR yes 
8 R R AR no 
9 R R SR yes 
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10 IA  IA AI no 
11 IA IA SI no 
12 R NA  GR no 
13 IA NA AI no 
14 R NA AR no 
15 R R DR yes 
16 IA IA AI no 
17 R R AR no 
18 IA IA SI no 
19 R NA SR yes 
20 R NA SR yes 
21 IA NA SI yes 
22 R NA AR yes 
23 AR NA SA yes 
24 IA NA SI no 
25 IA NA AI yes 
261 IA IA AI2 yes 
27 R R SR yes 
28 R R SR yes 
29 IA IA SI no 
30 IA IA SI no 
31 R R AR no 
32 R R AR yes 
33 IN NA IN no 
34 IN IN IN no 
35 IA IA SI no 
36 R NA AR no 
37 IA IA  SI no 
38 IA IA AI3 no 
39 IN IN IN no 
40 R IA AR no 
41 IA IA SI no 
42 R IA AI no 
43 R NA AR no 
44 R R AR yes 
45 IA IA AI no 
46 R R UR no 
47 R R UR no 
48 IA IA AI no 
49 R R AR no 
50 R R AR no 
51 IA NA AI no 
52 R NA AR yes 
53 IA NA SI yes 
54 R NA AR yes 
55 IN IN IN no 
56 R NA AR no 
57 R  NA AR no 
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58 R NA AR no 
59 R NA  AR no 
60 R NA AR no 
61 IA  NA AI no 
62 R NA AR no 
63 IA NA AI no 
64 R NA AR yes 
65 R NA SR no 
66 IA NA SI no 
67 IA NA AI no 
68 R NA SR no 
69 IA NA UI no 
70 R  NA AR yes 
71 IA NA AI no 
72 R NA  AR no 
73 R NA AR no 
74 R NA AR no 
75 IA NA AI no 
76 R NA AR no 
77 AR NA AA no 
78 IA NA AI no 
79 R NA AR yes 
80 IA NA AI no 
81 R NA SR yes 
82 R NA AR yes 
83 R NA UR yes 
84 IA NA SI yes4 
85 R NA SR no 
86 R NA SR no 
87 R NA AR yes5 
88 IA NA AI no 
89 R NA SR no 
90 IN IN IN no 
NOTES: 1. Case 26 was not formally authorised albeit a charge was taken forward; 2. In this case the 
alleged offender was the victim’s mother’s boyfriend of eight years, so it could be construed as a quasi-
incest attempt; 3. The accused was the step-father of the underage victim who reported as an adult; 4. 
Offered but refused; 5. The victim in this case contacted CASA herself. 
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Appendix 15: Data collection relating to the Victoria Police 
SOCIT/VARE sexual assault training course (strand three) 
 
This appendix is divided into four sections: online questionnaire; SOCIT course 
trainee feedback sheets; non-participant observation; and in-depth interview of 
SOCIT training team members. (NOTE: Not all of the data collected were analysed 
and incorporated into the body of the report due to aspects relating to child sex 
offending being outside the PJO project scope and to the data mine being largely for 




Victoria Police 4 Week Sexual Offence Investigation Course Survey 
 
Q1 Do you give your consent to completing the following questionnaire about the 
Victoria Police 4 Week Sexual Office Investigation Course? 
no 1 (If this option is selected no values will be stored in database as user will not be 
allowed to complete survey) 
yes 2 
 




Q3 Which category below includes your age? 
18‐24 1  
25‐29 2  
30‐39 3  
40‐49 4  
50‐59 5  
60 or more 6 
Other (please specify) 7 
 
Q4 What is your rank? 
Senior Constable / Detective Senior Constable or below 1 
Sergeant / Detective Sergeant or above 2 
 









Other (please specify) 5 




Q7 How long have your been a member of Victoria Police? 
 
Q8 Briefly describe your experience in the policing of adult sexual offences, and/or 
years working in this field. 
 
Q9 Which month and/or year did you attend the 4 week sexual offence investigation 
course? 
 






Q11 Did the course instructor clearly explain the objectives of the 4 week sexual 











QUESTIONS 13 to 15 ALLOWED SPACE FOR COMMENTS AND INCLUDED 
THE FOLLOWING RATING SCALE 
 






Q13 From a design perspective, how do you rate the following aspects of the 4 week 




Curriculum content and resources 
 
Linkage(s) between the program and other programs (e.g.,: DTS) 
 
Course relevance to work role 
 
Teaching and learning methods used 
 
Assessment methods used (quiz's and simulated VARE interviews) 




Use of Feedback Sheets for program evaluation 
 
Expertise/experience/qualifications of teachers 
 
Location of physical facilities and resources 
 
Access to administrative and educational support 
 
Duration of the course 
 
Q14 How did you find the quality of teaching for the following aspects of the 4 week 
sexual offence investigation course? 
 
Theory about adult victims of sexual offences 
 
Techniques for interviewing victims of sexual offences 
 
Techniques for interviewing peoples with intellectual disabilities 
 
Theory about suspected sex offenders 
 
Techniques for interviews with suspected sex offenders 
 
Q15 From your experience, how did you generally find the following aspects of the 4 
week sexual offence investigation course? 
 
Quality of Course Materials 
 
Quality of teaching of theory in Victims/Survivors of Sexual Offences: 
 
Quality of External Presenters 
 
Access to Teachers 
 
Access to Resources e.g., Accommodation, Meals 
 
Access to Educational Resources (e.g., library services) 
 




Relevance to Work Role 
 
Please add any other feedback about your experience as a student on the course: 
 
QUESTIONS 15 to 19 ALLOWED SPACE FOR COMMENTS AND INCLUDED 
THE FOLLOWING RATING SCALE 
 




inadequate ‐ needs improvement 2  
neutral ‐ no comment 3  
can't remember 4 
good ‐ relevant and informative 5  
excellent ‐ useful and highly relevant 6  
 
Q16 Week 1 of the SOCIT course 
 




Introduction to Victimology 
 
Grooming ‐ 'The W hole Story'  
 
Victims ‐ Chi ld Development  
 
Memory ‐ Impact of Trauma  
 
Interviewing Theory (victim/witness) 
 
VATE Procedural Guidelines 
 
Q 17 Week 2 of the SOCIT course 
 
Centre Against Sexual Assault (CASA) ‐ guest speaker  
 
Victim/Survivor ‐ guest speaker  
 
Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer ‐ guest speaker  
 
Cultural Diversity/Multicultural Liaison Officer ‐ guest speaker  
 
Family Violence Safety Notices 
 




Q18 Week 3 of the SOCIT course 
 




Interviewing Theory Part 2 ‐ (interviewing chi ldren and other vul nerable witnesses)  
 
Legislation ‐ a hi story of relevant and recent cha nges to sexual assault legislation 




Pretext ‐ information and instruction  
 
Drug & Alcohol Facilitated Sexual Assault 
 
Sex Offender Register, Intel, Proactive Legislation, Risk Assessment Tool 
 
Q19 Week 4 of the SOCIT course 
 
Suspect Interviewing Theory 
 
Suspect Rapport Building & Planning 
 
OPP ‐ guest presenter  
 
Specialist Sex Offences Unit ‐ guest presenter  
 
County Court ‐ site visit  
 
Child Witness Services ‐ site visit  
 
Look after yourself ‐ support for sexual offence investigators  
 
Surviving Sexual Assault ‐ guest presenter  
 




















Q23 Overall, how satisfied were you with this course for preparing you as an 
investigator of sexual offences? 
 
Not satisfied at all 1 
Poor, needs improvement 2 




Good, satisfied 4 
Extremely Satisfied 5 
 
Q24 Can you give any examples where you have utilised theory or skills from the 
course in action? 
 
Q25 Now that you have returned to your workplace, can you identify any topics that 
are relevant to the investigation of adult sexual offences, but not included in the 
course? If so, what are they? 
 













Q28 If yes, how often should sexual offence investigators receive "Refresher 
Training"? 
 
Q29 As a result of the 4 week Sexual Offence Investigation Course, have you 
experienced any of the following...? ALLOWED SPACE FOR COMMENTS AND 
INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING RATING SCALE 
 
not at all 1  
not much 2 
neutral 3 
a little 4 
very much 5 
 
Improvement in Investigative Skills, Tools and Techniques 
 
Changes in your ideas and attitudes towards survivors of sexual violence 
 
Networking and opportunities to meet other sexual offence investigators 
 
Increased confidence dealing with suspected sex offenders 
 
Increased confidence interviewing vulnerable victims/witnesses 
 
Improvement in your role as a Sexual Offence Investigator 
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Q30 In your experience, and from what you have learned from colleagues, what 
percentage of reports of sexual assault made to police do you believe are false? 
 
Q31 Do you have any further thoughts, suggestions, comments or questions? 
 
SOCIT course trainee final feedback forms 
 
SOCIT trainees were asked for written responses to the following questions: 
  
• What is your opinion of the standard of the sessions delivered by external 
presenters (expertise, presentation style, content)? 
• How did you find the Vitoria Police instructors/course staff?  
• What do you consider to be the strengths of the course? 
• What do you consider to be the weaknesses of the course? 
• How do you think the course could be improved? 
• Any further general comments on the course? 
 
Non-participant observation of course delivery 
 
A PJO researcher attended as a non-participant observer of the SOCIT course held 
from 19th July until 18th August 2010. Three sessions were off-site, with one day in 
the city to visit courts and related services in Melbourne, another session at 
Dandenong Police Complex. The Dandenong site was used because Academy 
facilities were fully booked by other training programs on the day. Other off-site 
sessions were related to child sex offences, which were not observed as research was 
focused on adult sexual assault. There was no preconceived instrument for data 
collection. 
 
In the opening session of the course, trainees were asked  “What do I want from this 
course?”.  Student responses were recorded by the PJO researcher. 
 
In-depth interview of SOCIT training team members 
 
Interview Schedule for Focus Group with 
Course Designers / Teachers 
(Victoria Police SOCIT Course) 
Project conducted by Edith Cowan University and funded by Australian 
Research Council Large Linkage Grant, in partnership with Victoria Police 
 
Introductory comments:  
Thanks to everyone for attending today. Introduce yourself. 
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Explain briefly the ARC project and VicPol’s SOCIT Training involvement in strand 
3 
Explain confidentiality and the need to sign a consent form  
Explain that the interview will be taped and information will be de-identified and no 
police or region identified and no VicPol personnel will have access to session audio. 
Introductions all around 
15  questions, 1 ½ hours, will need to move fairly quickly, and at the end there will be 
time for any additional thoughts that are important to note for the research. 
Ensure the focus is on SOCIT Training with regards to Adult sexual assault not other 
crimes (remind them every so often) 
 
In your opinion and from your experience (say this at regular intervals)  
Key Question 1: 
 
 
Do you think VicPol need the SOCIT training course?  Tell me about why / why not? 









Key Question 2: 
 
 





Key Question 3: 
 
 
What are the intended learning outcomes of the program ?  (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts 
Any qualifications? (VARE)   
Any other expertise? 
 
Key Question 4: 
 
 
Tell me about the course enrolment procedures?  (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts 






Tests, interviews, pre-requisite qualifications? 
 
Key Question 5: 
 
 
Tell me how the SOCIT course team was established and how resources are allocated 




What input did you have? 
Was an operating budget provided? 
expertise/experience/qualifications requirements of teachers 
 
Key Question 6: 
 
 
What was the driver(s) for curriculum content topics (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts 
Direction from “above” 




Key Question 7: 
 
 
What proportion of the training is relevant specifically to adult sexual assault 
compared to that specifically focussing on child sexual abuse? How is this decided? 
(Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts 
Use course syllabus as reminder 
 
Key Question 8: 
 
 
Are there any linkage(s) between the SOCIT program and other VicPol programs? 
(Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts 
Can same training be used elsewhere? 
Aspects of ?  
Probationary Constables 
Or other programs e.g.; courts, casa, health, parole 




Key Question 9: 
 
 
Tell me about the types of teaching and learning  techniques used, How and Why are 







Mock interviews  
 
Key Question 10: 
 
 









Key Question 11: 
 
 








Key Question 12: 
 
 
What can you tell me about costs of delivering the program, as well as the per capita 
cost per successfully completing student/participant, and which agencies bear which 
parts of these costs? (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts 




teacher salaries  




associated costs (e.g., travel allowance) 
 
Key Question 13: 
 
 
Tell me about sites, resources and equipment actually deployed and used.  Have these 
been adequate?  (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Key Question 14: 
 
 
How are student enrolments handled, is there enough administration support or time?  
(Allow 2 minutes) 
 
 
Key Question 15: 
 
 
With a team of 3 teachers, and up to 18 visiting speakers, how do you manage?  
(Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts  
Do you have any back up staff? 
Staff succession plans? 
Managing staff leave 
Written policy or documents on training 
 
Key Question 16: 
 
 
What are the staff / student ratios?  Are these appropriate ? (Allow 2 minutes) 
 
Key Question 17: 
 
 
Are there any processes for distribution of learning materials? (Allow 3 minutes) 
 
Prompts  
Is there a “set” of notes or learning materials ?  
How has this evolved? 
Tell me about how and when materials are distributed? 
 
Key Question 18: 
 








How are they used? 
Are they adequate? 
What would you like to see? 
 
Key Question 19: 
 
 
What is the student progression/course completion (attrition) rate  (Allow 2 minutes) 
 
Prompts  
Drop out rate? 
 
Key Question 20: 
 
 
How have costs of delivery impacted the design and implementation of the course.  
(Allow 2 minutes) 
 
Key Question 21: 
 
 
Discussion on syllabus; What are the key elements of the syllabus? Why is this so? 







Key Question 22: 
 
 
How has the syllabus evolved over time? What does your idea of the perfect syllabus 
look like? (Allow 5 minutes) 
 
Prompts  
More / less topics  
Which topics 
 
Key Question 23: 
 








Language / dress/ demeanour 
 
Key Question 24: 
 
 
Tell me about the assessment practices.  What types of learning outcomes do you 
measure? (Allow 3 minutes) 
 
Prompts  
Tests - Pass/fail 
Formal/informal 
Qualifications – VARE 
 
Key Question 25: 
 
 
Tell me about the assessment practices.  What types of learning outcomes do you 





Work performance improvement 
 
Key Question 26: 
 
 
Do you have any further thoughts, suggestions, comments or questions? (Allow 5 
minutes) 
 
Thank you for participating in this focus group, your opinions and experiences are 
highly valued and help improve our understanding of the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the SOCIT course. 
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Appendix 16:  Police SOCIT/VARE sexual assault training course 
outline (strand three) 
 
In respect to SOCIT/VARE course content, the following is an outline of the training 
sessions (NOTE that this is the July/August 2010 course, and the course has been 
modified over the years, being a three week course in April/May 2009 and extended 
to four weeks from the November 2009 course): 
 
WEEK ONE  
• Course opening – 1 hour & 20 minutes 
• SOCIT Philosophy & Background – 40 minutes 
• SOCIT Transition – 40 minutes 
• Introduction to Victimology – 3 hours 
• Introduction to offenders/offending – 3 hours & 20 minutes 
• Grooming - 'The Whole Story' – 3 hours 
• Victims - Child Development – 4 hours & 20 minutes 
• Memory - Impact of Trauma – 2 hours 
• Interviewing Theory (victim/witness) – 5 ½ hours 
• Code and Tally Pre-course interview – 1 hours & 40 minutes 
• Briefing – 40 minutes 
• School visit – 1 hour & 10 minutes 
• VATE Procedural Guidelines – 3 hours & 10 minutes 
 
WEEK TWO 
• Briefing – (40 minutes)x2 
• Assessment, VATE interviews – (5 ½ hours)x2 
• Developmental review – 40 minutes 
• Centre Against Sexual Assault (CASA) - guest speaker – 40 minutes 
• Victim/Survivor - guest speaker - 40 minutes 
• Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer - guest speaker - 40 minutes 
• DHS Joint Investigation – Child First – 2 hours & 50 minutes 
• Family Violence & Child Abuse - 2 hours & 40 minutes 
• DHS/VicPol practical study - 2 hours & 50 minutes 
• Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine – 1 hour & 20 minutes 
• Court transcript – 40 minutes 
• VFPMS – 1 hour & 20 minutes 
• Cultural Diversity/Multicultural Liaison Officer - guest speaker – 1 hour & 20 
minutes 
• Code & Tally – 1 hour & 20 minutes 
• Family Violence Safety Notices – not listed 
• SOCIT/DHS Collaboration – (2 hours & 40 minutes)x2 
 
WEEK THREE 
• Intellectual Disability and Communication Failure – 3 hours & 20 minutes  
• Mental Health – 3 hours 
• C I Briefing – 40 minutes 
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• Assessment VATE Interviews – Cognitive – 3 hours & 40 minutes 
• Developmental Review – 1 hour & 40 minutes 
• SUDI Morning – 3 hours & 10 minutes    
• Interviewing Theory Part 2 - (interviewing children and other vulnerable 
witnesses) – 3 hours 
• Briefing – 40 minutes 
• Legislation - a history of relevant and recent changes to sexual assault 
legislation – includes reference to the Investigative Guidelines - 1 hour & 20 
minutes 
• Pretext - information and instruction – 40 minutes 
• Drug & Alcohol Facilitated Sexual Assault – 1 hour & 20 minutes 
• ICET – 40 minutes 
• Child Pornography / E Crime – 1 hour & 40 minutes      
• Sex Offender Register, Intel, Proactive Legislation, Risk Assessment Tool – 6 
hours & 20 minutes 
 
WEEK FOUR 
• Check Transcript/ Code & Tally – 40 minutes 
• Suspect Interviewing Theory – 5 ½ hours 
• Suspect Rapport Building & Planning – 5 hours & 20 minutes 
• Debrief – 40 minutes 
• Suspect Interview Practice – 6 hours & 20 minutes 
• OPP - Specialist Sex Offences Unit - guest presenter - 6 hours & 20 minutes 
• County Court - site visit - not listed 
• Child Witness Services - site visit - not listed 
• Look after yourself - support for sexual offence investigators – 1 hour & 20 
minutes 
• Final Exam / Course Debrief – 1 hour & 20 minutes 
• Surviving Sexual Assault - guest presenter – 2 hours & 40 minutes 
• Course closure – 1 hour & 40 minutes 
Policing Just Outcomes: Improving the Police Response to Adults Reporting Sexual Assault Final Report.   
 
 409 
Appendix 17: Ethics- plain language explanation statement and 
consent form (all strands)  
 
The following are examples of the plain language statements and consent forms used 
in all PJO research strands and studies. The wording of each statement varied slightly 
to reflect the specifics of the particular study for which it was relevant. 
 
Plain Language Statement for Individual Interviews 
 
Project conducted by Edith Cowan University and funded by 
Australian Research Council Large Linkage Grant 
 
Project Title: Policing Just Outcomes Project: 




Project Director and Chief Investigator: Professor Caroline Taylor 
Researcher: Dr Shane Muldoon 
Researcher: Ms Caroline Norma 
 
 
Explanation of Project: 
 
This Edith Cowan University project, in which you have been invited to participate, is 
funded by the Australia Research Council. Victoria Police is the Industry Partner for 
this five year project.  The aim of the research is to better understand the factors and 
dilemmas encountered by victim/survivors when making decisions about whether to 
report rape and sexual assault to police.  The research material will be used to inform 
the development of an evidence-based policy, practice and advocacy model for 
Victoria Police.   
 
• Your Involvement: Participation in this project is voluntary.  If you choose to be 
a participant in the project you will be involved in an interview.  The interview 
will be conducted by the researcher and audio recorded for later transcription.  
You will be asked to indicate your age within a six year range on a data 
collection form.  
 
• Time: the duration of the interview will be approximately 50 minutes. 
 
• Privacy: All information contained in the transcript and survey tool will be de-
identified before use in any report or published document.  Participant personal 
details will only be accessible by the researcher.  No identifying information 
about participants will be used in any material arising from the project.  Audio 
tapes will be destroyed when transcription is complete, in accordance with Edith 
Cowan University policy and procedures.  
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• Benefits: Your participation in this research will provide valuable information to 
help Victoria Police improve their policy, practice and training in responding to 
reports of rape and sexual assault.  In addition, the focus group discussions will 
provide a forum for police to share their work experiences of decision-making 
about sexual assault cases.  Your experiences and views will help researchers and 
Victoria Police to generate greater understanding about this topic area. 
 
• Withdrawing from the research: You are free to withdraw from the research at 
any point up until the data is aggregated.  Should you decide to withdraw your 
contribution all information provided by you will be destroyed immediately in 
accordance with Edith Cowan University ethics requirements and reference to 
your material in any report/s removed.   
 
• This project has been approved by Edith Cowan University Human Research 
Ethics Committee 
 
Further Information: If you have any questions, or you would like further 
information regarding the project titled: ‘Adult Sexual Assault, Decision-Making 
Processes about Reporting: An Evidence-Based Policy, Practice and Advocacy Model 
for Victoria Police’ please contact the Project Manager, Mr Gary Cozens on 0427 985 
211. 
 
Should you (i.e. the participant) have any concerns about the ethical conduct of this 
research, please contact the Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, 
Office of Research and Innovation, Edith Cowan University 08 6304 2170 or email 
research.ethics@ecu.edu.au  
 
CRICOS Provider Number 00103D 
 
Project conducted by Edith Cowan University and Victoria Police in collaboration with 
the University of Tasmania. The project is funded by Australian Research Council Large 
Linkage Grant. 
 





This is the consent form given to and duly signed by all participants in the PJO 







Consent (fill out below) 
I, . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.   
. . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
hereby consent to being interviewed in the above research study.  
 
The research program in which I am being asked to participate has been explained fully to 
me verbally and in writing, and any matters on which I have sought information have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that: all information I provide will be treated with the strictest confidence 
and data will be stored separately from any listing that includes my name and address. 
 my participation will be audio-taped  
 aggregated results will be used for research purposes and may be reported in scientific 
and academic journals 
 I am free to withdraw my consent at any time during the study in which event my 
participation in the research study will immediately cease.  
 In the case of my withdrawal I understand any information I have given will not be able to 
be taken out due to all the participants not being identified during the interviews. 
 
 
SIGNATURE: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  DATE: . . . . . . …….. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
